

THE TUTORIAL HISTORY OF GREECE

*FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE DEATH
OF DEMOSTHENES*

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PREFACE.

THIS short history is intended for readers who require in a single volume an account of the period down to the death of Demosthenes, and is primarily intended for those who have not the opportunity of attending lectures or of receiving other oral teaching. With their requirements in view, I have not hesitated to keep silence as to many things, nor, on the other hand, have I recoiled from decisiveness of statement in many cases where reserve or indecision would have defeated their own end. The achievements of the Greeks in the regions of philosophy, literature, and art are of too great importance to be dealt with in a book such as this.

Although much of the present work was written long before Professor Bury's *History of Greece* appeared, advantage has been taken of his wide knowledge and mature judgment to correct defects and errors throughout the book. Especially in the treatment of the prehistoric period and of certain historic episodes (such as Alexander's battle on the Hydaspes) Professor Bury's views have been adopted as the latest and most harmonious attainable. Touching the history of Macedon, much has been derived from Mr. Hogarth's brilliant sketch, *Philip and Alexander of Macedon*, and his views on the Macedonian army and the chronology of Alexander's campaigns have been adopted. On the period intervening between the end of the Peloponnesian war and the rise of Macedon, Mr. Underhill's *Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon* has been largely used. Mention should also be made of Abbott's *History of Greece* and Holm's *History of Greece*, as well as Greenidge's *Handbook of Greek Constitutional History*. The plan of the battle of Plataea is taken, by kind permission of the Council of the Society for the promotion of Hellenic Studies, from my article contributed to the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. xviii.

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THE TUTORIAL HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

THE COUNTRY OF THE HELLENES.

§ 1. Extent of Hellas in the Wider and Narrower Sense.—§ 2. The Development of Greece Proper Determined by the Sea and the Mountains.—§ 3. Influence of the Geography of Greece on its Politics; Separatist Tendency.—§ 4. Importance to Greece of the Aegean Islands and Asia Minor.—§ 5. Contrast between Greece and Italy.

§ 1. HELLAS, the land of the Hellenes, was of far wider extent than the modern kingdom of Greece: only on the north and on the south does the modern kingdom even approach the bounds of the ancient Greek world. Those bounds were, indeed, never precisely fixed, for the reason that the Greeks never formed a single united power like Persia, Egypt, or Rome. Hellas was the stage upon which the Hellenes played their part, and any land in which they were found predominating was entitled to the name: the unity of Hellas lay primarily not in geography, but in ethnology. The dwellers on the northern shore of the Black Sea who had mingled with and intermarried with the Scythians of the Russian steppes; the colonists of southern Italy, of Sicily, of Massalia, the last outpost of Greek civilisation on the west;

Extent of Hellas.

the dwellers in Cyrene and other towns of northern Africa ; the semi-oriental inhabitants of Cyprus and of the multitude of cities fringing the coast of Asia Minor—these were all members of the Greek name, and the totality of their widely scattered abodes constituted Hellas in its widest sense. Common language, common religion, common manners and customs, though in all these domains there were divergences and differences, made the Greeks one nation ; and the general impression of essential unity found voice in the legend which derived all Greeks from a common ancestor, Hellen, through his sons Dorus and Aeolus, and his grandsons Ion and Achaeus, as well as in the distinction which was drawn between Greek and non-Greek peoples, the latter being summed up in one word as “barbarians” (*βάρβαροι*). Geographically, the bond of union between the different parts of the Greek world was the sea : for the sea alone provided a way of intercourse between Greece proper, the islands of the Mediterranean, the Asiatic coast, and the Hellenic fringe on the more distant continental shores.

True as this is of Hellas in this widest sense, it is still ^{Hellas in the} more strikingly true of Hellas used in that ^{Narrower Sense.} more restricted sense in which, in a book so small as this, the word must in general be used—namely, as including Greece proper, the Aegean islands, and the coast of western Asia Minor. Yet not the whole even of the area thus indicated is rightly embraced under the term “Hellas.” In the north-west the boundary line runs obliquely across Greece proper from the base of the Chalcidic peninsula through Mount Olympus to the mouth of the Corinthian gulf. The districts to the west of this line had but a slender hold upon Greek culture, and were denied the title “Greek,” although the starting-point and home of the

Greeks when they first emerge from the darkness of the past lies in this region. Macedonia, in spite of the claim of her kings to Hellenic descent (a claim recognised by the Greeks, since the Macedonians were allowed to compete at the Olympic games), was outside the circle of Greek states; Epirus and Thessaly also were not included in the true Hellas; and it was only after the Macedonian conquest of Greece that Aetolia played any part in Greek history.

§ 2. Looking at Hellas in this narrower sense, the most striking feature, and that most easily read on the map, is the development of the coast-line, or, in other words, the extent to which the land-masses are penetrated by the sea. When we reflect how little we hear in Greek history of the long harbourless coast of Thessaly, or of the rock-bound eastern side of Euboea, or of the inhospitable eastern littoral of Laconia, we can divine the effect that would have been produced had Greece been everywhere of this stamp. A similar general contrast is observable between the eastern and western sides of the peninsula. The determining element in Greek geography and politics is the sea. As Greece stretches southwards she becomes more maritime, and more really Greek. The great inland plains of Macedonia did not become Greek until after the decay of the autonomous Greek city-state. The three-tongued projection of Chalcidice which hangs like an excrescence to Macedonia is Hellenic in its maritime character, and shares from an early period in the history of the more southern portion of the peninsula. Thessaly, with its almost harbourless coast, was only half-Greek. In the Peloponnese—the “isle of Pelops” (now really answering to its name since the isthmus of Corinth has been pierced)—the maritime character of the whole reaches its culmination, and the

The Development of Greece
Proper Determined by the Sea—

Peloponnese was both geographically and ethnologically the “citadel of Greece,” containing the most truly Hellenic of all her peoples.

In a land so pierced and indented with deep gulfs and bays, the attention of the people must from the first have been directed to the sea. It is significant of the attitude of the Greeks towards the sea, and of the share which the sea had in moulding their history, that their earliest poetry speaks of it as the highway of nations—the “watery ways” (*ὑγρὰ κέλευθα*)—a point of view the exact opposite of that which suggested the Horatian epithet of “estranging” (*dissociabilis*). The mere presence of the sea was, however, but a single factor of the result. Account must be taken of the character of the land itself. Greece is pre-eminently

—and by the Mountains. a land of mountains: while no point within it is more than forty miles from the sea, none is more than ten miles from mountains. The mountains, again, rising not at random or as isolated masses, but as members of a clearly articulated system, make communication between northern and southern Greece, or between the east and west sides of the peninsula, very difficult. The ancient Greeks made little or no attempt to combat these difficulties, and their reality may be gauged from the fact that the modern inhabitants of the country have not yet connected the Attic railway system with that of Thessaly, or that of Aetolia with either, and that it is only now, after years of labour, that the Peloponnese is crossed by a line running from Corinth over the Arcadian plateau to the southern shore of Messenia. In ancient times, as in modern, it was by the sea routes that communication was easiest and most rapid.

The combined influence of mountains and sea had a great effect upon the character and political development of the

Greeks. With these two physical features we identify two opposite types of character—the conservative, imbued with intense love of home; on the other hand, the enterprising, ever ready for something new, and receptive of foreign influences. It is the characteristic of the Greek land to present these two contrasted features in closest juxtaposition; and of Greek history to show in the Dorian and Ionian races these diverse influences expressing themselves in sharpest contrast.

§ 3. The nature of the land exercised the strongest possible influence upon the political development of the people. The country is an agglomeration of narrow valleys or enclosed basins opening, if at all, upon the sea. The barriers to intercourse by land compelled nearly every town to be a political unity, more or less self-sufficing. There is nothing to unite the different territories, apart from the means of transit afforded by the sea. No particular region is marked out by nature as dominant. It is a land of small city-states, each of which, obeying the impulses fostered by nature, jealously guarded its independence. It is to geography, therefore, taken in conjunction with the spirit of the people—an ultimate factor which defies analysis—that we must trace what has been called the parochial character of Greek politics—the source at once of the strength and of the weakness of the national life: of strength in so far as this separateness of life meant a healthy spirit of independence and consciousness of the true meaning of civic life; of weakness in so far as it fostered jealousy, selfishness, and disunion. The separatist tendencies in the end proved victorious. Greece was never unified in the way in which the Italian states were compelled to acknowledge the sovereignty of one of their number.

Influence
of
the Geography
of Greece on
its Politics.

Separatist
Tendency of
the Greeks.

Partly, no doubt, this difference must be traced to the fact that within the bounds of the Greek world there were no racially different elements of any political importance. The course of Greek history, summed up shortly, is the story of the conflict between the separatist tendency and the struggle to unify, upon which in turn Athens, Sparta, and Thebes embarked, only to fail. The maritime empire of Athens is the only example of successful union on a great scale, within the period of Greek history here treated.

§ 4. It was of the highest importance for Greece that her broken eastern coast does not, like the western coast of Ireland, front a vast expanse of bare ocean. The islands which stud the Aegean are the natural complement of the capes and peninsulas of the mainland. Moreover, it had a deep significance for Greek history that on the opposite side of the Aegean was a land which was in touch with im-memorial civilisations, presenting at the same time the physical features with which the Greeks were familiar—the same narrow valleys separated by mountain ridges permitting lateral communication with difficulty, the same land-locked bays formed by the prolongations of the ridges, which are further continued seawards in chains of islands. The effect of these conditions may be estimated by comparing the development of the eastern coast of Greece with that of the western coast. Although the western side is less richly furnished with islands and bays than is the eastern, yet from the mouth of the Corinthian gulf northwards to Corcyra (Corfu) the same general features occur; but here they faced the great expanse of the Ionian sea backed by the uncivilised lands of Sicily and southern Italy, to which it was the destined mission of the Greeks to go as teachers, not as learners. Similarly, compare the

Importance to
Greece of the
Aegean Islands
and Asia Minor.

western coast of Scotland, with its rich development of waterways and its complement of islands—leading nowhither. The islands of the Aegean served as a bridge across the sea, and nature thus directed the expansive energy of the Greeks eastwards. South-eastwards down the Aegean runs a double chain of islands, the outstanding peaks of the submerged mountain ranges of eastern Thessaly and Euboea (Andros, Tenos, Myconos, Naxos, and Amorgos), and of Attica (Ceos, Cythnos, Seriphos, and Siphnos) : between the two chains as connecting links lie Gyaros, Syros, Paros, and Ios. These constitute the group called by the Greeks the Cyclades (*Κυκλαδες*), as they imagined them disposed in a circle round the sacred islet of Delos. Intersecting these and connected with these are other island chains, less complete and continuous, indeed—hence their name of Sporades (*Σποράδες*), “the scattered isles”—the prolongation of the mountain ranges and promontories of Asia Minor.

The Aegean is enclosed on north and south by similar chains—on the south by the fine semicircle of Cythera, Crete, Casos, Carpathos, and Rhodes, stretching from the south-eastern corner of the Peloponnese to the south-western angle of Asia Minor ; in the north, severing the Thracian sea from the Aegean, the chain of Scyros, Lemnos, and Imbros leads to the Thracian Chersonese and the important waterway of the Hellespont, Propontis, and Bosporus, where a new world opened before the mariners who first burst into the great inland sea called by them the Pontus Euxinus, (the Hospitable sea). Under the lee of these islands so admirably disposed, the Greek sailors, never out of sight of land, ran across with safety from continent to continent. The Aegean was a Greek lake, the real centre of the Hellenic world ; and from the eighth to the fifth century B.C. we must look for the real life of Greece,

both intellectual and commercial, to the Asiatic side of the Aegean.

§ 5. The contrast between Greece and Italy is instructive.

In both there is a northern plain of great extent, Thessaly answering to the plain of Lombardy; both are cut off from the western sea by mountains—the masses of Epirus in the one case, the rugged country of the Ligurians in the other. The Apennines, the spine of Italy, correspond to the central ridge of Pindus in Greece; both springing from a transverse range—the Alps, and the Cambunian range running eastwards to Mount Olympus. From the Apennines, as from the Pindus, numerous lateral spurs run off, forming inland valleys, or surrounding extensive plains that open seawards; only in Greece these lateral chains are longer and more distinctly marked. Finally, just as the Peloponnese is the complement of northern and central Greece, so is Sicily the natural complement of Italy. With these striking resemblances are combined great differences which profoundly affected the history of the two peninsulas. The uniform and but slightly broken coast-line of Italy stands in strongest contrast with the diversity of configuration in Greece; the cantons of Greece, owing to the sharper development of the lateral ridges, are more decisively marked than in Italy; the fact that Sicily is, and the Peloponnese is not, completely severed from the mainland was fraught with grave consequences for the history of the two countries; and, lastly, the paucity of islands contiguous to the coast, or of any older seat of civilisation within easy reach, confined the Italians to their own peninsula, while the more fertile soil encouraged their development as in the main an agricultural, not seafaring people. The history of the two peninsulas was also materially affected by the fact

Contrast
between Greece and Italy.

that they stand, as it were, averted from each other. The principal outlets and the islands of Greece are on her eastern side, while those of Italy are on the west—the harbours and islands fringing the rich plains of Etruria, Latium, and Campania, marked out by nature as the seat of her most developed civilisation. “The historical vocation of the two nations was prefigured in the relations of the ground which they occupied; the two great stocks, on which the civilisation of the ancient world grew, threw their shadow as well as their seed, the one towards the east, the other towards the west.”*

* Mommsen, *Roman History*, i. 6.

CHAPTER II.

PREHISTORIC GREECE.

§§ 6-7. Evidence about the pre-Greek Inhabitants of Greece supplied by Geology, by Ethnology, and by Archaeology.—
§ 8. Prehistoric Remains found on the Hill of Hissarlik; the Lowest, Second, and Sixth Cities of Troy.—§§ 9-10. Remains found in Argolis, Tiryns, Mycenae; Vaulted Tombs at Mycenae, Vaphio, etc.—§ 11. Discoveries in Crete; Cretan Systems of Writing.—§ 12. Origin of Aegean Art; Intercourse with Egypt.

§ 6. ACCORDING to their own traditions, the Greeks were not the earliest inhabitants of the peninsula which ^{Pre-Greek} _{Inhabitants of} was their home in historical times. A long _{Greece.} list of its pre-Greek “barbarian” inhabitants is found in ancient authors. The most important name, and the one most widely extended, is that of the Pelasgians. Much is heard also of Leleges and Carians. The accounts given by the Greeks themselves of these peoples are full of discrepancies, and much labour has been expended in the effort to reconcile their conflicting statements, and to extract history from them. Between the attitude of the Greeks, who believed implicitly in the legends as sober history, and that of a thorough-going scepticism which in the end defeats itself, many varieties of view as to the value of the legends are possible. The tendency of modern research is in the direction of showing that the Greek traditions rest on a basis of solid fact, and are not lightly to be set aside. Nevertheless, it is not to them that we must look for information as to the beginnings of civilisation in Greek

lands, but to the evidence presented by the monuments which have been revealed by excavation. It can no longer be said with truth that "the evidence of monuments is of small service to the historian," or that the excavations on the primitive sites in the Greek world "tell us nothing of the time at which the cities were built, or of the men who built them." The discoveries of the last quarter of a century now admit of correlation to a certain extent, and it is the object of this chapter to give in outline the substances of the results to which they lead.

§ 7. The Mediterranean basin is made up of three distinct basins formed by the sinking which submerged the land barriers uniting North Africa with Europe. The remains of these land bridges are seen (1) in the near approach of the two continents at the straits of Gibraltar; (2) the great projection of North Africa, the island of Sicily, and the "toe" of Italy; (3) the projection of the Cyrenaica, the islands of Crete and Cythera, and the promontory of Malea: this is what the geologist tells us. The ethnologist tells us that the earliest recognisable inhabitants of this area constitute a single closely connected group of races, a dark-haired stock to which the predominant element in the population of Spain—namely, the type called Iberian—the Ligurians of Sicily and Italy, and the Berbers of North Africa as well as the primaeval race in the Aegean lands, all belonged. The original home of this people is probably to be looked for in the formerly fertile interior of North Africa, perhaps in or near the valley of the Upper Nile. The archaeologist confirms this by pointing to the extension over this same area of the custom of burial in sepulchral chambers, either hewn in the rock or constructed on or near the surface and covered with a tumulus of earth

Evidence of
Geology—

—of Ethnology—

—of Archaeology.

or stones. The "Mediterranean race" seems to have been already composite, as far back as it can be traced, and such was probably the case with that section of it which inhabited the Aegean area—a section to which no national name can be given other than the vague title of "Aegean" peoples.

§ 8. Remains belonging to this prehistoric civilisation in various stages of development have been found in all parts of the Greek world, but chiefly in Argolis and the neighbouring region, and the islands of the southern Aegean. In Asia Minor, such remains are confined, as yet, practically to a single site—that of Troy.

The district round Troy (the Troad) was occupied by the Dardans, who had crossed over by way of the Hissarlik. Hellespont from the Balkans. Troy itself was built on the hill of *Hissarlik** in a valley down which the Scamander flows. It stands about three miles south of the Hellespont. Here the ruins of no fewer than six cities are found superimposed one upon another. The lowest city belongs to the Neolithic period—*i.e.*, the implements are of stone; metal is just beginning to be worked, as is shown by the few simple copper weapons; the pottery is a local fabric made by hand, with incised lines,

The Second points, and spirals. The second city, often called City. the Burnt City, from the fact that it came to a sudden end by fire, shows a decided advance. It is girt with a wall of sun-dried bricks, resting on stone foundations. The centre of the fortress is occupied by the palace of the chief, showing the essential features described in the Homeric poems—a covered gateway opening into a courtyard with an altar in the centre, from which we pass through a portico into a great hall with its central hearth. Stone implements are in common use, but copper and

* *Hissarlik* = "fortress."

bronze of simple types begin to prevail. The third and fourth cities were mere villages. The fifth city was much larger, and was surrounded by a wall. About 1500 B.C. arose the Sixth City, the Ilium of Homer's *Iliad*. This was not so much a town, as a fortress and palace. It was enclosed by a wall, strengthened by towers and defended by four gates. The wealth of the kings was proverbial : it seems to have been derived partly from commerce with Egypt, the Danube valley, and the Baltic, partly from control of the streams of traffic converging on the Hellespont, partly again from the tribute of the peoples to the south of the Troad. The Trojans, a warlike people, would also receive large payment for their services as allies.

§ 9. Still more imposing and rich are the remains found in Argolis, at Mycenae and Tiryns. The hill ^{In Argolis,} _{Tiryns.} of Tiryns, an isolated long rock rising to less than ninety feet above sea-level, about a mile from the head of the Argolic gulf, forms three distinct platforms ; it was already occupied in the Stone Age, to which the first and second cities on the Trojan hill belong. Later the entire hill was surrounded with a wall of "Cyclopean" masonry—*i.e.*, of huge limestone masses, only slightly dressed, laid in approximately horizontal courses, with a mortar of clay. The Greek legend was that this style of masonry was the handiwork of the Cyclopes invited from Lycia by King Proetus. The Homeric epithet for Tiryns, the "walled city," shows that even in that age its fortifications were regarded as something wonderful. Varying in thickness from sixteen to fifty-seven feet, the wall is not solid throughout, but at certain points contains within it long galleries with doorways leading into separate chambers, all in the thickness of the wall. These chambers probably served as store-rooms. Both the chambers and the corridors

are roofed with a vaulted ceiling formed by the gradual convergence of the courses of the walls, in the method employed in constructing the vaulted tombs of Mycenae.*

Within the walls, upon the highest part of the hill, a labyrinth of passages and a number of chambers have been laid bare—a great hall, with ante-chamber and vestibule, approached from a colonnaded court, to which a propylaeum or double portico gave access, after the type already described at Troy. The large hall is supposed to have belonged to the men; a smaller, similar hall, with court and vestibule, parallel to and alongside the large hall, being perhaps the women's apartment. Near the men's hall is the bathroom, the floor of which is composed of a solid block of limestone estimated to weigh about twenty tons. The walls were decorated with frescoes—*i.e.*, paintings made on the plaster while it was still wet. It is clear that this great palace came to its end by fire.

§ 10. The greatest site in Argolis, and indeed in all Greece, though its pre-eminence is now overshadowed by the Cretan discoveries, is that of Mycenae. Mycenae lies on a hill, which rises to about 1,000 feet above the sea-level, in the north-eastern extremity of the Argolic plain, commanding the pass which leads from it towards Corinth. Its distance from the sea is about ten miles. A rugged triangular height is occupied by the citadel, nearly 400 yards long from east to west. The city, surrounded by walls, lay on either side of a lower ridge extending southwards. Its population was distributed within the enclosed area in several separate villages, each with its own burying-ground. Even in historical times Sparta was just such a collection of villages, but without a general wall of enclosure.

* See p. 16.

The principal entrance of the citadel is near the north-west corner. It is the famous Lion Gate. The lintel of the doorway is formed by a vast block of stone about sixteen feet long, and over this a triangular gap is left in the masonry to relieve the lintel of superincumbent weight: the gap is filled by a triangular slab, on which are sculptured two lionesses standing opposite each other on either side of a short column, on the pedestal of which they rest their fore-paws; their heads, probably of bronze, now missing, faced one who approached the gate.

Just inside the gate is a circle of upright stone slabs enclosing six graves hewn in the rock vertically, once containing in all nineteen bodies with a profusion of gold ornaments—"one of the most wonderful hoards that have ever met a treasure-seeker's eye. Gold appeared in abundance never before seen in Greek tombs, beaten into face-masks, head-bands, breast-pieces, and innumerable stamped plaques; into bracelets, necklaces, rings, baldrics, trinkets, dagger- and sword-hilts. Ivory, silver, bronze, alabaster were there as well, and in profusion, the whole treasure in mere money value being worth thousands sterling."* This mass of treasure reminds us of the epithet "golden" applied to Mycenae in the Homeric poems. The art of these objects is not to be identified with any other known art, and so distinctive is it of the Aegean area that the whole civilisation to which it belongs is spoken of as "Mycenaean." Especially characteristic is the pottery, which falls into two classes: (1) ornamented with geometrical patterns (lines, bands, circles, and spirals), painted in dull lustreless colours; (2) ornamented with designs derived from nature, especially marine objects.

* Hogarth, *Authority and Archaeology*, p. 223.

(seaweed, shells, cuttlefish), only rarely quadrupeds and human beings. It is this last variety that is eminently characteristic of this civilisation, and from its profusion at Mycenae it has been conjectured that this city was the centre of the manufacture, and that its wealth was gained from it; but more probably this style of pottery originated in one of the Aegean islands, and was manufactured largely in various centres. Both these sorts of pottery were made on the wheel, and must be distinguished from the more ancient unpainted pottery, ornamented, if at all, with incised lines, such as is found in the earliest cities at Hissarlik. This earliest kind is also found at Mycenae.

The most important remains in the lower city are the so-called beehive tombs, often spoken of as "treasuries" from a mistaken theory as to their purpose. Nine of these have been found. The largest is that called the Treasury of Atreus, or the Tomb of Agamemnon. It is a subterranean circular vault, to which access is gained between the walls of a long passage (*dromos*) running into the hill. A small square chamber opens off the circular vault. The domed chamber is not constructed on the principle of the arch, but of horizontal layers, each projecting inwards over the one below, and the whole interior chiselled to a smooth surface when finished. Possibly these domed tombs belong to a dynasty of another race which overthrew the kings of the line to which the graves on the citadel belong. The civilisation to which all the objects found at Mycenae belong is that of the Bronze Age. Iron is a rare and costly metal, and is found only in use for finger-rings. Some of the bronze dagger-blades are decorated with inlaid work in gold and silver, and show various scenes—a lion hunt, cats chasing wild ducks by a stream which contains papyrus or lotus plants. These last

The Vaulted
Tombs at
Mycenae—

point to contact with Egypt; and the influence of the East, through Egypt and Libya, is abundantly proved by other objects.

Vaulted tombs like those at Mycenae have been found at many other places in Greece. One at *Vaphio*, —at Vaphio and near the ancient Amyclae, three or four miles ^{other Places.} south of Sparta, has yielded two golden cups with scenes of the snaring of wild bulls. Other tombs have been found in Laconia; several in Attica—at *Menidi* (ancient Acharnae), Thoricus, Eleusis; in Thessaly; at Orchomenos in Boeotia. Great remains of the “Mycenaean” civilisation have been unearthed in many of the Cyclades; at Ialysus in Rhodes; in Melos; and in Thera, which was destroyed by a volcanic upheaval, perhaps about 1600 b.c. The sixth city at Hissarlik belongs also to this period (probably 1600–1100 b.c.).

§ 11. The “Mycenaean” civilisation just described began about 1600 b.c. and ended about 1100 b.c. It was introduced among the Greeks by ^{Mycenaean Culture due to Cretans.} the Cretans, who seem to have conquered and colonised Boeotia and parts of the Peloponnesus about 1600 b.c. From about 2200 b.c. Crete was the chief seat of a “bronze” culture which extended over the Aegean islands. Its marvellous monuments have been and are still being revealed by the excavations of archaeologists.

About 2150 two great palaces were built in the two chief settlements of the island, Cnossus on ^{Cnossus and} the north and Phaestus on the south coast. ^{Phaestus.} About 1600 the palace of Cnossus was destroyed, but was soon re-built on a grander scale. As the centre of a great naval and commercial power, it was quite unfortified, the sea-kings relying on their fleet alone. Round a central court was a maze of rooms and corridors, and on the walls

were several pictures of a double axe, the emblem of a Cretan god afterwards identified with Zeus. The Carian

<sup>Palace of
Cnossus.
The Labyrinth.</sup> name for "double-axe" was *labrys*. From these facts we can trace the origin of the famous myth according to which Daedalus built a "labyrinth" for Minos, king of Cnossus. Minos was either a Cretan god or one of the kings of Cnossus; the Greeks made him the son of Zeus, and to them he stood as the representative of the Cretan sea-power.

Jars for storage of oil have been found in the palace, and it appears that careful commercial and financial accounts were

<sup>Interior of
the Palace.</sup> kept. The domestic arrangements included hot baths and a system of pipes for drainage almost as perfect as that in use at the present day. Frescoes on the walls depict women dressed in flounced skirts, tight bodices, and puffed sleeves.

§ 12. It is a noteworthy and interesting fact that two <sup>Cretan Systems
of Writing.</sup> distinct modes of writing were developed in Crete. Steatite and cornelian seals with hieroglyphic or pictographic symbols ("picture-writing"), the earliest dating from about 2500 B.C., have been found in many places. The later system was "linear," the signs being formed by straight or curved lines, each sign denoting a syllable. More than a thousand rectangular clay tablets inscribed with this script have been found in sealed boxes in the palace of Cnossus. The writing cannot be read; but the numerical symbols have been interpreted.

From 2200-1400 B.C., when their palace and power were destroyed, the kings of Cnossus ruled Crete and exercised a thalassocracy over the Aegean. The Cretans had regular traffic with Egypt, and exported goods to Sicily and Spain. Further, the Philistines were Cretan settlers in Palestine.

CHAPTER III.

THE COMING OF THE GREEKS.

§ 13. Gradual Nature of the Greek Invasion.—§ 14. Routes taken by the Greeks ; the Achaeans in Thessaly.—§ 15. Expansion to Asia Minor of the Achaeans : of the Greeks of Attica and Argolis ; “ Ionian ” Civilisation.—§ 16. Later Greek Invasions of Greece—the Thessalians, the Boeotians, the Dorians ; Dorian Conquest of Laconia and Argolis.—§ 17. Dorian Expansion to Asia Minor ; Doris ; Colonisation of Cyprus.

§ 13. THE Greeks were a people speaking an Aryan tongue, and closely allied to the Italians, the Celts, and ^{The Coming of} Phrygians. They came into Greece from the ^{the Greeks.} north-west regions of the Balkan peninsula. The pressure of the Illyrians from the north drove them gradually southwards and south-eastwards over the Pindus into Macedonia and Thessaly. At the same time, and probably from the same cause, the Phrygians emigrated from Thrace into Asia Minor, where one tribe of them, the Dardans, seized the hill of Troy. These movements were already in operation in the third millennium before our era. The coming of the Greeks must be imagined not as a sudden irruption of invaders who swept the pre-Greek peoples into destruction, but as a “ slow infiltration ” extending ^{A Gradual Process.} over thousands of years. The beginnings of it are lost even to tradition and legend ; the last phase of it, the incoming of the Dorians, is well within the range of tradition and almost within that of history. From 3000 to 2000 B.C. the Hellenisation of the peninsula was going on, as band after band pressed southwards to find a new home among the

pre-Greek population or among their own brethren who had already settled in Greece, it might be hundreds of years before them. And as the process was a gradual one, so also it did not mean the substitution of one race for another. Naturally there was much fighting, but speaking generally the process was rather one of assimilation than of destruction. It is now considered by the best authorities that the Mycenaean civilisation (1600-1100) described in Ch. II. was not pre-Hellenic, but was introduced by the Cretans into a Greece where the infiltration by Greek settlers was already complete. The quality of the mixture of old and new peoples differed in different districts. Herodotus tells us that the inhabitants of Attica and of some other districts were not originally Hellenes, but had become so by the adoption of Hellenic language and manners.

§ 14. Traces of the pre-Greek population of Greece survive in certain names (such as Corinth, Olympus, Larisa), which the Greeks received from the older peoples. The fact that some of these place-names are found in Asia Minor also suggests that there was a single pre-Hellenic race common to both sides of the Aegean. It is probable that by 2000 b.c. the first migration of the Greeks into Greece was complete. About 1600 b.c. the Aegean or Mycenaean civilisation took its rise among the Greeks under Cretan influence (§ 11).

About 1300 b.c. the Achaeans were the most prominent among the Greek peoples; they formed settlements in Crete, and became dominant in the Peloponnesus. Their first home was the valley of the Spercheus in Thessaly. As there was in many respects a great difference between the Greece of 1400 b.c. and that of 1200 b.c., it has been held by some that the Achaeans were not Greeks at all,

but a blonde warlike people from the Danube regions. According to this view, fighting bands of these warriors destroyed the palace of Cnossus (1400 b.c.), settled in Thessaly, and spread thence to Peloponnesus, where they formed dominant aristocracies, displacing the old Greek kings, but adopting the Greek language and customs.

It is certain that from about 1300 b.c. Achaean families ruled in the Peloponnesus, and especially took the place of the old Greek rulers of Argolis. It is also certain that by 1200 b.c. the Achaeans were the ruling people in Crete, that they had invaded Egypt in 1223, and that they modified the Mycenaean culture of South Greece by the introduction of cremation, broad-bladed "cutting" swords, and small round shields.

Tradition, however, consistently represents the Achaeans as Greeks, who settled originally in Thessaly. If this is so, members of their ruling families may well have left the uninteresting district of the Spercheus in search of wealth, power, and adventure.

§ 15. The Achaeans were the first of the peoples of Greece proper to cross the Aegean to Asia Minor. The movement began about 1150, and was due partly to pressure of new tribes (§ 16) from the north, partly to the love of adventure characteristic of this people, and partly to the fact that there was now no great Asiatic power to oppose their expansion to the fertile valleys of Asia Minor. The great inland Hittite Empire, dominating Asia Minor 2000-1300 b.c., was now on the decline. The powerful Sixth City of Troy (§ 8) had been destroyed (about 1180). This destruction was the work of the Achaean princes themselves, who prepared the way for their own expansion to Asia Minor by leading the Greeks against Troy, with the Achaean prince of Argos as commander-in-chief. The

immediate cause of the Trojan War (1200-1180) was the abduction of the Achaean princess Helen (§ 19), but the real motives were the prevention of the lords of Troy from levying tolls on the traffic converging on the Hellespont, and the opening of the way for the permanent settlement of Achaeans in Asia Minor. The chief Achaean (called "Aeolian") settlements in Asia Minor were in Lesbos, and at Smyrna, Cyme, and Magnesia on the Hermus.

Later a second series of colonists left Greece, mainly from Argolis and Attica. These occupied most —^{of the Greeks} — of Attica and of the Cyclades, as well as the large islands of Argolis.

Chios and Samos, and the Asiatic coast between the mouth of the Hermus and a point far south of that of the Maeander. The towns here founded were destined to a great future. The most important was Miletus, on the fine bay of Latmus, which is now almost entirely dry land. Ephesus, a few miles from the coast, just south of the Cayster, which was navigable as far as the town, marked the commencement of one of the chief routes into the interior of Asia. The most northerly site occupied was that of Phocaea, at the entrance of the gulf of Smyrna. Teos, Erythrae, Clazomenae, and Magnesia on the Maeander were also great towns of this group. By some means the Greeks who occupied the twelve cities of this central region got the name Ionians, or Iavones in its earlier form. They were united by the common worship of Poseidon, the sea-god, on the promontory of Mycale, opposite Samos, between

"Ionian" Ephesus and Miletus. The civilisation which Civilisation a Continuation of the immigrants brought with them was that the Mycenaean. "Mycenaean" (more correctly Aegean) civilisation which they had themselves assimilated: there must, in fact, have been among the "Ionian" colonists a large admixture of the pre-Greek element, and possibly it was

due to that fact that the Ionian cities of Asia Minor exhibited so splendid a development which placed them for long in the very forefront of Greek history.

§ 16. As the last phase of the long-continued inpouring of Greeks into the peninsula, we have three movements which may have been closely related one with another. These are the Thessalian invasion, the Boeotian conquest, and the Dorian invasion. The Thessali crossed the Pindus and conquered the whole plain which was thenceforth called after them, Thessaly. The earlier Greeks, *i.e.*, the Achaeans and others, and the remnant of the still earlier pre-Greek populations, if such still lingered, were alike reduced to serfdom. Under the name of Penestae they tilled the soil which had once been their own for the new lords, paying a fixed proportion of the produce. Thessaly from this time onwards falls into four great divisions: Thessaliotis, in the south-west; Achaea Phthiotis, in the south; Pelasgiotis (a name which shows the preponderance in this part of Greece of one of the pre-Greek Aegean peoples), in the east; and Histiaeotis, in the north-west. These formed a loose federation: only in time of war was a common commander, with the title of Tagos, elected. The greater part of the Achaeans departed from the country when the Thessalians came, and passed southwards into the Pelopon-^{Achaea in the Peloponnese.} nese. Here they occupied the narrow strip of fertile land at the foot of the mountains that rise along the southern shore of the Corinthian gulf, and play little part in Greek history until its final period.

The Boeotians appear to have derived their name from Mount Boeum in Epirus. They belonged to the same group of peoples as the Thessalians and the Dorians. Entering the country which was afterwards

Later Greek
Invasions of
Greece: the
Thessalians.

The Boeotian
Conquest.

called by their name on the west, they conquered the Cadmeans of Thebes, but they could not effect a complete subjugation of the country, owing to the power of the rulers of Orchomenos; nor did they reduce to serfdom the inhabitants of the conquered districts. The invasion of Boeotia contributed greatly to the impulse of emigration which led to the foundation of the Ionian cities; and the same is true of the invasion of the Dorians.

The original home of the Dorians is not known. For a long time they occupied central Greece, the mountainous region (including Phocis) on the north and west of Boeotia. Gradually, however, by various routes they departed to seek new abodes; only a remnant was left in central Greece, at the back of Mount Parnassus, to constitute the tiny and unimportant state of Doris. Some of the Dorians appear to have emigrated by way of the Corinthian gulf, where the name of Naupactus, "the place of shipbuilding," seems to record their presence. As to the course of their invasion of the Peloponnes, nothing is certain: most of the Dorian bands probably sailed round from the Corinthian gulf, and attacked it from the south and east. It seems clear, at any rate, that the conquest of the Peloponnes falls into two, if not three, separate acts: the conquest of Laconia, and the conquest of the eastern Peloponnes—of Argolis, and of the isthmus. The invasion was not one homogeneous expedition, as represented in the legend describing it, which also compresses within the space of a few years events which must have been spread perhaps over generations. The Dorians who conquered Laconia had nothing to do with those who conquered Argolis and the isthmus, and the historical development of the two

Dorian Conquest of the Peloponnes—

sections was on divergent lines. The Dorians of Laconia did not amalgamate with the mixed race which they conquered—a race due to the fusion of the earliest Greek immigrants and the pre-Hellenic stock. In Argolis and the isthmus it was quite otherwise. In Argos, as at Corinth, the existence of the three Dorian tribes—the Hylleis, Pamphyli, and Dymanes—is the chief trace of the conquest: amalgamation with the conquered population took place, and perhaps this was largely the cause of the difference between the career of these cities and that of Sparta. One result in Argolis was the destruction of the ancient centres, Tiryns and Mycenae, though their sites continued to be inhabited. Argos, at the foot of the lofty height called Larissa, on the western side of the plain, was chosen as the abode of the conquerors.

§ 17. Connected with the Dorian conquest of the Peloponnese is a movement eastwards to the south-western corner of the opposite continent. The islands of Cos and Rhodes were occupied by Dorians: on the mainland their chief towns were Cnidus and Halicarnassus, the latter famous as the birthplace of the “father of history,” Herodotus. This region was called Doris; and it was probably not until after this new Doris became famous that the two northern groups of colonies were distinguished as Aeolian and Ionian. The colonies of Asiatic Doris differed from the more northerly Greek colonies in this respect, that they came in contact with an Asiatic people, the Carians, who were pushing seawards, and the Dorian immigrants combined with the Carian invaders of the land in establishing cities. Still further afield, in the distant island of Cyprus, somewhat the same thing took place. For Cyprus also received colonists from the Peloponnese as a

result of the Dorian conquest, and these colonists in many cases combined with the Phoenicians to establish towns on the island. The date of the Dorian invasion appears to lie about the year 1000 B.C. Its last phases are the conquest of the island of Aegina, in the Saronic gulf, by Dorians from Epidaurus, perhaps about 800 B.C., and the conquest of Messenia at a date which cannot be fixed.

CHAPTER IV.

THE GREEK LEGENDS.

§ 18. Oral Tradition as Represented in Genealogies, Poets, and Story-writers.—§ 19. Oecumenic Legends ; the Trojan War.—§ 20. Homer; the *Iliad* in its Original and in its Developed Form ; Mycenaean Civilisation Depicted by Homer ; Hellenic Art a Development of Mycenaean Art.—§ 21. The Return of the Heraclidae.—§ 22. Historic Elements in, and Political Influence of, the Legends.

§ 18. HISTORICAL knowledge is based upon contemporary evidence, but a nation has had a long history before it reaches the stage in which it can record its own life. Before the use of writing, events are handed down by oral tradition. Probably the earliest form this takes is that of genealogies, or lists of ancestors of noble families. The deeds of such ancestors become the theme of poetry. Imagination and invention play a great part in clothing the skeleton of oral tradition with details that pass as the genuine tissue of history. In Greece the primary source of knowledge of the past was the Homeric poems, to which there came to be attached other epics dealing methodically with the whole cycle of legends connected with the Trojan war. This body of poetry was known as the Epic Cycle, but with the exception of the Homeric poems themselves it no longer exists for us. Next arose a school of poets called the Hesiodic School, from Hesiod (the first to systematise the legends by means of a poem), who took in

hand the genealogical side of tradition and composed in —^{in the Hesiodic School—} metrical form connected accounts of the ancestors of families, tracing their descent from gods, and the relations in which they had stood to other famous names of tradition. These productions were, of course, not poetry, save in so far as they were presented in metrical form. Next, in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., the “story-writers” (*λογογράφοι**) arose, whose object was —^{in the Story-writers (Logographers).} to give the legends in a prose form, harmonising them and completing them by supplying the names wanting in order to bridge the chasm between the various series of legendary events, actions, and lives; to this extent their work implied criticism. The most famous of the logographers is Hecataeus of Miletus (about 500 B.C.), the predecessor of Herodotus.

§ 19. Among the mass of Greek legends, certain names ^{Oecumenic Legends.} and stories stand out as centres round which others are grouped, such as those of Heracles and the Trojan war. These two stand apart from each other, and are connected merely by a series of names. In the same way certain districts of Greece stand out as rich in legends—viz., Argolis, Boeotia, and Thessaly, and in a less degree Attica. The legends of Heracles, of the Trojan war, of the voyage of the Argo to the country of the Golden Fleece, and to a less degree that of the Calydonian boar-hunt, are oecumenic in character—that is to say, they touch all Greece and form common points of contact between the groups of local legend.

* The word *λογογράφοι* is thus conventionally used of the Greek chroniclers who preceded Herodotus, but it does not bear this special sense in any ancient author; in its genuine Greek use, Thucydides was as much a *λογογράφος* as Hecataeus: the distinction between *λογογράφος* and *συγγραφεύς* is invalid.

The most famous legend of Greece—one which, through the Homeric poems, has influenced all the modern world—is that of the Trojan war.^{The Trojan War.} Paris, a son of Priam, king of Troy, abducted Helen, the beautiful wife of Menelaüs, king of Sparta. All the chieftains of Greece had been her suitors,, and had bound themselves by oath to punish injury done to her. Agamemnon, brother of Menelaüs, assembled the hosts of Greece, and sailed from Aulis in Boeotia, with twelve hundred ships, to Troy. Conspicuous among the Greeks for courage was Achilles, the youthful chief of the Thessalian Myrmidons, son of the sea-goddess Thetis; the leader of the Trojans was Hector, Priam's son. All the gods took part on one side or the other—Pallas Athena, Hera, and Poseidon for the Greeks ; Phoebus Apollo, Ares, and Aphrodite for the Trojans. The war dragged on for ten years; part of the tenth year is the subject of the *Iliad*. Agamemnon deprived Achilles of his captive maid, Briseis, and the Thessalian chief and his Myrmidons kept still in their huts, refusing to fight, while Thetis besought Zeus to give victory to the Trojans that Agamemnon might feel need of Achilles. The Greeks were hard pressed, and Patroclus, the friend of Achilles, was slain by Hector. Then Achilles arose and slew Hector in single combat. The *Iliad* ends with the account of the funeral of the Trojan hero ; but the story was continued in later poems. Achilles was slain by an arrow from the hand of Paris, directed by Apollo. The hero of the fall of Troy was Odysseus, the prince of Ithaca, a man “full of counsel,” who had no rival for sagacity. A huge wooden horse was built, within which Odysseus and other heroes concealed themselves. The Trojans took the horse within the walls, and in the night the heroes burst forth and admitted their friends. Troy sank in flames and

blood. Legends and poems dealing with the diverse fates of the Greek heroes were in existence. Agamemnon reached Mycenae only to be foully murdered by his wife, Clytaenæstra, and her paramour Aegisthus; Menelaüs was a wanderer for seven years; most famous of all were the ten years' wanderings of Odysseus, which formed the subject of the *Odyssey*.

Such was the tale of Troy. That it has a basis in history has been shown, but it is a profitless task to look for trivial realities in the poem. The poet was not a geographer or a scholar, and if we can make out a broad correspondence between the poem and the main features of the scene of the story, that is all we have a right to expect. More profitable is it to trace in outline the growth of the *Iliad* to its present shape, and to gain some idea of its relation to the culture of which it professes to give a picture. The true answer to both these questions is not yet known, and the view here given is but one of many possible theories.

§ 20. The Greeks themselves knew less about Homer than we do, and there were many rival theories ^{Homer.} as to his date and native place. The opinion of Herodotus was that both Homer and Hesiod lived "four hundred years before me, and no more"; he himself was born about 484 B.C. Out of twenty claimants for the honour of being Homer's birthplace, Smyrna is perhaps the most likely place; or the poet may have been, as in verses quoted by Thucydides, "a blind man, dwelling in rocky Chios."

Two extreme views with regard to the *Iliad* may be rejected at the outset. On the one hand, the *Iliad*—
The Iliad—has not been pieced together out of short "lays" not originally connected by any common design; on the other hand, the *Iliad* is not the work of a single poet, as

the *Aeneid* is the work of Vergil. Unity of authorship is disproved by discrepancies and contradictions affecting the very structure of the poem, not mere details. Beyond doubt, the kernel of the *Iliad* is the story of the "Wrath of Achilles." Possibly the poet who composed in its Original Form this "primary *Iliad*" used pre-existing material in the shape of older songs on the same subject; but these were not simply welded together, and analysis of the poem with the object of discovering them is baffled. This nucleus of the present *Iliad* was composed among that group of Asiatic Greeks which was called Aeolian, in a dialect which we may call Aeolic—*i.e.*, the old Thessalian Achaean tongue. The date can only be guessed—perhaps it was about the eleventh century. Perhaps two hundred years later, a poet of great genius, who sang in the courts of the Ionian princes, created the *Iliad* nearly as we now have it by a double process—he added episodes, expanding the original "Wrath of Achilles," and developing in its Developed Form its story; also the old Achaean epic was loped Form. Ionicised—*i.e.*, the dialect was changed, but the older forms were kept perforce in cases where the Ionic forms did not suit the metre. Other episodes were added at a still later date, the last of them being perhaps the Catalogue of the Ships at the end of the second book. At Athens, in the sixth century B.C., Pisistratus and his son Hipparchus took in hand the task of arranging the poems and committing to writing an "authorised version." As the last stage, the poems were transliterated from the old Attic alphabet into the new Ionic alphabet, which came into use in Athens about 403 B.C., and this text is that which we now read.

Speaking broadly, therefore, the *Iliad*—and the same is true of the *Odyssey*—is the result of a slow growth, and

contains matter belonging to different dates. The poems are highly artificial, and are not to be classed with the old English and Scottish ballads. They are partly archaic, partly archaistic—that is to say, the later Ionian poet did not portray the civilisation of his own day, but moved in imagination amid that of the old Achaean epic, sometimes betraying himself by an anachronism. The poems, therefore, as a whole, while professing to depict the heroic age, do not belong to it themselves. They have their root in the

^{"Mycenaean"} "Mycenaean" period; in the details of armour, ^{Civilisation} dress, palaces, the whole environment of the ^{Depicted by} Homer.

heroes, they picture the Bronze Age; and in spite of some differences, the civilisation depicted by the Homeric poems is that of Tiryns, Mycenae, and the other centres of Aegean culture. It is the culture which the Achaeans shared with the Trojans themselves, the culture which, already senile at the time of the Dorian invasion, received from that event, or series of events, a shock which enabled new principles to assert themselves, and thus gave rise to that culture which we call distinctively Hellenic. The discrepancies between the poems and the "Mycenaean" monuments "have lost much of their force with the progress of discovery, and, all taken together, need imply nothing more serious than that difference in date between the Epics and the Mycenaean age, which must be assumed in any case":* for that the poems are actually contemporary with that age no one has ever maintained. It is also quite possible that certain important differences between the poems and the monuments, such as those touching the disposal of the dead, who at Mycenae are buried, but in Homer are burnt, may be due to changes which came about within the "Mycenaean" age

* Hogarth, *op. cit.* p. 246.

itself, and that in the future more light may be thrown upon its later period. The Homeric poems, in fact, show us just that later period of the “Mycenaean” culture about which our knowledge is most defective. It is, however, sufficient to enable us to say that “there is no sudden and violent breach between Mycenaean and Homeric civilisation, just as the later Hellenes felt there was no sudden and violent breach between the Homeric world and their own. The spade gives corroborative evidence. The earliest form of fluted Doric column ; the ground plan of the propylaeum, portico, and cella ; the pitched roofs of the temples—these characteristics of Hellenic architecture exist in embryo in Mycenaean architecture. Gems, especially a class found in Crete and Melos, link the Mycenaean to the Hellenic art-motives ; the graves of the Dipylon and the Areopagus at Athens show the Mycenaean types of pottery and metal-work passing into those of early Hellas.”*

Hellenic Art a
Development of
Mycenaean Art.

§ 21. Of an entirely different type is the legend of the Dorian invasion or the Return of the Heraclidae. It stands at the end of the legendary history of Greece, as the story of Troy stood near the beginning, and was not a theme of poetry. Heracles was the son of Alcmena, wife of Amphitryon, the exiled king of Tiryns, with a claim to the sovereignty of Argos and Mycenae. Having assisted Aegimius, king of the Dorians, against the Lapithae, Heracles received a third of the kingdom of Aegimius as a reward, but did not take possession of it. When Heracles died, Aegimius protected his children, and adopted the eldest of them, Hyllus, as his heir. Hyllus tried to regain his Peloponnesian dominions. He had been told by the Delphic oracle to wait for the “third fruit,”

* Hogarth, *op. cit.* p. 250.

which he interpreted to mean harvest, and so in the third year he invaded the Peloponnese by way of the isthmus. The Tegean Echemus slew him in single combat. Cleodaeus, the son of Hyllus, renewed the attempt, but failed; and so did Aristomachus, the son of Cleodaeus. Aristomachus left three sons—Temenus, Cresphontes, and Aristodemus. The oracle now explained that “third fruit” meant the “third generation,” which had now come. They were to enter not by the isthmus, but by the straits at Naupactus. Their guide should be one with three eyes. So eighty years after the Trojan war they, with a Dorian host, set forth, and were guided by the one-eyed Aetolian, Oxylus, whom they met riding upon a mule. Oxylus had bargained for the district of Elis as his reward, but fearing that the Dorians would seize it when they saw how goodly a land it was, he led them through the rugged mountains of Arcadia. Tisamenus, son of Orestes and Hermione, the daughter of Menelaüs, was at that time king of Argolis and Sparta, but he was slain, and the defeated Achaeans retired northwards into the historical Achaea, driving out the Ionians of the shore (Aegialeis), who in their turn migrated to Attica. Argos, Laconia, and Messenia were divided by lot among the Heraclidae—Argos fell to Temenus, Messenia to Cresphontes, Laconia to Eurysthenes and Procles, the twin sons of Aristodemus, who was now dead: from these two the double line of Spartan kings was descended. Thus the Dorian invasion was to be regarded as simply the recovery of long-usurped rights.

§ 22. No criterion can be found by which to extract the element of truth in the legends; each must be tested separately by comparison with the results yielded by many lines of research. This much is certain, that the legends contain more of the

Historic
Elements in
the Legends.

historic element than was once supposed: and “as science is always progressive, we may hope by degrees to distil more and more history” * from them. It must be realised that the Greeks themselves thoroughly believed in them, and that they influenced their views on political questions. Thus the legend of the Neleids of Pylus who emigrated to Athens, and finally led the Ionian emigration to Asia Minor, gave Athens the basis to her claim to be regarded as the “mother city” ($\mu\eta\tau\rho\sigma\pi\omega\lambda\varsigma$) of the Ionian settlements, and ultimately as their mistress. Again, when Athens and Megara disputed as to the possession of Salamis, and referred to the arbitration of Sparta, Athens based her claim upon certain verses of Homer, in which the Salaminian ships are represented as drawn up alongside those of Athens; but the Athenian Solon was always suspected of having forged this decisive evidence.[†] The political bearings of the legend of the Return of the Heraclidae are obvious.

Political
Influence of
the Legends.

* Percy Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History*, p. 84.

CHAPTER V.

THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GREEKS—MONARCHY AND ARISTOCRACY.

§ 23. Village Communities : Their Amalgamation to form the City-State.—§ 24. Earliest Political Constitution: The King, the Council, the Assembly.—§ 25. Decline of Monarchy and Rise of Aristocracies.—§ 26. Rule of the Aristocracies ; Causes of their Decline ; Rise of Oligarchies.

§ 23. THE Homeric poems give us the first glimpse of the political institutions of the Greeks. They ^{Village} Communities. depict the state of things at the period of transition from the older form of political organisation to that which is distinctly Hellenic, the city-state (*πόλις*). Before the rise of the city, the Greeks lived in village communities. Even in historical times village life prevailed in some of the less forward parts of Greece, e.g., in Aetolia, Acarnania, and among the Ozolian Locrians. Each village in primitive times belonged to a group of families or households which was cemented by the tie of blood; all were descended from an ancestor whose name they bore; all shared in a common worship; and the land of the village was enjoyed in common. The village was ruled by a head-man—*i.e.*, that head of a household who was regarded as being nearest of kin to the original head of the family from which all were descended. Such a group constituting a village community was called a *γένος* (*gens*), ^{The Clan and} or “clan.” Several clans constituted a larger ^{the Tribe.} group, the *φυλή* (*tribus*), or “tribe,” the head of which was the king. By conquest, or otherwise,

community might come to consist of several tribes, ruled by the head of a *gens* which claimed this prerogative. Intermediate between the clan and the tribe, we hear of the *φράτρα*, or *φρατρία*, "brotherhood," constituted by several clans which had certain common religious observances. In the fully formed city-state of historical times we find the lineal descendants of the original village communities—e.g., in the *γένη* of Athens and the *gentes* of Rome. For the later city was formed out of the early village communities by the process of amalgamation to which the Greeks gave the name *Synoecism* (*συνοικισμός*). The Change from Village to City Life.
necessity for mutual defence, or the consolidating policy of a king, might bring this about ; in the village groups of Mycenae under the shadow of the citadel we see the process of transition to the later city. The phratry was the connecting link between the family, or clan, and the state, and in Athens membership of a phratry was essential to citizenship.

§ 24. The earliest political constitution of the Greeks consists of three elements—king, council, and assembly. Monarchy was regarded as a divine institution ; the king was the head of a clan tracing descent from Zeus or one of the other gods, and his relation to the people was that of a tutelary deity. The honour was hereditary, probably under the proviso of personal fitness. The functions of the king were threefold ; he was supreme judge, priest, and leader in war. He sacrificed on behalf of the people as every father of a family did for his household, according to a traditional ritual. Even if deprived of his kingly powers, he still retained the sole right of sacrifice and ministration to the deity with whose service he had been specially associated, for the secrets of the ritual were known only to him. Similarly,

other heads of clans were the repositories of the ritual secrets of other deities ; thus the Butadae at Athens had the exclusive right to the two great priesthoods of Athena Polias and Poseidon Erechtheus. By virtue of divine descent the king was inspired by Zeus with judgments or —as Judge : “dooms” (*θέμιστες*), decisions given in cases of His “Dooms.” dispute between families or members of families. As the state was not yet born, there were no laws ; such ordinances as were universally binding rested upon religion. The punishment of murder was an obligation lying upon the blood-relations of the murdered person, and the murderer was obliged to pay a fine to them, or else flee the country.

The characteristic of the powers and prerogatives of the Homeric king lies in their vagueness ; he had no certain sphere of duty and no definite limits to his power ; he was rather a hereditary chieftain and “shepherd of the people,” as Homer calls him, than a constitutional king. A second feature is that he was only one among many “kings” (*βασιλεῖς*), the first among equals ; for side by side with the king there existed a number of other chieftains, heads of clans, or of tribes, who equally bore the title Basileus, and exercised the same prerogatives, though not so widely. How certain clan chieftains gained this privileged position is not known ; but as far back as we can trace the social organisation of the Greeks we find this nobility in existence.

It was, in fact, this circle of privileged heads of clans that constituted the second element in the political organisation—the council of the elders (*βουλή*). ^{The Council of the Elders} Theoretically, perhaps, all the heads of clans should have been members of this council, which, in that case, would have been a representative assembly ; and, perhaps, originally this was so until the rise of a nobility.

Though the members of the council are spoken of as elders (*γέροντες*, whence the council is sometimes called *γέροντοι* = *senatus* from *senex*), all the members would not necessarily be aged men, though in the majority of cases this would be so. The council acted as a check upon the king, who was bound to consult it and to be guided by its decisions ; conflict between king and council, if chronic, meant, ultimately, revolution and limitation of the king's powers.

The third element was the assembly (*ἀγόρα*) of the folk, the Roman *comitia*. All freemen had the right to be present, and to take part in the acclamation with which the proposals of king and council were greeted. No discussion was possible, nor counter-proposal. The assembly did not meet at stated times, but only when summoned by the king. In composition it was simply the army, so that ultimately the final decision lay with it, and it could hardly be coerced.

§ 25. Such was the constitution of the Greeks when first we get a glimpse of them through the Homeric poems. It is a constitution which hardly suits a people dwelling in cities ; and when the historical age begins the Greeks are already, for the most part, inhabitants of cities, and the old monarchy is at an end, or is being reduced to a merely nominal form. It was the ^{Decline of} ^{the Monarchy} already passing away when the latest parts of the Homeric poems were written—*i.e.*, during the eighth century B.C. In some of the more slowly moving regions of Greece, such as Macedonia, monarchy of the old type lingered on until it was actually galvanised into an absolutism of which the primitive Greeks had no conception. Monarchy also survived as a “picturesque ruin” in Sparta. The actual stages and causes of transition

<sup>Its Survival
in Macedonia
and Sparta.</sup>

from the village life of the early period to city life are unknown, and equally obscure is the process of transition from monarchy to aristocracy; probably the two processes were connected. Generally speaking, throughout Greece

^{Rise of} _{Aristocracies.} monarchy was abolished, and the task of government, which was becoming more and complicated as the nation developed, fell into the hands of the noble families which from of old had composed the king's council. Sometimes, however, as we shall find at Corinth, power fell not into the hands of the whole body of noble clans, but into those of the royal clan itself.

§ 26. The aristocracies which thus succeeded monarchies ^{Rule of the} _{Aristocracies.} were what they claimed to be—the “rule of the best,” and the test of excellence was birth. The Greeks of that age rightly recognised that it is “blood” that tells; the man who came of a long line which for generations had sat at the king's council-board and shed blood for the state, inherited with the lands of his fathers their skill in counsel and war, and their high ideals of life. “It was the man capable in body and mind, strong and agile in limb, brave in fight, free from personal greed, zealous for the general good, who was the ideal of life and conduct in the eyes of the nobles. They clearly saw that their privileged position in the community also entailed duties upon them.”* This was the “excellence” (*ἀρετή*) which the nobility claimed for themselves—this idea of public duty and capacity of fulfilling it. And under the rule of aristocracies the Greek states enjoyed great Causes of their prosperity. Aristocracy, however, is fated to Decay. decay very rapidly, as the two things upon which it rests, pride of birth and wealth, easily degenerate

* Duncker, *History of Greece*, translated by Alleyne and Abbott ii. 307.

into exclusiveness and self-seeking. This decay was the more rapid in Greece as during the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. there took place a revolutionary change in the nature of wealth. The wealth of the early aristocracies consisted in landed property and cattle, but the expansion of Greece by means of her colonies allowed wealth to be accumulated in other forms, so that men who could not boast of noble birth acquired the privileges of nobles by virtue of their wealth; and the admission of parvenus meant a steady deterioration in the standard of conduct. The old aristocracies of birth developed into aristocracies based upon wealth alone—“timocracies,” as the Greeks called them, or “oligarchies,” the rule of the wealthy few. Internal feud, or outrageous acts of violence, and many other things contributed to the fall of the aristocracies in their degenerate days; but the chief cause lay in the fact that the unprivileged citizens, gradually becoming the equals of the governing class in wealth and education, insisted also upon equality of privilege.

CHAPTER VI.

THE AGE OF COLONISATION.

[For a map illustrating this Chapter, see p. 58.]

§ 27. Phoenicians in the Aegean; Extent of their Influence on the Greeks.—§ 28. Expansion of the Greeks over the Mediterranean Coasts: Its Causes.—§ 29. Relation between a Greek Colony and its Mother City; Independence of Colonies.—§ 30. Grouping of Colonies.—§ 31. Euboean Colonies in Italy and Sicily; Dorian Colonies in Sicily; Syracuse, Acragas.—§ 32. Colonies in Lower Italy; Sybaris, Croton, Tarentum (Taranto); Magna Graecia.—§ 33. The Western Mediterranean; Phoenician and Phocaeian Colonies; Massalia (Marseilles); Struggle of Greeks against Carthaginians and Etruscans.—§ 34. Euboean Colonies in the Northern Aegean; Chalcidice.—§ 35. Colonisation of the Propontis and Euxine by Megara and Miletus.—§ 36. Colonies on the North Coast of Africa; Cyrene.—§ 37. The Opening of Egypt to the Greeks; Naucratis.

§ 27. BETWEEN the old maritime empire which had its centre in Crete and the development of the supremacy which the Greeks afterwards enjoyed in the Aegean there was an interval (approximately 1000—700 B.C.), during which the trade of the Aegean was largely in the hands of the Phoenicians of Sidon and Tyre. The later Greeks had a mania for deriving all their civilisation from the East, and greatly exaggerated the amount of contact between themselves and the Phoenicians: the worship of Dionysus, the knowledge of mining, quarrying, and the use of the alphabet were said to have been acquired from them. Modern scholars, by an analysis chiefly of place names, have attempted to prove the existence of numerous Phoenician settlements in Greece. A Phoenician

colony is said to have been established even in inland Thebes. It will probably be nearer the truth to deny that the Phoenicians were ever supreme in the Aegean or established in colonies on Greek soil. A few trading stations at suitable points on the coast,^{Extent of their Influence on the Greeks.} on the island of Cythera, or on the isthmus of Corinth, some influence upon Greek religion—*e.g.*, the introduction of the worship of Aphrodite (the Phoenician Astarte) at various places, or of Melkart, whom the Greeks called Melicertes, at Corinth, or identified with Heracles—this is probably the amount of influence exerted upon Greece by Phoenicia. Her greatest gift was the alphabet; but the history of this is still so obscure that future discoveries may modify our views as to the part played by the Phoenicians in regard to it.

§ 28. Gradually the maritime spirit of the Greeks asserted itself. The Phoenicians found themselves driven from the Aegean. The Greeks became masters of their own waters, and began to push out into the Mediterranean basin. From the first half of the eighth to the middle of the sixth century B.C., that wonderful expansion of Greece took place which created Hellas in that wide sense in which its bounds extended from the Black Sea to the African coast, from Cyprus to the shores of Spain.

The cause of this expansion is to be found in the development of trade, and especially trade by sea: *Its Causes: Trade.* certainly the colonies on the northern shore of the Black Sea, “where neither sea, sky, nor earth had anything Greek about them,”* must have been founded solely in order to exploit the profitable commodities, grain, cattle, and fish of these regions, and the caravan trade with the Baltic. The development of maritime commerce brought

* Holm, *Greek History*, i. 277.

about an improvement in the art of shipbuilding. The small, clumsy "tub" (*ναῦς στρογγύλη*—"round ship") gave way to the long, narrow "fifty-oar," the penteconter, with twenty-five benches, on each of which two oarsmen sat. Besides being more speedy, these vessels were adapted for fighting, and to that end the prow was armed with a bronze-sheathed spur.

Increase of population and the resulting economic distress also operated to further emigration to distant shores; but most powerful must have been the political discontent reigning among the unprivileged citizens, who were exposed to all the misrule of a degenerating aristocracy, which was taking an ever narrower view of its duties and drawing an ever sharper line between itself and the mass of the people. These causes were operative throughout Greece, and we must not be misled by finding that the colonies emanate apparently from a small number of centres in Greece proper and on the coast of Asia Minor—Corinth, Chalcis, and Megara, or Miletus, Phocaea, and Rhodes. These centres were only the points of departure, the official parents of a progeny which was in reality composed of representatives from many other cities: we may be sure that this was so in nearly every case, and, in fact, in many instances the foundation legend of the colony asserts the composite nature of its first population.

§ 29. The Greek colony was always something more than the mere factory or trading-post of the Phoenicians; only in a few instances did the Phoenician collecting station or dépôt develop into a true city—e.g., Carthage. Very different also was it from the various forms of colony which we meet in Roman history—the "maritime colonies" of Roman citizens, "communities separate in fact, but

not independent"; or the so-called "Latin colonies," which were nominally allies, but in reality subjects: both these were primarily garrison towns intended to hold a conquered and hostile population. The "cleruchies," or out-settlements, founded at various times by Athens in order to provide land for poor citizens or overawe doubtful allies, bore a far closer resemblance than the Greek colonies proper to the Roman and Latin colonies.

The relation between a Greek colony and its mother city (*μητρόπολις*) was sentimental and rooted in religion: it was a filial relationship that implied complete independence. While it was considered impious for a colony to war with the mother city, political interference on the part of the latter was unwarranted, and released the colony from such allegiance as sentiment demanded.

Certain customary observances regulated the procedure of founding a colony. The oracle of Delphi was consulted, that the intended act of colonisation might receive the sanction of religion. In later times, but hardly in the earlier, a charter embodied the conditions under which the colony was founded, and appointed the "oecist" (the leader of the enterprise). If a colony itself founded a fresh settlement, custom demanded that an oecist should be sought from its own mother city: the sacred fire for the hearth of the new community was taken from the prytaneum (public hall) of the original mother city.

Commercial interests often rudely clashed with the sentimental ties which bound together mother and daughter. It was such a quarrel which was destined to plunge all Greece into civil war—the mutual hostility of Corinth and her offshoot Corcyra. In many cases the effect of the environment

Independence
of Colonies:
Its Causes.

and of the new conditions of life of the colonists created a type of character very different from that seen in the parent state: wealthy Tarentum and Sybaris did not resemble their mother cities, Sparta and the towns of Peloponnesian Achaea. In many cases, again, the colony was destined to greater things than the mother city—Byzantium outgrew Megara in wealth and importance, and even Corinth could hardly vie with her offshoot Syracuse. Thus gradually the connection between mother and daughter, rarely operative in any practical sense, came to be a mere matter of history: from the very first the colonies were self-determining units of the Greek world. They were, in fact, scarcely a source of strength to the states which founded them, for although they provided new outlets for the products of their parents, the prosperity thereby enjoyed by the latter was dearly purchased at the price of the draining of their best blood—the young, vigorous, and ambitious element of their population. It is a significant fact that the future of Greece lay with Sparta, Athens, and Thebes—non-colonising states.

§ 30. The colonies fall into three great groups—those of the west, those of the north, and those of the south. These, again, fall into smaller groups. The colonies of the west may be subdivided into (1) those of Sicily; (2) of Italy; (3) of Epirus; (4) of Gaul and Spain. The northern colonies fall into three smaller groups: (1) those of the Aegean; (2) of the Hellespont (Dardanelles), the Propontis, and the Bosporus; (3) of the Euxine. In the south are two groups—(1) Africa and (2) Egypt. Grouping them according to their mother city, we find that Corinth, the Euboean cities of Chalcis and Eretria, and Ionian Phocaea, are of importance in Sicily and further west, Achaea in southern Italy. In the northern Aegean Chalcis and Eretria

were the colonisers ; the Euxine was almost monopolised by Miletus. Megara founded important cities on the Bosporus and in Sicily.

Chalcis was apparently the first city to send forth a colony. The importance of Chalcis and Eretria dates from an early period. Both lay on the Euripus or narrow channel between Euboea and the mainland, Eretria a few miles south-east of her neighbour and rival : between them stretched the fertile Lelantine plain. Rivalry culminated in a tedious struggle for the possession of the plain, perhaps about the middle of the seventh century B.C. This was the first of those commercial wars which at last ruined Greece : by virtue of their trade interests with one or other of the combatants, the most important maritime states on both sides of the Aegean were ultimately involved in the struggle—Corinth and Samos as allies of Chalcis ; Miletus and Megara as allies of Eretria, which city was irretrievably ruined by the war.

§ 31. If we are to believe the tradition, the earliest Greek colony was that of Cyme, or Cumae, on the Campanian coast, in Italy, founded by settlers from Chalcis in Euboea and Cyme in Aeolia (more probably Cyme on the east coast of Euboea)—1046 B.C. is the traditional date. The early date is probably a mistake, as the age of colonisation does not seem to have begun until 800 B.C.; but it is impossible to disprove the claim of the city to be the earliest western colony. The dates assigned by the ancients to the colonies are all untrustworthy ; in the case of those in Sicily the process of calculation by which they were reached has been divined.* By common consent Naxos had the honour of being the first Greek foundation on Sicilian soil. This also, like Cyme, was a

* Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek History*, p. 236.

joint colony, in which the Chalcidians shared. At the time the Greeks first set foot on the island Sicily was inhabited by three peoples : (1) the Elymians ^{Non-Hellenic Peoples of Sicily.} in the north-west, a small people whose origin is unknown : their settlements, Eryx and Segesta (or Egesta), were of some importance in both Greek and Roman history ; (2) the Sicans in the west ; (3) the Sicels the most numerous and important people, occupying the whole eastern section of the island : their chief town was Henna, or Enna, in the centre. Before the Greeks came, a foreign race, the Phoenicians, had established trading stations on the coast, and they actually never relinquished their hold over the western corner of the island, where they possessed three genuine towns—Panormus, Solus, and Motya.

Naxos lay on the north-eastern foot of Mount Etna ; a few years later the Chalcidians founded Catane ^{Other Euboean Colonies in Sicily : Catane, Leontini, Zancle (Messana), Himera.} and Leontini to the south of the volcano. They also combined with Cymaeian adventurers to seize and colonise a site on the strait between

Italy and Sicily ; from the shape of its sickle-like promontory protecting its harbour, the town was called Dancle or Zancle ("sickle"), afterwards Messana, and now *Messina*. The straits were secured by the foundation of Rhegium, on the Italian shore, by Chalcis and some Messenians from the Peloponnese. Himera, the only Greek city of importance on the northern coast of Sicily, was a colony from Zancle.

Thus north-eastern Sicily fell to the Chalcidians ; while ^{Dorian Colonies in Sicily.} in the meantime Dorians secured the south-eastern section of the island. The first of the Dorian colonies was also destined to be the greatest of the Greek cities of the west. From Corinth Archias led

a band of emigrants to the islet of Ortygia (the "isle of quails") lying in front of a great bay on the east coast. The settlement soon spread over the adjacent plateau on the mainland. This was the origin of Syracuse, ^{Syracuse} a city with a glorious future as the champion ^(784 B.C.) of Greek against Semitic civilisation, destined also to measure strength with the queen of Hellas herself. From Syracuse were founded Acrae, Casmeneae, and Camarina. The sea route from Corinth to Sicily went, not across the open sea from the mouth of the Corinthian gulf, but northwards along the coast of Epirus to Corcyra (now *Corfu*), and thence to the "heel" of Italy and so along Lower Italy, keeping ever ^{Corcyra} near the land. The island of Corcyra was thus the key to the western waters, and was valuable also for its timber and the possibilities of trade with the adjacent mainland. Corinth founded (about 715 B.C.) the city of Corcyra, which in half a century had grown so strong that it came to blows with the mother city, and in 664 B.C. the first naval battle recorded in Greek history was fought.

Other Dorians, from Megara, founded a Megara, called the Hyblaean Megara, on the coast north of Syracuse; and about a century later the inhabitants of the Hyblaean Megara founded Selinus on the southern coast, the most westerly outpost of Hellenic commerce and civilisation among the Phoenicians on this side of the island, as Himera was on the northern shore. Lastly, a combined body of Rhodians and Cretans planted Gela on the coast northwest of Camarina, and the Geloans founded Acragas, or Agrigentum, half-way between Gela and Selinus, ^{Acragas} on a lofty site, but poorly provided with ^(Agrigentum) maritime facilities; in spite of this, however, Acragas under

her tyrants became the second city in Sicily and the rival of Syracuse.

§ 32. In southern Italy the foremost colonisers were the Achaeans of the Peloponnes. Their first colony was Sybaris, in a fruitful plain at the mouth of the river Crathis, which receives the waters of the Sybaris and flows into the great gulf of Tarentum. All this region, forming the "toe" of Italy, the prolongation of the Apennines, is now *Calabria*, a name which in ancient times was restricted to the "heel" of Italy, on the east of the gulf of Tarentum. Sybaris had not a good harbour; her wealth depended upon her agriculture and her trade connections with the Tyrrhenian sea—*i.e.*, with the western side of the peninsula. By means of their settlements Laüs and Scidrus on the western coast, the Sybarites controlled an overland route to the western Mediterranean; this was of vital importance, as Sybaris was thereby enabled to act as intermediary between Miletus and Etruria; for Miletus, being in alliance with Eretria, was excluded from the straits of Messana by the Chalcidians. The result was that Sybaris reached a height of prosperity which has made her name for all time a synonym for extravagant luxury. Posidonia (*Paestum*), where are the ruins of mighty temples, was also an offshoot from Sybaris. South of Sybaris, not far from the Lacinian

Croton. promontory, now called Cape *Colonne*, from the solitary column still standing high above the sea, the remains of a famous temple of Hera (Juno), Croton was founded. Like Sybaris, she had her outposts on the western sea, her colonies of Terina and Temesa, or Tempsa. Pandosia was also an offshoot from Croton. Croton became famous shortly after the middle of the sixth century B.C. as the centre of the mysterious

semi-religious, semi-political brotherhood or sect of the Pythagoreans, founded by Pythagoras, a native of Samos who emigrated to Croton. During the ascendancy of Pythagorean oligarchs at Croton, war broke out between that city and Sybaris: probably commercial rivalry had much to do with it. The superiority of Sybaris was great, but the Crotoniates proved victorious and razed Sybaris to the ground (511 B.C.) Then in Croton itself the popular party rose against the Pythagorean nobles, and a general persecution of the sect in Lower Italy followed (450 B.C.). The destruction of Sybaris was a great blow to Miletus.

Other colonies in Lower Italy were Scylletium, Caulonia, and Locri Epizephyrii ("western"), the latter the farthest settlement to the south on this eastern side of modern *Calabria*; Metapontion (Metapontum), famous for its corn; and Siris, the latter a solitary example of Ionian colonisation on this coast; its mother city was Colophon—Sybaris and Croton afterwards united to destroy it. Greatest and most permanent of all the settlements in this region was that which was at the same time the only offshoot of the greatest of the Dorian stock, the Spartans. This was Taras, or Tarentum (now *Taranto*), in the northern angle of the gulf which bears its name. The wealth of Tarentum depended chiefly upon her manufactures, her fabrics and pottery; she had a rival in the native town of Brentesior (Brundusium), on the eastern side of her peninsula—a town which survives in the modern *Brindisi*. The prosperity of the foundations in Lower Italy was remarkable even in this age of the birth and flourishing of great commercial centres. They formed a group distinct in character, to which the name "Great Hellas" ($\eta\mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\eta\text{ }\mathbf{\acute{E}}\lambda\lambda\acute{a}s$, *Magna*

Other Colonies
in Lower Italy:
Metapontum.

Tarentum
(707 B.C.).

Graecia) was given. Why "Great Hellas" rather than ἡ μεγάλη Ἑλλάς "Great Achaea," we cannot tell; it has been (*Magna Graecia*). suggested that the people of southern Italy applied the name through having come in some way to regard the Hellenes—who joined the Achaeans, their neighbours formerly in Thessaly now in Achaea, in the work of colonisation—as typical of the race; and that this was the origin of the name as applied to the Greek nation at large.*

§ 33. The western Mediterranean was in the hands of the Etruscans and the Phoenicians, the most powerful of the latter being the Carthaginians, whose ^{The Western Mediterranean : Carthage.} town, established on the northern coast of Africa, near the centre of the bay of *Tunis*, rose to power as Sidon and Tyre were weakened by Assyria. The silver of the mines of southern Spain (the Tarshish of Scripture) and the tin of the British isles were jealously monopolised. It was a Samian vessel captained by one Colaeus which, driven out of her course by continual gales from the east, first made Tartessus beyond the Pillars of Heracles (the strait of Gibraltar) and brought back proof of the richness of the newly discovered country in the shape of a cargo that passed as the second richest that had ever been carried in a Greek ship (about 600 b.c.). The Phocaeans were those who ventured to establish themselves in this Phoenician preserve; they founded ^{Phocaeans Colonies : Massalia (Marseilles).} Massalia (*Marseilles*), near the mouth of the Rhone, and so tapped the profitable trade with the Gauls. They made known to the Greeks the recesses of the Adriatic, the coast of Etruria, Iberia in north-west Spain, and were on friendly terms with the king of Tartessus. These adventurous voyages of the Phocaeans

* J. B. Bury in *Journ. of Hell. Studies*, xv. 217 fol.

were performed in penteconters, for fights with Carthaginians or Etruscans gave variety to these voyages of discovery. Massalia extended her influence eastwards along the Ligurian coast by her colonies, Nicaea (*Nice*) and Monoecus (*Monaco*), and westwards by similar settlements. The Phocaeans encroached upon the Etruscan sphere by their foundation of Alalia in Corsica. Twenty years after its foundation the town was strengthened by refugees from Phocaea fleeing before the Persians (545 B.C.); but now the Carthaginians and Etruscans combined to destroy the interlopers. The Greeks, though outnumbered by two to one, conquered in the sea-fight: it was a "Cadmean victory," for the conquerors lost forty out of sixty ships and suffered as much as the conquered. In consequence Alalia was abandoned, and its population built the city of Elea, or Velia, in Lucania.

§ 34. It is intrinsically probable that the earliest colonies sent forth by Chalcis were directed northwards.

Between the Axius and the Strymon, Macedonia shows a mountainous excrescence running out in

Euboean Colonisation in the North.

three promontories into the northern Aegean. Here many colonies were planted, mostly by Chalcis, so that the entire territory received the name Chalcidice. Other towns than Chalcis, however, sent colonies hither; especially Eretria, which founded several towns on Pallene, the most westerly of the three peninsulas; Scione, however, on this peninsula, was founded by Achaeans from Pellene; and Potidaea was a Corinthian colony. The chief town of Sithone, the central peninsula, was Torone, a Chalcidian settlement. The eastern peninsula, called Acte, is more rugged than the others, and ends in Mount Athos, "which rises like a gigantic watch-tower above the Aegean," a terror to shipmen. Eretria planted

settlements in Acte; and the island of Andros, which was a dependency of Eretria, was the mother city of Argilus, Stageirus, Acanthus, and Sane, towns round the Strymonic gulf, east of the Chalcidian cities. All this region became of importance in Athenian history. Farther east, the Parians occupied the island of Thasos, which contained valuable gold-mines. On the Thracian coast there was a series of colonies, of which the most important were Maronea and Aenus, planted by Chios and Mytilene respectively.

§ 35. The founding of colonies in the north-eastern section of the Greek world was not a methodical process beginning with the Hellespont and the Propontis and Euxine—gradually proceeding to the more distant shores of the Euxine. Rather, the Milesian merchants had already revealed the possibilities of wealth residing in the somewhat forbidding regions of the Black Sea before enterprise was directed to securing the waterways that led thither. Megara, one of the smallest, but one of the most enterprising and interesting of the Greek states, was perhaps the

first to see the importance of the straits. She —by Megara. founded Chalcedon on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus; seventeen years later she gave birth to an immortal daughter, and profoundly influenced the destinies of Europe, when she sent forth men to occupy a Thracian fort on what is now the “Golden Horn.” This was the beginning of Byzantium (*Constantinople*). The position of the city and the set of the local currents enabled Byzantium

Byzantium. to control the passage of the straits. Megara also planted Selymbria on the north coast of the Propontis, west of Byzantium. Later, in the Black Sea itself, the Megarians founded Heraclea in Pontus, on the Bithynian coast, east of the straits; Byzantium

and Chalcedon together founded Mesembria, on the Thracian coast, to the north-west. The Pontic Heraclea in her turn planted another Heraclea (also called Chersonesus) on the Tauric Chersonesus (the *Crimea*), near the site now occupied by *Sebastopol*.

The Tauric
Chersonese
(Crimea).

Miletus was the pioneer of colonisation in the Black Sea, which from its extent the Greeks called the Pontus (the "Sea"). In the centre of its southern shore Sinope was planted, on a fine harbour; Sinope planted Trapezus (now *Trebizond*) farther east. As half-way stations, Cyzicus was founded on the Propontis, and Abydos on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont. Then the Milesians turned their attention to the northern and western shores of the Pontus. Istrus, south of the mouths of the Danube; Odessus, just north of Mesembria; Olbia, at the mouth of the Borysthenes (*Dnieper*); Panticapaeum, on the Cimmerian Bosphorus, leading into Lake Maeotis (sea of *Azov*); Tanais, at the mouth of the *Don*, were all founded by them. Directly or indirectly Miletus founded, according to tradition, more than eighty colonies in the Pontus. In later times these towns became the chief source of the corn supply of Greece.

Other Milesian
Colonies in the
Euxine.

§ 36. The character of the African coast hardly suited Greek instincts; the best parts of it were occupied by the Phoenicians. Between Egypt and Phoenician territory, however, on the projection on the eastern side of the great North African bight, emigrants from the island of Thera, reinforced by Cretans, established themselves at Cyrene, after their first settlements on the islet of Platea and the opposite mainland had proved failures (about

Cyrene

630 B.C.). Their leader was called Aristoteles; but as king of Cyrene he took the name Battus, which is said to have been the Libyan for "king," but in Greek the word means "stammerer," so that in the foundation legend of the colony Battus appears as halting in his speech. In the royal family of Cyrene the names Battus and Arcesilas alternated with each other. Under Battus II. the colony was strengthened by reinforcements invited from Crete and the Peloponnese. Cyrene was, in fact, the only flourishing Greek colony on the African coast. Her horses were famous; she was the intermediary between the Greeks and the Libyan natives; above all, she had the *silphium*, a plant now extinct, esteemed in ancient times for medicinal purposes: it grew here only in the world, and was

^{The Arcesilas} a royal monopoly. A famous vase shows
^{Vase.} Arcesilas II. superintending the weighing and packing of the precious plant. It was in the reign of this Arcesilas that the king's younger brothers left Cyrene on

^{Barca.} account of domestic dissensions and founded

Barca, farther west. This entire region was called the Cyrenaica.


§ 37. The opening of Egypt to Greek traders belongs to the chapter of Greek colonisation. For long the gates of Egypt had been closed against them; but a native prince of Lower Egypt, by name Psammetichus, revolted against Assurbanipal, king of Assyria, and with the help of "bronze men who came from the sea"—*i.e.*, bronze-clad warriors of Ionia and Caria sent by Gyges, king of Lydia—he established his independence and sovereignty over all Egypt, according to the promise of the oracle. For his Greek mercenaries Psammetichus built the permanent camp of Daphnae, or Defenneh, on the Pelusiac arm of the Nile, to guard the

^{The Opening of}
^{Egypt to the}
^{Greeks.}

eastern frontier of Egypt. He and his successors, Necho, Psammetichus II., Apries, and Amasis, opened Egypt to the Greeks, and allowed them to settle in the country. The Milesians established themselves on the Canobic, or western arm of the Nile; this emporium developed into Naucratis. Naucratis was a common home and emporium for all the Greeks trafficking in Egypt. There was a huge common enclosure, called the Hellenium, for the rest of the Greek settlers, containing their temples and places of business; but the Milesians, the Samians, and the Aeginetans had separate temples and business houses. The settlement appears to date from about 650 B.C. Its importance lies in the fact that here the Hellenic and the Egyptian civilisations came into contact with each other; for here only did Greek colonists meet with a civilisation superior to their own.

The Greek Emporium at Naucratis.
Its Importance.

MAP ILLUSTRATING
GREEK
COLONISATION
50 25 0 50 100 200
English Miles



KEY TO THE MAP ILLUSTRATING GREEK COLONISATION.

**Western Colonies
and Sicily.**

**Thrace and the
Aegean.**

1 CYMEE	62 MARONEA	65 PERINTIUS	68 OLBIA
2 BLEA	61 ABIBRA	70 CYZICUS	65 PANTICAPAEUM
20 RIGEUM	69 AMPHIPOLIS	71 LAMPSACUS	66 PHANAGORIA
8 MESSANA (ZANOLE)	48 S'AGEIRUS	73 ABYDOS	62 ISTRIUS
9 HIMEERA	42 MELIONE	79 PILOCAEA	61 OALLIATIS
19 NAXOS	41 PYDNA	80 CHIOS	60 ODESSEUS
18 CATANE	60 THASOS	81 ERYTHRAE	58 APOLLONIA
17 LEONTINI	47 AGANTHUS	83 CLAZOMENAE	67 SINOPE
IONIAN.	43 OLINTHUS	83 TEOS	—
	46 MENDE	84 GOLOPHON	
	46 TORONE	85 REPILUS	
	94 ANDROS	87 MILETUS	
	95 TENOS	86 SAMOS	
	96 MYRCONOS		
	98 NAXOS		
	97 PAROS		

**Propontis and
Coast of Asia Minor.**

26 TAKENTUM	44 POTIDAEA	66 SIBYMBRIA	64 HERACLEA
16 MEGERA HYBLAEA	99 MELOS	67 BYZANTIUM	64 CLEONNESUS
16 SYRACUSE	100 THERA	67 HALCEDON	69 MYSCEMBRIA
10 SELINUS	101 CYDONIA	69 HALICARNASSUS	69 HERACLEA PONTICA
11 AGRAGAS	102 GNOSSES	89 COS	
12 GELA	103 GORTYNIA	90 CUNDUS	
13 CAMARINA		91 CAMIRUS	
CASMENAE		92 IALYXUS	
14	37 EPIDAMNUS	93 LINDUS	
	28 APOLLONIA		
	29 CORCYRA		
	30 AMBRACIA		
	31 LEUGAS		
	33 SOLIUM		

Dobriani.

2 POSIDONIA	68 AENUS	64 SESTOS	MOOTHER CITIES
4 SCIDROS	73 ASSOS	73 ASSOS	
5 LAON	74 ANTANDRUS	74 CHALOIS	
5 METAPONTUM	—	76 MEHYMNA	76 BRETRIA
24 SYBARIS		77 PITANE	43 ATHENS
25 CROTON		78 MYTILENE	37 MEGARA
6 TERINA		78 CYMIS	36 CORINTH
6 TEMISA			35 SPARTA
23 GAULONIA			
21 LOCRU			
24 ZAÖYNTHUS			

CHAPTER VII.

THE UNITY OF THE GREEKS.

§ 38. Forces tending to Hellenic Unity: Colonisation.—§ 39. The Homeric Poems as Promoters of Community of Feeling; Homer's Influence on Greek Religion.—§ 40. Community of Worship as Unifier.—§ 41. Amphictionies of the Narrower Class: Delos; the Panionia; Political Side of Religious Leagues; the Argive Amphictiony.—§ 42. Amphictionies of the Wider Class: League of Calauria; the Delphic Amphictiony.—§ 43. Unifying Influence of Oracles; Delphi.—§ 44. The National Games as Promoters of Unity; the Olympic Games.—§ 45. Site of Olympia.—§ 46. The Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian Games.

§ 38. WE have seen how in the course of two hundred years the Greeks spread in nearly every direction over the coasts of the Mediterranean and those of the seas connected with it. Only the African coast west of Carthage, and the Syrian coast, with that of Cilicia, remained outside the sphere of Greek colonisation; Phaselis, founded by the Rhodians about 700 b.c., on the western shore of the Pamphylian gulf, marked the limit of Greek advance on the southern coast of Asia Minor. We have now to see what forces were at work partially counteracting the centrifugal tendency which had scattered the nation so widely.

Colonisation itself must be reckoned among the forces tending to unity. Nowhere did the Greeks realise so vividly the meaning of that community of language, manners, and blood which they claimed for themselves as in the colonies which fringed the lands of the "barbarians." Hence it came about that

Forces Tending
to Unity:
Colonisation.

it was precisely these outposts of Hellenism that most enthusiastically supported those institutions which were Panhellenic in character, such as the games at Olympia. Hence, also, it arose that the unity of the race was apparently more deeply realised during the early period of its history, when the contrast between itself and its neighbours was most sharply drawn and most obvious. That this was so is proved by the fact that all the really vital unifying institutions—the amphictionies and the games—have their origin in the age before history begins, so that when we know them they are in many cases already decaying. The Greeks, again, found no difficulty in believing that at the opening of their history they had all been united in a Pan-Hellenic enterprise, the Conception of Siege of Troy as Pan-Hellenic siege of Troy—a strange contrast to the dissension which prevailed at the crisis of the Persian invasion.

§ 39. One of the most powerful engines in the promotion of community of feeling among the Greeks was the collection of epics dealing with the story of Troy; especially powerful in this respect was the *Iliad*. To us Homer is mainly literature, but what he was to the Greeks has been sometimes expressed by saying that Homer was the Greek Bible; he was the educator of Greece, and it was claimed that a man might direct his whole life by what he learnt from him. This The Homeric Poems as Promoters of Unity. extravagant estimate of his value is a fact of Their Importance for Greeks. importance, as it was not the estimate of a school or clique, but a national estimate; and even those who might care little for this ethical aspect of the Homeric poems attached a historical value to them, and found in them a common ground on which the majority of Hellenes met. The importance of the poems was enhanced by the fact that they were not confined, as is literature nowadays, to a

reading public ; the knowledge of them was disseminated among all classes by the professional reciters, *Rhapsodes.* or "rhapsodes" (*ῥαψῳδοί*), who wandered from city to city, and publicly competed in recitation at the festivals. Furthermore, Homer spoke in a tongue which was not identical with any living form of Greek ; for the

The "Epic" Dialect. so-called "Epic" dialect was not a spoken dialect,

but a metrical language which, with a prevailing Ionic character, exhibits the fossilised remains of the old Achaean speech. Thus the very vehicle of the poems prevented their being anything less than a national possession, though they were most closely identified with the Ionians, and, as we shall see, with Athens, the representative of Ionic character and culture. Homer was the embodiment of national Hellenic sentiment, of the consciousness of community of race and culture differentiating Greek from

"barbarian." He was also in a sense the

Homer as Creator of Greek Religion. creator of Greek religion, inasmuch as the eternal types of divine character, which were the same for all Greeks, were first clearly portrayed by him. The same gods were worshipped everywhere, although there were local differences in the attributes assigned to them ; these distinctions, however, did not strike the Greeks, as we see from the fact that they could call by the same name their own beautiful Artemis and the nature deity represented in the hideous many-breasted figure at Ephesus. The Homeric poems embodied in noble and enduring forms the essential conceptions of the nation respecting its divinities. This is the real meaning of the remark of Herodotus when he says that "Homer and Hesiod created the Greek theology," by giving the gods their titles, prerogatives, faculties, and their personal and moral characteristics. - This aspect of Homer is of great

importance, for of all the unifying influences at work upon the Greeks, none were more powerful than that of religion, whether the older more external state religion and ritual or that new form, the Orphic mysticism (so called from Orpheus, the mythical poet and priest of Thrace), which began to spread about the middle of The Orphic Religion.
the sixth century b.c.

§ 40. Community of worship led in very early times to the formation of “amphictionies,”* or associations of cities or tribes for the protection of the temple of the deity for whose worship the members met at stated intervals. At these periodical meetings, contests (*ἀγῶνες*) of various kinds were combined with religious functions—the contests, athletic or other, were in fact held in honour of the god, and were themselves truly religious functions. Whether it was the games at Olympia, or the dramatic contests in the Dionysiac theatre at Athens, these public competitions were not only a popular spectacle and amusement, but part and parcel of a great religious celebration. Apparently in some cases the agonistic element—*i.e.*, the contests—outgrew the other functions of the association and came to be the chief end of the gathering; and other states than those originally belonging to the association being admitted to the contests, the latter gradually attained a national significance; this was probably the course of the development of the Olympian games. In other cases, again, the amphictionic association failed to attain any but a purely local significance, or died out altogether. We can distinguish also two main classes of amphictiony: (1) amphictionies restricted to the cities of a certain national group;

* *ἀμφικτίωνες*, “dwellers round”: the form *ἀμφικτύωνες* is also found.

(2) those composed of cities belonging to different groups. The second class, as being one of wider unions than the first, is of chief importance.

§ 41. Of amphictionies of the narrower class, one of the most important was the “gathering of the Ionians and the neighbouring islanders” to Delos; hither, perhaps annually, the “long-robed Ionians, with their wives and children,” assembled for contests of boxing and dance and song in honour of Apollo. The festival was of high antiquity, but it gradually decayed owing to the misfortunes of Ionia. Its historical interest lies mainly in the fact of its restoration by Athens in 426 b.c. as a quadrennial festival to give a religious bond of union to her empire. The Delian amphictiony thus illustrates the mode in which religious unions might be used for political purposes. On the Triopian promontory near Cnidus, the inhabitants of the six chief Dorian cities in Asia met for the worship of Apollo, excluding all other Dorians. The prize in the games was a bronze tripod, and the rule was that the winners of them should not carry them out of the temple, but dedicate them then and there to the god. A man of Halicarnassus violated the rule, so the other five cities—Lindus, Ialysus, Camirus, Cos, and Cnidus—for the future excluded Halicarnassus from the amphictiony. On the promontory of Mycale, in the territory of Priene, the twelve Ionic cities of Asia Minor assembled to worship the Heli-
conian Poseidon in their common temple, the Panionium: the festival was called the Panonia. This association meeting at the temple is found acting as a representative body for all the Ionians in the time of the advance of the Persians under Cyrus, and still more emphatically during the Ionic revolt from Persia. The Euboeans seem to have had a religious centre in the temple

*Amphictionies
of the Narrower
Class : Delos.*

of Artemis Amarynthia at Eretria ; the Triphylian cities on the western side of the Peloponnese had one in the temple of Poseidon, on the hill of Samicum, by the sea ; the twelve cities of Achaea had theirs in the temple of Poseidon at Helice, and, after the destruction of Helice by earthquake, in the temple of Zeus at Aegium. All these Political unions, principally religious, were necessarily Development of Religious more or less connected with politics ; in the case Associations. of Achaea, the political side developed, and the league became a federal association. Probably those national leagues which we only know on the political side, so far as they played any part in political history at all—*e.g.*, the Phocian, Locrian, and Acarnanian leagues—had their basis in a religious association. It is clear that the gathering of the Boeotian cities at the temple of Poseidon at Onchestus, in the territory of Haliartus, or at that of Athena Itonia at Coronea, served as the groundwork of the later federal union.

This political significance of the religious association is illustrated also by the Argive amphictiony. About this we hear very little, and some have denied its existence. The members of the association seem to have been Argos, Cleonae, Phlius, Sicyon, Epidaurus, Troezen, and Aegina ; its local centre was the shrine of the Pythaeon Apollo (Apollo Pythaeus) on the Larisa, or acropolis, of Argos. In this case Argos, the centre of the league, claimed also a political hegemony over the members of the association, as all of them were said to have been founded by her ; just as Athens used her legendary position as “metropolis” of Ionia, and the control she usurped over Delos and the Delian amphictiony, as a support to her imperial claims. In virtue of this claim, Argos imposed a fine on Sicyon and Aegina for supplying ships to the Spartan king, Cleomenes, on the occasion of his invasion of Argolis ;

but she was unable to maintain her political hegemony, and even her power of coercion in religious matters came to be questioned.

§ 42. Among the amphictionies of the wider type, the most important in early times must have been that of the seven states which met at the island of Calauria, on the north-east coast of Argolis, for the worship of Poseidon. These cities were Troezen, Hermione, Epidaurus, Prasiae, Nauplia, Aegina, Athens, and Orchomenos in Boeotia; Argos subsequently took the place of Nauplia, and Sparta that of Prasiae. This maritime league had little political significance; it must have been primarily commercial, just as in later times it was commerce which brought bad blood between two of its members, Athens and Aegina. Its main interest lies in the fact that the temple of the god was one of the earliest stone temples in Greece, and that within its portals the greatest of Greek orators was destined to die.

The most famous of the amphictionies was the amphictiony of Delphi, which was also, in fact, the one which extended most widely. Its origin and growth are obscure. It seems to have been at first an amphictiony of the tribes of central and northern Greece, having as local centre the shrine of Demeter at Anthela, at the pass of Thermopylae (the Pylae, or the "Gates"). Twelve peoples were included in it: Ionians, Dolopians, Thessalians, Enianes of Mount Oeta, Magnetes, Perrhaebians, Malians, Phthiotians, Phocians, Boeotians, Locrians, and Dorians. This list, containing the Phthiotians as independent members, may show that the league was in existence before their incorporation by the invading Thessalians. Each tribe had a double vote, and all, great and small alike, had equal voting power. All were pledged to

mutual protection and assistance; no member should raze the city of another to the ground, nor cut off running water from it in war. The oracle of ^{Its Constitution—} Delphi and the worship of Apollo came to be put under the protection of this league; the members swore to assist the god "with hand and foot and voice and all their strength, should any one pillage the temple or complot against his belongings." Membership, with all its rights and duties, belonged also to all colonies of the participant tribes, so that it was largely true to call the association the "common assemblage of the Hellenes" (*τὸ κοινὸν Ἑλλήνων συνέδριον*); but in spite of this, large sections of the Greek race were excluded—e.g., the Eleans and Arcadians. The general council of this league met twice a year—in ^{and Representation.} spring and in autumn, on each occasion at the two meeting places, Anthela and Delphi, each people sending two Hieromnemones as its official representatives. We hear also of Pylagorae, who in some way were also representative, perhaps of the cities of the various peoples. The amphictionic council thus constituted was a purely religious body; in its institution it belongs to the prehistoric age of Greece, and it is already out of relation with practical politics when it is first met with in history; nor was it ever reformed with a view to making it a real federal council. As a consequence its name is associated only with the darkest pages of Greek history—with the so-called Sacred Wars which did so much to destroy Greece. Its share in these arose out of its narrower object, the defence of the privileges of Delphi. Wars of this character were waged in 590 B.C. (against the Crisaean for acts of extortion committed on the pilgrims), in 355 B.C. (against the Phocians), and in 340 B.C. (against Amphissa) in the last two cases for violation of sacred territory. ^{Sacred Wars.}

§ 43. Very important was the influence of oracles, such as that of Trophonius at Lebadea, in Boeotia; of Amphiaraiüs, near Oropus; of Apollo Ptoüs, near Thebes; of Apollo at Abae, in Phocis; of Zeus at Dodona, in Epirus—"the most ancient of all in Greece." Famous as were these seats of prophecy, they were scarcely rivals of the Delphian Apollo, whose shrine marked, according to Greek fancy, which had much truth

<sup>Influence of
Oracles.</sup> Delphi. in it, the "navel" or centre of the Hellenic world. The sanctuary of "rocky Pytho" lay at the foot of the towering cliffs of Parnassus—the Phaeidiades, the "Shining Rocks;" from their recesses gushed forth the sacred spring Castalia, in which all who came to Delphi for religious purposes were required to purify themselves. The site falls steeply from the base of the cliff's to the ravine at the bottom of which flows the Pleistus. In the temple of Apollo was the Omphalus, marking the centre of the earth; on either side stood a golden effigy of the eagles which, sent forth by Zeus from east and west, had met at this spot. From a cleft in the ground in the Adytum, or subterranean chamber of the oracles, there issued an intoxicating vapour. Seated on a tripod over the chasm, the Pythia, or priestess, inhaled the vapour, and "with raving mouth, but full of the god," spoke words which the priest standing by her reshaped in hexameters.

From the middle of the eighth century B.C. the fame of Delphi began to eclipse that of other oracles, even in Ionia, where were famous oracles of Apollo at Didyma, near Miletus, and at Clarus, near Colophon. The Phrygian king, Midas, dedicated a throne at Delphi, and the oracle was appealed to in order to settle the succession to the Lydian throne—probably here also merely to recognise an accomplished fact, the usurpation

of Gyges. Delphi became, indeed, a sort of "ecclesiastical capital of Hellas"; but, as the instances given above show, its influence was not confined to Greeks; it was a point at which Greeks and barbarians met on common ground.

"Its influence was a moderating one, that is to say, directed against what was evil and pre-judicial, but it did not, as has often been believed in modern times, inspire the nation with positive ideas or point out new paths."^{*} Some would ascribe to it, in fact, all progress in Greece for the first three centuries of the historical period, "in every department of intellectual life, in religious and moral speculation, in politics, in architecture and sculpture, in music and poetry," and above all would see in the history of Greek colonisation its greatest service to the nation. This is to attach too much importance to the oracle, and to ascribe a genius to the priests of Delphi of which we have no real evidence —apart from the success which attended the colonising efforts of the states. It is absurd to attribute to the hereditary hierarchy of Delphi a minute geographical knowledge which enabled the priests to select the precise point at which a colony could command success; such knowledge undoubtedly guided the colonists, but it was obtained by their own pioneers at the cost of their own labour and danger, not from the second-hand source of the oracle. The sanction of the oracle was always sought, but it was to a project already formed upon its own merits. The oracle had value also as a charter, legitimising the undertaking against possible rivals for the advantages of a site. The ascription of initiative to the oracle in the foundation legends of the colonies undoubtedly enhanced the reputation of Delphi during the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.

Nature of its
Influence.

As a Guide to
Colonisation.

* Holm, *Greek History*, E.T. i. 284.

§ 44. Delphi was also connected with the games which did so much in the way of holding the Greeks together. Of these national contests there were four: the Olympic, the Pythian, the Nemean, and the Isthmian. There were other games also, of a local character. The Olympic games were the most renowned in Greece. They were celebrated in the sacred precinct of Olympia in the territory of Pisa, on the western side of the Peloponnese, in the angle between the Alpheius and a tributary, the Cladeus, flowing from the north. The control of the sanctuary was usurped from the Pisatans by the Eleans, their neighbours on the north, about 572 B.C. At that date both sanctuary and games must have been in existence hundreds of years. Legends took them back to the mythical hero Pelops, or to Heracles. Sparta always supported the claim of Elis to control the festival, and it was feigned that it had been re-established by the Spartan Lycurgus and the Elean Iphitus in 776 B.C., in proof whereof the discus, or quoit, of Iphitus was shown in the temple of Hera at Olympia, on which was graven the formula of the sacred truce which was proclaimed during the month in which the festival was celebrated. In 776 B.C., the starting-point of the first Olympiad, Coroebus of Elis

The First Olympiad (776 B.C.). was victor in the stadium, or foot-race. From that date onwards the Eleans claimed to have a complete record of the victors and of the changes in the games. This list has been preserved, but it is supposed to have been compiled by one Hippias of Elis about 400 B.C., no complete and authoritative register having been kept before his time. The festival was held every fourth year about the second full moon after midsummer. At first there was only one contest, the foot-race in the stadium of 600 feet, and even after other contests were

added the winner in the stadium was held in highest honour at Olympia, and his name was used to denote the Olympiad—*i.e.*, the interval between the Foot-Race (Stadium). The celebrations. The games at last came to include many “events” beside the foot-race—wrestling, boxing, chariot and horse-races; the pentathlum, which consisted of five contests—jumping, running, throwing the discus, casting the javelin, and wrestling; those who were distinguished in the pentathlum were the most Pentathlum. beautiful and accomplished of the Greeks; lastly, the pancratium, a cruel combination of boxing and wrestling, the least pleasing of all the contests. From one day the festival was extended to five. There were several contests under each head, and contests for boys as well as for men. Strange and almost incredible tales are told of the prowess of those ancient athletes, whose aptitude was part of their national heritage, and their training, it must be remembered, was lifelong. None but Greeks of the pure blood could compete; all competitors must make good their pedigree before the stewards and judges, the Hellanodicae, appointed by the Eleans to control the contests. The competitors strove together in a state of absolute nudity, and all Greece gazed upon the highest types of physical beauty and excellence fully revealed, and learnt to know what bodily perfection meant. The victor’s prize was a wreath made of an olive-branch cut with golden sickle from the sacred tree, the “Olive of the Olympic Victors.” Fair Crown”; but honour and substantial rewards at the hands of his fellow-citizens came to him who had crowned his city with the glory of a victory at Olympia. At Athens he had a right to live at public expense in the Prytaneum; at Sparta the right to stand in battle next the king; Philip of Macedon, proud of his victory in the single-horse

race, placed on his coinage the figure of the steed, with rider on his back and wreath on his neck; Syracuse and Agrigentum adopted the victorious four-horsed chariot (*quadriga*) as the normal type on their coins, while poets like Pindar and Bacchylides celebrated their victories.

§ 45. The scene of these contests has been excavated.

The Altis
(Sacred Pre-
cinct) at Olym-
pia : The
Heraeum.

It was the sacred p�ecinct or Altis, a quadri-lateral bounded by a wall, at the foot of Mount Cronius. Within it stood the great temple of

Zeus, the chapel of Pelops, who was worshipped here before Zeus, the great open-air altar of Zeus, a temple of Hera, the remains of which are those of the oldest temple in Greece. Along the foot of Mount Cronius stood a row of Treasuries, built by various states, wherein to store their offerings; these Treasuries were twelve in number, belonging to Sicyon, Syracuse, Epidamnus, Byzantium, Sybaris, Cyrene, Selinus, Metapontum, Megara, and Gela; two of them are not identified. Two things

The Olympic
Games as a Bond
of Connection
between Eastern
and Western
Greeks.

appear from this list: (1) the predominance of the cities of the west; Olympia, which is so curiously far from the centre of Greece proper, and from the eastern side in which her life was

most vigorously exhibited, is thus seen to occupy a really more central position in the Greek world than is at first sight evident: the Olympic games are the real bond of connection between the western colonies and the mother country; (2) with the exception of Sybaris and Metapontum, the other known names are those of Dorian cities; Olympia is most closely connected throughout with the Dorian section of the Greek name.

§ 46. The other festivals never attained the importance of the Olympian. The Pythian games, on the Cirrhaean (Crisaeæan) plain near Delphi, were organised by Cleisthenes

of Sicyon, on the model of those of Olympia in 582 B.C., gymnastic contests being added to the older contest between players on the lyre (*cithara*). The Pythian Games. The prize was a wreath of laurel. The contests were held every four years, so arranged that the celebration fell in the third year of the Olympiad, two years thus intervening between the celebration of the Olympic and that of the Pythian games. The chief event was always the so-called Pythian Nomos or strain in honour of Apollo, accompanied by the flute.

The Nemean games were celebrated in the lonely vale of Nemea, belonging to the territory of Cleonae. The Nemean Games. They were held every two years (the second and fourth of each Olympiad), about midsummer. The contests resembled those at Delphi, being gymnastic, equestrian, and musical; the prize was a wreath of parsley. These games also were an adaptation of an earlier festival; their organisation was perhaps due to Cleisthenes, about the beginning of the sixth century B.C. Three columns of the temple of the Nemean Zeus still stand.

The Isthmian games, organised in honour of Poseidon, perhaps by Periander, tyrant of Corinth, were held on the isthmus among the pine-woods at Schoenus. The Isthmian Games. They occurred every two years, in the second and fourth year of the Olympiad, in spring; consequently one or other of the four Pan-Hellenic festivals occurred every year. The prize was a wreath of parsley, but at a very late date a crown of pine was introduced. The contests were gymnastic, equestrian, and musical; this festival again was a reorganisation of a much older periodical gathering and sacrifice.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SUPREMACY OF ARGOS.

§ 47. Early Supremacy of Argos in Peloponnesus ; Pheidon of Argos ; his Expedition to Olympia.—§ 48. Date of Pheidon.—§ 49. Pheidon's Constitutional Position ; his System of Measures ; his Coinage.—§ 50. Decline of Argos after Pheidon's Death.

§ 47. AMID the obscurity in which the early history of the Peloponnese is shrouded, one broad fact is clearly visible—that Argos was for long the most powerful of the Dorian states, ruling directly or indirectly over the most important part of the Peloponnese, and standing forth as the heiress of the old Mycenaean power, or the Achaean power, as it came to be called under the influence of the Homeric poems. The legend of the Dorian invasion seems to intend to express this fact by making the rulers of Argos descendants of the eldest son of Aristomachus.* The capital of the Argive kingdom was Argos, lying at the base of the steep citadel-hill called Larissa, much nearer the coast than Mycenae, and just at the point where the routes from the interior enter the Argive plain. The origin of the city is not given even in legend, whereas to Mycenae and Tiryns are assigned definite founders. Mycenae and Tiryns continued, indeed, to exist, but without a vestige of their former importance. The greater part of the territory at the head of the Argolic gulf belonged directly to Argos. She also extended her power eastwards by the conquest of Nauplia and Asine,

* See p. 34.

and thus secured complete command of the gulf. Southwards, the entire eastern littoral, inland as far as the range of Parnon, and down to and including Cape Malea and the island of Cythera, apparently belonged to her; of its conquest we have no record. Lastly, her influence spread also to the north-west and north-east over the Dorian states of the Argolic peninsula; the legends of the Dorising of these states from Argos express her claim to political hegemony over them as constituting the "lot of Temenus." How far this claim was recognised we cannot say. Certainly the inevitable growth of certain members of the sacrificial league, such as Aegina, more favourably placed for commerce, was bound to weaken the ties that existed, and Argos failed in the end to convert her position into one of acknowledged political and military pre-eminence.

For only a brief period Argos realised her dreams of empire. This was under King Pheidon. The Pheidon of Argos. meagre fragments of tradition suffice to show that no other ruler in the list of Argive kings was his equal in ability and power. He found, we are told, the "lot of Temenus" divided into several parts, but he reunited them; by this we must understand that the process of disintegration in the Argive confederacy had gone far, but for a time he consolidated the power of Argos and widened it. What he actually did it is hardly possible to say, beyond the general statement that he evidently attempted to do in the north-east of the Peloponnese what Sparta afterwards succeeded in doing in the south. The only action of Pheidon about which we can speak with a certain confidence is his intervention in the dispute between the Pisatans and the Eleans as to the control of His Expedition to Olympia. the festival at Olympia. He sided with the Pisatans, whose claim was, indeed, on grounds both of

geography and history, incontestable, and restored the management of the games to the Pisatans, who held it subsequently for many years. Pheidon himself presided in the year of his intervention. The Eleans appealed to the nascent power of Sparta; we see that the expedition to the west of the Peloponnese was an episode in a struggle between the two powers of which few details are preserved.

§ 48. The expedition to Olympia is important, as it gives us the only real basis for an opinion as to the date at which Pheidon reigned. It is curious that this should be one of the most perplexing problems in Greek chronology. The figure of Pheidon looms out of the mists of this early age as that of a ruler with wide aims and high abilities, but it is formless and intangible. It is doubtful whether he belongs to the eighth or even to the sixth century B.C. If the Olympic festival at which he presided was the eighth, as one authority expressly declares, his expedition took place in that year (748 B.C.); if "eighth" is a mistake for "twenty-eighth," as some moderns believe, it took place in 668 B.C. Theories, whether ancient or modern, which transcend these limits in either direction need hardly be taken into account. The problem is too complicated for discussion here; it will probably be found that those are nearest the truth who assign his reign to about the middle of the seventh century, say from 670 to 630 B.C. It is tempting to bring into his reign the great battle of Hysiae, fought in the pass (669 B.C.) between Tegea and Argos, in which the Argives defeated the Spartans, and checked for a time their advance in this direction; the traditional date of that battle is 669 B.C.

§ 49. Naturally, a ruler of the stamp of Pheidon made the power of the crown a reality, and temporarily checked that decay of monarchy which was a universal symptom in Greek constitutional history from the middle of the eighth century before our era. Hence, from the standpoint of later democratic ideas, which won the upper hand in Argos and elsewhere, Pheidon appeared to be indistinguishable from the tyrants who overthrew the aristocracies; so far as we can see, the basis of his power was legitimate, and he had nothing in common with the tyrants except his breadth of view, and perhaps sometimes the character of the methods he employed to realise his aims. He may have reorganised the Olympian festival in the way of making it more representative and Panhellenic. It is apparently certain that he left his mark upon Greek civilisation by what he did in connection with commercial intercourse. What it was that he did is not clear. Herodotus tells us that he "made their measures for the Peloponnesians." A later historian improves upon this by saying that he invented weights, measures, and coinage, his mint of silver coins being in Aegina. "Previous to the time of Pheidon," we are told, "there were no gold or silver coins; men bought and sold with oxen, slaves, and uncoined lumps of precious metal." The gold and silver were in the shape of small bars, or "spits" (*ἀβελίσκοι*), as they were called; the Spartans used such, of iron, even in historic times. It is certain that Pheidon did not invent the art of coinage; the Lydians made that contribution to civilisation. Of the two standards according to which coins were struck in historic times, the Aeginetan and the Euboic, the Aeginetan originally prevailed most widely in Greece, being in use throughout

Pheidon's Constitutional Position.

His System of Measures.

His Coinage.

the Peloponnese and northern Greece, while the Euboic was at first confined to Euboea, Samos, and the other islands. Aegina was probably one of the first states to adopt the art of coinage from Asia Minor, and specimens of her heavy coins bearing the image of a tortoise are still in existence, dating apparently from about 700 B.C. The statement that Pheidon coined money in Aegina may perhaps be a mere false inference from the fact that he did something in some way connected with coinage, and the fact that the Aeginetan standard prevailed in the Peloponnese. Measures, weights, and monetary standard are closely allied; Pheidon perhaps officially adopted the Aeginetan system in Argos, and in this sense introduced silver coins into the Peloponnese; we can say nothing about the changes he made in the system of measures and weights.

§ 50. It is clear that with Pheidon's death, which is said to have been a violent one, at Corinth, the Decline of Argos after Pheidon's prestige of Argos decayed. Sicyon and Corinth Death. came to greatness under their tyrants. Aegina's commerce and wealth made her independent of any claims of suzerainty that Argos might urge. More serious than all this was the gradual expansion of Sparta. Argos thus ultimately fell from her proud position, but she never lost the recollection of her former glory, and more than once in the later history of Greece the memory of it influenced her conduct.

CHAPTER IX.

THE AGE OF THE TYRANTS.

§ 51. Conflicts between the Oligarchies and the People; Concessions of the Oligarchies; Written Codes and the Appointment of Aesymnetae.—§ 52. Meaning of the word "Tyrant."—§ 53. The Age of Tyrants.—§ 54. Theory *v.* Fact as regards Tyrants: their Services to Greece.—§ 55. Ionian Tyrants.—§ 56. Position of Corinth; Overthrow of the Oligarchy.—§ 57. Cypselus.—§ 58. Periander: his Imperial Policy; his encouragement of Literature; Arion and the Dithyramb; Fall of the Tyranny.—§ 59. Sicyon; the Orthagoridae; Cleisthenes; the Sacred War; Cleisthenes' Anti-Argive Policy.—§ 60. The Wooing of Agariste.—§ 61. Theagenes of Megara: his War with Athens for Salamis.

§ 51. THE distinguishing feature of the eighth century in the constitutional history of Greece had been the struggle between the king and the nobles; the mark of the seventh century was the beginning of the struggle between the classes —*i.e.*, between the privileged aristocracy or oligarchy of birth or wealth, and the unprivileged and poor freemen of the state. The conflict with monarchy had been one result of the transition from the village community to the city-state; the conflict with aristocracy was born of the decline of agriculture, the development of commerce and industry, and the growth of great towns. The old order of things was felt in the commercial centres to be out of harmony with the times, but the governing few met demands for reform by acts of oppression. Economic changes, such as the introduction of coinage, bore heavily upon the poorer citizens, and their

condition was rendered intolerable by the harshness of the debtors' laws. Colonisation provided a remedy for distress and discontent, but it was a remedy of which all could not, or would not, avail themselves. The primary demand was for social and economic reform, rather than for a share in privileges ; just as at Rome it was the personal wrongs of the plebeians rather than their political inequality that led to the long struggle between the Orders. The political aspect of the question was soon prominent, for popular government in some form was the surest means of amelioration of the position of the lower orders ; but the first cry was for equal justice—a cry which could be satisfied only by the publication of a written

^{—met by} ~~Written Codes~~ into the following century, we hear of legislators in various parts of the Greek world. The earliest of these legislators is said to have been Zaleucus

among the Italian Locrians ; in Catane there was Charondas, whose laws were adopted in other Sicilian and Italian cities (about 640 B.C.). Of their work we know nothing. Philolaüs of Corinth made laws for Thebes ; Demonax of Mantinea for Cyrene ; and Draco for Athens. Sometimes these internal difficulties were met by the appointment of a constitutional dictator, called by the Greeks *Aesymnetes*

^{—and by the} ~~of Aesymnetae.~~ (*αἰσυμνήτης*) : such was Pittacus of Mytilene. This office might be given for life, or for a

term of years, or until certain duties had been accomplished ; it is described by Aristotle as an “elective tyranny.” Solon of Athens must be classed as an *Aesymnetes*, though his actual title was *Archon* ; his power was absolute over all departments. The work of such legislators was possible only where the oligarchy was willing to make concessions. In other cases the discord led

to the establishment of that type of personal ascendancy which to the Greeks appeared only hateful—to the establishment of the “tyrannis.”

§ 52. The name “tyrant” (*τύραννος*) appears to have been derived from Lydia; it is first applied to the Lydian king Gyges, by the poet ^{Meaning of the word} Archilochus, of the middle of the seventh century B.C. The word had not necessarily the bad sense which it now bears; it had reference to the basis of power, rather than to the manner of its exercise. As that basis was armed force (the distinctive mark of the tyrant being the body-guard), the effect upon the tyrant himself was often evil, impelling him to acts of violence and oppression, and so the word came to have its modern connotation, and to be applied even to those who held the throne by due course of law. Put most shortly, tyranny to the Greek meant power that was absolute and irresponsible: the tyrant was outside the ordinances of the state by his own act, and literally an “outlaw,” so that “killing was no murder” in his case. Generally the tyrants obtained their power as champions of the oppressed stratum of the population; often they were renegade nobles who used popular discontent as the lever to overthrow the constitution.

§ 53. The *tyrannis* first came into existence, then, during the intestine struggles of the seventh century B.C., and thenceforth it was a standing menace of the Greek states. Their position was one of unstable equilibrium, a delicate balance between the rule of All (democracy) and the rule of Few (oligarchy), with the *tyrannis* looming in the background. For while all hated the tyrant, their hatred was born of envy. In no race has the thirst for personal power been so intense and so widely felt as in that of ancient

Greece; this instinct of despotism is the key to many of her brilliant failures. Although tyranny was always with the Greeks, it is still correct to speak of the century after the fall of the aristocracies as the "age of the tyrants." It is only futile criticism that can condemn the expression as a misnomer; it implies merely that a "crop" of tyrants flourished in different parts of Greece at about the same time, with certain well-marked and very similar characteristics, and no more suggests that tyrants were unknown in later ages than the expression "age of colonisation" suggests that colonies were not afterwards a feature of Greek life.

§ 54. Irresponsible rule need not be evil rule, but the Greek tradition has painted the tyrants in dark colours. This is because the extant literature is the work of aristocrats, or is based on the traditions of aristocrats, and, as already explained, tyranny sprang from the democratic struggle to break down aristocratic monopoly of privileges. Hence the rule of the tyrants is represented as systematic oppression, if not stained with blood. The general theory of their rule is set forth in a story which attaches itself to various names, to Thrasybulus of Miletus, or Periander of Corinth; in Roman history it is told of Tarquinus Superbus: the tyrant walks through the fields striking off with his stick all the finest and tallest ears of corn—an object-lesson on the best method of governing a city. In the language of the political theorists, the typical tyrant did not represent the state and its needs, but his own personal interests only. Nevertheless, the accounts given of individual tyrants are not consistent, even from this point of view; Periander, for example, is portrayed as a monster of lust and cruelty, and at the same time stands

The Age of
Tyrants.

Tyrants Mis-
represented
by Political
Theorists.

by the side of Solon and Pittacus as one of the Seven Sages.

The tyrants did much for Greece. They raised their respective states to a pitch of greatness never before or (in many cases) afterwards attained; ^{Their Services to Greece—} they introduced wider views of policy and statesmanship than those which inspired either aristocracies or democracies. None of the types of legitimate government evinced so keen an interest in the welfare of the state as did ^{—in Political Development—} the tyrants. They broke down the exclusive oligarchies and unified the state, and thus created a truly national spirit; it was this, indeed, which ultimately hurled them from their seats. The corner-stone of their policy was the elevation of the depressed elements in the state at the expense of the hostile dominant section, and the breaking down, to a certain extent at least, of class distinctions. It was with this object that they fostered popular cults which had hitherto been of no account—*e.g.*, the worship of Dionysus and the allied Mysteries. Most striking were their services to art and literature; both poetry and the plastic arts owed much to their ^{—in Art and Literature—} munificence. Hiero of Syracuse is the most splendid example of this side of the tyrant's work; Pindar, Bacchylides, and Aeschylus were not ashamed to share his bounty. Earlier tyrants played the same part, which, indeed, has been congenial to tyrants in most ages; the poet Anacreon, and Democedes the greatest physician of the time are found at the court of Polycrates of Samos. Delphi and Olympia both owed much of their glory to the tyrants. The temples and other vast works which they undertook had also an economic object—to ^{—in Public Works.} provide work and wages for the lower classes; according to Aristotle, who was in politics a theorist, the

object was to keep them poor and hard at work that idle hands might not find mischief to do!

§ 55. Little is known of the Ionian tyrants. The most famous of them was Thrasybulus of Miletus, ^{Ionian Tyrants.} who successfully defended his city against absorption by Lydia, and aided in the colonisation of the Euxine. The island of Lesbos had her tyrants, but her history at this period is interesting, as showing how, if a state was lucky enough to possess the right man, she could solve the burning questions between the orders without falling a prey to a tyrant. Pittacus, elected Aesymnetes (590 B.C.), framed a code of laws which gave Mytilene peace, and gained for himself a place among the Seven Wise Men.

§ 56. Central Greece shows four great tyrannies: the rule of the Cypselids, at Corinth; of the Orthagorids, at Sicyon; of Theagenes, at Megara; and of the Peisistratids, at Athens. All these states, it should be noticed, lay on the great highway of trade, the Saronic and Corinthian gulfs.

No state was so advantageously placed as Corinth. She did not occupy the isthmus itself, but lay to the south-west about two miles from the sea, at the northern foot of the lofty and semi-detached hill of Acrocorinthus, which was crowned by her citadel. Her harbour on the Corinthian gulf was Lechacum; that on the Saronic Gulf, about eight miles distant, Cenchreæ. She thus commanded the routes which converged from the Peloponnesus to the isthmus, as well as the stream of commerce between the two gulfs. The isthmus itself is only about four miles across, so that it was easy to transport the light ships of the ancients on a system of rollers (the Diolkos) from sea to sea; and as in ancient times the voyage round Cape Malea was dreaded, this course was generally adopted.

Corinth thus received dues not only from those trans-shipping cargoes, but from merchants trading between northern Greece and the Peloponnese. Her own manu-factories in metal, pottery, and fabrics also combined to make her in early times one of the most important commercial towns in Greece. By her defeat (about 664 B.C.) at the hands of the Corcyreans, she partially lost her hold upon the western trade; it was perhaps this failure of their policy that led to the overthrow of the oligarchy of the Bacchiadae. The instrument of revolution was Cypselus, himself connected through his mother Labda with the dominant class. An oracle had foretold his greatness, and the Bacchiadae resolved to kill him in infancy. Ten of the Bacchiadae, Overthrow of their number chosen to do the deed were melted to pity by his baby-smile at the moment when he was about to be dashed to the ground, and none of them had the heart to slay him. After a while, however, they steeled themselves to accomplish their design, but in the meantime his mother had concealed the child. Eight hundred years afterwards the traveller Pausanias saw and described the wonderful cedar-wood chest decorated with mythological scenes in gold and ivory, dedicated in the temple of Hera at Olympia by the Cypselidae, the very chest (*κυψέλη*), it was alleged, in which the founder of the dynasty had been hidden from his would-be murderers.

§ 57. Little is known of Cypselus (657—627 B.C.). The Bacchiadae were driven into exile. One of them, Demaratus, was said to have taken refuge in Etruria, and his son, Tarquinius Priscus, became king of Rome. Cypselus initiated the vigorous colonial and commercial policy of his house. To counteract the defection of Corcyra, Corinthian colonies were founded

Cypselus (657—
627 B.C.): His
Colonies.

upon the sea-route to the west—Molycreum, in Locris; Chalcis, in Aetolia, both near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf; Ambracia, in Epirus, on the northern shore of the deep gulf to which it gave its name (modern gulf of *Arta*); Anactorium, on its southern shore; Leucas, on an Acarnanian peninsula converted by means of a canal into an island, were perhaps all foundations of Cypselus.

§ 58. Under his successor Periander (627—586 B.C.).

^{Periander (627—} Corinth attained the acme of her power. The ^{586 B.C.)} stubborn rivalry of Corcyra was broken by his subjugation of that island. New settlements were planted—Apollonia on the Illyrian shore; Epidamus, farther north, a Corcyrean colony, fell also into the hands of the Corinthians; Potidaea was founded in the Chalcidic peninsula. The Cypselids aimed at something more than sporadic settlements: their ideal was rather that of a confederated ^{Imperial Policy} empire, the colonial members of it not being ^{of the Cypselidae.} dependent in the usual Greek fashion, but ruled by members of the dynasty. Periander was also allied with the despots of Megara and Sicyon, and the old antagonism between Corinth and Miletus was abandoned for alliance with Thrasybulus; for the sovereignty of the commercial world was passing away from Chalcis and Eretria, which had ruined themselves by mutual hostility, into the hands of the Corinthians, Aeginetans, and others, and with this came changes in the foreign policy of the states. Periander appears to have entered into relations also with Psammetichus II. of Egypt; this seems to be indicated by the fact that the son of his brother bears the name of that king.

It was perhaps this Egyptian connection that suggested ^{Canals of} to him the cutting of the canal at Leucas ^{Periander.} through the neck of the peninsula, and the design with which he is credited of cutting a canal through

the isthmus of Corinth—a vast work which fired the imagination, we are told, of Julius Caesar, Nero, and Hadrian, but was not actually accomplished until our own time. Of the development of art in his reign the remains of a great temple on the site of ancient Corinth are perhaps an evidence. It was at Corinth that the passionate hymn to Dionysus the wine-god, the dithyramb, was converted by Arion of Methymna, in Lesbos, the greatest harpist of the day, into a choral ode of regular artistic form. This was the famous Arion who, embarking at Tarentum for Corinth with all his wealth, was set upon by the rascally crew, and compelled to leap into the sea ; but a dolphin sent by the god bore him on its back to Taenarum. It is doubtful whether the revival and extension of the festival of Poseidon on the isthmus was due to Periander or was of later date. The closing years of the great tyrant are said to have been clouded with sorrow ; his sons all died before him, so that the succession fell to his nephew Psammetichus, who, after a reign of three years, was assassinated. The dynasty thus came to an end, and the power of Corinth declined. Corcyra regained her independence. Oligarchy was re-established in Corinth, but it ruled with intelligence and moderation, recognising that in a city whose life depended on her commerce oppression of the trading and industrial class was suicidal. Pindar praises the city as one “in which Good Law and her sisters, Justice and Peace, dwell, the sure keepers of cities, the golden children of Themis, who know how to guard against rebellion.” Corinth entered the Spartan alliance, but without any sacrifice of independence. We shall see her exercising great and fatal influence over the policy of that confederacy, and thereby over the destinies of Greece.

His Patronage
of Literature.
Arion and the
Dithyramb.

End of the
Tyranny.

Wise Rule of
the Oligarchy.

§ 59. Sicyon lies to the west of Corinth. Its territory is narrow, but very fruitful. The town was bound Sicyon. to profit from the trade in the gulf and from the proximity of wealthy Corinth. Besides the three Dorian tribes, the Hylleis, Dymanes, and Pamphyli, we find another tribe, the Aegialeis, which must have included the pre-Dorian inhabitants of the land. These seem gradually to have increased in importance, and from them sprang the line of the tyrants, evidently the leaders of a national anti-Dorian movement. Orthagoras, who seems also to have been called Andreas, was the founder of the dynasty Orthagoras. (665 B.C.). No incident of his reign is reported.

He was succeeded by his son Myron, who won the prize at Olympia with his four-horse chariot in 648 B.C. The most famous of the family was Cleisthenes. He had a

Cleisthenes. great military reputation. His most important achievement was the championship of the Delphic oracle in alliance with the amphictionic states against the people of Crisa in the first Sacred War (590 B.C.). The Crisaean laid claim to the control of the

The First Sacred War. oracle, and took toll of the pilgrims who landed at their port and crossed their territory on their way to Delphi. The result of the long war (which, on the model of that of Troy, is said to have lasted ten years) was that Crisa was destroyed and her territory dedicated to the gods, with solemn curses against all who should attempt to take any of it under cultivation. At the close of the war the Pythian games were instituted, the old musical contest being reorganised and enlarged. Cleisthenes was the victor in the first chariot-race. He devoted his share of the spoils of Crisa to the adornment of Sicyon with works of art. Cleisthenes also engaged in war with Argos, his object being to free his city from the supremacy of

Argos—a supremacy which was supposed to be justified by the legends. To this end the cult of the Argive hero Adrastus was suppressed, and the recitation of Homer by the rhapsodes was forbidden; in their place were introduced festivals in honour of Dionysus.

Anti-Argive
Policy of
Cleisthenes.

§ 60. The name of Cleisthenes is connected with a famous story. He had no son, but he had a daughter whose name was Agariste. At the Olympic games, at which he had himself been crowned victor in the four-horse chariot-race, he made proclamation that all who aspired to wed the daughter of Cleisthenes of Sicyon should repair to Sicyon within sixty days, there to be entertained for a year; at the year's end choice of a husband should be made. From all parts of the Hellenic world—from Italy, Thessaly, Epirus, Euboea, the Peloponnese, and Athens—suitors came flocking. For twelve months Cleisthenes entertained the suitors, keeping close watch upon the way in which they bore themselves at gymnastic exercises and the feast; above all things he wanted a gentleman for his son-in-law—the founder of his dynasty had been but a cook, if legend spoke truly. The struggle seemed to lie between two Athenians, the Alcmaeonid Megacles and the Philaid Hippocleides—the latter a brilliant man; moreover, a connection of the Cypselids by descent. At length the day for decision arrived. All Sicyon was feasted. After their dinner the suitors displayed their skill in music and their wit in conversation. The brilliant Hippocleides surpassed himself, and at length displayed an accomplishment kept in reserve for the decisive moment. Calling a flute-player he bade him play, and danced to his music. Cleisthenes “looked on at the whole matter with suspicion.” Next Hippocleides had a table set, and, mounting it, capered in Laconian and Attic figures. The grand finale was reached

when he stood on his head and gesticulated with his legs. Cleisthenes could restrain himself no longer. "Thou hast danced away thy wedding!" he cried. "Little cares Hippocleides," was the retort, an expression which became proverbial at Athens. So Megacles won Agariste, and she bore him a daughter (who was married to Peisistratus, tyrant of Athens), and a more famous son, Cleisthenes the reformer. To this core of historic fact have been tacked on elements which are found in the Indian fable of the *Dancing Peacock*, a fable of "indefinite antiquity."*

We hear no more of Cleisthenes; the date and manner of his death are unknown. When Sicyon is next heard of she is a member of the Lacedaemonian confederacy.

§ 61. Megara played a great part in the development of Greek commerce. Her territory extended from sea to sea, separated from that of Corinth by the range of Geraneia, running east and west.

Megara : Its Geographical Position. The town of Megara itself lay a mile from the eastern sea; her port on this side was Nisaea; on the Corinthian gulf it was Pegae. Thus Megara resembled Corinth in holding the routes that crossed the isthmus from east to west, or from northern Greece to the Peloponnes. The poverty of the land on the one hand, and the great development of maritime commerce on the other, caused great inequality of wealth; rich nobles occupied the city, while on the hills peasants "clad in goat-skins" lived "like deer." Theagenes, who was himself of noble birth, gained

Theagenes. the tyranny as champion of the poor (about 640 B.C.). Little is known of his reign; he left a memorial of it in the shape of a fine aqueduct. His daughter was married to Cylon, an Athenian, who, with the support of Megarian troops, tried to make himself

* Macan, *Herodotus* IV.-VI., vol. ii. p. 304 fol.

tyrant of Athens. The attempt failed, and this seems to have led to war with Athens. The island of Salamis, occupying the angle of the Eleusinian bay between Athens and Megara, was of decisive His War with Athens for Salamis. moment for both states, and the war was fought to decide the question of its possession. For a time the Megarians were victorious, but the tide at last turned. Perhaps it was this failure of the foreign policy of Theagenes that led to his downfall; apparently he was expelled. Then Megara was torn by faction. The people gained the upper hand, but behaved with extravagant violence, and this brought back the aristocratic party to power. The history of Megara as a great state was by that time at an end.

CHAPTER X.

SPARTA : ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION.

§ 62. Dorian Conquest of Laconia ; Origin and Constituents of the Spartan State.—§ 63. The Helots : their Position ; Neodamodes ; Mothones ; the Crypteia.—§ 64. The Perioeci : their Position.—§ 65. The Spartiates ; Conditions of Citizenship ; Peers and Inferiors ; Lots ; Nobles.—§ 66. The Spartan Constitution ; the Kingship : Its Dual Character.—§ 67. Religious, Judicial, and Military Functions of the Kings ; Power of the Kings.—§ 68. The Council of Elders (Gerusia) : their Mode of Election and Functions.—§ 69. The Apella (Popular Assembly).—§ 70. The Ephors ; Method of Electing them ; their Powers.

§ 62. THE Greeks who first entered Greece amalgamated ^{Amalgamation} with its primitive inhabitants. In the same ^{of Dorians with Conquered Peoples.} way, that section of the Greeks which was ^{Peoples.} the last to arrive, the Dorians, who entered the Peloponnese at various points hundreds of years after the beginning of the process of Hellenisation, also amalgamated, but less completely, with the inhabitants of the districts they conquered. In Argolis the amalgamation seems to have been most complete ; in Sicyon, as we saw, the pre-Dorian population enjoyed a revival of their power and influence under the Orthagorid dynasty. In Laconia amalgamation hardly took place at all. How far the process of fusion between the Hellenic and pre-Hellenic inhabitants of the land had advanced we cannot say. The chief place in Laconia at the incoming of the ^{Amyclae} Dorians seems to have been Amyclae, but whether its princes belonged to the Greek stock or to the

earlier race is not known—most probably to the former. The Dorians who invaded Laconia seem to have been more numerous than those who invaded the north-east of the Peloponnese, and they maintained themselves more effectually as a victorious element uncontaminated by the conquered population. Hence they developed that peculiar type of character and civilisation which is regarded as essentially Doric. This is also the reason why we find in Laconia that class of serfs which is called the Helots; these were simply the inhabitants of the land, Hellenic and non-Hellenic, enslaved by the Dorian invaders. The invaders themselves developed in a peculiar manner. They established themselves in the land in village communities planted amid the subject population. In course of time certain villages occupying a central site coalesced to form a city-state, Sparta. Like Athens, Sparta originated in what the Greeks called synoecism —i.e., a surrender of political individuality in order to become incorporated in a larger whole. Probably before Sparta was thus created the Dorians dispersed through the country had, to a certain extent, begun to amalgamate with the noble families of the conquered race, but this process went no further. Sparta became the rallying point of the pure Dorians, who sharply severed themselves from the rest of the inhabitants, and from such of their brethren as had amalgamated with them. It is possible that there were other local centres besides Sparta owing their existence to precisely the same causes —i.e., synoecism based on nationality. These, in course of time, were compelled to recognise Sparta as the sovereign city, and to be content to live themselves without political rights. It is also probable that the Dorians who gathered at Sparta contained non-Dorian elements admitted on various grounds

Dorian Conquest of Laconia.

The Spartan State: Its Origin.

and regarded as of the pure blood. That Sparta arose from a union of villages is evident from the fact that the five components of the city—Pitane, Messoa, Limnae, Conoūra (or Conosura), and Dyme—continued to exist as local phylae, or tribes, of the historic Sparta.

The Spartan state, therefore, consisted of the Spartiates—
i.e., the Dorian clans gathered at Sparta. Below
Its Constituents. these, free, and enjoying local independence, but without political rights in the Spartan state, came the Perioeci, composed mainly of Dorians, with an admixture of earlier inhabitants. At the bottom of the scale were the Helots, or serfs. The Dorians of Sparta, and the Perioeci scattered in the towns throughout Laconia, were together called “Lacedaemonians,” a title which was also applied to either body separately.

§ 63. The class of Helots, or serfs bound to the soil
(adscripti glebae), was a creation of the Dorians.
The Helots. Speaking generally, the Helots differed in nationality from their lords; in Laconia they must have been mostly of the old race which held the peninsula before the Greeks came. A similar class of serfs, called Penestae, is found in Thessaly; there also the result of conquest. The name Helot was traditionally derived from that of Helos, a town near the mouth of the Eurotas; or from ἡλος (“fen”), and so “fenmen,” in allusion to the fens of that region, as though the conquered people had retired to the fens and held out there, like the English before the Normans. Probably the derivation is from ἡλεῖν, “to capture”; hence the name was extended to the conquered Messenians also. The Helot was a public slave, used by, but not the property of, private individuals; the state assigned him his residence by allotting him to a particular noble family. The Spartan noble for whom a Helot was compelled to

toil could neither sell, slay, nor liberate him: the Helots were bound to the estate which they cultivated. ^{Their Position.} Though the land they cultivated belonged to private individuals, the Helots paid only a fixed proportion of the produce; and this proportion could not be increased, under penalty of a curse. The remainder belonged to the Helot cultivators, who could thus acquire some degree of wealth. The state employed Helots as light-armed troops and as servants to the full citizens on service (at the battle of Plataea each Spartiate had seven Helot attendants), as rowers in the fleet, and occasionally as heavy-armed troops of the line (hoplites). The reward for faithful service was freedom; for the state only could emancipate. Liberated Helots, or their children, were called ^{Neodamodes.} Neodamodes.* This class is first mentioned during the Peloponnesian war, and seems to disappear after the time of Xenophon. The status of the enfranchised Helot must have resembled that of the Perioecus; he cannot have been admitted to the class of full citizens. Another class connected with the Helots is that of the Mōthaces or Mothōnes ($\mu\acute{o}\theta\alpha\kappa\epsilon\varsigma$, $\mu\acute{o}\theta\omega\nu\varsigma$), who were free men, but not full citizens by birth, yet sharing in the Spartan training, and able by merit to attain full ^{Mothōnes or} Mōthaces. privileges. They were probably the illegitimate sons of Spartans by Helot mothers. From this class sprang Lysander, Gylippus, and perhaps Callicratidas.

The Helots were a necessary condition of the Spartan organisation, but the Spartans felt, as Tiberius said of himself with regard to the army, that they "held a wolf by the ears." The Helots were always "lying in wait" for the misfortunes of their lords. We have

* Τὸς Νεοδαμῶδες is the name of the class; from $\nu\acute{e}\os$ ("new"), and $\delta\acute{a}\mu\os$ = $\delta\acute{a}\mu\os$ ("citizen-body"), and so "new citizens."

the most extraordinary statement as to the length to which fear drove the Spartans, but extraordinary as it is, it is too well attested to be set aside out of sentimental regard for the Spartan character. A system of secret police, the infamous Crypteia (*κρυπτεία*), was organised by the Ephors and served by the Spartan youth. A number of young Spartans roamed secretly over the country, armed with daggers, spying upon the Helots, and assassinating those who gave indications of disaffection. That blood-guiltiness might not attach to this organised system of murder, the Ephors on entering upon office declared war upon the entire body of Helots. Thucydides gives us an example of the working of this system in the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war (424 B.C.), when two thousand Helots, emancipated with all the solemnities of religion for faithful service to the state, not long afterwards disappeared without leaving a trace of their fate.

§ 64. The Perioeci, or "dwellers round about" Sparta, were, as has been said above, largely of Dorian origin. They were the descendants of those Dorians who mingled with the original population in the towns of Laconia after the subjugation of the country and the reduction of the mass of its inhabitants to the position of Helots. The Dorians of Sparta conquered these towns perhaps about 800 B.C.; echoes of the conquest—e.g., of Amyclae, Pharis, and Geronthrae—are preserved in the legends. Thus there was in historic times no recognisable difference in race between the Perioeci and

The name "Lacedæmonian." of the Spartans, and both were called Lacedæmonians. It was just this community of race of the Spartans and the Perioeci that prevented the latter making common cause with the non-Dorian Helots.

The Perioeci were not a rural, but a town population ; and the towns were situated mainly on the coast, so that the trade and manufactures of Laconia were in the hands of the Perioeci. That the Dorian race, when mixed with other blood, took kindly to a mercantile and manufacturing life, is shown by the development of the Dorian cities in the region of the isthmus. Gythium, the port of Sparta, and Cythera, the centre of Laconian trade, belonged to the Perioeci. The Perioeci were not subjected to the rigorous Spartan training, nor to those restrictions upon individual freedom under which the full citizens lived. Consequently they must have enjoyed a higher average of wealth and comfort than any other class in Laconia. They had no part or lot in the Spartan state, but they were called upon to fight for it in the line —*i.e.*, as hoplites; generally, indeed, they outnumbered the pure-blooded Spartans on the field. They are found also in posts of command, especially in the fleet, but not over pure-Spartans. Though they had no share in the civic privileges of Sparta, they probably enjoyed full rights in the communities to which they belonged, and power of local self-government; but governors (*Harmosts*) may have been sent by the Spartan state to the several perioecic districts. The Perioeci thus resembled the demesmen of Attica in so far as regards their own communities, but there was this important difference between them—that the Attic demesman was *ipso facto* a citizen of the Athenian state with full civic rights. The Perioeci were not members of the central state, but were subjects of it; it was this relationship, offending the sentiment of autonomy, that made the perioecic status appear wretched to the Greeks. Upon the whole, 'the position of the Perioeci was very tolerable, and the facts seem to show that there was no great

discontent on the one side nor apprehension on the other. Even on the occasion of the great Helot revolt of 464 B.C. only two perioecic towns forsook their allegiance. As the Spartans dwindled in number they may have looked upon the numerous and wealthy Perioeci with less friendly eyes. It required, however, the crushing defeat of Leuctra, and the strange sight of Theban soldiers working their will in Laconia, to make the Perioeci as a body declare against their masters.

§ 65. The Spartiates were the members of the state of Sparta. Theoretically they were all Dorians of ^{The Spartiates.} the pure blood, but undoubtedly non-Dorian elements—*i.e.*, noble clans of the pre-Dorian population—had secured incorporation. It is at least doubtful whether one of the royal clans did not claim to be “Achaean”; and according to the official legend *both* the royal houses were descended from the twin sons of Aristodemus, and so were ostensibly non-Dorian. The “great tribe” of the Acgeidae represents non-Dorian elements, whence derived we know not.

To have been born a Spartiate was in general a preliminary condition of citizenship; but two other conditions had also to be fulfilled. Only those who had gone through the state training could be full citizens; secondly, only those who participated in the public mess and made the regular contributions thereto remained full citizens. Those who satisfied these two conditions were all equally privileged, and were called “Peers” (*ομοιοι*), whether belonging to the nobles or only to the common folk, or Demos.

“Peers” and “Inferiors.” Those who failed in one or other point lost their political rights, retaining only the civil rights, and were known as “Inferiors” (*ὑπομείονες*). It is obvious that the two conditions of citizenship could only be met by the

possession of an adequate property in land, together with the Helots required for its cultivation. Every Spartan citizen had therefore a holding or lot (*κλῆρος*) of land assigned by the state; the alienation of these lots by sale, gift, or bequest (out of the family) was forbidden; the "original lot" (*ἀρχαῖα μοῖρα*) passed from father to son, and probably reverted to the state in default of male issue. Property and citizenship in Sparta were thus indissolubly bound together; and Aristotle remarks that the decrease in the number of full citizens was the result of the concentration of property in few hands. This concentration was rendered possible by a law passed by the Ephor Epitadeus about the end of the Peloponnesian war, removing the restriction on the alienation, by gift or bequest, of the lot, though the *sale* of it was still not permitted, and continued to the last to be held disgraceful. The regulations concerning the lot did not apply to other landed property, and great estates were in the hands of the nobles, who were in fact debarred from all other sources of wealth. The result of the concentration of property and consequent disfranchisement of those who could not keep up their subscription to the public mess was that the class of "inferiors" became a large and dangerous element in the state, with a tendency to coalesce with the discontented Helots in order to effect a revolution.

Though all Spartan citizens were "peers" in respect of their citizenship and the uniform mode of life from infancy to the grave which citizenship implied, there existed among them a class of nobles (*καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ*) in the midst of the general body of freemen (*δῆμος*). The distinction had less value in Sparta than elsewhere just because life was reduced in Sparta to one uniform level, but it had some political significance in that the Nobles.

members of the council were taken only from the noble class.

§ 66. The Spartan constitution contained four elements —Kings, Council, Assembly, and Ephors ; the first three are found in the other Greek states, the Ephorate is peculiar to Sparta.

The kingship in Sparta presents this difference from the monarchies of other Greek states, in that at Sparta two kings of equal power are found. They were not of the same clan, though both dynasties traced their origin from Heracles in the official legend. The kingship passed from father to son in the two royal houses of the Agids and the Eurypontids. The origin of the Spartan dual kingship

^{The Dual Kingship : Its Origin.} must lie far back in the time of the synoecism which gave birth to the city, and that synoecism must have been brought about by the coalition of two communities, each of which retained its head as joint-king in the newly created state. Whether a difference of nationality also lay at the bottom of the phenomenon, we cannot say; it is a fact, however, that the Agid house was held in the greater estimation; but this may only indicate that that community was the original holder of the hills of Sparta, and the Eurypontid community immigrant. If the Dorians came into the land by two different routes, some from the sea, others through the Peloponnese pushing their way southwards through the Arcadian mountains, a subsequent union of the two bodies when they met in Laconia may have been necessitated in order to effect the conquest.

The monarchy in Sparta experienced the same process of decay as monarchy throughout Greece in general; in historic times it is the mere relic of its pristine greatness. Its dual character would tend to

weaken it, but at the same time it was partly because the two kings acted each as a check upon the other that the institution survived when elsewhere it was either totally abolished or reduced to an annual magistracy, as at Athens.

§ 67. The Spartan kings were the heads of the state religion, in the sense that they sacrificed as priests for the community every month to Apollo; they held the priesthoods of the Lacedaemonian Zeus and Zeus Uranius; in war they sacrificed for the army on the march and before action. They led the libations, and the hides of beasts sacrificed were their perquisite. They nominated the Pythii or annual envoys to Delphi, and shared with them the custody of the oracles delivered to the state—the latter an important function at Sparta.

The judicial authority of the kings is closely connected with their religious functions. Their most important judicial powers were the awarding of heiresses in marriage (to secure the maintenance and transmission of the family and the family worship), jurisdiction in cases of adoption, for the same object, and jurisdiction “about the public roads” (the demarcation of properties by the sacred boundary-stones depended largely on religious tradition). Hospitality, both private and public, was a religious obligation, and consequently the kings appointed the Proxeni, or those whose duty it was to entertain foreigners visiting Sparta on diplomatic or other business.

The military functions of the kings were those which resisted longest the process of decay. They were supreme commanders, and had the power to direct the state army against whatsoever country they pleased without hindrance from any Spartan, on pain of exile. This right was a real one in the hands of a strong

king, but it is not clear how far it was encroached upon by the Ephors and the assembly. After the year 510 B.C., the army was always assigned to one only of the kings, chosen on each occasion by the people; apparently his command thus became still more absolute than before, but he was now responsible for his conduct of the campaign. Two Ephors also accompanied him on warlike expeditions (though not outside the limits of European Greece) as members of his council of war, but without any power of direct interference or coercion; nevertheless, as on his return to Sparta the king could be court-martialed by the Council and Ephors, his attitude towards the two Ephors on service must have been regulated by that possibility. In the field the king controlled all military operations, both strategical and tactical, and had full power of life and death. As the ultimate decision respecting terms of peace rested with the assembly he often referred the enemy's ambassadors to the Ephors, for the Ephors controlled the assembly, but it was within his competence to conduct negotiations personally, and to make any arrangements that he saw fit until final decision was reached. When war was over and the king returned, he lost these wide powers. Friction between the joint monarchs paralysed vigour of action, and both together had to be content to be little more than ordinary members of the council, and to see the Ephors exercising powers almost higher than their own.

Yet the kingship at Sparta was an institution of great power. At the back of the kings, even late ^{Their Privileges.} into historic times, there was the full force of traditional reverence, which honoured them "more like heroes than like men." The royal domains, in the territory of many of the perioecic cities, placed them among the richest individuals in Greece. The chief seats at public

sacrifices were theirs, and a double portion of food. The death and burial of a king was the occasion of striking ceremonies. The death was announced in the city by women beating a cauldron, while mounted ^{Their Funeral Honours.} couriers carried the news through all Laconia. Thereupon two free persons in every household, a man and a woman, must go into mourning. A fixed number of the Perioeci must attend the funeral ceremony; and these, with Helots, Spartiates, and women, all made lamentation, praising the dead king as better than all who had ruled before him. Business of every kind was suspended for ten days after the burial. Nothing like this was to be seen in the rest of Greece; the ceremonies resembled, as Herodotus says, those of the "barbarians who dwelt in Asia," i.e., the Persians.

§ 68. The Council of Elders (Gerusia) at Sparta consisted of twenty-eight elective members and two hereditary members, the kings themselves, who belonged to it *ex officio*. As the twenty-eight elective members must be at least sixty years of age, they were literally "elders" (gerontes). Members were chosen from certain noble clans, which in some way also represented local divisions of the people; once elected they sat for life. When a seat became vacant the candidates appeared in turn before the assembly in an order determined by lot, and certain men appointed for the purpose sat in a chamber close at hand, so that they could hear the applause which greeted the candidates, but could not see them. He who was received with the loudest shouts was declared elected. Aristotle calls this method of election "childish"; it was primitive, but hardly childish and probably worked as well as more pretentious systems.

The Gerusia
(Council of
Elders)

Method of
Electing the
Council.

The functions of the Council were two-fold; it was a deliberative and administrative body, and also ^{Its Functions.} a court of justice. In its first capacity it discussed and came to a vote upon all questions before they were brought to the assembly, just as was done in Athens by the Boulé. An important point was that apparently the council was summoned and presided over by the Ephors, not by the kings, who were thus simply ordinary members, who might, however, vote by proxy. And it was the Ephors, not the kings, who carried out the administrative decrees of the council, or introduced before the assembly its Bills for ratification or rejection. As a judicial body it was supreme in criminal cases, the more so as there was no written, but only customary, law at Sparta. ^{Its Criminal Jurisdiction.} The kings themselves were, as we have seen, not exempt from its jurisdiction, and it could inflict the extreme penalty.

§ 69. The Assembly, or *Apella*, was composed of all full citizens, *i.e.*, the "peers," who had reached ^{The Apella (Popular Assembly).} the age of thirty years. In historical times it was presided over by the Ephors. It met according to an old ordinance at least once a month between the bridge Babyca and the river Cnacion. As in the Roman *comitia*, no debate was possible, but by acclamation assent or dissent was given to proposals laid before it by the council through the medium of the Ephors. With the popular assembly rested the decision in questions of war and peace and foreign politics generally, cases of disputed succession to the crown, election of members of the council and the board of the Ephors. The *Apella* had thus theoretically great power; but this power was minimised by the provision that the presiding magistrates could by "seceding" (or walking away), *i.e.*,

refusing to proclaim its decree, render that decree of no effect.

§ 70. The board of five Ephors was a peculiar and important element in the Spartan constitution. ^{The Ephors: Their Origin.} The origin of the office is obscure. The name (*εφόροι* “overseers,”) has been variously explained, and some have supposed it to mean “inspectors of the market.” Their only independent function was that of civil jurisdiction, and this was perhaps their original function. It seems probable also that their number had some connection with the five villages forming the city. Probably, therefore, the legend is true which represents them as originally the kings’ representatives for the trial of civil suits during the absence of the monarchs in the field. They are often compared to the Roman *tribuni plebis*, but the resemblance is shadowy, and almost confined to the general truth that both Tribunes and Ephors were champions of the popular against the noble element in the state, and gained a political importance never contemplated at their institution. For it seems clear that at some time during the seventh century b.c. there was a conflict between the nobility, including the kings, and the Spartan demos, which had little share in the government. The result was a compromise, which really left the victory with the Ephors as representatives of the people; hence we find that every month the kings and the ^{A Democratic Check on the Kings} Ephors interchanged an oath, the king swearing on behalf of himself to observe the laws, and the Ephors swearing on behalf of the city to maintain the royal power undiminished so long as the king kept his oath. The actual steps by which the powers of the Ephors were increased are unknown. The result was that the Ephorate came to represent the democratic element in the constitution. Any

Spartan was eligible to the office, which was held for one year, with responsibility to successors; the mode of appointment,

^{Method of} Electing the Ephors. according to Aristotle, was "exceedingly childish," and therefore was probably the same as that employed in the case of the Gerusia.

The five Ephors formed a college, in which all had equal powers, though one member had honorary precedence, and gave his name to the year. In a Roman magisterial board a negative prevailed even over an affirmative majority in case of disagreement, but a simple majority carried the day among the Spartan Ephors. The Ephors had the following powers:—They alone could summon and preside over the Apella; they sat with, and perhaps presided over, the

^{Their Powers.} council: in both bodies they had power of initiative, *i.e.*, of introducing business, and they

were also the executive, *i.e.*, they carried out decrees of the council and Apella. As members of the council they shared its criminal jurisdiction; they had also independent control of civil jurisdiction. Over the Perioeci they had, we are told, power of life and death, and that without form of trial; the Crypteia which kept down the Helots was also under their direction; both these powers were theirs as guardians of the state, and developed out of their primary functions as police magistrates. As the state depended upon the maintenance of the peculiar Spartan discipline, the Ephors were responsible for this also, and their first official order delivered to the citizens was that they should "cut their moustaches and obey the laws"; they supervised the education of the young, and the behaviour of old and young alike; and in the interests of the state had the power to interfere in the most sacred relations of life, whether of the kings or the people.

CHAPTER XI.

LYCURGUS.

§ 71. Varying Accounts of Lycurgus; the Traditional Story.—§ 72. Origin of the Spartan Constitution; Lycurgus not a Historical Personage; Meaning of the Name.—§ 73. Institutions attributed to Lycurgus.—§ 74. Character of Sparta before the Introduction of the Lycurgean Discipline; Terpander; the Carneia; Alcman.—§ 75. Military Training of the Spartans; Discipline of the Youths; Marriage.—§ 76. The Public Mess (*Phiditia*).—§ 77. Training of the Girls; the Spartan System.

§ 71. Of all the states of Greece, that of Sparta has its beginning and early history most thickly overgrown with fable. She had, even in historic times, no written laws; her constitution was based upon a few simple ^{The Rhetrae of} ordinances, or *Rhetrae* (*ρήτραι*, “compacts”), ^{Lycurgus.} which were connected with the name of Lycurgus. Some of these are given by ancient authors; the longest is that which established the main lines of the political constitution (excluding the Ephorate), already described. They are undoubtedly among the most ancient political documents which exist. The light thrown upon the early history of Sparta by the appearance of Lycurgus, however, is illusory. “Concerning the law-giver Lycurgus,” says Plutarch, at the opening of his life of him, “we can assert absolutely nothing which is not controverted; there are different stories in respect to his birth, his travels, his death, and his mode of proceeding, both political and legislative; least of all is his date agreed upon.” This is as true to-day as it

was in Plutarch's time. The different accounts agree only in saying that Lycurgus gave the Spartans the laws under

^{Different Accounts of Lycurgus.} which they lived, and that he was himself a relative and guardian of one of the kings, who was a minor; according to Herodotus that king was Leobotas, fourth in the Agid line; while the more usual account made him Charilaüs, seventh in the Eurypontid line. Thus the tradition placed Lycurgus somewhere before 800 B.C.

The story was that he left Sparta in order to avoid ^{Legend about Lycurgus.} any suspicion of desiring to usurp the royal power of his infant ward. He undertook a series of travels, to Egypt, Ionia, and Crete, and even further afield, coming into contact with famous men, and many forms of social and political life. This element in the tradition resembles what is told of Solon, and is only another instance of the passion of the Greeks for deriving all their institutions from surrounding nations, who were supposed to have attained a higher degree of culture than themselves. The Spartans themselves regarded Crete as the

^{Resemblance between Spartan and Cretan Institutions.} real source of their own peculiar institutions; and there is, in fact, a certain resemblance between the social institutions and training of Sparta and Crete, pointing to some racial community between the two peoples. Others regarded the oracle of Delphi—that is, the god Apollo—as the source of inspiration. During the absence of Lycurgus, Sparta had fallen into a state of intolerable anarchy. At length Lycurgus, accompanied by twenty-eight of the leading citizens, came forward with his projects of reform, and having restored order by his political measures, as set forth in the Rhetrae, he introduced the institutions and training which he had observed in Crete.

§ 72. Did Lycurgus ever exist in human form? It is certainly suspicious to find that his father bears the name of Eunomus, which is somewhat too appropriate; for was not his son the author of "good law" (*εὐνομία*) at Sparta? He was aided in his work of pacification by one Arthmiades (from *ἀρθμός*, "union"). It is certain that the legend given in its developed form by Plutarch does not for the most part rest upon very early authority. The strong personifying instinct of the Greeks led them to create heroes to account for all the great advances in their own early history. It is also no doubt true that such advances in historical times did imply the action of a lawgiver, such as Solon and others; there was among them little of that "broadening from precedent to precedent" which is characteristic of most modern constitutions. It is clear, however, that the Spartan constitution and social institutions must, like all others, have had an internal development; but the tradition ignores this, making them spring in a form already final from the brain of their creator. The truth is that we shall not be in a position to decide the question as to the existence of Lycurgus until we have succeeded in tracing in clearer lines the history of the Dorian state during the period immediately succeeding the conquest of Laconia. In the meantime we must hold that Lycurgus had no historical existence, but was created partly by popular tradition, partly by literary men who wrote with a purpose, as the author of a certain social and political system, which in the main was the product of the environment of the race, and was composed of elements of very different dates. It may have been the slow creation of a society of priests of Apollo working through many generations, claiming

Origin of the
Spartan Con-
stitution.

Lycurgus not
a Historical
Personage.

Apollo's authority for what they did, and governed by presidents who bore the sacred title of Lycurgus (*Λυκόργος*, "creator of light"). Or, again, "Lycurgus" Lycurgus (Lycoorgos) may have been an Arcadian hero or deity, a form of Zeus Lycaeus (*Λυκαῖος*, i.e. "wolf-repeller"), whose cult was taken over by the Dorian conquerors from the earlier inhabitants; it is certain that Lycurgus had a shrine and cult at Sparta. By the fourth century B.C. the divinity had become humanised; but before the time of Herodotus—i.e. in the fifth century B.C., the oracle of Apollo himself debated whether to call him god or man, and inclined to the former alternative.

§ 73. What is Lycurgus supposed to have done for Sparta? Herodotus assigns to him the introduction of (1) the military organisation; (2) the public mess; (3) the Gerusia; (4) the Ephorate. To this list Plutarch adds (5) a re-division of Laconia among the Spartiates and Perioeci; (6) the abolition of gold and silver currency, and the substitution of iron as the medium of exchange; (7) the public training and discipline; (8) miscellaneous minor regulations. Aristotle, lastly, believed that it was he who originated (9) the Crypteia. Taken together, the ancient authorities credit Lycurgus with the origination of all the characteristic features of social and political life at Sparta. This is clearly impossible. The Council, for example, is a primitive institution, while the Ephorate is indubitably a late growth; the re-division of Laconia is merely an antecedent dating of the reform attempted by the kings Agis and Cleomenes in the third century B.C. Analysis thus leaves as the residuum that can be attributed to Lycurgus—the military organisation, the

Residuum that
can be attri-
buted to him.

public mess, and the training, *i.e.*, the military, as opposed to the political and economic, institutions. The prohibition of gold and silver was connected with the Spartan discipline, and so may perhaps also be assigned to Lycurgus.

§ 74. Although it is impossible to say what are the earlier and what the later elements in the Spartan system of training and lifelong discipline, it is in this domain that there lies the great historic reality which is the basis of the Lycurgus legend. For this amount of truth the legend undoubtedly contains—that there was a time when Sparta knew not the discipline with which her name is identified, and that it was to this discipline when introduced that she owed her position and continued existence as one of the foremost states of Greece. For the character of Sparta at the dawn of her history was in many respects very different from that which she had in later times. Her citizens did not live under the strict discipline ^{Character of Sparta in Early Times.} which afterwards moulded every individual to a single type. Sparta even made some contribution to the religious music and song of Greece. It was at Sparta that Terpander of Lesbos substituted the seven-stringed lyre (*cithara*) for the four-stringed instrument hitherto employed, and so gave new rhythms and accompaniments to the choral songs in honour ^{Religious Music and Song : Terpander.} of the gods at festivals and sacrifices. Special opportunity was given in Sparta for the performance of choral music by the festival of the Carneia, in August, in honour of Apollo, at which Terpander won the first prize ever offered for the best invocation. ^{The Carneia.} The species of religious lyric in which Terpander excelled was the *Nome* (*vóμος*), which celebrated the attributes and majesty of the god in whose honour it was sung; it was not choral, but was sung as a

solo to the accompaniment of the cithara. A second great lyric poet was Thaletas, or Thales, of Gortyn, in Crete, who at Sparta developed that form of religious lyric called the Paean. Greatest of all was Alcman of Sardis, who also

^{Alcman of Sardis.} lived at Sparta; he composed paeans, hymns,

wedding-songs, but especially a species of lyric called Parthenia, or songs sung by choruses of girls. "If Sparta was the home, and not the mother, of lyric poets at this time—if she produced no genius, but supplied the conditions necessary for its growth, it was because there existed in Sparta a sympathetic public, which by its education was capable of furnishing the ready and appreciative welcome which is the best atmosphere for the growth of art, and the best stimulus on the artist to excel himself." *

§ 75. The fine promise of Sparta's youth was not fulfilled.

^{Military Training of the Spartans.} In historic times her citizens lived under a life-long iron discipline, the end of which was purely

military. The heads of the tribe inspected every new-born child, and upon their verdict it depended whether it was to live or to be exposed in the gorges of Taygetus. At the age of seven the boy passed from his mother's charge into that of the state. Officials called

^{Paedonomi.} Paedonomi supervised the education of the boys, who were arranged in companies, each captained by one of the Iranes (*ἱπαῖες*), i.e., youths between the ages of twenty and thirty. Youths

^{Iranes.} from eighteen to twenty years of age were called Melliranes (*μελιράιες*, "those about to become Iranes"). All the boys of a company ate, slept, and performed their gymnastic exercises, together; scantily clad, summer and winter alike, ill-fed, sleeping on such rude couch as he

* Jevons, *History of Greek Literature*, p. 124.

could make out of the reeds of the Eurotas, mercilessly flogged for the slightest breach of discipline or failure in deportment, the Spartan boy grew up a soldier ^{Discipline of the Youths.} matchless for steadiness, discipline, and bravery, looking on victory in the field as but his due, and death in action at the call of his country as his highest honour; of culture his only tinge was the hymns of Terpander and others, and the war-songs and marches of Tyrtaeus. Nor was this stern training without touches of primitive barbarism. Annually the altar of Artemis Orthia was reddened with the blood of lads, who, having arrived at a certain age, were flogged under the superintendence of her grim priestess, whose only cry to those who wielded the rod was "harder" and "yet harder." The boy who endured longest without a murmur was called "victor at the altar" (*βωμονίκης*): not seldom lads died under the cruel ordeal. At the age of twenty the youth might be called upon for active service; he might marry, and, indeed, he was required to do so, under penalty for refusal, ^{Marriage.} for the state demanded of every citizen a strong and healthy progeny, but cared not at all for the sanctity of the marriage-tie so long as this prime demand was satisfied. From the age of twenty the young Spartan was a member of the public mess, but it was not until he attained the age of thirty that he gained full rights of citizenship and became one of the "peers."

§ 76. It was one of the conditions under which a Spartan was admitted to full civic rights that he became ^{The Public Messa (Phiditia).} a member of the public mess, and regularly paid his contribution. The name of the public messes was Andreia ("men's meals") or Phiditia; they were also called Syssitia. Each mess consisted of about fifteen men; admission to a mess was by unanimous vote of its members.

Though not a tactical unit, each mess apparently stood in a body in the line; the institution is obviously a transference to times of peace of the life of the camp, as is clear from the fact that the members of a mess were called "tent-fellows" (*σύσκηνοι*), and that they were under the supervision of military officers, the Polemarchs. The monthly contribution of each member was a fixed quantity of barley-flour, cheese, figs, and wine, with a small sum of money for the purchase of swine's flesh. The contribution was derived from the "lot" of land cultivated by the Helots; for no Spartan worked with his hands or engaged in trade. The stock dish at the mess was the famous "black broth" (*βαφά* or *αιματία*), to relish which one required, it was said, to have "bathed in the waters of the Eurotas," i.e., to have undergone the training and to live the hard life of a Spartan. All, rich and poor, the nobles and the common folk, fared alike, even as the training was the same for all. Members of a mess might, however, add to their fare game got by hunting, or flesh of sacrifices. The meals were taken in booths in the Hyacinthian street.

§ 77. The girls of Sparta were trained on the same lines as the boys, but apart from them. At times ^{The Girls of Sparta.} the boys and girls were permitted to watch each other in their gymnastic exercises. The object was to secure women physically the equals of the Spartan men, and it was attained; for the Spartan women were regarded as the strongest and most beautiful in Greece; but the freedom allowed them was shocking to the sentiment of the other Greeks, whose admiration of the Spartans and their institutions was theoretical only, without any desire to imitate their hard, uncultured lives. Sparta was, in fact, simply a great camp, and her chief

care the breeding of recruits for her army. She had chosen the position of an aristocratic city domineering over a subject population (the Perioeci), and a serf population (the Helots); to retain this position, her citizens, never more than 10,000 in number, in the midst of at least 200,000 who hated them or at best did not love them, were compelled to live a one-sided life, and to become for all time a supreme example of what a community can do with itself in the unswerving pursuit of a single definite end, intelligible to all its members.

CHAPTER XII.

THE GROWTH OF SPARTA.

§ 78. Conquest of Messenia: a Gradual Process.—§ 79. First Messenian War; Aristodemus; Fall of Ithome; Condition of the Messenians.—§ 80. Revolt of the Messenians (Second Messenian War); Tyrtaeus.—§ 81. Aristomenes; Fall of Eira.—§ 82. Sparta as a Conquering State; Evolution of Foot-Lancers (Hoplites).—§ 83. Wars with Argos and Tegea; Conquest of Tegea.—§ 84. Conquest of Thyreatis.—§ 85. the Peloponnesian League; Sparta's Position in the Greek World.

§ 78. THE first stage in the growth of Spartan power was the conquest of Messenia. The Dorians, on their first coming, had established themselves only in the valley of the Eurotas, that is to say, between Mount Parnon on the east and Mount Taygetus on the west. The country on the west of Taygetus is for the most part a fruitful land, consisting of the upper and lower plains of the Pamisus, which runs into the head of the Messenian gulf; on the west, an irregular group of mountains, offshoots of Mount Lycaeum, in Arcadia, is interposed between the plains and the sea, and runs southwards to form the westernmost of the three Peloponnesian promontories. The land on the east of Mount Parnon shows no central river valley, but is rugged and forbidding; moreover, the power of Argos claimed all the eastern coast-land of the Peloponnese. The Dorians of Laconia therefore spread gradually westwards, in spite of the fact that the barrier of Taygetus is more lofty and formidable than that of Parnon. According to the legend,

the fruitful "Midland," or Messenia, was from the first occupied by men of Dorian blood; it was the inheritance of Cresphontes. It is certain that this was not the case. Messenia had been Hellenised by Greek tribes descending along the western side of the peninsula, but we have no record of the process. The Dorian ^{Pre-Dorian Inhabitants of Messenia.} Greeks did not conquer the land until the eighth and seventh centuries, B.C., though it is probable that it had partially passed into their hands before recourse was had to arms. Taygetus offers only one direct route from Sparta into Messenia, a pass which cuts the range transversely and gives access to the lower plain of the Pamisus and the head of the Messenian Gulf. This territory seems to have been gradually occupied by the Spartans, not without border warfare; the resistance of the Messenians, whose seat of power lay in the upper plain, round the head waters of Pamisus and its tributaries, brought about an organised attempt to conquer the whole country. The conquest was effected in two stages; the time and labour that it cost is indicated by the ^{Gradual Nature of the Spartan Conquest.} fact that the legends assigned to the first Messenian war a period of twenty years (743-724 B.C.), and to the second war at least fourteen years (from 665 B.C. perhaps). The dates and details of the two wars are quite untrustworthy; they are derived from the legends which gained currency in the fourth century B.C., when the Messenians were restored by Epaminondas to their long-lost land.

§ 79. The hero of the first war is said to have been Aristodemus. After some years of indecisive warfare the Messenians abandoned the smaller places ^{First Messenian War.} and concentrated upon the natural citadel of the country—the mountain of Ithome. The seers prophesied evil, and the Delphic oracle warned the Messenians that their doom

could be averted only by the sacrifice to the infernal deities of a maiden of the royal race, chosen by lot or voluntarily offered. Aristodemus offered his daughter; the man to whom she was betrothed tried to save her life by alleging that she

^{Legend of Aristodemus.} was about to become the mother of his child, but Aristodemus slew her with his own hand to prove her purity. The oracle also promised victory to those who should first erect ten-times-ten tripods round the altar of Zeus on Ithome. A Spartan named Oebalus, hearing of the oracle, immediately made a hundred small tripods of clay, and getting secretly within the fortress by night set his tripods round about the altar. Evil portents multiplied; the very dogs collected in packs and howled all night long like wolves, and then forsook the doomed stronghold. Aristodemus learnt that he had sacrificed his daughter in vain, and that the gods had deserted Messenia; he slew himself on his daughter's grave, and at last Ithome fell. Those

^{Fall of Ithome.} Messenians who remained in the land became Helots, tilling for Spartan lords the fields which had once been their own, paying one-half the produce to

^{Condition of the Messenians.} their conquerors. "Through our king Theopompus, beloved of the gods," sings Tyrtaeus, "we have conquered wide Messenia, good for husbandry and the cultivation of trees. For this land did the fathers of our fathers, the bearers of the lance, fight without ceasing for nineteen years, bravely enduring hardships; but in the twentieth year the foe abandoned the fertile acres, and fled from the lofty hills of Ithome. Like asses they were oppressed with heavy burdens; under hard necessity they gave to their lords the half of all the produce of the land, and when their lord died they and their wives perforce made lamentation for him." These fragments of the poet are, in fact, our primary source for the history of the conquest.

§ 80. Perhaps for two generations the Messenians endured the yoke. Then the growing power of Argos under King Pheidon, who was leagued with the Pisatae, and perhaps also with the Arcadians under the King of Orchomenos, gave an opportunity for revolt. Their Revolt. The rebels were at first successful, and Messenia was freed. The Spartans who lost their lands beyond Taygetus demanded lots in the Eurotas valley, and so in addition to their external disasters the Spartans were faced by domestic strife. In their extremity arose Tyrtaeus, who was both a warrior and a poet. His war-songs, or *Tyrtaeua*, "elegies," inspired the Spartans with fresh courage; singing his marches to the sound of the flute their phalanx advanced to the charge; his generalship was as good as his poetry, and the Messenians were defeated in a great battle at "the trench." They could not maintain themselves in the open country nor at Ithome on the edge of the central hill-district; but about the stronghold of Eira among the mountains on the north-west border, near the sources of the Neda, they held out stubbornly for eleven years.

According to a late story, Tyrtaeus, to whom the Spartans really owed their success, was an Athenian. It was said that the Delphic oracle bade the Spartans obtain a counsellor from Athens, and the Athenians, not venturing to disobey the god, but unwilling to render effective assistance, sent them Tyrtaeus, a lame schoolmaster of little intellect. Though he was certainly not an Athenian, it is at least doubtful whether he was not of foreign extraction. It is curious how completely he disappears after his work is done.

§ 81. The national hero of the Messenians in the second war was Aristomenes. The legends about him Stories about Aristomenes. were thrown into poetical form by Rhianus in the middle of the third century B.C. Aristomenes is

unique in Greek legendary history; neither Achilles, Hector, nor Odysseus is quite like him, but he has traits derived from all three, with the addition of a romantic element foreign to genuine Greek legend. Three times during the war he offered the Hecatomphonia, or thanksgiving sacrifice for a hundred slain enemies. He struck dismay into the hearts of the Spartans by stealing into their city by night, and hanging up in the temple of Athena on the citadel a shield taken from the spoil with the inscription "From the Spartans." When he tried to surprise the Spartan women celebrating a festival of Demeter, he was repulsed by them with the instruments of sacrifice and even taken prisoner; but the priestess Archidameia, who loved him, released him by night. In one of his raids he and fifty Messenians were captured. They were carried to the Caeadas, a chasm in Mount Taygetus into which condemned criminals were wont to be hurled. The captives were thrown down, and all were killed by the fall with the exception of Aristomenes, who gave himself up for lost, and covered his face waiting for death. On the third day he heard a fox gnawing the corpses. When it came near he seized it, and, protecting his hand with his robe from its bites, followed it as it struggled to escape, until at last it led him to a hole in the rocks, through which with infinite labour he managed to crawl. Yet a third time he was captured—by a band of Cretan bowmen. They rested at a farm on which a widow and her daughter lived. The daughter made the guards drunk, and freed Aristomenes, who slew them all; to the maiden he afterwards gave his son Gorgus in marriage. At

Fall of Eira. last Eira fell. The guards left their posts on the wall one stormy night, and the Spartans learning this made the assault. The barking of dogs roused the defenders, and men and women hastened to repel the

assailants. For three days and nights the despairing people fought, while heaven thundered overhead and rain poured down in torrents. Then Aristomenes collected the survivors, put the women and children in the centre, and demanded passage through the foemen. The Spartans dared not drive desperate men to extremity, and so the remnant was allowed to withdraw. The fugitives found shelter in Arcadia, or beyond the sea at Rhegium and Zancle. Aristomenes retired to Rhodes and became the ancestor of the great athletic family of the Diagoridae, which won prizes innumerable at the national games. Those of the Messenians who remained were reduced again to the condition of Helots.

§ 82. Sparta is the only example in the earlier period of Greek history of a state based upon conquest. Other states never succeeded in making permanent conquests ; but the Spartans, issuing from a single city, conquered first their brethren in the other Laconian towns, and then carried their arms westwards, northwards, and eastwards, until they ultimately ruled the fairest half of the Peloponnesus, solely by the right of the sword, and the limit to their conquests was self-imposed ; so far as can be seen, there was no reason why they should not have conquered the whole southern peninsula, save in their consciousness of inability to retain it in a subject condition. The reason why the Spartans alone enjoyed this splendid career as a conquering state was that they alone devoted their whole lives to the mastery of the technicalities of warfare. It was probably they who evolved the mode of fighting which was in use in historic times—of fighting in close order with masses of “ foot-lancers,” or “ hoplites.” Even after other states had adopted this method the Spartans remained immeasurably ahead of

Conquests of Sparta.
Evolution of Hoplites.

them in tactical skill, *i.e.* in the power of handling bodies of men on the field; for the Spartan hoplites as compared with the citizen-soldiers of other states were as professionals to amateurs.

§ 83. Of the details of their conquering career after the end of the Messenian wars (end of the seventh century B.C.), little has come down to us. The first encroachment seems to have been upon the districts about the upper Eurotas; here they made themselves masters of the district called Sciritis. Argos set a limit to their conquests in this direction by defeating them at Hysiae (668 B.C.): it was perhaps Sparta's loss of prestige by this defeat, and a coalition of the northern states, Argos, Arcadia, and the Pisatae, that encouraged the Messenians to enter upon their struggle for freedom. Long and weary were the wars of Sparta with the powerful city of Tegea, on the southern side of the plateau which constitutes eastern Arcadia. The conquest of this city was necessary before the Spartans could advance further into Arcadia. Once the Oracle of Delphi promised to give the Spartans Tegea "for a dancing-place, and her fair plain to mete with a cord"—and it was so, but in an unlooked-for sense; for the Spartans setting forth with fetters for the expected captives were severely defeated, and many of them were captured and set to forced labour in chains on the fields of the Tegeatae. The fetters they had brought with them were seen in the temple of Athena Alea at Tegea by the Greek traveller Pausanias, some seven hundred years later; he says they were much damaged by rust, which is probably true enough. About the middle of the sixth century, however, the resistance of Tegea was overcome, and she was compelled to enter into alliance with Sparta (about 550 B.C.).

§ 84. The victory of the Spartans in eastern Arcadia menaced Argos. For generations Sparta had disputed with her the possession of the district of Cynuria, on the east of Parnon, and especially the northern part of it in which was the town Thyrea, whence the district was called the Thyreatis. It was agreed, we are told, that the matter should be decided by a contest between champions, three hundred from each side. The battle raged until three only of the six hundred were left alive—two Argives, Alcanor and Chromios, and a Spartan, Othryadas. The Argives returned home to announce their victory, but the Spartan champion despoiled the dead Argives and remained on the field. Both states claimed the victory, and it came after all to a general action, in which the Spartans were victorious (about 550 b.c.).

§ 85. By the middle of the sixth century b.c. Sparta was thus supreme in the Peloponnese. She became the head of a confederacy, in which all the Peloponnesian states, except Argos and Achaea, were enrolled. The members engaged to supply troops in the common interests of the League. Sparta was the meeting-place of the representatives of the confederates, and with the Spartan Apella lay the decision on all matters of foreign policy. The Spartans did not directly dictate to the states the form of constitution under which they should live, but her influence was always exerted to maintain an oligarchic form of government, and to discourage democratic tendencies. Hence the League ultimately found itself, as champion of oligarchy, in conflict with the great extra-Peloponnesian democracy. Sparta's prominence in the Greek world about 550 b.c. is illustrated by the fact that it was to her the cities of Asia Minor appealed in 546 b.c., to save them from Cyrus, King of Persia

Sparta's Position in the Greek World.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF ATTICA AND ATHENS.

§ 86. Attica in Early Times.—§ 87. Rise of Athens; Synoecism of Attica.—§ 88. The Tribes and Classes in Attica.—§ 89. The Development from Monarchy to Aristocracy.—§ 90. Functions of the Archons.—§ 91. The Council of the Areiopagus.—§ 92. The Assembly of Early Athens; Naucrarias.—§ 93. Timocracy at Athens; the Property Classes.—§ 94. Distress in Athens; Cylon's Conspiracy; Dracon's Code; Economic Distress at Athens.—§ 95. Solon.—§ 96. His Social Reforms; the Seisachtheia.—§ 97. His Constitutional Reforms; the Property Classes; the Assembly; the Jury Courts; the Council of Four Hundred; Reform of the Areiopagus.—§ 98. Change in the Coinage.—§ 99. General Legislation of Solon.

§ 86. At the dawn of the historical period Attica is already a single state with its capital at Athens; all the inhabitants of Attica are Athenian citizens, so that we hear not of "Atticans," but of "Athenians" always. Tradition, however, contains vague echoes from a time before this, when Attica was a collection of village communities, often at war with one another, but with tendencies to union which in the long run were to make all Attica one. Certain of these early communities formed groups united for mutual aid or worship—the ^{Early Unions.} *Mara-* *thonian tetrapolis* in the north-east, and the *tetracomi* of Peiraeus, Phalerum, and two other villages near the coast, are examples of such primitive groups. If a transference of abode from the villages to a common site took place, or if in any other way the separate

communities gave up their small independence to live a common life as one body politic with a single lord at its head, then by this process of "Synoecism," as it was called, a city-state came into being; such "Synoecism" states were formed at various points in Attica; the two most important were Eleusis in the plain west of Mount Aegaleos, and Athens in the centre of the plain of the Cephisus between Mount Aegaleos and Mount Hymettus.

§ 87. Athens must be one of the oldest seats of human abode in Attica. Fragments of the mighty wall, built, it was said, by the Pelasgi on the Acropolis hill before 1000 B.C., are still in existence. The civilisation of the bronze age flourished here before the Greeks came into Attica. Athens herself was the result of a combination of settlements on and around the Acropolis. An echo of this early time is heard in the story of the struggle between the god Poseidon-Erechtheus and the goddess Athena for possession of the hill. Poseidon smote the rock with his trident and a salt spring gushed forth; Athena caused the olive-tree to spring up, and her token was held to be the better, and she became the patroness of the city, though the worship of Poseidon-Erechtheus still continued, and in the shape of a sacred snake he inhabited the temple of the goddess. The marks of the trident-stroke were pointed out on the rock, and indeed may be seen to this day; a representation of the contest was one of the chief decorations of the great temple (the Parthenon), which was afterwards reared to the honour of the victorious goddess. The story probably conceals a contest and ultimate amalgamation of rival communities, the result of which was to give to the city the name which it ever afterwards bore. The power

Contest of
Poseidon and
Athena.

of the people of Athens increased, and by force of arms they secured acknowledgment of their supremacy from the rest of the tiny kingdoms of Attica; one of them, Eleusis, seems to have resisted so vigorously that it may be doubted whether she did not succeed for a time in retaining complete independence, and only succumbed before the united might of Attica. The next stage in the history was the abolition of all separate political organisation of the principalities, and the carrying out of that process of Synoecism which was associated with the name of Theseus. Theseus was, like Lycurgus, a god who was

Synoecism of Theseus. afterwards humanised and elevated to the position of a national hero. "Partly by force, partly by persuasion," says Thucydides, "Theseus dissolved the councils and separate governments, and united all the inhabitants of Attica in the present city, establishing one council-chamber and town-hall. They continued to live on their own lands, but he compelled them to resort to Athens as their metropolis, and henceforward they were all inscribed in the roll of her citizens. A great city thus arose which was handed down by Theseus to his descendants, and from that day to this the Athenians have regularly celebrated the national festival of the

Feast of Synoecia. Synoecia, or 'union of the communes' in honour of the goddess Athena." The nobles who held sway in the separate states made Athens their home, and all the free inhabitants of Attica became citizens of Athens. Athens was thus the only example in Greece of a state which was more than a mere Unique Position city with its surrounding territory, and was of Athens. yet not founded on force. Sparta also was a great state, but she was the imperial mistress of subject communities which had no share in the national

life. Other states, again, never progressed beyond the point of being the head of a league of communities which surrendered as little as might be to the dominant city. The man who did the great work of creating the Athenian state, and put this coping-stone upon the edifice slowly built by a long line of conquering rulers, was a king of Athens and a political genius. It is strange that in the case of both Athens and Sparta, the men who set their stamp so deeply upon the history of their country should be immortalised only under the form of mythical heroes.

§ 88. It was probably at the time of the union of Attica that the four Ionic tribes (*Phylae*) were introduced. The names of the tribes—*Geleontes*, *Argadeis*, *Aegicoreis*, and *Hopletes*—cannot be explained with certainty, but probably have reference to the worship of special deities by members of the tribe; a Zeus *Geleon* at any rate is known to us from an inscription. The deities may have been Zeus, Hephaestus (*Vulcan*), Poseidon, and Athena. Some have imagined that the names denote occupations, and that a system of caste like that of Egypt prevailed in early times in Attica; this was the opinion of some of the ancients also, but it is an impossible theory. To what extent the tribe-names denote local divisions is also a disputed question. It was at first only the clans (or groups of families deriving themselves from a common ancestor) that were embraced under this fourfold classification. There was another classification of the population, from another point of view, into *Eupatridae* ("nobles," "well-born"), *Geomori* or *Georgi* ("husbandmen"), and *Demiurgi* ("craftsmen"). These classes also were ascribed to Theseus, and this may be true if we take it to mean that social distinctions were sharpened by the

*Origin of the
Four Ionic
Tribes.*

*Three Classes :
Eupatridae,
Georgi,
Demiurgi.*

growth of a city population. Apparently a fourth name should be added, that of the *Thetes*.
 ("labourers"), a class embracing all the poorest of the community, in whatever way they gained a livelihood. All of these classes were free; there was no subject population in Attica, as there was in Laconia, although the operation of economic causes tended, as we shall see, to create a class of serfs out of that of peasants. The Eupatridae, the descendants of the nobles who had once ruled in the independent states of Attica, mostly lived in Athens after the Synoecism, but they of course retained their estates in the country, and were country squires proud of their blue blood. The Demiurgi would in the main be gathered in Athens and the towns of Attica. A particular section of the *Thetes*, who had no land or capital of their own, were hinds of the nobles, cultivating their estates, but retaining a certain quantity of the produce for their own use. This class bore the name

Hectemori or *Pelatae*; by *Hectemori* is signified that they retained one-sixth of the annual produce of the land.

§ 89. Athens, like the majority of the states of Greece, began with monarchy and changed gradually in the direction of democracy. The series of changes by which she passed from monarchy to aristocracy is known to us. According to the legend, the last king with full powers was Codrus, who gave his life to save his country on the occasion of an invasion by a Peloponnesian army; the Athenians determined, therefore, that no king should

Fall of the Kings. henceforward reign over them! The truth is that, just as at Sparta, the kingship never was utterly abolished, although in piecemeal fashion its powers passed from it. At Sparta the military side of the

monarchy resisted the process of decay longest, but at Athens the military functions of the king were the first to be taken from him; by his side was established a Polemarch, or general-in-chief elected by the nobles from their own order, probably for a limited period.^{of Polemarch—} The next step (about the beginning of the eleventh century) was the institution of the office of Archon ("regent") to which members of the Medontid family alone were eligible. This new magistrate assumed the most important civil powers of the king. Apparently the office of Archon was held for life at first, like that of ^{Election of} king; and although none but a member of the Medontid family could hold it, the choice of a successor lay with the nobles. How the election was made, whether by lot or by vote, by the whole body of nobles, or by the Council of Nobles, or, lastly, by the whole body of citizens entitled to vote in the Assembly, we cannot tell. It seems probable, ^{Election of} then, that for some time an hereditary king and ^{Archons.} an elective Archon held rule side by side at Athens, the latter being from the first the chief magistrate and steadily gaining in power. It was no doubt owing to the increasing importance of the Archonship by the accumulation of civil powers that the tenure of the office was ^{Ten-yearly} at length limited to ten years (about the middle ^{Archons.} of the eighth century B.C.). Whether the same limitation of tenure was introduced at the same time with regard to the kingship, we cannot say. It is certain, however, that the Archonship was thrown open to all the nobles, and that the kingship also became elective and of limited tenure. The next stage was reached when the Archonship was made annual in tenure (683 B.C.), as were also ^{Annual Archons.} the offices of Polemarch and king. Finally, as civil business, especially legal business, increased,

it was found necessary to create six new officials called ^{Six} Thesmoothetae, who decided cases and kept a record of their decisions. These were associated with the three chief magistrates, and thus was constituted the board of Nine Archons holding office for one year, elected from and by the Eupatridae.

§ 90. The formation of the board of Nine Archons led to a certain amount of reorganisation and distribution of functions. Highest in dignity was the Archon ; by his name the year was dated in official decrees, whence he was called Archon Eponymus. He had in early times supreme civil jurisdiction ; but later there were brought before him

^{Functions of the Archon Eponymus—} only cases affecting the rights of the family, touching adoptions, marriage of heiresses, and the like ; he was charged with the conduct of certain festivals, notably the Great Dionysia, at which in later times tragedies were performed. Second in dignity was the Archon Basileus, the old title being retained for ^{—of the Archon Basileus—} religious reasons ; just as at Rome the sacrifices performed by the king continued to be performed by the official called *rex sacrificulus*, or *rex sacrorum*, after the fall of the monarchy. The King-Archon had jurisdiction in certain offences against religion. He was also president of the Council. Last in dignity was the ^{—of the Polemarch.} Polemarch, who, besides being commander-in-chief, had jurisdiction in all cases in which foreign settlers or metoeci were involved.

§ 91. The weakening of the monarchy in the manner above described was effected by the Council ^{The Council.} (*βουλὴ*) of Nobles, which in Athens, as elsewhere, is found by the side of the king as a primitive institution. How it was composed we know not. Probably the Archons were always members during and after their term of office.

It was the judicial side of the Council's functions which developed, and its connection with the Infernal Deities called the Semnae, for the trial and punishment of cases of murder and murderous assault. Sitting as a court of criminal justice, it was called the Council of the Areiopagus, a name which, whatever its origin, has nothing to do with the war-god Ares.

§ 92. The Assembly (*ἐκκλησία*) of early Athens was apparently composed of all the members of the first three classes—of nobles or Eupatridae, Georgi and Demiurgi; but we know nothing of its times of meeting, mode of voting, or competence. Certainly the decision in a question of war or peace must have belonged to it. Probably its place was, to a certain extent, filled by another organisation which came into being at an unknown date in response to the demands of a growing maritime trade. This organisation was that of the Naucraries, forty-eight in number—territorial divisions of Attica for the purposes of taxation, each Naucrary having to supply one ship. This organisation was in existence by the middle of the seventh century B.C.

§ 93. Attica also felt the effects of the change which passed over Greece during the seventh century, by which commerce and industry arose to compete with agriculture as sources of wealth. The increase of wealth on the part of the non-nobles broke down the exclusive privileges of the nobles; and aristocracy, or government by those of noble descent (in other words, by the clans), passed gradually into timocracy, or that form of constitution in which political rights are distributed according to wealth. We find the population of Attica arranged in three (or rather four) classes

Its Judicial Functions.

The Assembly.

The Naucraries.

Timocracy at Athens.

according to their wealth. The highest class was that of the Pentacosiomedimni, whose land produced as many measures (medimni) of grain and as many measures (metrētae) of wine or oil as together made five hundred measures. The second class, the Hippēis ("knights"), included those whose land produced between three and five hundred measures. Those whose land produced between two and three hundred formed the third class, that of the Zeugitae ("teamsters"), independent farmers possessing at least a yoke of oxen. Below the three classes came the Thetes, men of no account, without political rights, workers for hire, small traders, etc. To the first class political office belonged; and although the bulk of it was composed of the Eupatridae, yet the principle that a non-noble, if rich enough, could hold office was formally admitted. The internal history of Athens is the story of the way in which all in their degree won a share in political life.

§ 94. The introduction of coinage into Greece probably had much to do with the distress which reigned in Athens during the last half of the seventh century B.C.

Distress at Athens: its Causes. Again, the state suffered from over-population; Athens had not cast forth her children into the world in the shape of colonies—why, we cannot tell; the Athenians did not take to emigration. Thirdly, ignorance of the law, which was not as yet written, put the common people at the mercy of the nobles. The elements of revolution were present, and an attempt was made to overthrow the government and to found a tyranny. A

Cylon's Conspiracy. certain Cylon, of noble family, having married the daughter of Theagenes, tyrant of Megara, tried with Megarian help to make himself master of

Athens. Cylon had been a victor at Olympia, and when the Delphic oracle recommended the "greatest festival of Zeus" as the fittest time for his attempt he imagined that the Olympian festival was meant; but the oracle meant the Athenian festival called the Diasia. Cylon with some Megarian troops seized the Acropolis, but was there closely blockaded. Cylon made his escape, but his adherents and the foreign troops were compelled to capitulate, and were treacherously murdered by the Archon Megacles, of the clan of the Alcmaeonidae. For this act the Alcmaeonidae were condemned to the same sentence of perpetual banishment as Cylon and his descendants (about 630 B.C.). One result of the deed of sacrilege was a war with Megara; and as the fleet of Megara at this time was superior to that of Athens, the coast of Attica was harried, and the export of oil was largely stopped, which aggravated the distress of the rural population. The popular discontent led to a concession on the part of the ruling class, and Draco was appointed Thesmophetes with extraordinary powers to codify the law and publish it (621 B.C.). He used as his basis the judicial decisions recorded by the Thesmophetae. The name of Draco was afterwards synonymous with pitiless severity; Demades, an Athenian orator, remarked that his laws had been written not in ink, but in blood. We know nothing of his legislation save his regulations with regard to cases of blood-shedding, for these were embodied in the later legal code. A distinction was drawn between murder or killing in malice, and accidental or justifiable homicide. Such cases of bloodshed as did not come before the Areiopagus were tried by a body of fifty-one judges called

Banishment of the Alcmaeonidae.
War with Megara.
Draco's Code of Laws.
The Ephetae.

Ephetae, sitting in various places according to the nature of the case.

The code of Draco could not alleviate the distress caused by economic causes. A crisis was fast approaching. The law of debt was very severe, and was enforced mercilessly by the nobles and the rich. The independent farmers were often compelled to mortgage their farms in a desperate effort to keep solvent; stone pillars inscribed with the terms of the deed being set up on the boundaries of the mortgaged farms. The inevitable result was that the creditor became owner of the land, and its old owner, the descendant of generations of peasant proprietors, became a mere hind. The class of Hectemori also suffered and sank into a lower depth, for, being unable to live on the sixth part of the produce of the land they cultivated for the rich, they borrowed of their lord, and arrears of debt accumulated.

The person of an insolvent debtor was security for the debt, and thus he became a slave liable to be sold out of Attica. Fortunately for Attica, before this process had gone too far there arose a saviour in the person of Solon.

§ 95. Solon, the son of Execestides, was a descendant of the old royal house of the Medontidae. Though a noble, he was also a merchant of moderate fortune. He was a man steeped in the highest culture of the time, wise with the widest experience of men and things that was possible in his day. Above all, he had the confidence of both parties. In 594 B.C. he was chosen Archon with extraordinary powers for the purpose of mediating between rich and poor and reforming the constitution.

§ 96. The work of Solon touched social, economic, and

political problems. His first measure was the famous Seisachtheia, or "shaking-off of burdens." All outstanding debts incurred on the security of land or person were absolutely cancelled. This was the first proclamation made by Solon on entering upon his office. Farmers who had sunk into serfdom were thereby freed; those whose farms bore the fatal mortgage-pillar saw it removed, and with it went their indebtedness; those who had preferred exile to bondage, as well as those who had been sold as slaves beyond seas, might now return in safety. Nor could the old state of things ever return, for it was declared illegal to lend money on the security of the debtor's person. The growth of large estates was checked by a measure fixing the maximum amount of land that might be owned by a single person. This cancelling of all debts, public and private, was a desperate measure, but desperate remedies were needed. The rich were the sufferers, but probably those who were compelled to acquiesce in the loss of their money out at interest had already laid field to field as the result of their money-lending and application of the law of debt, so that little harm was done. Probably most of the rich made little outcry, lest a worse thing should befall them; for a large section of the poor had looked forward to a redistribution of landed property, and murmured loudly in disappointment. While he freed the poor of their burden of debt, Solon protected the rich against the revolutionary desires of the landless: "I threw my stout shield," he says, "over both parties."

§ 97. With the ground thus cleared, constitutional reform was taken in hand. Even before Solon's time political theory and practice had advanced so far as to substitute property for birth as the sole qualification for political rights. Solon retained, therefore, the

His Social
Reforms : the
Seisachtheia.

graduation of the people in four classes according to their wealth, but the highest class of all (which was almost co-extensive with the nobility of birth) was no longer to monopolise political privileges. The idea of Solon was to use the graduation of wealth to determine the degree of political privilege and political obligation of a man—and chiefly that greatest of all obligations in the ancient state, service in the army. The Pentacosiomedimni alone should not rule, nor yet should the Thetes be without duties and privileges. All classes were to serve in war—the three

^{Service in War.} highest classes as cavalry or heavy infantry, the lowest class as light-armed troops or in the fleet of warships. Election as one of the Nine Archons was still a privilege reserved for the first class; but members of the Hippes and Zeugitae were eligible to lower magistracies.

Although the Thetes were not eligible to any magistracy,

^{Admission of Thetes to the Assembly.} they were admitted to the Assembly (*Ecclesia*) and so had a voice in the election of magistrates

and in passing sentence on their conduct at the expiration of their year of office (the annual *Euthyna* or "audit"). For the Assembly was given judicial functions by the institution of the *Heliaeae*, which was simply the whole

^{The Popular Jury-Court (Heliaeae).} body of citizens above thirty years of age sitting as a court of justice, as the Ecclesia was the same body convened for the purpose of passing

laws or electing magistrates. The chief function of the *Heliaeae* was to control the executive, for any magistrate on laying down his office could be accused before the people; in other cases it was a court of appeal against the sentence of an *Archon*, but gradually it became a court both of first and second instance. It was this institution of the popular jury-court that made the work of Solon so important in Athenian history.

In order to prepare business for the Assembly, a new Council was established—a novelty in Greek constitution-making. This Council consisted of four hundred members, one hundred from each tribe. In the period after Solon it became of great importance, but its work under the Solonian constitution is not clear.

Solon also reformed the Council of the Areiopagus. It was deprived of its deliberative functions, and ceased to have any direct share in the administration or legislation. On the other hand, it was given wide and undefined control over the conduct of the magistrates and the citizens. Its judicial and religious functions it retained unimpaired. It was the guardian of the laws and the constitution, with general supervision over public and private life—"a Council incorrupt, awful and severe; watchful guardian over those that sleep." As the Nine Archons at the end of their year of office became life-members of the Areiopagus, it came to represent the best practical wisdom of the community.

As regards the method of appointment to state offices, Solon employed the lot—*i.e.*, the decision was committed to the gods; not, however, without precautions to prevent the falling of the lot upon one quite unfit for office. In order to avoid this, he introduced a mixed system of election and lot. To fill the office of Archon, for example, forty candidates were elected, ten from each tribe, and from these again nine were chosen by lot.

§ 98. Solon introduced an important change in the system of weights and measures and currency. Hitherto the Aeginetan (Pheidonian) standard had been in use, or at least one very close to it. Rivalry with Aegina, and actual

hostilities with Megara, where the Aeginetan standard was employed, made a change desirable. Solon recoined seventy-

^{Change in the Coinage—} three of the old drachmas into one hundred

identical with the Euboic. This brought Athens into line with the cities of Euboea, and with Corinth, where a similar standard prevailed. This monetary reform had no connection with the Seisachtheia ; it seems to have been one of the last measures to be introduced. It had a purely com-

mercial object, being designed to facilitate trade
^{—a purely Commercial Measure.} with the Euboean colonies on the Thracian

coast, with Corinth and the cities of Sicily, and with Cyrene, in all of which the Euboic standard was used.

§ 99. Lastly must be mentioned Solon's general legislation General Legisla- on a variety of points. He forbade the export tion of Solon. of everything except oil ; this was to prevent famine prices for corn, for Athens had not yet begun to import grain. Sumptuary laws aimed at an improvement of the moral condition of the people. Testamentary disposition of property by one who had no natural heirs was allowed under certain restrictions. The ordinances of Draco were subjected to a thorough revision, with the exception of those relating to homicide, which were adopted without change. Other laws dealt with education ; every father must have his son taught a trade, otherwise the son was relieved of the duty of supporting his father in his old age.

The work of devising and organising the constitution must have extended over several years, perhaps Solon goes Abroad. from 594 to 591 B.C. When his work was done Solon set off for Egypt for ten years with the combined objects of trade and travel. He might have made himself despot of Athens by pandering to the desires of one or other party

in the state; had any other man, he says, received such power—

He had not kept the people back, nor ceased
Till he had robbed the richness of the milk.
But I stood forth, a landmark in the midst,
And barred the foes from battle.*

* Translation by Kenyon.

CHAPTER XIV.

ATHENS AND HER TYRANTS: DEMOCRACY.

100. Renewal of Civil Strife; Rise of Political Factions; Damasias.
—§ 101. War with Megara; Rise of Peisistratus; his Periods of Tyranny and Exile.—§ 102. Rule of Peisistratus; Prosperity of Athens; Development of Tragedy.—§ 103. Rule of Hippias and Hipparchus.—§ 104. Conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeiton; Murder of Hipparchus.—§ 105. Hippias and the Alcmaeonidae; Intervention of Sparta; Fall of the Peisistratidae.—§ 106. Isagoras and Cleisthenes; Second Intervention of Sparta.—§ 107. Coalition against Athens Defeated; Athenian Victory over Chalcis.

§ 100. SOLON'S reforms effected a permanent improvement in the condition of the people, but to a superficial observer his work must have seemed fruitless, for there followed a

<sup>Civil Strife
after Solon's
Reforms.</sup> space of thirty years of strife and unrest which ended in the establishment of a tyranny. He had, it seemed, done both too much and too little—too much in the eyes of the extreme aristocrats who claimed exclusive right to govern, and were besides hard hit by the “disburdening” ordinance; too little in those of the extreme anti-aristocratic section, hardly as yet to be called the democratic party, the landless and broken men who cast greedy eyes on the possessions of the rich. The strength of Solon lay in the middle class, partly composed of the free farmers (Georgi), partly of merchants, small traders, and craftsmen (Demiurgi), whose position had been improved by the new land laws, the change in the monetary system, the regulations touching trade, and

the recognition of their right to office. Thus there came into being three political parties: (1) the party of the Plain (the Pediaci or Pedieis), the extreme oligarchs, the Eupatridae, the great landowners who desired to return to the aristocratic form of government which Solon had partially overthrown; their leader was Lycurgus; (2) the men of the Coast (the Parali) including the bulk of the middle class, the traders, craftsmen, and small farmers who had all a stake in the country; this was the moderate party, holding to the reformed constitution; their leader was Megacles, son of Alcmaeon, the Megacles who had married Agarista of Sicyon—an amnesty proclaimed by Solon had permitted the return of the clan, which was embittered against the rest of the Eupatridae by reason of its exile; (3) the men of the Highlands (the Diacrii), the poor hill-folk of the uplands of Mount Parnes and northern Attica; to this party belonged the Thetes, and especially the Hectemori, for whom Solon had done little beyond guaranteeing personal freedom. The leader of the Diacrii was Peisistratus, son of Hippocrates, who belonged to the district of Brauron, in the east of Attica; this was a radical, almost an anarchist party. The parties derived their designation from the districts in which their chief strength lay; though their elements were in existence before the time of Solon, yet their consolidation as definite political parties was an undesigned result of the Solonian legislation; the third party seems to have organised itself somewhat later than the first two, which indeed is what we should expect to find. We know little of the details of the party strife; perhaps it broke out the moment the personal influence of Solon was removed, immediately after the fall of Crisa and the end of the

Political Parties:
The Pedieis;
Lycurgus.

The Parali :
Megacles.

The Diacrii ;
Peisistratus.

Sacred War (590 B.C.). Twice it was found impossible to elect Archons (perhaps in 589 and 584 B.C.), whence those years were called years of *anarchia*. Then a certain Damasias being elected chief Archon, held his power for two years and two months (583—581 B.C.), but he had no military force and was expelled from his position; he was the fore-runner of Peisistratus. The Solonian constitution, though justly regarded as the foundation of the Athenian democracy, in that Solon created the institutions and the machinery of popular government, never worked satisfactorily; from the first there was dissension which paved the way for tyranny, and then Cleisthenes gave new shape to the creation of his great predecessor.

§ 101. The decisive factor in the external history of Athens during the seventh century B.C. was the struggle with her neighbour Megara. Solon's fame originated in the share he had in the struggle for Salamis (610 B.C.), but the occupation of that island was not the last word in the long debate. Probably the Megarians never acquiesced in the decision arrived at on the battlefield, and later by the Spartan arbitrators. Possibly also the dissensions of the Athenians afforded a prospect of reversing that decision. At any rate, during the early part of the sixth century the two states were again at war. Peisistratus (born about 600 B.C.) greatly distinguished himself in this war, and captured Nisaea, the port of Megara. If he was actually in command of the expedition as Polemarch, its date must be about 565 B.C. It was on the strength of this achievement that he came forward as leader of the party of the malcontents, which

Years of
Anarchia
(589, 584 B.C.)

Archonship of
Damasias
(583—581 B.C.)

Rise of
Peisistratus

now for the first time gained a head. Solon, who was now old, in vain sounded in his verses a note of alarm and distrust of the fair professions of Peisistratus. For one aiming at the tyranny the first requisite was a force. One day Peisistratus appeared all bloody in the agora, making out that he had narrowly escaped assassination at the hands of his political opponents, the foes of the people. On the proposal of one Aristion a bodyguard of fifty men armed with clubs was voted to him. Then he threw off the mask and seized the Acropolis (560 B.C.).

For five years he held the tyranny, and then the parties of the Plain and the Coast combined to expel him. Megacles, however, at length deserted the coalition and undertook to help Peisistratus to recover his position on condition that the tyrant married his daughter. The restoration was effected (in 551 B.C. perhaps) by means of a strange trick. A woman of great stature and beauty was found in Paeania (east of Mount Hymettus) and was arrayed in the guise of the goddess Athena. The rumour was spread abroad that Athena was bringing back Peisistratus; when he drove into the city in a chariot with the woman beside him the inhabitants received him with adoration! The woman's name was Phye. Soon a rupture between Peisistratus and his father-in-law brought about a reunion of Megacles with the foes of tyranny, and Peisistratus was compelled once more to retire from Athens; the length of his second lease of power is not known, perhaps little more than a year (551—550 B.C.). His second period of exile lasted ten years; he spent them on the Macedonian coast and about the gold-bearing region of Mount Pangaeus. Here he acquired wealth, and hired

His First
Tyranny
(560—556 B.C.)

His First Exile
(556—551 B.C.)

First Restora-
tion and Second
Tyranny

Second Exile.

mercenaries ; he also gained many allies, notably the Second Restoration and Third Tyranny of Peisistratus. knights of Eretria, and Lygdamis of Naxos. Then he landed at Marathon, and defeated the constitutionalists at Pallene, in the gap between Hymettus and Brilessus (Pentelicus). No further resistance was offered, and Peisistratus retained the tyranny until his death (539—527 B.C.).

§ 102. The power of Peisistratus was based upon his Rule of Peisistratus : Mercenaries. mercenary force, partly, perhaps, composed of Scythians. He had also in his hands four hundred hostages of hostile families ; though some of the chief of these, notably the Alcmaeonidae, had fled the country. The mass of the lower classes also supported him, and he did much for their relief ; for the great estates of the nobles who had deserted Attica were distributed among the Hectemori and the landless, and the class of peasant proprietors was thus largely increased. Increase of Peasant Proprietors. The administration was temperate, "more like a constitutional government than a tyranny." The Solonian machinery was not abolished ; Archons were duly elected, the Assembly met, the law-courts were held ; this training of the people in the routine, if not the reality, of self-government was of immense service when in due time the democracy came to be restored. For Prosperity of Athens. the rest, it may be doubted whether Athens ever enjoyed such prosperity as under her first tyrant. Taxation—a ground-rent equal to one-tenth, later one-twentieth, of the annual produce—was light, and fell equally on all ; agriculture was aided by grants of money to the struggling ; public works, like the great temple (the Hecatompedon, or House of a Buildings. Hundred Feet) of Athena on the Acropolis, or the vast fane begun in honour of Zeus near the Ilissus, gave

employment and wages to craftsmen ; justice was dealt equally and fairly to all. Men looked back in after days upon the reign of Peisistratus as a “ golden age.” Much was done for religion, and thereby for art. Delos was purified, all sepulchres being removed from within sight of Apollo’s sanctuary. In honour of Athena, to whom he was much indebted, Peisistratus improved and extended the annual Panathenaea ; on the model of the Panathenaea. Religion : the national festivals it was held with special splendour every fourth year with athletic and musical contests, though the chief feature continued to be the long procession, afterwards to be immortalised by the greatest of Athenian sculptors, which wended its way from the outer Cerameicus to the Acropolis to present to the goddess a robe (*peplus*), the handiwork of Athenian ladies. In connection with the Panathenaea a great work was done for the Homeric poems ; it was provided that the Rhapsodes should recite the *Iliad* or *Odyssey* in a regular and officially recognised order, and to that end an official edition of this poems was made, the foundation of our present text; some, Official Edition of Homer. however, doubt the reality of this “ Peisistratean recension.” Most important was the work done in connection with the popular cult of Dionysus. A temple of the god was built at the southern foot of the Acropolis, and a new festival, the Great Dionysia or the City Dionysia, instituted, at which choirs of men in goat-skins to represent the satyrs that frolicked round the god contended in character-songs for a prize. From these rude beginnings tragedy developed, proclaiming in its name its origin in the “ goat-song ” of the satyric chorus. In what he did for the wine-god, Peisistratus paid his debt to the hill-men who had so faithfully supported him ; for Dionysus was a rustic god, and his special seat of worship The Great Dionysia : Development of Tragedy.

was in the Icarian Deme behind Mount Brilessus, in the heart of the Diacrian district.

§ 103. Peisistratus was succeeded by his eldest son, ^{Hippias and Hipparchus.} Hippias, brother of Hippias, had a share in the administration ; Thessalus (another son of Peisistratus, by an Argive wife) seems to have taken no part in politics. The policy of the father was continued and developed. The court at Athens became a centre of culture, for Hippias and Hipparchus had both of them literary tastes ; Lasus of Hermione, Simonides of Ceos, Anacreon of Teos, the most eminent poets of the day, made Athens their home.

§ 104. The position of the dynasty must have been weakened by events in the Aegean. The Persian power was advancing. Polycrates, the great tyrant of Samos, found himself compelled to become an ally of Cambyses (526 b.c.). Three years later he was destroyed, and by 516 b.c. the island was practically in Persian hands. The Spartan expedition of 524 b.c. against Samos had failed, it is true, to realise its primary object, the overthrow of Polycrates, but it seems to have brought about the fall of Lygdamis of Naxos, who was closely allied with the Athenian tyrants, to whom, indeed, he owed his position. With his fall, the Athenian hostages, who had been kept in Naxos, recovered their freedom. The first serious blow came, however, from an unexpected hand. Many stories were current about the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. All agree that the plot was not political in origin, but sprang from a personal quarrel between Harmodius and Hipparchus. Aristogeiton, who was the elder of the two, joined in the conspiracy out of affection for Harmodius. Accounts differ as to the number of persons

Conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.

privy to the plot. The design was to slay both Hippias and Hipparchus during the Panathenaic procession; it was expected that when once the tyrants were killed the people would rally round the conspirators. A mere accident upset all calculations. One of the conspirators was seen in converse with Hippias in the outer Cerameicus. Harmodius and Aristogeiton imagined that the plot was being betrayed, and that they were on the point of being seized. "Whereupon they determined to take their revenge first on the man who had outraged them and was the cause of their desperate attempt; so they rushed, just as they were, within the gates. They found Hipparchus near the Leocorium (in the agora), and falling upon him ^{Murder of} Hipparchus. with blind fury, slew him."* Harmodius was cut down by the guards; Aristogeiton for the moment escaped, but being taken, perished under torture. Such was the conspiracy, which sprang from personal resentment; the reckless attempt which followed arose out of a sudden fright. No rising of the people took place. So far as the plot was formed with the object of freeing Athens, it was a fiasco, and Athens finally owed her liberation to foreign intervention and to accident. Nevertheless, the historian might say what he would, the poetical instinct of the people fastened upon the deed of Harmodius and Aristogeiton as inaugurating the period of freedom; their memory was enshrined in the hearts of the Athenians; the *scolium*, or drinking-song, beginning "In a myrtle bough shall my sword be hid," became a national anthem; the statues of the tyrant-slayers were set up in the agora, and no other statue might stand near them.

§ 105. Hipparchus was slain in 514 b.c. Three years longer Hippias ruled, rendered suspicious and cruel by his

* Thucydides, in Jowett's translation.

brother's murder. He fortified Munychia to secure his ^{Severe Rule of} retreat in case of misfortune, and began to ^{Hippias.} look towards Persia as a possible refuge. The final blow came from the Alcmaeonidae, who had turned their exile to good account. The old temple at Delphi had perished by fire (548 b.c.) and the Amphictions had set on foot a Panhellenic collection for the rebuilding, the estimate for which was three hundred talents. The Alcmaeonidae

^{Rebuilding of} undertook the contract, and apparently, ac-
^{Temple of} cording to one version, made a good thing out of
^{Delphi by the} Alcmaeonidae. it; another version was that they made the front of the temple of Parian marble, though only *poros* (lime-stone) was specified in the agreement. The Alcmaeonidae thus gained great favour at Delphi, a religious centre which was neglected by the Peisistratidae. In 513 b.c. they had, with the other aristocratic exiles, seized Leipsydrium, on the northern slopes of Parnes, but had been compelled to retire. They now employed the Pythia to influence the Spartans to assist them. The constant injunction of the oracle to the Lacedaemonians, whether private or official inquirers, was that they must free Athens. At last the Spartans, according to their own account "setting the things of the

^{Intervention of} god before those of man," sent Anchimolus by

^{Sparta.} sea at the head of a force, but he was defeated and slain by a thousand Thessalian cavalry which had come to the assistance of Hippias. A second army under King Cleomenes invaded Attica by land, defeated the Thessalians and blockaded Hippias in the Acropolis. He tried to send his children secretly out of the country, but their capture forced his hand; he agreed to evacuate Attica within five

^{Expulsion of} days (510 b.c.). He retired first to Sigeium,

^{Hippias} and then to Aeantides, tyrant of Lampsacus, who had married Archedice the daughter of Hippias;

"from him he went to the court of Darius, whence returning after twenty years with the Persian army, he took part in the expedition to Marathon, being then an old man."

Athens was thus freed from her tyrant by the intervention of Sparta; but she had to pay the price of this deliverance by entering the Peloponnesian league. This gave Sparta a right to interfere in Athenian politics.

§ 106. Apparently the feud between the other noble families and that of the Alcmaeonidae was still alive. Athens was torn by that strife of factions which had rendered the Solonian constitution unworkable eighty years before. The head of the Alcmaeonidae was Cleisthenes, son of the Megacles who married Agarista; his opponent was Isagoras, the son of Teisander, who had the support of all who adhered to the Peisistratid house; probably many of the lower class feared a resumption of their estates by the returned exiles. If Cleisthenes entertained secret designs of seizing supreme power himself, he saw their hopelessness in 508 B.C., in which year his rival was chief Archon. He therefore "took into partnership the masses," and set to work to carry out a democratic programme; perhaps he had himself gained a place among the nine Archons. Isagoras appealed to Cleomenes to "drive out the pollution"—i.e., to expel the Alcmaeonidae, who were still under the pollution of the sacrilege in the affair of Cylon. On this, Cleisthenes, with a few of his adherents, retired from Attica, and Cleomenes expelled seven hundred Athenian families of the democratic party. When he attempted to dissolve the Council and set up Isagoras with three hundred of his partisans as supreme, the populace rallied to the defence of the constitution. Cleomenes and Isagoras

Cleisthenes
Democratic
Programme.

Democratic
Rising against
Cleomenes and
Isagoras.

were besieged in the Acropolis, and having only a small force, were obliged to capitulate on the third day. Cleomenes and his Spartans passed out under safe conduct, and Isagoras managed to effect his escape; but the people showed that they were in earnest by putting his adherents to death. Cleisthenes now returned and carried out his reforms (507 B.C.).

§ 107. The infant democracy was threatened from every quarter. War with Sparta was inevitable, and Spartan success meant the establishment of oligarchy, if not of practical tyranny. Thebes was eager for war, as Plataea, though lying on the Boeotian side of Mount Cithaeron, had entered into alliance with Athens (510 B.C.). The Aeginetans and Chalcidians were jealous of the growing Athenian commerce. Under these imminent perils the Athenians sent ambassadors to Artaphernes (Artaphernes), Satrap of Sardis, who demanded the recognition of the suzerainty of the Persian king, his brother Darius, as the price of Persian aid; this the ambassadors consented to give, but their acceptance of these terms was repudiated by the Assembly. The full force of the Spartan confederacy appeared and ravaged Eleusis (506 B.C.), but the coalition fell to pieces because the Corinthians withdrew their troops; they desired to support Athens as a counterpoise to the power of Aegina, who was at that time the most formidable commercial rival of Corinth. The two Spartan kings

quarrelled; Demaratus retired, and Cleomenes could do nothing but return home also. The

Spartan plan had embraced a simultaneous invasion of Attica by the Boeotians and the Chalcidians. When the Peloponnesians withdrew, the Athenians marched against the Chalcidians, who had crossed the straits and were

ravaging northern Attica. The Boeotians, who had also crossed Mount Cithaeron into Attica, hastened to join forces with the Chalcidians, but the Athenians turned suddenly against them and completely defeated them; then they crossed the Euripus and smote the knights (Hippobatae) of Chalcis so sorely that they were fain to cede a large part of the rich Lelantine plain, which was thenceforth occupied by two thousand Attic Cleruchs (*κληροῦχος*, a “lot-holder”—“outsettlers,” who retained all their rights as Athenian citizens, ^{The Athenian Victory over the Chalcidians.} ^{Cleruchs in Euboea.})—“outsettlers,” who retained all their rights as Athenian citizens, Seven hundred Boeotians had been made prisoners, and a still larger number of the Chalcidians; the Athenians held them to ransom at two *minae* each (about £8); of a tithe of the ransom they made and dedicated on the Acropolis to Athena a four-horse chariot of bronze, on the basis of which were verses by Simonides telling how the “sons of Athens in chains of iron and darkness quenched the insolent spirit” of their foes; some fragments of the inscription have been found. The fetters hung for years upon the Acropolis wall as a memorial of the fresh vigour of the youthful democracy.

CHAPTER XV.

CLEISTHENES.

§ 108. Political Power of the Clans ; Need of New Organisation.

§ 109. Constitution of Cleisthenes ; Basis and Composition of the New Tribes ; Demes and Trittyes ; the Demes as Corporations.—§ 110. The Tribes as Corporations ; the Eponymi.—

§ 111. The New Council ; Prytaneis.—§ 112. Functions of the Council,—Administrative, Financial, Deliberative.—§ 113. Ostracism.—§ 114. Military Change ; the Ten Generals (Strategi).

§ 108. THE fatal impediment to the working of the Solonian constitution had been the mutual rivalry of the great clans and the consequent splitting-up of Attica into local parties. For Solon had retained the old four-fold

^{Power of the Clans—} tribal division, at the basis of which lay the clan organisation. The Council was composed of an equal number of representatives from all the tribes, so that the aristocrats controlled its composition ; and seeing that no initiation of measures was possible in the Assembly except through the Council, there was no possibility of political action on the part of the middle and lower class of citizens except by means of faction—*i.e.* by alliance with

^{—gave rise to} some one or other of the clan-groups. It was ^{Faction.}

just in this way that Peisistratus had come to power, by out-bidding his noble rivals for popular support. The prime requisite was therefore a new organisation, which

^{New Organisa-} should destroy the political significance of the ^{tion Required.} clan-groups, and with it abolish that local division of parties that was so fatal to all political unity ; some means must be discovered of substituting a free play and

conflict of purely political principles and ideals for the pseudo-political strife of wealthy families. It was the great service of Cleisthenes that he saw how this reform must be effected. The method was simple, but simple with that simplicity which calls for genius for its apprehension.

§ 109. Attica consisted, as the result of past history, of a great number of Demes, or districts of varying size. These parishes were adopted as the local units of the new organisation replacing the social units (the clans) of the old divisions. In place of the old clan-groups, the Phratries, there were formed Deme-groups or Trittyes. And just as in the old scheme so many Phratries were combined to constitute the Tribe, in the new scheme three Trittyes were combined to constitute a Tribe. In place of four Tribes, ten were created; but the old Tribes had been primarily social, being based on the clan—*i.e.*, on real or supposed descent—whereas the ten new Tribes: their Object. new Tribes were local from first to last, and their object was purely political. In whatever Deme a man lived at the time of the reform, in that he and his descendants were ever afterwards enrolled, let their birth be high or low, their wealth great or small; change of residence did not bring with it transference to the burgess-roll of another Deme. The vital point in the new arrangement must be noted. Three Trittyes went to the Tribe; but while the Demes forming each Tritty were as a rule Local Divisions of Attica. contiguous, no two Trittyes in a Tribe were in juxtaposition. For all Attica lent itself to a triple division—the region of the city, that of the coast, and the inland districts. In assigning the Deme-Groups to Tribes. groups to the Tribe, one group, or Tritty, was taken from each of the three regions. The result was that

the Tribe was composed of demesmen from every part of Attica, the common bond between them consisting, not in all dwelling in the same place, or tracing descent from the same ancestor, or belonging to the same social stratum but in common possession of the citizenship of Athens. For the purposes of politics Athens was the common centre; the demesmen must go thither to attend the Assembly or serve on the Council or sit in the jury-courts; but both the Tribes and the Demes were corporations with an individual life—assemblies, officers, worship, and property. Each Deme had a head or Demarch elected by his fellow-demesmen for a year; in his charge was the Deme-roll, on which was entered the name of every

*Functions of
the Deme as
a Corporation.*

man when he reached the age of seventeen; this solemn entry constituted a man's certificate of citizenship. The Trittys, or Deme-group, it must be noted, had no independent existence as a corporation, simply because all the internal affairs of a parish were regulated by the members of that parish, while higher civic functions were performed by the parishes massed as a Tribe; there was thus no sphere left vacant for the intermediate Deme-group. Finally, the workableness of this scheme, which on paper wears a highly artificial look, lay in the fact that the Demes, the units on which it was based,

*The Demes
Natural
Divisions.*

were natural divisions which had their roots in history; there was no attempt to make the Tribes consist of the same number of Demes, or to secure a meaningless symmetry by making the Trittyes of a Tribe contain all precisely the same number of Demes.

§ 110. Community of worship was in ancient times the

*The Tribe as a
Medium of
Common
Worship.*

test and essence of all unions; hence the ten new Tribes were placed under the special protection of Attic Heroes (except the tribe Aeantis,

under the protection of Ajax), whose names they bore. The selection of names had the sanction of the Delphic oracle. The demesmen met at a common shrine and in common festivals in honour of the Hero of their Tribe. Statues of the Heroes, the Eponymi as they were called, stood in the agora at Athens, and the bases of the statues appear to have been used as a convenient point at which to post public notices relating to any particular Tribe. To have a statue erected near those of the Eponymi was an honour reserved for the greatest benefactors of the state. The names of the Tribes in their conventional order of precedence are as follows:—Erechtheis; Aegeis; Pandionis; Leontis; Acamantis; Oeneis; Cecropis; Hippothontis; Aeantis; Antiochis (all in the feminine, with $\phi\upsilon\lambda\eta$ understood).

New blood was infused into the new Tribes and a firmer support thus gained against the opposition of the oligarchic clans by the enfranchisement of many resident aliens ($\mu\acute{e}toukoi$) and freedmen or servile clients ($\delta\acute{o}\nu\lambda\omega\iota\mu\acute{e}toukoi$).

§ 111. The old Solonian Council of Four Hundred had represented the four Ionic Tribes, and in like manner the reformed Council was based upon the ten new artificial Tribes. It numbered five hundred, fifty from each Tribe, each Deme returning a certain number of the fifty, according to its size. The Council thus became a truly representative body, in which all Attica and every grade of the population was adequately represented. If, as is probable, the councillors were selected by lot out of a number of candidates chosen by the demesmen, the Council of Five Hundred was a popularly elected body; this was an important feature, seeing that the Council under the constitution of Cleisthenes was the real governing

The Eponymi.

Names of the Tribes.

The Council of Five Hundred.

A Representative Body.

A Popularly Elected Body.

body. All upon whom the lot fell had to undergo a rigid “scrutiny” (*δοκιμασία*) by the outgoing Council ^{Docimasia.} into their public and private life, and might be rejected as unfit; there was also a rigorous “examination of official conduct” (*εὐθύνη*), probably before ^{Euthyna.} the Areiopagus, at the end of the year of office. Further, the meetings of the Council were as a rule open to the public.

The whole body of five hundred did not sit constantly.

The official year of 360 days was divided into ^{The Prytaneis.} ten parts, each called a Prytany, and the fifty councillors of each tribe in turn sat as a permanent committee of the Council for a tenth part of the year; the fifty councillors so acting were called Prytaneis (“presidents”) and during their “Prytany” they dined ^{The Tholos.} at the public expense in the Scias or Tholos, a dome-roofed building on the south side of the agora, close to the Council Hall (Buleuterium).

§ 112. The Council of Five Hundred was the supreme administrative authority in the state. The old power of the Archons was largely diminished, and they became executive officers acting under the orders and supervision of the Council. The Council was at once a Board of Public Works, in connection with the building, repair, and upkeep of temples and other state buildings; a War Office and Admiralty, in connection with the control and administration of the military and naval affairs of the state; and a Foreign Office, representing the state in all diplomatic negotiations. Power of declaring war or of concluding a treaty lay solely ^{Functions of the Council: Administrative.} with the Assembly. It was especially in the ^{Financial: Apodectae.} domain of finance that the Council was supreme; all receipts and expenditures, with few exceptions,

were controlled by it; the ten new finance officials called Apodectae ("receivers"), one from each Tribe, acted under its direction. The Apodectae received all taxes. The deliberative functions of the Council were also important, for no proposal could come before the Assembly until it had been discussed by the Council and <sup>Deliberative :
the Probuleuma.</sup> been passed by it. The proposal, when passed by the Council, was a Probuleuma (*προβούλευμα*); in this form it came before the Assembly, and if passed there it became a Psephisma (*ψήφισμα*), or decree. The Council had also certain judicial functions.

§ 113. The third institution expressly attributed to Cleisthenes is that of Ostracism. By this law ^{Ostracism.} power was given to the people to decide by an absolute majority which of two rival policies should be followed, by banishing that leader who was voted dangerous to the state. We are told that the institution was specially aimed at the adherents of the expelled tyrants. The first example of its use belongs to the year 487 B.C., some twenty years after the alleged date of its institution. Hence it is probable that the law should not be ascribed to Cleisthenes. The tradition that the reformer was "hoist with his own petard" by being the first to suffer under his own law has no truth in it. We are unable to do more than guess at the cause of the strange disappearance of the name of Cleisthenes after the year 507 B.C. He may have been compelled to retire into private life by the popular indignation excited by the negotiations with Persia.

§ 114. A few years after the constitution of Cleisthenes had been framed the new division into Tribes <sup>The Ten
Generals.</sup> was made the basis of a military reform. Ten generals (Strategi) were elected, one from each Tribe, to

lead the tribal regiments of heavy-armed troops (hoplites). For some years the Strategi acted under the orders of the Polemarch; but after the latter came to be selected by lot they superseded him, and before long became the most important officers in the state.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE KINGDOM OF LYDIA.

115. Geography of Asia Minor.—§ 116. The Greeks of Asia, and the Lydian Empire; Gyges; his Attack on the Greek Cities; Cimmerian Invasions of Lydia and Ionia.—§ 117. Ardys; Alyattes and Miletus; Lydia Mistress of Asia Minor.—§ 118. Rise of the Medes; Destruction of Nineveh; War between the Medes and Lydia.—§ 119. Croesus; his Policy towards the Greeks; his Conquests.—§ 120. Rise of the Persian Cyrus and Fall of the Median Kingdom; Overthrow of Lydia by Cyrus.—§ 121. Conquest of the Asiatic Greeks by Cyrus; Satrapies of Asia Minor; Condition of the Greeks under Persian Rule.

§ 115. THE interior of Asia Minor is a table-land sloping, as we see from the courses of the rivers, to the north and to the west. Along its southern edge runs the lofty barrier of the Taurus mountains. The northern edge is formed by a chain which in its western part bears the name of the Mysian Olympus. Bursting from the plateau westwards are four considerable streams—the Caicus, Hermus, Cayster, and Maeander, enumerating them from north to south. The alluvial plains at the mouth of these and smaller streams have united so as to form a fringe of rich land broken by innumerable promontories and bays along the western foot of the central plateau. The Greeks who settled here found a scenery as varied and beautiful with its alternation and intermixture of land and sea as that of their old home on the other side of the Aegean. The Greek cities were planted mostly at or near a river-mouth,

The Greek Settlements.

for the river-valley formed the most convenient route of communication with the interior; the great route connecting Mesopotamia with the Aegean coast ran, for example, across the Halys and down through Phrygia, and so along the valley of the Hermus through Sardis into the valley of the Cayster and finally to Ephesus.

§ 116. In Asia Minor the Greeks came into contact with empires which in size had no parallels in the west and were in age and civilisation far ahead of the western world. The contact was peaceable for a long time, until

^{Contact of the Asiatic Greeks with Lydia.} there arose an empire filled with the spirit of expansion. This was the kingdom of Lydia, the nucleus of which lay on the central Hermus, where, at the foot of Mount Tmolus, hard by the gold-bearing stream of the Pactolus, was placed its capital, Sardis.

For many generations the Lydians were ruled by kings of Phrygian race, immigrants from Macedonia or Thrace who overran the greater part of western Asia Minor and founded several distinct states. The history of Lydia

^{The Mermnadae:} really begins, however, with the accession of Gyges.

Gyges, the first of the dynasty of the Mermnadae, which was apparently purely Lydian by blood. This was about the beginning of the seventh century B.C. The Lydians now entered upon a career of aggression which extended their power after one hundred and fifty years of

^{Policy of Lydia.} struggle over the whole Ionian coast. For

Lydian was essentially a trading state; to the Lydians was rightly ascribed the invention of coinage. The settled policy of the Mermnadae was to make Lydia the focus of the trade between East and West, and to extend

^{Conquests of Gyges.} her power over her natural seaboard. Hence Gyges attacked the Greek cities. Old Smyrna (on the north side of the bay) was saved only by desperate

fighting; on Miletus no impression could be made; Colophon seems to have fallen, and perhaps Magnesia on the lower Hermus was also captured. Thus the Lydians pressed seawards down all the river-valleys. Northwards, Gyges carried his arms to the Hellespont, and to the Propontis, on the coast of which he planted Dascylium. This career of conquest was interrupted by the hordes of ^{The Cimmerians.} the Cimmerians, a people from the Crimea and southern Russia, who, being driven out by the Scythians, swept, like the Huns or Mongols of later times, in a flood over Asia Minor. The Cimmerians first fell upon the kingdom of Phrygia, and the last Phrygian king, Midas, killed himself in despair (about 674 B.C.). Then Lydia was invaded. Gyges was fain to turn for help to the great Assyrian empire, at this time ruled by Assurbanipal, whom the Greeks called Sardanapalus (reigned 668—626 B.C.). The record of the connection of the Lydian king with Assyria exists on the tablets which tell how Gyges of Lydia, which had never been heard of before by the Assyrians, sent envoys to do homage, and sent also two Cimmerian chiefs in fetters to Nineveh. Soon, however, Gyges renounced his allegiance, and ^{Gyges and the Assyrian Empire.} aided Psammetichus I. of Egypt in his rebellion against Assyria. The subsequent defeat and death of Gyges at the hands of the Cimmerians seemed to the Assyrian monarch a just judgment upon his faithlessness. The Cimmerians overran Lydia and captured all Sardis, with the exception of the citadel (657 B.C.) The Ionian cities felt the storm; Magnesia on the Maeander was destroyed, the temple of Artemis at Ephesus plundered and burnt. Gradually, however, the wave of barbarism ebbed southwards and eastwards, and Lydia lifted up her head again. ^{Cimmerian Invasion of Lydia (657 B.C.)—and of the Ionian Cities.}

§ 117. Ardys carried on the aggressive policy of his father as vassal of Assyria. He failed before Miletus, but captured Priene, at that time a seaport, but now eight miles from the shore. The son of Ardys was Sadyattes, who pushed the war with Miletus with as little success as his predecessors. Under the next king, Alyattes (610—560 B.C.), the Lydians threw themselves again and again upon the city which for so long had been the bulwark of Ionia, and at last the long struggle came to an end in a treaty of peace and alliance between the two combatants. The treaty was a compromise; the Milesians were tired of their rôle as sole champions of Hellenism, and Alyattes was compelled by the development of events in the far east to surrender his demand for the absolute submission of the powerful city. The rest of Ionia was practically subjugated; Colophon was occupied, and Smyrna was obliterated as a city in order to give Sardis complete command of her own valley; thenceforth, until a new Smyrna rose two hundred years later, the Smyrniotes lived dispersed in villages on the primitive system and played no part in history. Thus the Lydians now had hold of the outlets to the sea in the valleys of the Hermus and the Maeander; only that of the Cayster was partially closed to them by Ephesus, which remained independent; and even Ephesus was friendly, for the despot who ruled the city was connected by marriage with the Lydian royal house.

§ 118. In the east Lydia was in contact with a great power. For about 700 B.C. the Medes in the highlands east of Assyria had asserted their independence under Deioces, who became the founder of the Median dynasty. This independence was

The Lydians
Masters of
Asia Minor.

Foundation of
the Median
Dynasty (700
B.C.).

fully won under Phraortes and his successor, Cyaxares; for the Medes and the Babylonians, the latter led by Nabopolassar (reigned 625-605 b.c.), destroyed Nineveh, the capital of Assyria (606 b.c.). In the partition of the Assyrian empire, the southern part, from the Euphrates to the borders of Egypt, fell to Babylonia, and the new Babylonian kingdom under Nebucadnezar (reigned 604-562 b.c.) rose to a great pitch of prosperity; the northern part, Assyria proper and the land stretching north-westwards into Asia Minor, fell to Media. War between Alyattes and the Median Cyaxares. For five years it dragged on, and in the sixth a battle between the two powers was interrupted by an eclipse of the sun, which in fact had been predicted by Thales, the philosopher of Miletus. Astronomers fix the date of this eclipse as May 28th, 585 b.c. The result was a treaty fixing the river Halys as the boundary between Lydia and Media; and to cement the peace the daughter of Alyattes was given in marriage to Astyages, the son of Cyaxares.

§ 119. Croesus (560—546 b.c.) completed the work of his father Alyattes, and under him Lydia reached the acme of her power. The Lydian conquest of the Greek cities was hardly a misfortune, for Lydia was no barbarous power, but one receptive of Greek civilisation; she became Hellenised even in speech, and the Lydian language died out completely: she had also much to give Greece in return; the entire commerce of Lydia with the west was carried in Greek ships and enriched the cities of the coast. It was not her policy to destroy them, but to incorporate them and make them the material basis of her power. The rich gifts sent by the first and the last of the Lydian kings to the

Destruction of Nineveh by Media and Babylonians (606 b.c.)

War between Alyattes and the Median Cyaxares

Battle of the Eclipse (585 b.c.)

Reign of Croesus (560—546 b.c.)

Policy of the Lydian Kingdom to the Greeks of Asia

shrines of Apollo at Delphi and Miletus showed that they sought recognition as members of the Hellenic world ; it was the same object as that for which Philip of Macedon afterwards strove so strenuously.

There was no unity among the Greeks of Ionia, and the reduction of their cities was easily effected. Ephesus succumbed, and then the Dorian and Aeolian cities likewise were subjugated upon one pretext or another.

^{Conquests of Croesus.} Only Miletus continued to enjoy her peculiarly privileged position based upon the treaty made when she renounced her position as champion of Ionia. The "barbarian" tribes west of the Halys were conquered also ; only in the extreme south, on the part of the brave highlanders of Caria and Lycia, was there any successful resistance to Lydian arms. Croesus was contemplating the reduction of the islands fringing the coast, when he was involved in the vortex of eastern politics and plunged into ruin.

§ 120. The Median kingdom had fallen in 549 B.C. before the onslaught of Cyrus II. the Great and his hardy Persians from about the head of the Persian gulf. Cyrus

<sup>Fall of the Median King-
dom : Rise of Cyrus.</sup> had ascended the Persian throne about 559 B.C., and ten years later he had overthrown Astyages

and gained the sovereignty of Upper Asia. The Medes had degenerated during the half-century which had elapsed since their conquest of Nineveh. This has always been the story of eastern empires ; the ruder but more vigorous race overthrows the more civilised but more effeminate one, only itself in its turn to experience the same fate.

Policy and ambition combined brought Croesus into the field against the victor. He went to work wisely,

<sup>Alliances of
Croesus against Cyrus.</sup> organising a great combination. Nabunaid,

king of Babylon, and Amasis, king of Egypt, both entered into alliance with him ; even the Spartans

promised assistance. The Delphic oracle guaranteed that by crossing the Halys he should destroy a great kingdom—his own was meant, so the priests The Delphic Oracle's Advice to Croesus. declared after the event, but undoubtedly the original reference was to Persia, for the Greeks then knew of none more powerful than the Lydian empire. What was the exact scheme we cannot tell; at any rate Croesus crossed the Halys alone in 546 B.C. In Cappadocia he captured Pteria, but encountering Cyrus he was compelled to fall back upon his capital after War between Cyrus and Croesus. a battle in which both sides claimed victory.

The rapid pursuit of Cyrus baffled all calculations; the Lydians were compelled to fight under the walls of Sardis; they were utterly defeated, and in fourteen days both the city and its king were in the hands of the Fall of Croesus (546 B.C.) Persians. The fall of the rich and powerful monarch from his pinnacle of pride into the state of a captive profoundly affected the Greek imagination, and gave rise to the stories reported by Herodotus of the chronologically impossible interview of Its Effect on the Greek Imagination. Solon and Croesus and the miraculous rescue of the latter from the pyre on which he was condemned by his conqueror to be burnt alive.

§ 121. With short-sighted policy the Greek cities had rejected the overtures of Cyrus, as well as refrained from vigorously supporting Croesus. When the Preparations of the Greek Cities to resist Cyrus. victory was won and the Greeks offered their submission on the terms which they had enjoyed under Croesus, Cyrus in turn rejected the offer. Miletus alone, occupying as she did a peculiar position among them, was allowed to retain her privileges; the rest saw no alternative and prepared for resistance. They resolved to repair their fortifications and to appeal to

Sparta for aid. The Spartans are said to have been on the point of sending troops to assist Croesus when news came that all was over, but they now contented themselves with the despatch of a single ship to Ionia with an idle demand for Cyrus to stay his hand. Cyrus himself, soon after the fall of Sardis, departed into

^{Capture of Babylon by Cyrus (538 B.C.)} inner Asia to capture Babylon (538 B.C.) and to carry his arms as far as the Jaxartes, finally to fall in battle with the barbarian Massagetae.

who lived near the sea of Aral. His general Harpagus

^{Conquest of the Asiatic Greeks by Persia.} had little difficulty in reducing the Greek cities; even the islands were fain to tender their allegiance. Bias of Priene, one of the Seven

Sages, advised all the Ionians to abandon their homes and to emigrate in a body to Sardinia, an island which enjoyed an unmerited reputation during the sixth century B.C. as an El Dorado. This advice of Bias was in part a repetition of that given by Thales of Miletus, who had suggested partial surrender of autonomy by the constituent states of the Panionium, and the formation of a federal capital at

^{Thales.} Teos; but Thales was a long way in advance of his compatriots, in politics as in natural philosophy. The Phocaeans actually did on their part prefer to abandon their city, and sailed in their long ships to their kinsmen at Alalia in Corsica; and the Teians likewise, and founded a new city, Abdera, on the Thracian coast.

The Persians formed the conquered country into three Satrapies. Ionia and all the western coast-land of Asia Minor, as far as the Pamphylians, formed the first Satrapy; the Lydian kingdom the second; (⁽¹⁾ Lydia and Ionia.) these two were ruled by a single governor, whose seat was at Sardis. The third Satrapy embraced Phrygia

and the north-western territory ; the seat of the Satrap was Dascylium, on the Propontis. Outwardly the position of the Greeks was little changed ; they retained municipal freedom, but paid tribute, as indeed they had done to the Lydian kings ; but in addition they now had to furnish troops and ships on demand. The very fact that the centre of gravity of the empire to which they belonged lay at Susa, a three months' journey into inner Asia, no longer at Sardis, a few miles only from the sea, made a grave difference in their position ; the Greek cities were now but fragments of a vast whole which was in race, speech, and religion alien to them, whereas under Croesus they were scarcely conscious of the difference between themselves and the Lydians. Politically, subjection to Persia meant the establishment in the various cities of men of power who set themselves above the law—*i.e.*, became tyrants, and looked to Persia for support. It was this absence of community of thought between the Greeks and their Persian conquerors, and this outraging of Greek political ideals, that led soon to the Ionic revolt.

Polycrates, the powerful tyrant of Samos, had grown still more powerful after the Persian conquest of Ionia. He defied the power of Persia for many years, and staved off the inevitable day of submission by aiding the Persian king, Cambyses, to conquer Egypt (525 b.c.). But at length (523 b.c.) he fell into a trap laid for him by the Satrap of Sardis and was cruelly put to death.

Condition of
the Greek
Cities under
Persian Rule.

Tyrants
Supported by
Persia.

Fall of Poly-
crates of Samos
(523 b.c.).

CHAPTER XVII.

THE PERSIANS IN EUROPE: IONIC REVOLT.

§ 122. Reign of Cambyses; Accession of Darius; Greatness and Unity of the Persian Empire under Darius; Comparison between it and the Greek States.—123. The Scythian Expedition.—§ 124. Its Probable Motive.—§ 125. Persian Conquest of Thrace and Submission of Macedonia; Histiaeus at Myrcinus.—§ 126. Persian Attempt on Naxos; its Failure; Causes of Ionic Revolt.—§ 127. The Ionic Revolt; Aristagoras at Sparta and Athens; Aid Given by Athens.—§ 128. Sack of Sardis by the Greeks;—§ 129. Fate of Histiaeus.—§ 130. Progress of the Revolt. Battle of Lade and Capture of Miletus; End of the Revolt.—§ 131. Expedition of Mardonius.

§ 122. CYRUS died in the midst of his conquests (529 b.c.).

Cambyses
Conquers
Egypt.

Cambyses, his son, succeeded him, and conquered Egypt by his victory over Psammetichus III. at Pelusium, on the eastern arm of the Nile (525 b.c.). The Greek cities of Asia and the Phoenicians provided a fleet which gave Persia the command of the sea, and allowed her to reduce Cyprus and the African cities, Cyrene and Barca. Thus, in the twenty years since the fall of Croesus, at least one-third of the area inhabited by Greeks had come under the sway of Persia; and the impulse of expansion was as yet far from being exhausted.

Cyrus had left a second son, whose name was Bardes or Smerdis. Before starting for Egypt, Cambyses caused him to be murdered in order to avoid possible rivalry; but the long absence of Cambyses in Egypt paved the way for trouble in Persia. The story is told by Darius himself in

the great inscription in the rock of Behistun, near the source of the Choaspes, how the “lie was great in the land,” and the dead Bardes was personated by the Magian Gaumates, and Cambyses, despairing of his throne, died by his own hand in Syria. The Magian usurper was slain by Darius, son of Hystaspes, and six companions. Darius succeeded to the throne, and married Atossa, daughter of Cyrus and widow of her brother Cambyses (521 B.C.).

§ 123. For five years Darius was busy crushing revolts in all parts of the empire. He also organised the administration of his vast realm, dividing it into twenty governments (Satrapies). Persia had thus by the end of the sixth century B.C. destroyed the old empires—Media, Babylonia, Lydia, and Egypt, and extended from the Aegean to the confines of India—the greatest empire the world had yet seen; in fact, the only empire then existing. The most fruitful section of the known world, the plains of the Euphrates and the Nile valley, were hers, together with the wealthiest cities and centres of maritime trade, the great mercantile towns of Asia Minor and Phoenicia. Above all, these vast resources were in the hands of a single ruler; however dearly purchased, the unity and effectiveness gained by the developed autocracy of Darius gave Persia an immense advantage in carrying out the remainder of her work—that of absorbing the free Greek states fringing her empire on the west. Opposed to Persian unity and directness of purpose, we find in Greece an apparently hopeless disunion and conflict of interests; but this very chaos contained within it the seeds of a bright future, as it was due, not to anarchy, but to a healthy political individuality which had its roots

The False
Smerdis.

Accession of
Darius (521 B.C.)

The Persian
Empire :
Its Extent.

Its Unity.

Comparison
with the Greek
States.

in the freedom which was the prize of the struggle. The moral superiority of the free Greek warrior facing conscripts driven into battle by the whips of their officers was great. Even in point of equipment the advantage lay also with the Greek. The Persian and Median bowmen were only in sorry case when faced in the rugged land of Greece by her spear-armed metal-clad hoplites.

§ 124. The Scythian expedition of Darius put off the moment of conflict. Its date must be about 513 or 512 B.C. According to Herodotus, he ordered (512 B.C.) a fleet of six hundred ships, furnished by the Ionian, Aeolian, and Hellespontine Greeks and the tyrants who governed their cities, to sail up the Danube and bridge the river. The king with the land forces crossed the Bosphorus by a floating bridge built by the Samian engineer Mandrocles. He marched through Thrace, reducing the tribes in his path ; the Getae alone made serious resistance. Then he crossed the Danube and plunged into Scythia. The original design was to break down the bridge and to combine the naval forces with the land army for the advance into Scythia, but Coës, tyrant of Mytilene, suggested that

The Bridge of Boats over the Danube. the Greeks in the ships should be left in charge of the bridge of boats, with instructions to watch it for sixty days.

it for sixty days. The lapse of time was to be estimated by means of a knotted cord, one knot of which was to be untied daily ! At the end of sixty days the ships were to depart. The time fixed had already elapsed when the Greeks heard from a detachment of the Scythians that Darius was in full retreat for the bridge, and they were urged to secure the total destruction of the Persian king

Miltiades and Histiaeus. and his host by breaking down the bridge.

Hereupon Miltiades, son of Cimon, the despot of the Thracian Chersonese, concurred with the Scythians, but

Histiaeus of Miletus reminded the other tyrants that the destruction of the Persians would involve their own downfall, and so Darius was saved. What he had done in Scythia except vainly pursue the ever-retreating nomads, and try to build eight forts on the river Oarus somewhere east of the *Don*, which were, however, left unfinished, we are not told.

The account given of the Scythian invasion, in fact, “consists of a mixture of physical impossibilities, of inconsistencies and absurdities, which make the whole affair doubtful in the highest degree.”*

Account of the
Expedition
Criticised.

It also contradicts the account of the geography of Scythia as given by Herodotus himself, as it completely ignores the great rivers of southern Russia between the Danube and the *Don*. What was the motive of the expedition ? Was it mere aimless conquest entered upon in the absence of geographical knowledge sufficient to disclose its futility and danger ? Or again, was it undertaken in order to establish a mining settlement in the gold-bearing region of the Agathyrsi between the Danube and the *Pruth* ? It is clearly absurd to say that the object was the conquest of the rich Greek colonies, such as Olbia, etc., on the southern coast of Russia ; for if so, why did Darius not proceed against them ? It is certain that if Darius had intended to march eastwards round the Black Sea, the only rational design that can be inferred from the account of Herodotus, he would have instructed the fleet to accompany him along the coast. Perhaps he never crossed the Danube at all—the bridge over it is not assigned to any maker, whereas the name of the engineer of the bridge of the Bosphorus is carefully preserved. The story of the debate of the despots at the Danube was probably fabricated

Its Probable
Object—

* Macan, *Herodotus*, iv.-vi., vol. ii. p. 43.

in the interests of Miltiades when he was tried for "tyranny" at Athens in 493 B.C. The truth would seem to be that the expedition was an item in the programme of conquest, and that its aim was the reduction of Thrace (the conquest of which was necessary for the security of Asia Minor), the entire tract between the Danube on the north and the Strymon on the west. This and more was actually accomplished. If the Danube really was crossed, the object was to guarantee the security of the provinces about to be added to the empire from the incursions of the nomads, just as Caesar crossed the Rhine in 55 B.C. in order to inspire the Germans with respect for the Romans.

§ 125. In the absence of their despots, Chalcedon and Byzantium revolted, and Perinthus, Abydos, and other Greek towns also renounced their allegiance to Persia. Megabazus was left by Darius in Thrace with eighty thousand men to complete the conquest, and to reduce the rebels. Megabazus even received the submission of Amyntas, king of Macedon, west of the Strymon, and thus extended the Persian "sphere of influence" in the direction of Thessaly. The importance of these operations lay in the fact that they secured for the Persians the command of the easy coast road through Thrace to the Strymon. It was in connection with the subjugation of this region that Histiaeus, the tyrant of

Histiaeus Myrcinus. Miletus, was put in possession of Myrcinus, on the lower Strymon, near Mount Pangaeus. The timber and gold-mines of that mountain, together with the fact that the place commanded the passage of the Strymon, made this a point of the utmost strategic value. The foundation of Amphipolis here by the Athenians in after years, at the cost of much blood and treasure, illustrates the extreme

importance of the place. Histiaeus incurred the suspicions of Megabazus by his fortifications, and he was consequently recalled by Darius, who took him up to Susa, pretending that he could not endure to be deprived of his company. Aristagoras, son-in-law of Histiaeus, thus became despot of Miletus.

§ 126. What space of time elapsed between the Scythian expedition and the next important event is unknown. That event was the Persian attempt upon the island of Naxos. Naxos is the largest of the Cyclades; she was now in great prosperity, with a large fleet, which had enabled her to acquire some sort of supremacy over the neighbouring islands. The conquest of this island would pave the way for an advance to Euboea and the mainland, and thus expedite the scheme of conquest which was being slowly realised along the land route. A favourable opportunity also presented itself, as certain of the wealthy Naxian oligarchs, expelled by a rising of the democratic party (about 501 b.c.), sought refuge in Miletus. Artaphrenes (Artaphernes), half-brother of Darius, was therefore ordered, as Satrap of western Asia, to raise a fleet of two hundred ships from the Greek cities. The fleet was under the command of Megabates, cousin of the king; a large force of Persians and allies was embarked for the enterprise. We are told that Aristagoras —under Arista-goras and Megabates. was in joint command, and a quarrel arose between him and his colleague respecting the treatment of a Myndian captain whom Megabates punished for a breach of discipline. In order to have his revenge on Aristagoras, the Persian secretly warned the Naxians. The result was that after a four months' fruitless siege the expedition was compelled to return to Ionia. Its Failure.

It is hardly likely that a high-born Persian should have turned traitor to his country in order to gain an advantage in a petty quarrel with a miserable Greek! Megabates is in fact found afterwards in positions of trust. Herodotus, however, professes to know the secret springs of action of all the parties. Aristagoras was afraid of being called upon to pay the expenses of the expedition, and of being expelled from his tyranny. Yet the first thing he does after resolving to raise Ionia in revolt to free himself from his difficulties is to lay down his power! He was

<sup>Histiaeus and
the Ionic
Revolt.</sup> confirmed in his resolution by the arrival of a slave sent from Susa by Histiaeus with the strange request that his head should be shaved by Aristagoras. Tattooed on the fellow's skull was a laconic message from Histiaeus, "Revolt." The revolt had its origin in causes lying much deeper than this. There was a widespread spirit of discontent abroad among the Greeks of Asia Minor. The failure at Naxos was a blow to Persian prestige. The moment was favourable, for all the contingents of the states were assembled, and much valuable time was thus gained.

§ 127. The various despots with the fleet, being all <sup>The Ionic
Revolt.</sup> Persian nominees, were seized and handed over to their cities, but only Coës of Mytilene experienced the vengeance of his countrymen. Thus in the autumn of 499 B.C. the standard of revolt was raised. Aristagoras passed at once into Greece, seeking the support first of Sparta. He took with him a tablet of bronze, on which was engraved a map of the world, "with all the sea and all the rivers," and pointed out Susa to the Spartan king, Cleomenes, as the prize of intervention. On hearing that Susa lay a three months' march from the sea, Cleomenes would have nothing to do with the matter.

Then Aristagoras offered him money, beginning with ten talents, and increasing his offer to fifty talents, whereupon the eight-year-old daughter of Cleomenes, Gorgo, afterwards the wife of Leonidas, gained immortality and saved her father's honour by the exclamation : “Father, if you do not go away, the stranger will do you harm !” So Aristagoras was baffled. The truth was that Sparta had too much on hand to interfere. As to the distance of Susa from the sea, that was nothing to the point, as the overtures of Aristagoras concerned only the liberation of the Asiatic Greeks, not the overthrow of Persia. The fifty talents were, of course, not a private bribe, but a war subsidy which Aristagoras was empowered by the confederate Council in Ionia to offer.

The Milesian had a better reception at Athens: it was easier, says Herodotus, to deceive thirty thousand Athenians than a single Spartan! This is because he takes the view that the interference of Athens was a “colossal blunder.” Athens was wise, however, to grant the desired assistance, as her exiled tyrant Hippias was living at Sigeium under Persian protection; Artaphrenes had even formally requested the Athenians to take him back, on pain of the king’s displeasure. Accordingly twenty ships, nearly half the fleet, were sent out under Melanthius in the spring of 498 B.C.; the Eretrians also sent five. “These ships proved to be the beginning of evils for the Hellenes and the Barbarians.”

§ 128. The course of events is obscure. Apparently the combined fleets sailed southwards, and gained a victory off Pamphylia: it was of great moment to close the Aegean to the king’s ships. In the meantime the Persians were besieging Miletus. The Athenians and Eretrians landed

Appeal of
Aristagoras
to Sparta—

—and to
Athens

Aid Given by
the Athenians.

at Ephesus, and marched up the Cayster valley, and then across Mount Tmolus on Sardis; their object was to compel the Persians to raise the seige of Miletus in order to protect the capital of the Satrapy. Artaphrenes took refuge in its ^{Sack of Sardis} citadel, but the lower town was reduced to ashes.

(498 B.C.) On the approach of the Persians from Miletus, the allies retired, but suffered some loss at Ephesus. The blow cannot have been severe, as the revolt was not checked, but spread from Byzantium to Cyprus. In the spring of 497 B.C. the Carians joined the movement, but the Dorian cities seem to have stood aloof. Athens did no more; probably she had good grounds for her inaction in the attitude of Aegina; but her true interest lay in vigorous support of the rising. The news of the burning of Sardis threw Darius into a great rage; so ran the

^{The Athenians and Darius.} Athenian story. He seized his bow and shot an arrow high in the air, crying: "God grant me to take vengeance upon the Athenians!"; thrice each day at dinner an attendant was charged to call out: "Sire, remember the Athenians!"

§ 129. Histiaeus was sent down to the coast to quell the rebellion. According to Herodotus he had ^{Histiaeus at Sardis.} fomented it himself in order to secure his return. Artaphrenes put the matter in a nutshell. "It was you," he said to Histiaeus, "who made this shoe, and Aristagoras put it on." We are told too little, and that little is too untrustworthy, to enable us to say what he really did, and what his plans were. At any rate, the Persians suspected him of treachery, and the Milesians were equally unwilling to have anything to do with him; so, having obtained eight ships from Lesbos, he turned pirate, infesting the Bosporus. Finally, after the fall of Miletus, he was surprised by the Persians near Atarneus in Mysia,

crucified, and his head sent up to Darius, who ordered it to be honourably buried, as the head of one of Persia's benefactors. Aristagoras had deserted Histiaeus and the Ionian cause even before the arrival of Histiaeus; he had gone to Myrcinus, and before long perished ingloriously at the hands of the Edonians of Thrace.

§ 130. The plan of the Persians was the organisation of three columns, to act respectively in the north, in Ionia, and in Caria. The Carians were twice badly defeated, but did not lose heart, and in a third battle (near Pēdasus) annihilated the invaders. In 497 B.C. the cause experienced a great blow, which in fact proved fatal—the loss of Cyprus. The Ionian fleet indeed proved victorious at sea, but on land treachery gave the victory to the Persians, and the fleet was compelled to withdraw. The Aegean was thus opened to the king's ships. By 494 B.C. the Persian land armies closed round Miletus, and six hundred vessels, Phoenician, Egyptian, Cilician, and Cypriote, came northwards to co-operate. At the last meeting of the Panionium at Mycale the representatives of the Ionian states decided to stake all upon a naval engagement. The headquarters of their fleet was the little island of Lадē, now a mound in the plain two miles west of the site of Miletus; the total number of ships is given as 353. We are also told that the Ionians might have conquered if they had been willing to listen to the advice of Dionysius, the Phocaean captain, who wore out the bodies and tempers of the patriots by his mania for drill and naval manoeuvres. The defeat of the Greeks in the great battle was due largely to the disproportion in numbers, but most largely to the desertion of forty-nine out of the sixty Samian ships and of the

The Battle
of Lade
(494 B.C.)

entire Lesbian contingent, seventy strong; these formed the wing towards the open sea, and their desertion allowed the Persian vessels to surround the weaker fleet. The Chians and the Phocaeans fought nobly. This was the only naval fight in which Persians defeated Hellenes (494 B.C.). The patriot fleet being defeated, the doom of Miletus was sealed, but she held out to the bitter end;

Capture of Miletus. her people were sold into slavery by the enraged victors. Thus Miletus atoned for a certain selfishness and aloofness which had characterised her policy in connection with Lydia and the first Persian conquest. Thenceforth Samos was the leading Greek state in the east of the Aegean, and none of the mainland towns lifted up their heads again. Phrynicus, an Athenian tragic poet, made the fate of Miletus the theme of a drama, called *The Capture of Miletus*; but the Athenians fined him one thousand drachmae for so vividly bringing home to them the blow which had fallen upon Hellas.

§ 131. The revolt in Asia Minor had entailed the loss of the Persian conquests in Europe. These were now again reduced—the towns on the straits and the Propontis by the Phoenician fleet. Miltiades, tyrant of the Chersonese, who had not aided Persia, but on the contrary seized the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, had to flee, and

Miltiades Captures Lemnos and Imbros. narrowly escaping capture, reached Athens—to win the battle of Marathon three years afterwards. In the spring of 492 B.C. Mardonius, the king's son-in-law, son of Gobryas (one of the seven conspirators against the false Smerdis) was appointed *Expedition of Mardonius.* commander-in-chief to reconquer Thrace and re-establish Persian influence in Macedonia. He seized the valuable island of Thasos. Athenian vanity, combined

with the experience of later years, suggested that the real object of the operations of Mardonius was the long-delayed conquest of the two offending cities, Athens and Eretria, by an advance by land through Macedonia and Thessaly. The end of his operations was marked by a misfortune, for his fleet suffered severely in a storm when rounding Mount Athos at the extremity of the peninsula of Acte in the Chalcidice; caught on a lee shore by a strong north-easter, three hundred vessels are said to have perished. Mardonius himself was also wounded in a night attack by the Thracian Brygi; but they paid for their Re-Conquest
of Thrace. temerity with the loss of their freedom. Altogether Mardonius displayed his fitness for the work to which he was called in the interests of the empire.

CHAPTER XVIII.

FIRST PERSIAN INVASION.

132. Persia and Greece Proper.—§ 133. Expedition of Datis and Artaphernes; Capture of Eretria; the Persians Land at Marathon.—§ 134. Message of Philippides to Sparta.—§ 135. Callimachus and Miltiades.—§ 136. Battlefield of Marathon; Athenian Position.—§ 137. Battle of Marathon.—§ 138. Story of the Shield; Return of the Persians to Asia.—§ 139. Importance and Effects of Marathon.—§ 140. Aegina Prevented by Sparta from Joining Persia; Cleomenes and Demaratus.—§ 141. Sparta under Cleomenes; Defeat of Argos (496 B.C.)—§ 142. Expedition of Miltiades against Paros; his Condemnation and Death.

§ 132. THE connection of Athens and Eretria with the Ionic revolt attracted the attention of the Persians to ^{Persia and} Greece Proper. Perhaps if that intervention ^{Greece Proper.} had not taken place Greece might have been spared the wars with Persia. More probably the conflict was bound to come sooner or later, for a conquering power sets no limits to its conquests, but is urged by success to advance ever farther afield by what seem imperative necessities. Even though we could say with certainty that the Persians would not have invaded Greece but for the burning of Sardis, Athens would still have been right in what she did, for nations owe duties to themselves which lead at times to actions that from the point of view of material interests are unwise. It was just the shrinking from the championship of Hellenism which caused Sparta all through her history to fall short of true greatness.

The presence of Hippias at the Persian court was a great advantage to the Persians, as he knew all about Athens and Attica ; one thing only, and that of prime importance, he did not know—the change in the spirit of the Athenians in consequence of their recovered freedom ; if he had returned to Athens he would not have known the people, for twenty years of freedom under democratical institutions which, while free of the undue prominence of wealth and birth, had not yet degenerated into mob rule, had wrought a wonderful revolution in the temper of the Athenians.

Hippias at
the Persian
Court.

§ 133. An expedition was planned against Eretria and Athens which should move straight across the Aegean. In order to test the feelings of the Greeks, and to give the expedition an air of formal correctness, heralds were first sent across to demand earth and water, the tokens of submission ; practically all the islands, and many of the cities of the mainland, did what was required, but the Athenians threw the messengers into the *barathrum* (a deep pit near the Acropolis, into which criminals were thrown), and the Spartans threw those sent to them into a well, bidding them take earth and water for themselves ; so at any rate they boasted. The “medism” or submission of “^{Medism} of Aegina” was of serious moment, and the Spartans intervened at the request of the Athenians.

The Persian armament, numbering six hundred ships, was commanded by Datis, a Mede, and Artaphernes nephew of Darius ; with them was Hippias, now an old man. The point of departure was Samos ; on their way the Persians conquered Naxos, and touched at Delos, but did no harm there. From Delos a course was laid for Carystus in Euboea, which city was reduced ; then the fleet passed up the channel to

Persian Expe-
dition against
Athens

Eretria. Eretria held out for six days, and then was betrayed by the oligarchs ; the Eretrians were enslaved, and their temples burnt. Under the guidance of Hippias, who remembered what his father had done, the Persian fleet crossed to the bay of Marathon, for there was a plain suitable for cavalry operations, and besides, a direct road ran from the plain to Athens.

§ 134. Apparently the Athenians made no move until they learnt exactly where the Persians had landed ; probably they had expected that the invaders would attack them from Phalerum. They now sent off to Sparta a courier, Philippides (or Pheidippides), asking for speedy assistance. As Philippides breasted the steeps of Mount Parthenium

Philippides above Tegea, dazed with fatigue and heat (for Sent to Sparta : it was August), his heart heavy with the Delay of the Spartans. thought of the danger which menaced his city and the temples of his gods, it seemed to him that he heard Pan's voice calling to him with assurance of succour and gentle reproof for the Athenians' neglect of his worship. When the peril was over the worship of Pan was revived, and he had a cave dedicated to him on the northern side of the Acropolis of Athens. Philippides was in Sparta on the second day after leaving Athens ; the distance between Athens and Sparta by road is not less than 140 miles. The Spartans were withheld by religious reasons from moving until it should be full moon.

§ 135. Meantime in Athens the momentous decision had been made to march forth to Marathon. The chief command was in the hands of the Polemarch Callimachus Polemarch. Archon, Callimachus ; his Council of War was composed of the ten generals commanding the tribal levies ; of these the foremost in repute and experience was

Miltiades, the late ruler of the Chersonese. The legends which gathered so thickly and so soon around the battle glorified Miltiades at the expense of his ^{Miltiades.} colleagues, and to him was ascribed all the wisdom with which matters were managed at this fateful time.


§ 136. The battlefield is a quadrangular plain, twenty-five miles north-east of Athens, about five miles long, and two in width, lying open to the sea ^{Topography} to the south-east. The coast-line sweeps round ^{of Marathon.} in a curve from south to north-east, ending in a recess formed by the sharp spur of Cynosura ("Dog's Tail") projecting southwards. The plain is divided into two nearly equal portions by a ravine and watercourse (the *Charadra*) flowing south-east from the valley of Marathon; its northern end is ^{The Charadra.} occupied by a great marsh; a much smaller tract of marsh-land almost fills up the space between the sea and the mountains at the southern extremity of the plain. Two roads lead from Athens to the plain of Marathon. The main road on leaving Athens turns east-
^{Roads from}
ward, and passes between Mounts Pentelicus ^{Athena.} and Hymettus; it traverses the demes of Gargettus and Pallene, and, on reaching the coast, turns due north, and after running between Pentelicus and the sea enters the plain at its southern end. The other road is shorter and more direct, but much more difficult: it runs in a north-easterly direction from Athens, passes the deme of Cephisia, traverses Mount Pentelicus, and finally splits off into two paths: one goes north-east to Marathon, and then south along the Charadra into the plain; the other passes the village of Vraná and enters the plain from the west. A third path connects these two (see Map, p. 185).

The Athenians, about nine thousand strong, took post in

a precinct of Heracles in the valley of *Avlona*; here they were joined by the full muster of the Boeotian town of ^{Position of the} Plataea, one thousand strong. The choice of ^{Athenians.} this admirable position was a strategic victory, for the Persians, encamped in the plain on the northern side of the ravine, were unable to take either the western or the southern road to Athens without exposing themselves to a flank attack, while the Athenians in the narrow valley were hardly assailable. If the Persians delayed in the hope that treason might work for them in Athens, there was a danger of the arrival of the reinforcements from Sparta before their plans were matured. The story that the delay of some days which actually ensued was due to Miltiades, who waited until his own day of command came round, although his colleagues had all surrendered their right of command to him, is false, as this rotation of command was not introduced until a later date; further, the Athenian attack depended entirely upon the movements of the Persians.

^{Story about the Delay: its Falsity.} § 137. The Persians at last determined to move southwards upon Athens. All the cavalry and the greater part of ^{Persian Pre-} the infantry were embarked; the rest prepared ^{pare to March.} to move in column through the plain for the road which leaves it at its southern end. If the Persians acted in accordance with the elementary principles of tactics, they would have a separate covering force on the right flank of their column. The Athenians were now compelled to take the offensive. In order to prevent their line being surrounded on one or both wings, the Tribes in the centre were drawn up in fewer ranks than usual in order to ^{Athenian Dispositions.} extend the centre; those on the wings were in the usual depth of formation and relatively stronger than the centre. Callimachus led the right wing;

the Plataeans were posted on the left. As the Greeks drew near the enemy they were met by a hail of arrows, and charged through it at a run ; this charge at the double during the last two or three hundred yards was afterwards magnified until it became a run over the eight furlongs which had separated the armies. What had been anticipated took



T. Tomb of the Athenians.
H. Heracleion—Athenian Camp.
C. Persian Camp.

THE BATTLE OF MARATHON.

place ; the Athenian centre was broken, but the wings were victorious, and then closed inwards upon the Persian centre, so that it in turn was routed. The fighting was with the covering force ; the marching column and the stream of fugitives were taken up by the

vessels as the battle proceeded, so that it was only the last seven vessels that fell into the hands of the victors. The Athenian loss was small, 192 dead ; of the Persians ^{Losses on Both Sides.} the number slain is returned at about 6,400. The brave Polemarch Callimachus fell, as did Cynegeirus, the brother of Aeschylus, the tragedian.

§ 138. When the Persians were already in their ships, a strange thing was observed. On the summit of Pentelicus there flashed a bright shield. What did the signal mean, and who made it ? These questions have never been answered. The current opinion was that it was the work of

^{Story of the Shield.} the Alcmaeonidae, who wished to betray Athens. At any rate the fleet made off southwards, rounding Cape Sunium. The Athenians immediately marched back to Athens and took post on the high flank of Mount Lycabettus, near the shrine of Heracles, in Cynosarges, whence they had a clear view of the bay of Phalerum with the hostile fleet riding there. Probably it was the opportune arrival of two thousand Lacedaemonians that stayed the Persians from hazarding a second battle. Soon the baffled invaders departed for Asia. The Lacedaemonians had made

^{Return of the Persians to Asia.} good speed on their march, for they were in Attica on the third day after leaving Sparta ;

though then were just too late for the battle, they went out to Marathon to view the bodies of the slain,

^{Arrival of the Spartans.} and then went home praising the Athenians and what they had done. The Athenians buried their dead on the field of honour, for from the first the men who had faced the Persians were regarded as in

^{The Soros of Marathon.} some sort different from others ; in the south of the plain the tumulus or *Soros* still stands, sadly hacked now by the modern excavators who have probed it to find the ashes and funeral urns of the Marathonomachi.

§ 139. Marathon is one of the decisive battles of the world ; such it must ever remain, though modern criticism reduce it to comparatively insignificant dimensions in respect of the numbers engaged and the slaughter made. It is true that from a certain point of view it is entitled to no higher rank than the battle of Salamis, ^{Importance} of Plataea, of Thermopylae ; but its superior ^{of Marathon.} importance lies in its significance for the Athenians themselves. They rightly felt that it marked an epoch ; but for Marathon there would not have been that series of victories which made glorious the story of the later invasion. The prestige won at Marathon lifted Athens to a great place among the Greek states ; but only her citizens ^{Its Effect} could realise the self-respect, self-confidence, and ^{on Athens.} boundless energy to which it had given sudden birth.

§ 140. Well was it for Athens that the hands of her enemies, the Aeginetans, had been tied during the short contest with the Persians. Hostility between the two cities dated from about 506 b.c. As Aegina was the ^{Athens and} strongest naval power of the time, a combination of her fleet with that of Persia would have soon sealed the doom of Athens. That such combination was very probable was shown by the fact that Aegina had tendered the tokens of submission demanded by the Great King in 491 b.c. Athens, as a member of the Peloponnesian League, like Aegina herself, had appealed to Sparta to check the "medism" of the powerful island, and Cleomenes, one of the Spartan kings, had seized ten of the chief Aeginetans as hostages and deposited them with the Athenians. In this he had been secretly opposed by his colleague Demaratus. Cleomenes therefore plotted with ^{Coercion of} Aegina by Cleomenes. Leotychides, the next heir of the Eurypontid line, to which Demaratus belonged, to ruin Demaratus by

impugning his legitimacy. The Pythian priestess was also suborned to declare that Demaratus was not his reputed father's son, so that he was compelled to abdicate, and to betake himself to that place of refuge for broken princes,

^{Deposition of} ^{the Persian court.} Demaratus by Cleomenes came to light, and he fled to Thessaly ; Cleomenes.

then returning to Arcadia he began to effect a combination of the Arcadians against Sparta, so that the Spartans were fain to recall him. After that, according to the story, he went out of his mind and was placed in irons,

^{Fate of} ^{Cleomenes.} and having compelled his warder, or Helot, by threats to give him his knife, he "cut himself into strips," and so died (about 489 B.C.).

§ 141. Cleomenes had in him the makings of a great man; but the constitution of Sparta was admirably adapted for the stunting and thwarting of such spirits as his. Throughout his life his abilities and ambitions were checked by the opposition of his colleague Demaratus or ^{Sparta under} Cleomenes the Ephors. For thirty years (520—489 B.C.) the history of Sparta was but the history of Cleomenes. He it was who three times invaded Attica, who pulled down and set up rulers at Athens and Sparta at his pleasure, who set Athens and Boeotia at variance, who first ventured to urge Sparta outside the narrow bounds of Peloponnesian politics in the expedition (524 B.C.) which had for its aim the shattering of the maritime power of Polycrates of Samos. The reason why the Spartans and Cleomenes had refused to accept the invitation of Aristagoras lay in the relations of Sparta to Argos. For Argos was recovering from her defeat of half a century before,

^{His Defeat of} ^{Argos (496 B.C.)} and a fresh war between Argos and Sparta was only a matter of opportunity. Consequently, perhaps in 496 B.C., Cleomenes invaded Argolis,

and near Tiryns won a victory which maimed Argos for twenty years.

§ 142. The end of the man whose name is for ever associated with the victory at Marathon was miserable. He was put in command of an expedition Miltiades against the island of Paros. The affair is Attacks Paros. mysterious, as we are told that Miltiades deceived the people, obtaining the fleet by great promises and using it to gratify private resentment. Probably the Athenians, instigated by Miltiades, were adopting a programme of conquest in the Aegean as a measure of precaution against Persia; the surrender of the islands to the Persians served as a pretext for hostilities. The expedition was a failure, and after a siege of twenty-six days Miltiades was obliged to return, severely wounded. According to Greek ideas Miltiades, as the author of a policy which had proved a costly failure, was alone bound to pay the penalty. He was impeached on a charge of deceiving the people, the penalty demanded being death. His chief accuser was Xanthippus, husband of Agariste, niece of Cleisthenes, belonging therefore to the Alcmaeonidae. Miltiades was fined fifty talents, but he died before it was paid; his son Cimon afterwards paid the fine. ^{His Condemnation and Death.} Evidently party hatred was at the bottom of the affair.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE WORK OF THEMISTOCLES.

§ 143. Renewal of the War between Athens and Aegina.—§ 144. Ostracism.—§ 145. Archons Appointed by Lot; Effects of the Change; Importance of the Tribe-Generals (Strategi).—§ 146. Themistocles.—§ 147. Aristeides.—§ 148. Their Rival Policies; Naval Policy of Themistocles.—§ 149. The Work of Themistocles; Fortification of the Peiraeus.—§ 150. Ostracism of Xanthippus and Aristeides; Appropriation of the Profits of the Laurium Silver-Mines to the Building of Ships; Increase in Athenian Navy.

§ 143. Of the history of the years intervening between the battle of Marathon and that of Salamis we have only a very scanty record; they were years of crucial importance for Athens and the world. The interval was partly filled by a recrudescence of the chronic strife between Athens and Aegina. Some time after the battle of Marathon and the death of Cleomenes, there was a change in Spartan policy, and the Aeginetans tried to obtain the restoration of their hostages. King Leotychides asked the Athenians to restore them, but they refused. The Aeginetans, however, seized the sacred mission-ship (*θεωρίς*) taking some of the chief men of Athens to a festival held periodically in honour of Poseidon at Sunium. This restored the balance. Probably there was an exchange of prisoners. Next the Athenians arranged with one Nicodromus, an Aeginetan, to appear with their fleet in support of a democratic *coup d'état*. Nicodromus and the populace duly did their part;

but the Athenians arrived a day too late, as they had had to buy twenty vessels from the Corinthians in order to raise their fleet to seventy, and thus enable it to cope with that of Aegina. Seven hundred of the democrats were executed by the victorious oligarchs, in spite of the fact that some took sanctuary at the temples. Nicodromus made good his escape to Athens. When the Athenians at last arrived, they defeated the Aeginetans at sea, and began the siege of the town ; but one thousand Argive volunteers under Eurybates came to the assistance of the Aeginetans, and the Athenians were driven in rout to their ships, and were even defeated at sea.

§ 144. The war with Aegina, waged upon the whole unsuccessfully by Athens, led to what was virtually a revolution. With the disgrace and death of Miltiades in 489 B.C. the party of the Alcmaeonidae, in the person of Xanthippus, was triumphant, but its triumph was short-lived. In 487 B.C. a new political weapon came into use—the Ostracism. The institution of ostracism is ascribed to Cleisthenes, but it was probably first established after the battle of Marathon. The regulations concerning it were that in the sixth Prytany in each year the Assembly voted as to whether ostracism should be used or not in that year ; if the vote was in the affirmative, then in the eighth Prytany the people voted, each man writing upon a pot-sherd (*στρακόν*) the name of any one whom he wished to see removed from the state as dangerous. The voting was not valid unless at least six thousand took part in it ; the man whose name occurred on the greatest number of sherds was exiled from Athens for ten years, but his property was not confiscated, nor did any other ill consequence follow ;

Democratic
coup d'état of
Nicodromus.

Its Failure.

Institution of
Ostracism at
Athens.

he still remained an Athenian citizen, and had liberty of return at the expiration of the period of exile.

§ 145. The first Athenian banished by ostracism was Hipparchus, son of Charmus, a man nearly related to the Peisistratidae. Next year (486 (486 B.C.) B.C.) ostracism removed Megacles, son of Hippocrates, and nephew of Cleisthenes. As Megacles was of course an Alcmaeonid, his ostracism shows that the democratic element was winning its way in the state.

A symptom of the change of political temper was the innovation which was made in connection with the archonship. Hitherto, since the reforms of Cleisthenes, the Archons had been elected by the people, and the great families still retained much of that influence which it had been one of the objects of Cleisthenes to break. Now a change was made. Fifty candidates were selected from each Tribe, and from these five hundred the nine Archons were taken by lot. The method was in fact a reversion to the Solonian arrangement. It was henceforth hardly possible for a man of real ability to be found on the board of Archons; the chances were so many against the appointment of any particular person. The archonship thus

Its Effects: sank in importance; and this must have increased the power of the Council. The degradation of the archonship was attended by another change. Hitherto the Polemarch had been the commander-in-chief; but now that the Archons were as a rule respectable nobodies, the Generals of the Tribes attained great importance as the supreme military board, not appointed by lot, but elected for their personal competence. From this time, therefore, dates the importance of the Strategi, who in addition were henceforth elected, not by the Tribes

*The Strategi
become of
Importance.*

separately, but by the Assembly—*i.e.*, the whole body of citizens; as far as possible each Tribe was represented on the board, but sometimes one or other Tribe had no suitable candidate. For a politician of vigour and ability a seat among the ten Generals was essential. For particular business a committee of the board was appointed, with one of the members holding the presidency.

§ 146. From 486 B.C. the democratic party, led by Xanthippus and Aristeides, called “the Just,” ^{Themistocles.} was supreme. There grew up within that party itself a rival to its leaders, in the person of Themistocles. Themistocles, the son of Neocles, belonged to the Deme Phrearrii. His mother seems to have been an Acarnanian—at any rate, she was not an Athenian, so that socially Themistocles was debarred from some of the privileges of those of pure blood. His remarkable natural endowments rendered him independent of the accomplishments and training which most regarded as indispensable—he could not touch the lyre, he said, but he could make a small city great and glorious. Thucydides speaks with enthusiasm of his acuteness and foresight, his power of ^{Thucydides' opinion of him.} persuading others to entrust themselves to his guidance through the intricacies of diplomacy, his never-failing resourcefulness in every political emergency. Tradition, growing up after his disgrace and ignominious end, painted his youth as wild and wayward, but such stories should be received with caution; similar tales were told of Alcibiades, the man who both in powers and fate most resembled him.

§ 147. In complete contrast to Themistocles stood Aristeides, whose reputation for spotless integrity ^{Aristeides.} was expressed in the epithet of “the Just,” which was always applied to him. Thucydides expresses no

opinion about him, but the verdict of Herodotus is that he was the best and most upright Athenian of his time. The opportunity afforded by the contrast between the two statesmen was too good to be lost, and the rhetoric of a later age is responsible for the sharpness of the antithesis between them—an antithesis not confined to the sphere of morals,

^{Contrast be-}
tween the two Statesmen.
Themistocles was an innovator, Aristeides must

have been a conservative; because the former was a democrat, the latter must have been of aristocratic or oligarchic views. The truth is that both were democrats, Aristeides even more democratic than his rival, if we look merely to the measures actually passed by each; the work of Themistocles lay in a sphere apart from that of constitutional reform. “It was the choice of means in the widest sense of the word, the method of making use of circumstances, which alone really separated the two men, and not their political aims, in which they were agreed.” *

§ 148. In its briefest form, the question at issue between the two was this: Should Athens develop her hoplites or her fleet?

^{Policy of}
^{Aristeides:}
^{Development}
^{of Athenian}
^{Hoplites.}

Aristeides relied upon her hoplites, and he had past experience and present circumstances in his favour. The tendency of the time in Attica was strongly in favour of agricultural life, and

the Athenian hoplites had a record of fifty years' success in the wars with Chalcis, Boeotia, and Persia.

In so far as he clung to the old line of development, Aristeides may be called conservative. The aims

^{Policy of}
^{Themistocles:}
^{Conversion of}
^{Athens into a}
^{Naval Power.}

of Themistocles were revolutionary—nothing less than the formation of a large permanent fleet

of warships. Athens should become an imperial city, and that by means of her naval power. Themistocles,

* Holm, *Greek History*, E.T. ii., 31.

as his enemies said, made oars and the rower's cushion, instead of lance and shield, the badge of Athens ; that he, so far ahead of his fellows, had grasped the possibilities of her position is the eternal proof of his greatness, and the success which his efforts won is the proof of his statesmanship. Athens produced no greater man than Themistocles, and few that could claim to stand by his side. It was undoubtedly true that if Athens decided to develop her fleet she must give up the idea of ever having an infantry like that of Sparta. The fact that Themistocles turned the attention of the Athenians to the sea was afterwards expressed in an exaggerated manner as if he had inaugurated a policy which had no precedent in the history of the country ; but it should not be forgotten that it was one of the chief titles of the Peisistratid policy to be called great that it had been directed to maritime enterprise.

§ 149. Already in 493 B.C. during his archonship Themistocles had laid the foundation of the new policy by carrying in the Assembly a measure for the fortification of the Peiraeus Peninsula (493 B.C.). Hitherto the Athenian harbour had been the wide bay of Phalerum, but its long curving beach was too insecure, both against storms and an enemy's attack, to be adopted permanently ; there were no harbour works, but the ships were simply drawn up upon the gently shelving sand. Its only advantage was that it was nearer Athens than was the Peiraeus, and that the ships at Phalerum were actually within sight of the sentinels of the Acropolis. To the west of the bay of Phalerum lies the hill of Munychia, and further seawards the Acte or rocky peninsula of Peiraeus (*Πειραιές*). At the foot of Munychia are two small harbours, Munychia

Naval Policy
of the
Peisistratidae.

Drawbacks
of the old
Harbour at
Phalerum.

The Harbours
of Peiraeus.

and Zea; on the western side of the promontory the great basin of the Peiraeus. The hill of Munychia served as a common citadel rising above the three harbours; Hippias had observed the value of the position. The design of Themistocles was to enclose the entire peninsula and its harbours with a strong wall. The work was interrupted by the first Persian invasion.

§ 150. The Aeginetan war aided the designs of Themistocles by bringing home to all the conviction that Athens could not dispute the mastery of the seas with her island rival without a large addition to her fleet. Perhaps the failure of Athens in the war had something to do with the downfall of the Alcmaeonidae. That the new impulse given by Themistocles was gradually overriding all opposition was seen when

Ostracism of Xanthippus (485 B.C.) and Aristeides (488 B.C.) Xanthippus was ostracised in 485 B.C. Two years later Aristeides was silenced by the same means. The schemes of Themistocles required a vast outlay; under him Athens made acquaintance with financial problems on a big scale, and the administration entered upon a new and higher phase. It was fortunate that in the silver-mines of Laurium, in the extreme

Revenue of Laurium Silver-Mines— south-eastern corner of Attica, Athens possessed a perennial source of revenue. Just now, per-

haps because the miners for the first time struck the deepest and richest silver-bearing stratum, a large sum, given as one hundred talents, had come into the Treasury. The proposal was to distribute this as a bonus among the citizens. Themistocles urged the people to employ it in build-

ing ships, and the measure was carried; in effect, it was a personal contribution on the part of every citizen towards the realisation of the new naval programme. The ships were to be all triremes; the old penteconter was

now obsolete. In this way Athens had a hundred triremes by 481 B.C., and the work of building must have gone on, supported probably by the revenue from the mines, for by 480 B.C. she had a fleet of more than two hundred ships—a navy which had no rival on the east of Greece, and in the west was outnumbered only by the navies of Corcyra and Syracuse. Thus, as Herodotus says, the Aeginetan war indirectly saved Greece by compelling the Athenians to make themselves a maritime power.

CHAPTER XX.

THE SECOND PERSIAN INVASION.

§ 151. Death of Darius and Accession of Xerxes; Plan of the Invasion of Greece ; The Ship Canal ; Bridging the Hellespont.—
§ 152. March from Sardis to Doriscus ; Numbers and Description of the Persian Forces.—§ 153. Greek Congress at the Isthmus.—
§ 154. Attitude of Argos ; of Crete ; of Corcyra ; of Syracuse ; of the Northern States of Greece ; Condition of Athens.—
§ 155. Thessaly Abandoned to the Persians ; Topography of Thermopylae ; Numbers of Greek Forces at Thermopylae and Artemisium.—§ 156. The Stand of the Greeks at Thermopylae ; Turning of the Pass by the Persians ; Death of Leonidas and his Three Hundred.—§ 157. Fighting at Artemisium ; Retreat of the Greek Fleet.—§ 158. Xerxes in Central Greece ; Evacuation of Athens ; its Occupation by the Persians.—§ 159. The Greek Fleet at Salamis ; Disputes of the Admirals ; Xerxes Resolves to Fight ; Trick of Themistocles ; Persian Plan of Battle.—§ 160. The Battle of Salamis.—§ 161. Movements of the Persians ; Policy of the Greeks ; Prizes of Valour.

§ 151. KING DARIUS had determined to avenge his repulse at Marathon, and preparations were begun with that object. Four years thus passed, and then Egypt revolted. Before Egypt was reduced, Darius died. Xerxes, the son of Atossa, succeeded to the Persian throne (485 B.C.) ; for a time he was occupied with the reconquest of Egypt. It was not until 483 B.C. that Xerxes was free to resume the scheme of his father, aided by his gallant and fiery cousin,

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Mardonius. Profiting by the lesson of the first expedition, it was determined that the new army of invasion should be of irresistible strength, and that it should act throughout in closest co-operation with the fleet. This involved the adoption of the route by the northern Aegean and Thrace, and the provision of some means of safety in the neighbourhood of the dangerous promontory of Athos. The engineers reported the practicability of avoiding the promontory entirely by cutting a canal through the neck of the peninsula. Between the bay of Acanthus on the north and Sane on the south the ground is flat, with the exception of a few insignificant hills, and the distance between the two shores is only a mile and a half. Here, therefore, in 483 b.c. thousands of workmen began to dig a canal wide enough to admit two triremes abreast. This was not the first work of the kind to be undertaken by the Persians, for Darius had signalised his reign by completing the canal which the Egyptian king, Necho, had planned between the Nile and the Red Sea. The canal of Athos was not simply a vain display of power, but a really useful undertaking carried out by men highly trained in the art of moving vast bodies of men over immense distances, leaving as little as might be to chance. Similar works were the bridging of the great river Strymon at the point called the "Nine Ways,"^{The Bridging of the Strymon—} where in later times Amphipolis stood, and the formation of vast dépôts of supplies at suitable places on the line of march—at Leuce Acte (the "White Point"), a promontory on the European side of the Propontis, at Tyrodiza, Doriscus, the mouth of the Strymon, and at Therma, in Macedonia. The work that most impressed the Greeks as being beyond the measure of what man might rightfully do

Plan of the
Invasion of
Greece.

The Ship Canal
through Athos.

in the conflict with nature was the bridging of the Hellespont itself. Mandrocles had bridged the Bosphorus for Darius, but this was a more daring enterprise. The two bridges started from Abydos ; Phoenician and Egyptian engineers built them. The first pair having been utterly destroyed by a storm, Xerxes, in true Oriental style, ordered their makers to be executed. The stream which had dared to destroy the Great King's work was punished with three hundred lashes and insolent reproaches. No story current among the Greeks exhibits more consciously and pointedly the contrast between Oriental extravagance and "barbarity" and Hellenic good taste and restraint. Perhaps, therefore, we may say that the whole story was a Greek invention made with that contrast in view. A fresh site was selected and two bridges were successfully completed. Two lines of ships moored by prow and stern were laid athwart the strait ; over each line of ships, six huge cables, two of flax and four of papyrus, were made taut and beams laid crosswise thereon for a foundation for a roadway of planks and earth, with a palisade on either side sufficiently high to guard against the dizzying effects of a view of the swiftly flowing current. At three places in each bridge gaps were left in the line of ships under the cables for the passage of small traders.

§ 152. Towards the close of 481 B.C. these preparations were completed, and the contingents of the eastern part of the empire concentrated upon Critalla, in Cappadocia. Here in the autumn Xerxes took command. The army marched by way of Celaenae and Colossae to Sardis, where the winter was passed. In the spring of 480 B.C. the king set forth for the Hellespont. His exit from the city was marked, we are told, by a solar eclipse which the Magi

interpreted as portending the utter ruin of the Greeks; popular tradition antedated a partial eclipse which occurred two years later. The troops marched ^{The March from Sardis.} out between the severed halves of a human body; it was that of the eldest son of Pythius of Celaenae, the richest man in Asia, whose wealth fell short of four million gold darics by seven thousand darics ^{Story of Pythius.} only. All this wealth Pythius had offered to the king, but Xerxes had refused the gift, and had made up to him the full tale of four million darics. In an evil hour Pythius asked the boon that, of his five sons serving in the army, the eldest should be left at home. The king was furious at the demand of a subject to be free of service, and ordered the executioners to saw the youth asunder and to expose the fragments on either side of the road.

In a month from Sardis Abydos was reached, and sitting on a marble throne high above the strait, the king watched the crossing of the stream of men. At Doriscus ^{Review at Doriscus.} a grand review of the host was held. It was numbered in rough and ready fashion; ten thousand men were massed in square and the area they occupied was surrounded with a wall; the enclosure was filled again and again until all were counted. The grand total is given at 1,700,000 infantry, and 80,000 cavalry, but no reliance can be placed on these figures. After the numbering Xerxes inspected the nations composing the army. Herodotus has given us a list of forty-six ^{The Persian Forces: Their Description—} peoples, with a description of their dress and weapons; but many of the peoples described can have had no place in the army of invasion. Ethiopians of Nubia with stone-headed arrows, Mysians with poles tip-hardened in the fire, Sagartians from the steppes of Iran, whose only weapons were dirk and lasso—these, and many others,

were never haled into Europe to swell an army which at the highest computation can hardly have exceeded 300,000 men. The number of ships is given as 1,207 triremes, with 3,000 smaller vessels ; here again —^{and Numbers.} there is much exaggeration. The Phoenicians were the flower of the naval force, which was commanded by four Persians of high rank, among them two brothers of the king.

§ 153. The Greeks had ample warning of the blow which threatened them ; in 481 b.c. heralds from Sardis had demanded the tokens of submission. Only to Athens and Sparta were no heralds sent, those two states being thus declared to be beyond the pale of mercy. In the autumn Greek Congress of this year a national Congress, the Synedrion of the Probuli or representatives of the at the Isthmus. patriotic states, was convened at the Isthmus in order to concert measures of resistance. Sparta, by reason of her acknowledged headship in the Peloponnese, and Athens, by reason of her victory at Marathon and her growing importance as a naval power, were the natural centres of the national resistance. As a preliminary, it was resolved that all feuds and disputes between states should be dropped so that all might fight side by side like brothers for the common freedom. The old quarrel which for nearly

thirty years had estranged Athens and Aegina
Union of Athens and Aegina. was thus laid to sleep, and the two largest navies of Greece secured for the coming struggle.

The confederate states bound themselves by an oath to "tithe" the state which voluntarily submitted to Persia ; in others words, to confiscate its territory and to dedicate a tenth part to the god at Delphi.

§ 154. Command of the land forces by common consent belonged to Sparta, and as for the fleet, the cities were

unwilling to serve under any but a Spartan leader. Envoys were sent to various powerful states for aid, but they met with no success. Argos maintained a stubborn neutrality, owing to her jealousy of Sparta, at a time when neutrality was tantamount to "medism." Crete followed the same policy, and Corcyra, with characteristic selfishness and duplicity, declared for the cause, but took care not to commit herself to active interference. Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, the greatest power in the west, was threatened by the Carthaginians, and could have sent no help, even if his claim to the supreme command of the confederate forces could have been conceded satisfactorily. At home things looked dark for the patriots. In general throughout northern Greece, where the brunt of the invasion would fall, there was a strong tendency to inaction; the attitude of these weak northern states was bound to be decided by the extent to which they could count upon Spartan support.

The darkness of the outlook was gauged by the Delphian priests, who in their oracles counselled non-resistance. Athens had a difficult task—to combat at once the narrow, self-interested calculations of the Spartans, who limited their view to the Peloponnese the temporising, or even the open "medism," of the northern Greeks and the astute time-servers of Delphi. The glory of this year lies in the fact that the credit for all that Athens did belonged not to any single man, but to the whole Athenian people. In 490 B.C. there were certainly traitors within the city; in 480 B.C. but one sentiment animated her people. Minor political disagreements were forgotten, even as between state and state feud had been buried. The state needed the


Attitude of Argos—
—of Crete and Corcyra—
—of Gelon of Syracuse—
—of the Northern States of Greece.
Condition of Athens.

best talent it could command. Aristeides and Xanthippus, driven into exile by the ostracism, were recalled and chosen to be Generals along with their great rival Themistocles. The Council of the Areiopagus seems to have distinguished itself at this crisis by its public spirit and patriotic attitude.

§ 155. For a moment it seemed that opposition to the invaders would be made on the frontier of Greece, on the most northerly line, that of the Cambunian range. About the time of the crossing of the Hellespont the Thessalians asked the confederates to adopt that line of defence, and ten thousand men were sent to the vale of Tempe between Mount Olympus and Mount Ossa. The line of Tempe can be turned, however, by the passes of *Volustana* and *Petra*, to the west of Olympus, and — abandoned to the Persians. it was impossible for the Greeks to hold all these routes into Thessaly. They had no alternative but withdrawal, and the abandonment of Thessaly to the enemy.

A second line of defence was constituted by the range of Mount Oeta and the entrance to the Euboean channel. On this line the famous pass of Thermopylae was the portal of central Greece; its loss meant the loss of Boeotia, Attica, and all the country north of the Isthmus. The outline of the coast has been greatly modified by the alluvial deposits of the Spercheius, which enters the Maliac Gulf near the pass, but we can reconstruct the map of the pass as it was in 480 B.C. At its western end near Anthela, the meeting place of the Amphictionic Council, and its eastern end near Alpeni, the mountain approached the sea so closely as to leave barely room for the road. Between these points it receded somewhat, leaving a small plain at its foot, over

which flowed the water from the hot springs sacred to Heracles, which gave their name to the pass. The mountain falls in sheer precipices to the road, which then was also blocked by a transverse wall, built by the Phocians as a defence against the



THE PASS OF THERMOPYLAE.

Thessalians. The weak point was that a rough path, practicable, however, for troops, ran across the mountains south of the pass and descended to the road east of Alpeni. The position could therefore be turned, unless the allies could also hold the mountain path. The enemy's fleet had

also to be taken into account. Thermopylae was in fact only the land section of the whole line of defence. In order to prevent a descent in rear of the pass from the Persian fleet, the strait between the northern end of Euboea and the mainland of Thessaly had also to be guarded by the Greeks. Leonidas, one of the Spartan kings, occupied Thermopylae with about seven thousand hoplites; four thousand of these were Peloponnesians,

^{Greek Land Forces at Thermopylae.} including one thousand Laconian Perioeci and two thousand Arcadians. The flower of the

force consisted of three hundred Spartiates, chosen from those who had children. One thousand Phocians were charged with the defence of the path over the mountains. Over the fleet Eurybiades, a Spartiate, but not of royal blood, held chief command. The total number of ships was 271 triremes and nine penteconters in station near Artemisium, on the northern coast of Euboea;

^{Greek Fleet at Artemisium.} in addition fifty-three Athenian triremes kept watch in the rear at the strait called the Euripus; of the entire fleet of 324 triremes, the Athenians provided 200.

§ 156. Towards the end of August (480 B.C.) Xerxes drew ^{Xerxes before Thermopylae.} near Thermopylae. Immortal stories were told of the stand at the pass—how the Persian scout gazed with astonishment on the Lacedaemonian outpost in front of the wall engaged in athletic exercises or combing their long hair; and how one of the three hundred, Dieneces by name, when told that the Persian host was so numerous that their arrows hid the sun, gaily replied: “So much the better! We shall fight then in the shade.” Four days the Persians lay before the pass; it needed no general to see the difficulties of a frontal attack upon the Greek position. On the fifth day Xerxes attacked. First the Mèdes and

Cissians, next the ten thousand Persian "Immortals" under Hydarnes, dashed upon the Greek spears, only to be thrown back broken. Thrice in agony of fear for his dying soldiers Xerxes sprang from his royal seat. At last he decided to send round the "Immortals" by the mountain path. A Malian named Ephialtes has been branded in history as the traitor who sold his country; but he was only the guide impressed by the Persians, who from the first must have known of the existence of the path from the Thessalians in the army. Marching all night, the detachment surprised the Phocians, who retreated towards the summit of the mountain; but the Persians passed onwards without paying further attention to them.

In the camp of Leonidas the Greeks had learnt the movement which threatened them; the seer Megistias had read in the sacrifices that death would come with the morning. A council of war was held. The decision was that the Lacedaemonians, Thebans, and Thespians should remain to defend the pass, while the rest retired eastwards, probably in order to attack the flank of the Persians descending the hills. Afterwards it was said that the withdrawal of the main body was a desertion, and that the Thebans were retained against their will, and went over to the Persians during the action. Hitherto the Greeks had merely received the Persian onset; now they advanced outside the pass and fell upon the enemy. Many of the noblest Persians fell, among them two half-brothers of the king; many were driven into the sea. Leonidas also fell, and a Homeric contest was waged for his body. At last the spears of the Greeks were broken; and the Persians began to pour into the pass from its eastern end. The remnant of the defenders retired to

a hillock for the last stand, and by the thousands that
Last Stand and Death of Leonidas and the Spartans. surged into the pass from either side they were borne down, desperately fighting to the last. The Persians were masters of the gates of Greece, and Thermopylae had become the type for all time of loyal defence that ends only when life ends.

§ 157. The defeat at Thermopylae entailed the retirement of the Greek fleet. The first blood actually shed in the campaign was in a conflict between three Greek vessels reconnoitring in the Thermaic gulf and ten swift cruisers of the enemy. On the coast of Magnesia the main fleet of the Persians came to anchor, between Casthanaea and Cape Sepias, at the south-eastern extremity of Thessaly. So numerous were the ships that they lay in eight lines, only the first line being hauled ashore, while the rest rode at anchor. A furious storm from the north east, which, in spite of the incantations of the Magi, raged for three days,

The Storm off Cape Sepias. destroyed hundreds of ships and their crews.

Thus Boreas, the Greeks said, remembered his kinship with the Athenians. After the storm the Persians came to Aphetae, opposite the station of the Greeks. In order to cut off the Greek retreat they sent a squadron of two hundred ships outside Euboea to block the southern end of the Euboean channel, but these ships were destroyed by a storm in the "Hollows" of Euboea. The collapse of

Fighting at Artemisium. this attempt enabled the fifty-three Attic ships at the Euripus to join the main body, and several actions were fought in the strait near Artemisium. No decisive result was reached, but as the Persians were the assailants on the last occasion, it looks as though the

Retreat of the Greek Fleet. Greeks were being gradually beaten from their post. The disaster at Thermopylae released the fleet, for nothing could be gained by holding the strait.

§ 158. When the ships reached the Saronic Gulf the Athenians were disappointed to learn that all idea of further stand north of the Isthmus was abandoned. Xerxes was in full march through Phocis and Boeotia, devastating and destroying. In Phocis, according to the Delphian tale, a Persian detachment had turned westwards in order to pillage Delphi. The women and children at Delphi were sent across the gulf for safety into Achaea, while the men sought refuge in the Corycian cavern on Parnassus. Only sixty men, with Aceratus, the prophet, remained in the temple. Apollo himself had promised to defend his own treasures. When the spoilers approached, a storm of thunder and lightning burst upon them; two rocks came crashing from the precipices of Parnassus into their midst, and a supernatural war-cry rang from the temple of Athena. Panic-stricken, the assailants fled, pursued by two avenging apparitions, the native Delphian Heroes, Phylacus and Autonoüs.

No such supernatural intervention saved Athens; indeed, the gods themselves seemed to have deserted the city, seeing that for the first time in man's memory the monthly dole of food placed in the temple of Erechtheus for Athena's sacred snake remained untasted. Proclamation was made that the women, children, and old men should be transported across the Saronic Gulf to Aegina, Troezen, or Salamis, and that the rest should man the ships. The Council of the Areiopagus distributed from the treasury of Athena eight drachmae to every citizen who embarked. Athens was thus entirely deserted with the exception of the Acropolis, the great natural strength of which gave hopes of its being held successfully. The small garrison left there actually did maintain itself

for two weeks, and then the Persians discovered the secret stair on the northern side of the rock near the <sup>The Persians
Capture the
Acropolis.</sup> sanctuary of Aglauros. Later tradition represented the garrison as consisting merely of a few deluded citizens who chose to understand the "wooden wall" in which, according to the oracle, safety should be found, as wooden barricades; the event proved clearly enough that the oracle had meant ships.

§ 159. During the evacuation of the city the allied fleet lay in the bay of Salamis, and hither gathered the entire available fleet of Greece—378 triremes and seven penteconters. Across the Isthmus a wall had been built in feverish haste, and behind it lay the army, now commanded by Cleombrotus, younger brother of Leonidas and regent for his brother's child, Pleistarchus. The situation of the fleet at Salamis resembled that at

<sup>The Greek
Fleet at Salamis.</sup> Artemisium, with the difference that the passage between island and mainland was easier to block than the Euboean straits had been. During the days which succeeded the simultaneous arrival of the Persian army at Athens and of their fleet at Phalerum, hot debate was held in the Council of Admirals; the majority were in favour of withdrawing the fleet towards the Isthmus; Athens, Megara, and Aegina were strenuous in opposition. In the story of these debates Themistocles is the hero. He convinced Eurybiades, when the other captains were on the eve of departing, of the advantage of fighting in the narrow strait, where

<sup>Attitude of
Themistocles.</sup> the numerical superiority of the Persians would be neutralised, and Eurybiades called a fresh meeting. It was on this occasion that the Corinthian Adeimantus reproached Themistocles with his impatient eagerness to address the Council: "Those who stand up too


soon in the games are whipped," said he. "Yes," retorted Themistocles, "and they who lag behind lose the crown." When the Corinthian reminded him that he was a man without a city, Themistocles replied that so long as he commanded two hundred ships he had a city and a country greater than Corinth, and threatened to sail to Italy to found a new Athens there. The decision was taken to fight at Salamis.

According to the story, a somewhat similar scene was being enacted at the council-board of Xerxes. The tyrants of the various states and the captains of the ships were all eager for action. Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus, alone declared in favour of avoiding a battle. Xerxes resolved to fight, and brought his ships across the space between Salamis and Peiraeus, so as to ^{Xerxes Re-} _{solves to Attack.} block the entrance of the strait. The islet Psyttaleia, lying right in the fairway, was occupied by Persian troops. The Greek fleet lay behind the long rocky promontory of Cynosura which projects towards the Attic shore.

For a third time the Greek admirals met, and clamoured for retirement. Themistocles then determined upon a desperate expedient in order to force a ^{Trick of Themis-} _{to force} ^{to} _{on a Battle.} battle in the strait. Under the cover of darkness he sent a faithful slave, Sicinnus, to the Persians with a message to Xerxes in which he represented himself as a secret friend of Persia ; he unfolded the resolution of the Greeks to retire westwards by way of the winding strait towards the Isthmus, and bade the king forestall them in order to destroy them. Xerxes consequently modified his plan of battle. What exactly was done is not clear. Some believe that the Egyptian squadron of two hundred ships was sent southwards round the island to take post at the Megarian end of the bay of Eleusis ;

^{Persian Plan}
_{of Battle}

others that the Phoenician ships on the right wing crept along the Attic shore into the strait, so as to block that portion of the strait which connects the bay of Salamis with that of Eleusis. In any case the Persians carried out their movement unperceived, while the Greek admirals wrangled. Suddenly towards morning Aristeides appeared with the



announcement that the fleet was surrounded and further discussion useless.

§ 160. The Athenians were stationed on the left of the The Battle. Greek line, the Corinthians and lesser contingents in the centre, the Aeginetans and Lacedaemonians on the right. The Greek line was probably

drawn up, facing northwards, east of the town of Salamis and north of the promontory of Cynosura. The poet Aeschylus, who himself took part in the battle, says that the Great King ordered his captains “to marshal the close-packed fleet in three rows, to guard the passages out and the navigable sea-straits.” The Ionian Greeks were on the left wing and the Phoenician squadron on the right, close to the Peiraeus. At dawn the Persians turned their three rows into three columns: the Phoenicians advanced between Psyttaleia and the mainland; the Athenians at once wheeled round, attacked their flank and cut them off from the main fleet; in their endeavours to escape they caused confusion among the ships pressing in their rear. The Ionians now sailed into the straits between Psyttaleia and Salamis; but the Aeginetans, having broken through their division and completed the defeat of the Phoenicians, took the rest of the Persian ships, whose very numbers proved an encumbrance in the narrow space, in the flank. By nightfall Xerxes’ great Armada was practically annihilated. The barbarians fought with great courage, but they were badly led, and there was no room for tactics in the narrow straits. Artemisia, the Halicarnassian queen, greatly distinguished herself.

§ 161. Xerxes retreated immediately. He is represented as overwhelmed with terror and fear of being penned up in Greece by the destruction of the Hellespontine bridges. As a matter of fact those bridges had long ago been broken up by storms, and the king was in no danger unless Ionia revolted. Mardonius did not remain behind with the army on the desperate chance of conquering Greece in order to avoid being made the scapegoat for the failure Movements of the Persians. of the expedition, as the Greeks made out. The blow to the fleet might indeed be expected to have

an important influence upon the loyalty of the Asiatic subjects, but it hardly touched the position of the land forces, which were still masters of the situation north of the Isthmus. The real danger threatened the Greeks themselves, with their jealousies and disunion; their proper course was to have followed up their victory

^{Policy of} _{the Greeks.} upon the retirement of the army. For retirement was for the moment imperative. The season was far advanced, and Mardonius had to find his winter quarters in Thessaly. Cleombrotus was on the point of advancing in pursuit when an eclipse of the sun (October 2nd, 480 B.C.) caused him to desist. As for the advice ^{Advice of} _{Themistocles.} of Themistocles, to pursue the retreating fleet with the object of raising Ionia, it was rejected. The Peloponnesians had been unwilling to fight at Salamis, and they were now still less disposed to quit their own waters, and carry on a naval war upon the coast of Ionia. While Mardonius remained in Greece they could urge that there was occupation enough for the fleet at home; at the same time the immediate danger was over, and it was only under the stress of imminent peril that the council could be prevailed upon to adopt vigorous measures. The Greek fleet, therefore, contented itself with an advance to Andros. An indemnity was demanded from that island, which had fought on the Persian side, but after a fruitless attempt to extort one by siege the fleet withdrew.

When the ships had returned to Salamis, division of the spoils of war was made, and offerings to the gods. Then all ^{Prizes of Valour.} assembled at the Isthmus to adjudge the prizes of valour. The first prize was given to the Aeginetans, the second to the Athenians. Later invention added the following story. A prize was offered to the man

who had most distinguished himself for valour or wisdom. The commanders each wrote two names in order of merit and deposited the tablet on the altar of Poseidon. Upon examination it was found that each man must have written his own name first and that of Themistocles second. Themistocles himself must then have put his own name down twice! The result was that no prize was awarded—in reality for the best of reasons, that none was offered. Themistocles, however, received unique honours at Sparta—a crown of olive, a prize chariot, and when he left the city three hundred Spartans escorted him as far as the frontier.

The victory at Salamis gave a fresh impulse to Greek literature, and forms the subject of the *Persae* of Aeschylus, the only strictly historical Greek drama we possess. The Greeks themselves held it to be the most significant event in their history : for to them it stood for the triumph of individual liberty over the hated power of Oriental despotism. Periander, Croesus, and Cambyses were all in their way typical tyrants, but Xerxes was the tyrant for all time.

CHAPTER XXI.

PLATAEA AND MYCALE.

§ 162. Prospects and Motives of the Greeks in 479 B.C.—§ 163
Mardonius's Overtures to Athens; Second Occupation of Athens by the Persians; March of the Spartans to the Isthmus.—§ 164. Movements of Mardonius and Pausanias; the Armies near Plataea.—§ 165. First and Second Positions of the Greeks.—§ 166. Retrograde Movement of Pausanias; Amompharetus.—§ 167. Battle of Plataea.—§ 168. Submission of Thebes; Festival of Freedom; Dedication of the Spoils.—§ 169. Battle of Mycale.

§ 162. It was in 479 B.C. that the real struggle for the freedom of Greece was waged. Mardonius was joined in Thessaly by Artabazus and the troops which had escorted Xerxes to the Hellespont. The total of the force with Mardonius is said to have reached 300,000 men; though that is not true, they were at all events the best troops that Persia could put into the field. Meanwhile the Persian fleet, 300 strong, was concentrated at Samos, supported by an army watching over Ionia.

The Greek fleet of 110 ships, commanded by Leotychides, one of the Spartan kings, was gathered at Aegina, whence, at the solicitations of the Chians, it advanced as far as Delos. The secret history of this year has been guessed with a high degree of probability. The fact that Themistocles after all his brilliant success of the previous year was not continued in command proves that his policy no longer fell in with the views of the people.

There was, in fact, a division of interest between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. As before, the Spartans were anxious not to operate beyond the Isthmus, if it could be avoided ; on the other hand, the appearance of a strong Greek fleet on the coast of Ionia, and a second crushing victory over the Persian ships, would free the Peloponnesians of all apprehension of a descent upon the Peloponnesus, while their lines at the Isthmus were beyond all fear of direct attack by land. The Athenians could therefore free northern Greece of the presence of the Persian armies only by refusing to co-operate in a decisive operation at sea until a decisive blow had been struck on land.

§ 163. Upon this division of interest Mardonius laid his plans. He made overtures directly to the Athenians through Alexander, king of Macedonia. Overtures of Mardonius to Athena. He offered them a free and independent alliance. In answer to the counter-envoy sent by Sparta, the Athenians declared that so long as the sun's course remained the same, they would never accept the terms of Xerxes. In return, the Spartans engaged to send an army into Boeotia for the protection of Athens. Mardonius at once began to march southwards, while the Athenians waited in vain for the promised assistance. The Spartans pleaded the festival of the Hyacinthia as the ground for their refusal to take the field immediately. Once again the Athenians were compelled to remove their families and property to Salamis, and to take to their ships. Mardonius entered Attica without opposition, and reoccupied Athens ten months after its first entry by Xerxes ; this time no damage was done either to the land or to the city, as the Persian general still hoped to detach the Athenians from the Peloponnesian alliance. Envoys from Athens, Megara,

and Plataea appeared in Sparta to remonstrate with the Ephors. For ten days an answer to their demand for Spartan intervention was postponed, but at last the patience of the envoys was exhausted, and they delivered their ultimatum—the threat to go over to the Persians. Never were men more astonished than they when the Ephors replied by informing them that already the regent Pausanias, ^{Spartans March to the Isthmus.} with 5,000 Spartiates and their Helot attendants, had crossed the frontier in full march for the Isthmus, and that 5,000 hoplites of the Perioeci, each with a Helot attendant, were at that moment mobilising for the campaign. Never afterwards did so large a force of Spartans take the field.

Mardonius had made a last attempt to win the Athenians. His envoy appeared in Salamis with his proposals. Lycidas, one of the Council, urged that the matter should be laid before the people in the Ecclesia, but their answer was to stone him to death, while the women did the same to his wife and children.

§ 164. On the approach of the Lacedaemonians Mardonius ^{Movements of Mardonius.} was constrained to retire from Attica. He did what he could to complete the ruin of Athens, and then, after a demonstration as far as the Megarid, retired northwards by way of Deceleia to Tanagra, where he turned westwards and marched up the Asopus to Scolus, a hamlet at the northern foot of Mount Cithaeron. Here he was in Theban territory, at the point where the direct road from the Peloponnese or Attica crossed the ^{The Persians on the Asopus.} Asopus. A fortified camp, ten furlongs square, guarded the passage of the river, while his army lined its bank from a point opposite Erythrae on the east to one opposite Plataea on the west. In the rear, five miles distant, lay Thebes, the Persian base, thoroughly

fortified and provisioned. Pausanias was joined at the Isthmus by contingents from the patriotic states ; advancing to Eleusis, he effected a junction with the ^{Movements of} Athenians, 8,000 strong under Aristeides, and ^{Pausanias.} then crossed Mount Cithaeron by the pass of Dryoscephalae ("Oak Heads") and halted on the northern face of the range. Further advance was impossible, and a frontal attack upon the Persian position was equally out of the question.

For many days the two armies faced each other. In Herodotus we can read the story of events as <sup>The Armies
near Plataea :
Account of
Herodotus.</sup> coloured by Athenian jealousy and antipathy ; it has proved possible, however, to divine the truth about the operations at Plataea in a higher degree than in the case of the other battles with the Persians.

§ 165. Pausanias had advanced on the direct road from Athens to Thebes with the intention of striking <sup>First Position
of the Greeks.</sup> at Thebes. In his position on Mount Cithaeron he lay astride that road ; on the right stood the Spartans above Erythrae ; on the left, on much lower ground, the Athenians and Megarians. Against the left wing Marandonius flung his cavalry under Masistius. The <sup>Cavalry Battle
near Erythrae.</sup> Megarians hardly withstood them, but on the arrival of three hundred Athenians in support, the Persians were beaten off with the loss of their leader ; he was slain with difficulty by a spear-thrust in the eye, as his armour was impenetrable. The body remained in the hands of the Greeks, and Boeotia echoed with the Persian lamentation for the loss of Masistius.

Seeing that an advance on Thebes by this road was impossible, Pausanias, by a sudden movement <sup>Movement of
Pausanias.</sup> in an oblique direction from Cithaeron, threw himself on the road which, farther west, ran directly from


Plataea to Thebes. His object was to cross the Asopus, and thus turn the Persian right wing. That ^{Its Object.} this operation was not carried beyond the half-way stage was owing to the timidity of the Athenians, who, being on the Greek left, naturally formed the head of the column in its advance across the river. Unfortunately the crossing was never effected, as the Athenians shrank from the task, and in the end a halt was made among the ridges which extend from Cithaeron to the Asopus; the spring Gargaphia and the precinct of the Hero ^{Second Position of the Greeks.} Androcrates marked the new Greek position. The Persians, of course, at once seized the passes over Mount Cithaeron, which the Greek movement had thrown open to attack. The Greeks were thus straitened for supplies, and their position was untenable. Pausanias was compelled to give up the offensive, and to fall back upon Mount Cithaeron in order to try to recover his communication with the Isthmus. The masterly inactivity of Mardonius was apparently certain to bring him victory by the gradual melting away of the allied army.

The Athenians pretended that Alexander of Macedon ^{Malicious Story about the Spartans.} secretly warned the Greeks that Mardonius was meditating instant attack, and that the Spartans, being unwilling to face Persian troops, exchanged places with the Athenians during the night. When the change was remarked by the enemy in the morning, Mardonius also made his Persians and the Boeotian allies exchange places, so as to bring the former once again opposite to the Spartans. On this, Pausanias caused the Spartans to resume their former position, and Mardonius did likewise.

§ 166. Pausanias held a council of war, in which the

details of the proposed retrograde movement were discussed. The Athenians, with the allies constituting the centre, were to retire to a ridge of Cithaeron, called the "Island," because it was enclosed by the two arms of the stream Oeroe; it lay ten stades east of Plataea. The Lacedaemonians and Tegeans, composing the Greek right, were to advance eastwards to recover the pass. When night fell the centre retreated in disorder, not to the "Island," but to the temple of Hera under the walls of Plataea; while the Athenians did not move at all. The Spartans also did not leave their position until dawn broke. The story was that Pausanias was thwarted by the irrational obstinacy of one of his bravest captains, Amompharetes by name, who regarded the retirement as unworthy of a Spartan. Pausanias was at last compelled to leave him to his fate; but he had advanced with the rest only ten stades, as far as the stream Moloeis, when the obdurate captain followed hard after him with the news that the Persian cavalry were pouring across the Asopus in pursuit. It was even so. The Greek army was now sundered into three bodies, and all cohesion was lost. The time for Mardonius to strike had come.

§ 167. Mardonius made the mistake of advancing by his left, so that he came into contact first and chiefly with the Spartans and Tegeans; the Boeotians fell upon the Athenians; the Greek centre was two miles away from either scene of action, and practically took no part in the battle. For long the omens were unfavourable, and the troops under Pausanias patiently waited under the storm of arrows shot from behind the Persian rampart of wicker shields. At last the Greeks charged, and swept over the barrier. The battle raged



long and fiercely, but at last the Spartan Aeimnestus struck down Mardonius, and the Persians fled in rout to their fortified camp. By this time the Athenians and the troops of the centre had come up, and the ^{storming of the} _{Persian Camp.} camp was stormed. The Greeks slew and spared not; we do not hear of any prisoners. The honours of the day rested with the Spartans and Tegeans, whose steadiness had retrieved the fearful blunders of the divisional commanders of the army.

§ 168. Ten days after the battle the allies advanced to Thebes and demanded the surrender of the leaders of the Persian party; the names of the chief of them were Attaginus and Timagenidas. For a time the Thebans refused to give them up, and siege was laid to the city. At last, at their own request, the men were surrendered; they hoped by means of bribes to secure their release, but they miscalculated, for Pausanias hurried them off to Corinth and executed them without trial. Attaginus, however, made his escape.

The Greeks who fell in the action were buried before the gate of Plataea, where their memory was honoured by annual sacrifice by the Plataeans, who also every four years celebrated the deliverance of Greece in a Festival of Freedom (Eleutheria). In the name of Sparta and the Peloponnesian confederacy Pausanias solemnly guaranteed the political independence and inviolability of the Plataeans; we shall see how that oath was kept. A tangible memorial of the victory has survived to our own day in the three bronze serpents intertwined so as to form a column that once supported a golden tripod; this was dedicated at Delphi. On the coils of the serpents are graven the names of the patriotic states. This is now at Constantinople, having

^{Surrender of}
_{Mediating}
_{Thebans.}

^{Festival of}
_{Eleutheria.}

^{Memorial at}
_{Delphi.}

been removed thither by Constantine the Great. From a second portion of the spoil was made a colossal image of Zeus, fifteen feet high, which was set up at Olympia; on its base also was a list of the loyal states. From a third portion was made a statue of Poseidon eleven feet high, set up at the Isthmus. Thus the Greeks gave thanks to the gods who had saved them.

§ 169. Meantime the Greek fleet had lain idle at Delos.

^{Movements of the Persian and Greek Fleets.} At length it sailed eastwards in response to the messages of the Samians, who declared

that the Ionians only waited for a sight of the Greek fleet to revolt. The Persian fleet withdrew from Samos to the promontory of Mycale, seeking the protection of the army of 60,000 men stationed there; the ships were hauled up and surrounded with a palisade. The Greeks, nothing daunted, landed and overcame the Persian infantry ranged on the shore, and drove it to the fortified camp; the camp in its turn was captured and burnt, together with all the ships. During the action the Ionians turned against their masters, and so "for a second time revolted from the Persians."*

The belief gained currency that this battle of Mycale (August, 479 B.C.) was fought on the very same day as that of Plataea, and the story was that just as the Greeks were on the point of engaging, the rumour ran down the line that their brethren were victorious in Boeotia; and a herald's staff was seen wafted to the shore as a sign of the victory thus mysteriously announced. It seems almost a pity to suspect that tidings of the Boeotian victory had already reached the commanders, who withheld the news until the psychological moment.

* Herod., ix., 104.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE WESTERN GREEKS.

§ 170. Preponderance of Dorian Element in Sicily; Struggle between the Greeks and Carthaginians in the Western Mediterranean.—§ 171. Tyrants in Sicily; Hippocrates of Gela; Gelon of Gela; Anaxilas Founds Messana.—§ 172. Gelon Captures and Enlarges Syracuse; his Power; Theron of Acragas; Terillus of Himera.—§ 173. Carthaginian Invasion of Sicily; Concert between Carthage and Xerxes; Battle of Himera.—§ 174. Acragas under Theron and Thrasydaeus; Death of Gelon; his Titles to Greatness.—§ 175. Hieron of Syracuse Defeats the Etruscans at Cyme; Hieron a Patron of Literature.—§ 176. End of the Tyranny at Acragas and Himera; Death of Hieron; Tyranny of Thrasybulus; Syracuse Freed from Tyranny; Ducetius; Reduction of Sicel Towns by Syracuse; Democracies throughout Sicily.

§ 170. SIMULTANEOUSLY with the attack of Xerxes upon the inhabitants of Greece Proper came that of the Carthaginians upon the Greeks of Sicily. This was not mere coincidence; the two blows had a real connection with each other.

It must be noticed that nearly all the Hellenic colonies in Sicily were situated on the eastern or the southern shores of the island, but it was in the southern part of Sicily that the important cities lay—in other words, in the history of the Sicilian Greeks it was the Dorian element that was in the ascendant. Syracuse and Gela, both direct Dorian colonies, and Acragas, an offshoot from Gela, divided between them the hegemony of Sicily,

Preponderance
of Dorians in
Sicily.

while the other Greek cities were little more than prizes to be fought for by their more powerful neighbours. Another remarkable point in the history of the Sicilian Greeks is the permanence of the phenomenon which Tyranny in Sicily : its Main Cause. to last the history of Sicily is the history of tyrants. One reason for this was that the Greeks in Sicily had always a foe at their door in the Phoenicians, who kept a firm hold over the western extremity of the island. The representative of the Phoenician nationality in Carthage. the western basin of the Mediterranean was the great mercantile city on the African coast, Carthage. In many ways the Greeks, both those of Sicily and those of the mother-country, infringed upon those exclusive rights of possession which Carthage claimed in the west. The Phocaeans as Rivals of Carthage at Massalia. Phocaeans planted Massalia on the coast of Gaul, and then spread to other places on that coast, both to the east and the west. The foundation of Alalia in Corsica challenged the right of Carthage to that fruitful island, but she replied by crushing At Alalia. Alalia out of existence (535 b.c.). Even the Phoenician preserve in Sicily was threatened—once when Pentathlus. Dorian adventurers from Cnidus and Rhodes, led by Pentathlus, tried to found a settlement on Cape Lilybaeum, hard by Motya (about 580 b.c.); and again when Dorieus, son of the Spartan king, Dorieus. Anaxandridas, tried to establish himself near Mount Eryx (about 510 b.c.). The Phoenicians at Panormus, the Elymians at Segesta, and the Sicani at Hyccara might quarrel among themselves, but they all readily combined to keep the Greeks from penetrating thither; Selinus on the south coast and Himera on the north coast continued to be the most westerly outposts of Hellenic civilisation.

§ 171. It was about the close of the sixth century B.C. that the epidemic of tyranny began in Sicily; ^{Tyrants in Sicily.} up to this date examples had been sporadic only. Since 505 B.C. Cleandrus had ruled in Gela; after seven years he was assassinated, but the reins of power were grasped by his brother Hippocrates, a man of daring and ability, who made Gela mistress of most of ^{Hippocrates of Gela.} eastern Sicily; Naxos, Zancle, and Leontini were reduced to subjection and ruled by feudatory princes. Hippocrates actually defeated the Syracusans in a great battle on the Helorus, and might have taken their city but for the intervention of the Corinthians and Corcyraeans; as it was, Syracuse had to yield ^{Battle of Helorus (492 B.C.)} Camarina, which became a dependency of Gela (492 B.C.). Hippocrates fell in battle in 491 B.C. He was succeeded by his general, Gelon, who gained the tyranny by pretending to support the claims of ^{Gelon of Gela.} the two sons of Hippocrates, against whom the citizens had taken arms.

Hippocrates, as overlord of Zancle, had established Scythes as ruler there. After the conquest of Miletus (494 B.C.), Scythes invited those Ionians who would not tolerate the Persian yoke to found a new home in Sicily. These refugees were tampered with by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, on the Italian side of the strait, who persuaded them to seize Zancle. This act of treachery was performed; a few years later Anaxilas himself seized the town, drove out the ^{Anaxilas of Rhegium, called Messana.} traitorous Ionians, repopulated the city with a people of mixed race, and renamed it Messana.

§ 172. Gelon, tyrant of Gela, succeeded, and that by peaceable means, in effecting the thing which Hippocrates had failed to accomplish—the acquisition of Syracuse.

Dissensions prevailed in Syracuse between the nobles and Gelon's *Aequi*.^{sition of} the lower classes, and ultimately the people of Syracuse (485 B.C.)^{expelled the Gamori, or landed aristocracy.} The exiles retired to Casmeneae, and after a few years invoked the assistance of Gelon. The Syracusan demos made no resistance, and Gelon thus became tyrant of Syracuse with the title of General (485 B.C.). Gela was left to be ruled by his brother Hieron.

Gelon devoted his life to the aggrandisement of his new *Enlargement* capital. Syracuse was enlarged in area, the *of Syracuse* plateau of Achradina being included within a wall of fortification, so that Achradina became the city proper, while the island of Ortygia, now joined by a mole to the mainland, served as an acropolis. Special provision was made for a large navy. In order to increase the population violent measures were taken. More than half

Compulsory Migration to Syracuse. of the people of Gela were compelled to migrate to Syracuse; the town of Camarina was totally

destroyed and its inhabitants haled to the capital. Other cities also suffered similar transplantation of their nobles, while their commons were sold into slavery. Gelon made himself master of the whole south-eastern portion of Sicily, and he possessed land and sea forces such as no city in Greece could rival. Hence the *Power of Gelon.* Greeks of the mother-country were anxious for his assistance in 481 B.C.

In addition to Anaxilas of Messana and Gelon of Syracuse, there were two other tyrants in Sicily at this period—Theron of Acragas (Agrigentum) and Terillus of

Terillus of Himera and Theron of Acragas. Himera. Terillus was father-in-law of Anaxilas, and Theron held the same relationship to Gelon; besides, Theron himself had to wife the daughter of Polyzalus, a younger brother of Gelon. It was the

hostility between these two family groups of tyrants that brought the Carthaginians into Sicily in a renewed attempt to expel the Greeks. Theron expelled Terillus, and Terillus and Anaxilas applied to the Carthaginians for assistance. The part played by Terillus is curiously analogous to that of the exiled tyrant of Athens at the Persian court.

§ 173. The invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians was inevitable under the circumstances; nevertheless there can be little doubt than its synchronism with the Persian invasion of Greece was not accidental. It was of consequence both to Carthage and to Xerxes that the eastern and the western Greeks should, if possible, be hindered from rendering each other assistance. To this extent the two hostile powers were acting in concert. The Greeks expressed their consciousness of the historical significance of the two invasions in their belief that the decisive battles in Greece and Sicily fell upon one and the same day.

The vastness of the Carthaginian preparations matched those of Xerxes. Three hundred thousand men conveyed in more than two hundred warships and three thousand transports landed at Panormus and advanced upon Himera. Theron called to his aid Gelon, and upon the tyrant of Syracuse was laid the task of championing the cause of Hellenic civilisation in the west. With fifty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry he marched to the theatre of war and encamped on the right bank of the river Himera, to the east of the city. The Carthaginians were commanded by one of the kings (Suffetes) of Carthage, Hamilcar, son of Hanno; Hamilcar had pitched two camps, one on the shore and a second among the hills on the west of the town. Gelon learnt from a prisoner that the Carthaginians were expecting

Carthaginian Invasion of Sicily.

Concert between Carthage and Persia.

cavalry from Selinus, and he determined upon a bold stratagem. A portion of his own cavalry was sent to them, representing themselves as Selinuntines; when these began to burn the ships, Gelon attacked the camp in the hills. The victory of the Greeks was complete. One hundred and fifty thousand of the enemy are said to have perished, and of all the fleet only one small boat returned to Carthage with news of the

<sup>Battle of
Himera
(480 B.C.)</sup> great disaster. Hamilcar also fell, but how, no one knew. According to one story, he stood all through the battle at the altar offering victim after victim; when he saw the battle go against him, he cast himself as a supreme sacrifice into the flames. The booty won by the victors was immense; in addition, Carthage purchased peace by payment of a war indemnity of two thousand talents.

§ 174. The victory at Himera raised both Syracuse and Acragas to a great pitch of prosperity. The thousands of captives were usefully employed in task-work for the beautification of the two cities. During the last eight years

<sup>Extension of
Acraga.</sup> of Theron's reign Acragas was greatly enlarged and the foundations were laid of the great temples along the southern wall of the city, which astonished the world afterwards by their magnificence. Theron died in 472 B.C. He had been a wise and just ruler, and after his death he was worshipped as a Hero. His son and successor, Thrasydaeus, was a man of

<sup>Death of Theron
and Succession
of Thrasydaeus.</sup> very different character. He had previously ruled Himera for his father, but his severity had caused a rebellion which for a moment had caused strained relations between Acragas and Syracuse; in fact, the two great cities almost came to blows, but the poet Simonides reconciled them, being a friend both of Theron and of Hieron who then ruled at Syracuse (477 B.C.).

Gelon did not long survive his great victory. He had been ruthless and violent in carrying through the ambition of his life, the making Syracuse a great city ; but his latter end was peace, and he went down to his grave (478 B.C.) happy in the knowledge that he was beloved by his people. We are told that he summoned the Syracusans to an assembly armed, and that he came before them himself unarmed and gave account of all that he had done. His aims had not been those of a selfish personal ambition ; in the short space of seven years he had established an Hellenic power that knew no superior, and had brought greatness, prosperity, and security to Syracuse. The people only gave him his due when they greeted him as their benefactor, saviour, and, most precious title of all, not tyrant but king.

§ 175. Gelon's son was a minor, and a dual regency was established ; Hieron, the ruler of Gela, and Polyzalus, both brothers of Gelon, were entrusted with the government. The jealousy of Hieron compelled Polyzalus to take refuge with his son-in-law, Theron of Acragas, but when the reconciliation between the two cities took place he was allowed to return to Syracuse. Hieron completed his brother's victory at Himera by inflicting a crushing blow upon that other powerful race which was ever hostile to the Greeks, the Etruscans. The hostility of the Etruscans was focussed upon the most northerly outpost of Greece on the Italian coast, the city of Cyme (Cumae). The combined fleets of Cyme and Syracuse defeated the Etruscans so decisively (474 B.C.) that never again were they an object of fear to the Greeks. Some of the booty was sent as an offering by Hieron to Olympia ; a bronze helmet with the inscription—“ Hieron, son of Deinomenes, and the

His Services
to Syracuse.

Hieron of
Syracuse.

The Etruscans
Defeated by
Hieron at Cyme
(474 B.C.)

Syracusans to Zeus; Tyrrhenian spoils from Cyme," a memorial of this victory, is now in the British Museum.

Hieron was a chronic invalid whose life was full of pain; doubtless that had much to do with the fact that he regarded his people with suspicion, established a system of espionage, and displayed avarice and violence in his rule. Outwardly his court was the most splendid and famous in existence at that time, the home of the best

^{Poets at the Court of Hieron.} literary talent of the day: Epicharmus and Phormis, the comedians; Aeschylus, the tragedian; Pindar, Bacchylides, and Simonides, the lyric poets, were found there. The art of Pindar and Bacchylides was exercised in celebrating the successes of the Syracusan ruler in the Panhellenic games at Delphi and Olympia.

§ 176. The strife between the two great Sicilian cities at last came about. Thrasydaeus for some unknown reason declared war on Hieron, who defeated him in a bloody battle. Thrasydaeus is said to have retired to Megara in Greece, and to have been executed there. This was the end of the tyranny at Acragas and Himera, so far as we know (470 B.C.). Nor was the fall of the ^{Death of Hieron} tyranny at Syracuse long delayed. In 467 B.C. (467 B.C.) Hieron died, and his younger brother Thrasybulus succeeded to the regency; he was a vicious, incapable man, and soon the Syracusans rose against him. He was compelled to surrender and to leave Syracuse for ever (466 B.C.). Thus after twenty years Syracuse recovered

^{End of the Tyranny at Syracuse.} freedom. A colossal statue was dedicated to Zeus Eleutherius, and annual games called Eleutheria were established in memory of the occasion. For a time, however, there was strife in the city between the old citizens and those whom Gelon had brought in from every quarter. It was during this period of strife

and weakness that a national movement began among the pre-Hellenic race of eastern Sicily, the Sicels, who found a leader in Ducetius (461—440 B.C.). ^{Sicel Rising under Ducetius: his Cities.} He organised a federation of Sicel towns, built new cities, and attempted to wrest supremacy in Sicily from the Greeks. He even defeated the Acragantines and Syracusans, but in 450 B.C. he was defeated by the latter with fearful slaughter. Ducetius threw himself upon the mercy of his enemies, and one morning the Syracusans found him a suppliant at the public altar. His life was spared and he was sent to Corinth. Five years later he was again in Sicily founding a colony, Cale Acte, on the northern coast, apparently with Syracusan support. Whatever his designs, his death in 440 B.C. cut them short, and with him passed away for ever the national aspirations of the Sicel race. The last appearance of Ducetius had led to a war between Acragas and Syracuse, in which the latter was victorious on the banks of the Himera river (445 B.C.). Syracuse also reduced all the Sicel towns; only Trinacria made any resistance. Syracuse thus became the chief city of Sicily; democracy was firmly established both there and in the other Greek towns. The triumph of this form of government in Sicily is the more curious as the Dorian element was there preponderant, for the (Ionic) Chalcidian element (Naxos, Catane, and Leontini were its chief representatives) had become of little importance. On the contrary, in Greece Proper democracy was identified, not with the Dorian, but with the Ionian element.

^{His Surrender and Retirement.}

^{His Death.}

^{Reduction of Sicel Towns by Syracuse.}

^{Democracies in Sicily.}

CHAPTER XXIII.

PAUSANIAS AND THEMISTOCLES.

§ 177. Sparta after Mycale ; Pausanias at Byzantium ; his Medism ; Mutiny of the Allies against him ; his Recall and Death.—§ 178. Themistocles and the Fortification of Athens and the Peiraeus ; Encouragement of Resident Aliens (Metics).—§ 179. Themistocles Frustrates Attempt of Sparta to Form Continental Empire.—§ 180. Position of Themistocles ; his Ostracism ; his Residence at Argos ; his Proscription, Flight to Asia, and Death. —§ 181. Death of Aristeides.

§ 177. THE Lacedaemonians were unwilling to embroil themselves further with the affairs of Ionia after the battle of Mycale. They proposed to transport the Asiatic Greeks to the territory of the states in Greece Proper which had medised. This proposal was rejected, and the Samians, Chiots, Lesbians, and the other islanders were formally received into the Hellenic League. The united fleet then sailed to the Hellespont, whence Leotychides and the Peloponnesians returned home. The Athenians and the Ionians besieged and took Sestos, the strongest fortress in the Chersonese.

Next year Pausanias commanded the allied fleet. He sailed first to Cyprus to safeguard the southern entrance of the Aegean, and then to Byzantium, which was captured. Here a change came over him ; he entered into negotiations with Xerxes ; in imagination he saw himself already Satrap of with Persia. Greece, and began to act with more than Persian arrogance and brutality. The allies refused to continue

Pausanias
Captures
Byzantium.

His Intrigues
with Persia.

under his command, and called upon Aristeides to assume the leadership. The Spartans indeed recalled Pausanias, and sent out one Dorcis in his place, but the mischief was already done : the allies refused to recognise the Spartan headship.

The Spartans
Lose the Head-
ship of the
Allies.

The remainder of the life of Pausanias was passed in intrigue until it ended in disgrace. He even established himself at Byzantium, but the Athenians and allies expelled him. When he was finally summoned home he intrigued with the Helots. When about to be arrested, he escaped to the temple of Athena of the Brazen House ; as a suppliant he could not be removed, but the door of his chamber was built up, and he was starved to death ; his mother was said to have laid the first stone at the door.

The fall of Pausanias, a mysterious episode, gains importance only for the reason that it involved in ruin a greater man than himself, the greatest man that Greece produced—Themistocles.

Fall of
Pausanias
(about 471 B.C.)

§ 178. After 480 B.C. Themistocles no longer directed the action of Athens abroad ; but at home he was putting the coping-stone to his great work of making Athens the first maritime power of Greece. When the Athenians returned home after the battle of Plataea, Athens was a heap of ruins. If Themistocles could have had his way, the old city should have served but as a quarry for materials for a new city by the sea. This could not be, however, and the first care was for the fortification of Athens on a scale hitherto unseen in Greece ; the new walls had a circuit of about six miles. It was probably the scale of the rebuilding that aroused the jealousy and fears of the Peloponnesians ; the fortifications, the ships, and the terrible activity of the Athenians might well seem evidence of a

—and the Forti-
fication of
Athens.

dangerous ambition. Sparta therefore sent envoys to suggest that all the fortifications in Greece should be razed. A good story was told to illustrate the crooked ways of Themistocles. At his suggestion the envoys were dismissed with the reply that Athens would send an embassy to Sparta to discuss her proposal. Themistocles reached Sparta in advance of his colleagues, who were instructed to tarry until the wall had reached a defensible height ; meantime,

<sup>He Outwits
the Spartans.</sup> the building went on with feverish activity. Rumours of this reached Sparta, and the Ephors, on the advice of Themistocles, sent envoys to Athens to see how matters stood ; these envoys were detained as hostages for the safety of Themistocles and his colleagues. When the long-expected members of the Athenian embassy arrived, Themistocles threw off the mask and asserted the right of Athens to an independent policy.

The fortification of the Peiraic peninsula was next completed. Thus the Athenians now possessed the Peiraean. two fortified towns, the upper city and the harbour town, separated by about five miles of open country. In the course of the next twenty years measures were taken to remedy this unfortunate duality of the Athenian capital.

Themistocles saw that ships would bring empire ; he saw also that the foundations of empire must be laid in commerce. He therefore attracted traders and manufacturers to Athens from all quarters by offering favourable conditions of life to all resident aliens or Metics. These numbered ultimately not less than ten thousand, and apart from the commerce in which they were engaged, were otherwise a source of wealth.

<sup>Their
Condition.</sup> For they were liable to the same burdens as full citizens, but paid a higher property-tax in war-time ; they also paid an annual protection-fee

(*metoecium*). They served chiefly in the fleet, as rowers. It must be borne in mind that Athens was not primarily a conquering state, like Sparta, but a great centre of trade and industry; this fact explains her vitality.

§ 179. While thus giving Athens her outfit as the future mistress of an empire, Themistocles won diplomatic triumphs over Sparta. Sparta had let slip the chance she had of expanding her Peloponnesian Confederacy into an Hellenic Confederacy embracing not only northern Greece, but the Greeks of Asia and the islands. She now tried to retrieve her error by extending her influence on land as a counterpoise to the maritime power of Athens. Leotychides was entrusted with the conquest of Thessaly, but he was bribed by the Aleuad princes to betray the interests of his country (476 B.C.). On his return he was tried and obliged to retire into exile at Tegea, where he died in 469 B.C. The Spartans then attempted to accomplish their designs in another way. In the Amphictionic Council they proposed to expel from this League those states which had either taken the side of the Persians or failed to fight against them. This blow was aimed at the Thessalians, Thebans, and Argives. The proposal was actually in accordance with the oath sworn by the confederates at the Isthmus; nevertheless, Themistocles, representing Athens at the Council, strenuously opposed the measure, pointing to the grave disturbance that would result in the balance of power. Themistocles thus stood forth as the most deadly enemy of Spartan aggrandisement.

§ 180. It was probably through Spartan intrigue that Themistocles was ruined. Cimon, who was now rising into prominence, was a fervid supporter of Sparta. Themis-

Sparta Projects
a Continental Empire.

Her Expedi-
tion against
Thessaly.

Her Attempt
to Coerce the
Amphictionic
League
Frustrated by
Themistocles.

stocles, as an ultra-democrat, was regarded with suspicion by the moderate Aristeides. Lastly, vanity and envy were characteristic of the Greeks, and many on purely personal grounds were ill-disposed to a man who cared

^{Position of} _{Themistocles.} little about offending others. The weak point in the position of Themistocles was that he had not at his back the prestige of a great family or a great political party; his authority was purely personal; his work was in a peculiar sense his own, and he stood really alone in the state. About 473 B.C. a vote

^{His Ostracism.} of ostracism drove Themistocles into banishment. He retired to Argos, where he was even more dangerous to Sparta than in Athens, for Argos

^{His Residence} _{at Argos.} just at this period was recovering from the great defeat inflicted by Cleomenes, and was reasserting her power over the Argolic towns, such as Orneae, Hysiae, and Tiryns, which had availed themselves of that disaster to renounce their allegiance to her; she was also supporting Tegea and the other Arcadian cities in a combination against Sparta. It seemed not unlikely that the genius of Themistocles might effect what Cleomenes in his exile had attempted—a union of Arcadia and the other hostile Peloponnesian states against Sparta. So in the papers of Pausanias the Spartans professed to have found proofs of the complicity of Themistocles in his traitorous schemes; evidence was easily forged when enemies were at once

^{His Pro-} _{scription.} accusers and judges. Themistocles was accused of high treason, but he escaped from Argos before the arrival of the men sent to arrest him. He fled to Corcyra, but the Corcyraeans were afraid to shelter him; he then crossed over to the mainland and threw himself upon the mercy of Admetus, king of the Molossi, who had indeed little reason to befriend him. Admetus

refused to surrender him to his pursuers, and sent him across the mountains to Pydna, in Macedonia ; here he found a merchantman sailing for Ionia, and after a narrow escape from falling into the hands of the Athenian fleet at Naxos, he reached Ephesus (469 B.C.). Some time he remained in hiding in the Ionian towns, ^{His Flight to Asia.} but when in 464 B.C. Xerxes died, and Artaxerxes came to the throne, the exiled statesman went up to Susa. He was received with honour, and made governor of Magnesia on the Maeander, with the revenue of three cities for his maintenance. It is usually said that he engaged to bring Greece under the power of Persia, and necessity may well have driven him to trade upon the ambition of the Persian king. After some years he died a natural death at Magnesia (perhaps 458 B.C.); the story soon became current that in despair at his inability to redeem his promises to the king he committed suicide by drinking bull's blood. ^{His Death}

§ 181. Some years after the fall of Themistocles Aristeides also died (some time after 467 B.C.). He gradually disappears from politics, his fame eclipsed ^{Death of Aristeides.} by that of Cimon. He died perhaps on some public mission in the Pontus. In accordance with the character which had earned him the title of "the Just," he is said to have died so poor as not to have left sufficient to bury him ; there is, however, no more truth in this than in the view of him expressed by Plutarch—that he was a great general, and won the battle of Plataea ! ^{His Title to Fame.} His best title to fame was his work in connection with the Delian League, to the history of which we must now turn.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE DELIAN LEAGUE.

- § 182. Origin, Organisation, and Object of the Delian League.—
- § 183. Cimon's Capture of Eion and Conquest of Scyros.—
- § 184. Coercion of Carystus; Revolt and Reduction of Naxos; Battle of the Eurymedon and Freeing of Greece from Persia; Revolt and Reduction of Thasos.—§ 185. Process of Transformation of the Delian League into an Athenian Empire; Commutation of Ships for Money; Subject Cities; Chest of the League Transferred to Athens.—§ 186. Extent of the Athenian Empire; Assessment-Lists and Quota-Lists.—§ 187. Jurisdiction of Athens: Political Aspect of the Empire.

§ 182. We have seen how in 481 B.C. the Peloponnesian Confederacy expanded into an Hellenic League, which in 479 B.C., after the battle of Mycale, included also certain Ionic cities and Aegean islands; and how Sparta left Athens and the Asiatic Greeks to prosecute the siege of Sestos. This was the origin of the Delian League, and the capture of Sestos in 478 B.C. was its first achievement. In the following year the League formally acknowledged the leadership of Athens. The position of Athens at first was simply that indefinite primacy or "hegemony" which fell naturally to that member of the League which possessed the greatest number of ships and also commanders of acknowledged skill. What towns constituted the original nucleus of the League, we do not know; its growth at first must have been rapid.

From the first it was arranged that some states should

furnish ships, finding also their crews and keeping them in commission during the year, while others should only pay a yearly contribution to the League chest ; the latter class was always the larger of the two, and was ^{The Contribution (φόρος).} always increasing. The contribution or *Phoros* was assessed in the first instance by Aristeides. It was a fortunate thing for Athens that in him she possessed a statesman whose acknowledged integrity secured acquiescence in his decisions. As assessed by him, the yearly contribution amounted to four hundred and sixty talents. This total annual revenue, based upon Aristeides' valuation, ^{Valuation of Aristeides.} was, as a rule, maintained for over forty years, but every four years the individual contributions were revised and re-adjusted. The common chest was placed in the temple of Apollo at Delos ; from the first it was controlled by ten officials called Hellenotamiae, who were Athenians. All the members of the League were sovereign ^{Constitution of the League.} and independent states, each possessing only a single vote in the common assembly at Delos ; Athens, and the other states which contributed ships and men, would of course have most influence upon the deliberations and decisions. The object of the League was to ^{Its Object.} keep the Aegean clear of the Persians, whose fleet always menaced it from Phoenicia, to guarantee the independence of the islands and Asiatic cities, and to raid the king's country. This is all that is known of the constitution of the League in its earliest form ; when, some twenty-three years later, our knowledge becomes fuller, the change has already taken place which converted this League of free states into an Athenian empire over subject allies. The ^{Change to an Athenian Empire.} change was indeed inevitable. The power of Athens preponderated from the beginning ; she was the

chief agent in carrying out the decisions of the synod; soon these decisions came to be but the expression of her individual will.

§ 183. The conduct of the war was in the hands of Cimon, the son of Miltiades; his strength lay in Cimon. his military ability. After driving Pausanias out of Sestos and Byzantium, he captured the Persian fortress at Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon. The name of Boges, its Persian commander, deserves to be held in honour as that of a brave man who preferred death to the surrender of the trust of his royal master. When food was

^{His Capture} gone, he threw his treasure into the Strymon, ^{of Eion.} lighted a funeral pyre, slew wife and children and all his harem, hurled their corpses into the flames and leaped in after them, and so perished (476 B.C.). Doriscus, at the mouth of the Hebrus, was held by Mascames, but it and all the Thracian towns were recovered from the Persians. A small thing, the conquest of the island of Scyrus, brought Cimon great fame (473 B.C.). A grave was found containing the bones of a prehistoric warrior of

^{His Conquest} gigantic stature; they were declared to be those ^{of Scyrus.} of Theseus, which the Oracle of Delphi had bidden the Athenians find and remove to Athens. So with great pomp and enthusiasm the relics of the great Ionic Hero were deposited in a temple, the Theseum, at Athens, and a festival was instituted in his honour. The island was entirely occupied by Athenian cleruchs, so that Athens alone reaped advantage from a conquest undertaken by the League.

§ 184. The clearance of the Aegean benefited all the cities and islands within its basin, and both those which refused to enter the League and those which wished to secede from it incurred the hostility of the allies. The

first case of coercion was that of Carystus, which refused to follow the example of the other Euboean cities and become a member. Carystus was ^{Carystus forced to Join the League.} subjugated and compelled to enter the Delian confederacy (472 B.C.). Three years later the powerful island of Naxos, which had been the last to submit to Persia and the first to throw off her ^{Revolt and Reduction of Naxos.} enforced allegiance, seceded, and was reduced by the allies (469 B.C.). Both Carystus and Naxos by way of penalty forfeited their autonomy ; they lost their ships, paid tribute, and had no voice in the synod ; they became subjects of the League.

The existence of the League was amply justified in 468 B.C., when Xerxes had once more assembled an army and fleet against Greece at the river Eurymedon, in Pamphylia. Cimon appeared at Cnidus with two hundred ships and brought the Carian and Lycian coast-towns within the circle of the League. By his glorious double victory, over the Persian fleet and land-forces, at the Eurymedon he finally freed ^{Battle of the Eurymedon (468 B.C.)} Greece from Persia. Greece from all further danger. The continued existence of the confederacy could only result, therefore, in the completion of the process of transformation which had already begun.

An outspoken expression of the Athenian imperial policy was the war with Thasos, which arose out of the desire of the Athenians to secure the gold-mines and the trade of Thrace (465 B.C.). Cimon defeated the Thasian fleet, but the city surrendered only after a two years' blockade. The Thasians had counted upon Spartan intervention. Athens demanded that they should raze their walls, give up their ships, surrender their claims to the mines and the mainland, and pay a war-indemnity and annual tribute (463 B.C.). ^{Revolt and Reduction of Thasos.} ^{It is made Tributary.}

§ 185. Carystus, Naxos, and Thasos are three typical examples of the methods of Athens in the Aegean. In general, however, the transformation of the League was effected not by definite blows, but into an Empire. by the operation of causes working continuously and quietly, for which Athens was not responsible. From the first, many states adopted the method of commuting ships and men for annual contributions in money, which by no means implied loss of independence, though it certainly involved a practical surrender of control over the direction of active operations. The position of the independent state contributing money and not ships was not improved when there came into existence a class of subject cities paying money which was recognised as tribute, and not as an equivalent for ships. That a state sank from the former into the latter class was the inevitable penalty of revolt; with this went also the imposition of a new burden—the obligation to furnish hoplite contingents to the Athenian armies.

The result was that within the ten years after the reduction of Thasos the process was practically completed; the only surviving free states were the great islands of Chios, Lesbos, and Samos, which still retained their navies and could not be called upon to furnish men or money to

The Chest of Athens. The Delian synod died a natural death, and the seal was set to the change by the (454 B.C.) transference of the chest of the League from the temple of Apollo in Delos to that of Athena in Athens (454 B.C.). In that year the Delian League really came to an end, though official language, refusing to recognise facts, still spoke of the “Allies” (*σύμμαχοι*); but in fact Hegemony (*ἡγεμονία*) had become Empire (*ἀρχή*).

§ 186. The Delian confederacy or Athenian empire was roughly conterminous with the Aegean basin, including the coast on the north and east. From the ^{Extent of} Thracian and Propontine cities to Phaselis in ^{the Empire.} Lycia, the number of subject towns was more than two hundred and fifty. They were divided after 443 B.C. into five geographical districts : (1) Thracian ; (2) Hellespontine ; (3) Ionian, from Assos to Miletus ; (4) Carian, including Rhodes, Cos, and the Lycian cities ; (5) Insular, embracing Lemnos, Imbros, Aegina, Euboea, and nearly all the Cyclades. The duties and rights of each city were regulated by the terms of its treaty with Athens. Athenian garrisons did not, as a rule, occupy <sup>Internal Free-
dom of the
Subject States.</sup> the towns, nor were their constitutions interfered with, except as special opportunity offered of supporting a change in the direction of democracy.

Our information about the empire is largely derived from the extant stone records. These are of two kinds : (1) the so-called Quota-Lists, or lists of the cities drawn <sup>The Quota-
Lists.</sup> up by the thirty Logistae ("accountants") giving the amount paid as "first-fruits" (*ἀπαρχή*) to Athena at the rate of one-sixtieth, or a mina in the talent; fragments of these lists of varying length exist for every year from 454 to 436 B.C., and scraps of those for the years following, down to 425 B.C.; (2) one Assessment-List (*τάξις φόρου*), of the year 425 B.C., giving the full <sup>The Assess-
ment-Lists.</sup> tribute imposed at the general redistribution of the tribute every fourth year by the Athenian Council. It was not until after 437 B.C. that the total annual sum fixed by Aristeides was abandoned, and the tribute raised until it reached six hundred talents yearly. The tribute was paid by the representatives of the states to the Hellenotamiae at the Festival of the Great Dionysia. "Money-collecting

ships" (*ἀργυρολόγου νῆες*) were sent out to gather in arrears. The amount imposed was by no means excessive.

§ 187. The independence of the allies was limited by the jurisdiction of the Athenian courts. Capital of Athens. charges of certain kinds had to be taken to Athens; in civil cases no fixed rule seems to have been imposed. This was regarded as a special hardship, but there is no definite complaint of abuse of jurisdiction or of injustice. It must be remembered, however, that, from the point of view of the ancient Greeks, no material benefits could ever compensate for the loss of absolute freedom of self-direction.

The Empire
an Outrage on
Greek Political
Feeling. The rule of the tyrant, whether individual or city subjects), was a standing outrage upon the political feeling of Hellas. The situation was complicated by the eternal schism between the democratic and the oligarchical parties; the former tending always to attachment to Athens, the latter hating her with a deadly hatred. "The Athenian

The Empire
Democratic. empire was in its essence the alliance of Hellenic democrats against the internal enemy—the oligarchy—which was always conspiring or ready to conspire with the Barbarians";* hence the empire was "the chief product, basis, and perpetuator of democracy in Greece."†

* Whibley, *Political Parties in Athens*, p. 30.

† Greenidge, *Handbook to Greek Constitutional History*, p. 189.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE CONTINENTAL EMPIRE OF ATHENS.

§ 188. Position and Policy of Cimon.—§ 189. Earthquake in Laconia and Revolt of the Messenian Helots; Cimon's Failure at Ithome, and Ostracism; Settlement of the Messenians at Naupactus.—§ 190. War of Athens with Corinth and Aegina; the Expedition to Egypt.—§ 191. War in Boeotia; Battle of Tanagra; Battle of Oenophyta; Conquest of Boeotia; Fall of Aegina.—§ 192. Expeditions to the Corinthian Gulf; The Cities of Achaea Added to the Empire; the Empire at its Greatest Extent.—§ 193. Cimon's Campaign in Cyprus; his Death; End of the War with Persia.—§ 194. Oligarchic Reaction in Boeotia; Battle of Coroneia and Loss of Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris. § 195. Loss of Megara; Revolt and Reduction of Euboea; Collapse of the Athenian Land Empire. § 196. The Thirty Years' Peace.

§ 188. THE foremost man in Athens after the exile of Themistocles and the death of Aristeides was Cimon. His jovial, not too cultivated manners, his generosity, his successes at sea, endeared him to the people, but he came of a family (the Philaidae) which was no friend to democracy—rather one steeped in traditions of autocracy. The descendant of the tyrants of the Chersonese was little likely to go with the tide of democracy, which was rising ever higher in Athens. The cardinal points of his policy were in fact two: the prosecution of war with Persia, and the maintenance of peace with Sparta on the basis of a division of leadership—that Athens should be mistress of the seas, and Sparta leader of the continental Greeks. It was inevitable that as time went on Cimon should find himself left behind by

the mass of the citizens as the exponent of an obsolete and impracticable policy. It was, however, not the intrigues of political opponents, but the colossal folly of the state with which he sympathised, that ruined Cimon and his party.

§ 189. Sparta had in secret prepared to invade Attica when Athens was engaged in the Thasian war; but in a moment the Spartans found themselves brought to the brink of ruin by a terrible disaster. An earth-

Earthquake in Laconia, and Revolt of Messenian Helots (464 B.C.) quake almost totally destroyed their city; and

the Helots of Messenia seized the opportunity to revolt (464 B.C.). The rebels gathered at Ithome, the old stronghold of their race, and defied all efforts to dislodge them. The Spartans were at last compelled to apply for aid to the Athenians, who had a reputation for special skill in the art of attacking fortified places. Cimon espoused their cause with striking metaphor

—“Let us not see Hellas lame,” he cried, “nor Athens deprived of her yoke-fellow.” So four thousand Athenians were sent into Messenia under his command. Ithome baffled their skill, and then the Spartans sent them home

Cimon's Failure at Ithome. without explanation. This insult ruined Cimon.

The alliance with Sparta was repudiated, and alliance was concluded with two of her bitter enemies, Argos and Thessaly. Ostracism sent Cimon into exile (461 B.C.), the immediate cause of it being his opposition to the radical measures carried during his absence at Ithome by Ephialtes and Pericles. Four years after their first occupation of Ithome, the Helots capitulated and were

Messenians Settled at Naupactus. allowed to leave the Peloponnes unharmed on condition of never returning. The Athenians

received the homeless fugitives and placed them at Naupactus, a town near the entrance of the Corinthian gulf, recently taken from the Ozolian Locrians. Athens

thus struck not only at Sparta, but at Corinth, whose merchantmen she could now annoy ; the establishment of an Athenian naval station at Naupactus must be reckoned as the first of that series of grievances which brought about the Peloponnesian war. The war between Sparta and her Helots is sometimes called the Third Messenian war.

§ 190. Another opportunity soon came of interfering in Peloponnesian affairs. Megara quarrelled with Corinth, seceded from the Peloponnesian League, and appealed to Athens for succour. Alliance with Megara would give Athens control of the "bridge of the sea," and troops were at once sent to garrison the two Megarian ports—Nisaea, on the Saronic gulf, and Pegae, "Long Walls" on the Corinthian gulf. Two "long walls" of Megara were built to connect the town of Megara with Nisaea, and thus block the eastern coast-road (460—459 B.C.). "This," says Thucydides, "was the main cause of the intense hatred which the Corinthians felt towards the Athenians." Athens followed out the policy thus initiated, of securing full control of the Saronic gulf, by occupying Halieis near the south point of Argolis, but she seems to have been driven thence by Epidaurus and Corinth (458 B.C.), though she conquered the enemy's fleet at Cecryphaleia, a small island between Aegina and Argolis. This marks the beginning of the Hellenic war, or first war of the Peloponnesians with Athens.

The victory of Athens compelled Aegina to bestir herself ; the moment was favourable, as the Athenian fleet was weakened by the absence of two hundred ships in Egypt. After an obstinate fight off Aegina Athens remained the victor, with seventy captured vessels. Aegina was then blockaded. The Corinthians

Megara Won
by Athens.

Battle of
Halieis—

—and of Cecry-
phaleia.

Blockade of
Aegina.

tried to create a diversion by falling upon the Megarid, but they had not estimated aright the spirit animating the Athenians in this wonderful year. Not a man was withdrawn from the blockade, but the oldest and youngest citizens were called out for service under Myronides, a general who had distinguished himself in the Persian war. Both sides claimed the victory in the battle which ensued, but the Corinthians retired first. Twelve days afterwards, smarting

Victories of Myronides in the Megarid. under the reproaches of their fellow-citizens, they returned, this time to be decisively defeated by

Myronides, who issued from Megara. Brilliant as were the achievements of Athens on the waters and shores of the Saronic gulf, it was a fatal mistake that her forces should have been divided at this moment of conflict ; neither in Egypt nor in the Peloponnese was she able to win a decisive success.

The expedition to Egypt was one of the most important enterprises ever undertaken by the city ; its

Expedition to Egypt. parallel is the Syracusan expedition. Egypt had revolted under Inaros, a Libyan prince, upon the death of Xerxes (464 B.C.). The Athenian fleet in the Levant

Capture of Memphis. went to his aid and captured Memphis, with the exception of the White Fort, where for two years the remnant of the Persians held out (459 B.C.) We have the grave-stone containing the names of the 168 members of a single Tribe (Erechtheis) who fell in this feverish year 459-8 B.C., "in Cyprus, in Egypt, in Phoenicia, at Halieis, in Aegina, at Megara, in the same year."

§ 191. In 457 B.C. the Spartans took the field with a large army, ostensibly to succour the Dorians of northern Greece against the Phocians, in reality to assist Thebes in the subjugation of Boeotia in order to create a power north of the Isthmus

Lacedaemonian Expedition to Doris and Boeotia.

that might check Athens. It was easy to get into Boeotia, but not so easy to return, for Athens strengthened her posts on Mount Geraneia, and her ships cruised vigilantly in the two gulfs. The Lacedaemonians encamped at Tanagra, on the borders of Attica ; whether true or false, the idea gained ground in Athens that they were in collusion with the oligarchs, and that a *coup de main* was contemplated. The Athenians resolved to forestall the blow. They marched to Tanagra fourteen hundred strong ; as soon as the border had been crossed, Cimon appeared, asking to be allowed to fight in the ranks of his Tribe. His request was refused, but he called upon his friends to clear his and their own names of all suspicion of disloyalty by their conduct in the action. One hundred of them went into battle, but when the day was done they all lay on the bloody field ; this paved the way for Cimon's recall. The battle of Tanagra, the first in which Spartans and Athenians met in conflict since the time when Cleomenes had tried to expel Cleisthenes fifty years before, was won by the Lacedaemonians ; their Thessalian allies deserted the Athenians during the action. The Lacedaemonians made good their retreat into the Peloponnese, but Boeotia was left exposed to reprisals. Sixty-two days after the battle the Athenians were again in Boeotia under Myronides, and a decisive battle was fought at Oenophyta, near Tanagra, which left all Boeotia except Thebes at the feet of Athens. Phocis also joined her alliance, together with the Opuntian Locrians. About the same time Troezen, an important station on the eastern coast of Argolis, joined the Athenian alliance. To crown all, the Aeginetans capitulated and agreed to give up their ships and pay tribute ; at last the "eyesore

Battle of
Tanagra.

Cimon's
Patriotism.

Battle of
Oenophyta
(457 B.C.).

Conquest of
Boeotia :
Alliance with
Phocis, Locris,
Troezen.

Fall of Aegina.

of the Peiraeus" was removed, and the proud island, so long a foe, was defenceless.

§ 192. Athens was not equally fortunate in Egypt, where the tide of success turned in 456 B.C. Two years later the Greeks were compelled to burn their ships to prevent their

^{Athenian Reverses in Egypt.} seizure by the Persians, and were themselves driven to surrender at last to the Persian general Megabyzus.

He allowed them to march across the desert to Cyrene, whence a few war-worn fugitives reached their homes again. Unfortunately an Athenian reinforcement of fifty ships, being in ignorance of the collapse of the revolt, sailed up the Nile and was utterly annihilated. Inaros was crucified. This was the sorry ending of the Egyptian undertaking.

In Greece itself fortune continued to smile. Tolmides cruised round the Peloponnese ravaging and conquering (455 B.C.); the Lacedaemonian dockyards at Gythium were burnt; Chalcis, a Corinthian post on the Aetolian shore,

^{Pericles' Attempt on Oeniadae.} was captured. In 453 B.C. the great imperialist statesman Pericles was also in the Corinthian

gulf, attempting, though in vain, to reduce the important town of Oeniadae, in Acarnania. The object was to deprive Corinth of her western trade route, and to make

^{Acquisition of the Cities of Achaea.} the Corinthian gulf, like the Saronic, an Athenian lake; but this was never completely

accomplished. One effect of this expedition was that the cities of Achaea were added to the Athenian empire.

The Athenian empire had now reached its greatest extent; it was at once maritime and continental. At sea the Athenian navy was supreme

^{The Empire at its Greatest Extent.} from the Black Sea to the Levant; on land Athens controlled all Greece from Thermopylae to the

Isthmus. Her enemies were impotent. She had now need of peace at home to enable her to restore her damaged prestige in the East. The negotiation of a Five Years' Truce with Sparta was not the least of the many services which the Athenians owed to Cimon (450 B.C.).

§ 193. In 449 B.C. the great admiral sailed with two hundred ships on his last expedition, to protect Cyprus. He laid siege to Citium, but died of disease during the operations. For thirty years he had led his countrymen to victory, and victory hovered round his corpse, for, raising the siege, the Athenians gained a double success—over the Persian fleet off Salamis on the east of the island, and over the army drawn up on shore. Cimon died at the moment at which his work was done; the long struggle now ceased, for all true Hellenic cities were free of the “barbarians”; only in Cyprus was a decisive issue impossible. The Phoenicians gained the upper hand, but after many years Hellenic civilisation here experienced a resurrection.

It is a vexed question whether the war was concluded by actual treaty. Some maintain that the so-called Peace of Cimon or Peace of Callias is a fiction of Athenian rhetoricians; even some of the ancients themselves had doubts as to its authenticity. Probably the two powers did arrange a *modus vivendi* after Cimon's death. The Persians engaged not to send ships of war into Greek waters, the Athenians not to prosecute aggressive warfare; both agreed to let the question of supremacy on the Asiatic coast and over the islands drop, without prejudice to their respective claims. The arrangement resembled that of the

Five Years'
Truce with
Sparta.

Cimon in
Cyprus.

His Death.

Double Victory
of the
Athenians.

Greeks and
Phoenicians
in Cyprus.

End of the War
with Persia.

Nature of the
Arrangement
made with
Persia.

truce with Sparta; it was a postponement of the questions at issue until a time more convenient for one or the other party came. Subsequently it was represented as a humiliating Peace by which the Great King was only too glad to purchase immunity from further losses; this view was so far true that Athens was actually in possession of the towns and islands to which the Persians laid claim.

§ 194. The Athenian land empire collapsed with truly

Oligarchical Revolt in Boeotia. alarming rapidity. Boeotia was the weak spot.

Exiled oligarchs seized Orchomenos and Chaeroneia in the north-west. Tolmides hurriedly took the field with only one thousand volunteers and some auxiliaries. On his march back from Chaeroneia (which he recaptured) he was attacked by the enemy coming from Orchomenos, and destroyed near Coroneia; the survivors of the battle

Battle of Coroneia (447 B.C.). were made prisoners, and the evacuation of all Boeotia was the price at which they were released (447 B.C.). The loss of Boeotia involved

Loss of Boeotia, Locris, and Phocis. that of Locris and Phocis; thus one day saw the bounds of Athenian power removed from Thermopylae to Cithaeron.

§ 195. The oligarchical movement which thus triumphed in Central Greece spread in widening circle eastwards and

Revolt of Euboea. southwards. Euboea, an ally for thirty years, revolted (446 B.C.). No sooner had Pericles landed in the island than a rising occurred in Megara; the Athenian garrison in the town was cut to pieces, but the survivors held Pegae and Nisaea. The troops of three Tribes went into the Megarid under Andocides, but before Pericles, who had returned at once, could join him, a Lacedaemonian army under Pleistoanax was between the two forces. Andocides succeeded in getting into Boeotia, and so back into Attica. Pleistoanax advanced no further than

Eleusis. He and his adviser Cleandridas were afterwards condemned on a charge of having been bribed to withdraw. Whatever the reason for their retirement, it left Pericles free to deal with Euboea. With fifty ships and five thousand hoplites he reduced the island. The people of Histiaeum were expelled, and their land was distributed among Attic cleruchs, and a new settlement, Oreos, took the place of Histiaeum. The whole island was reduced to the position of a tribute-paying subject without ships, and its towns retained only qualified autonomy.

§ 196. The impression produced on the Athenians by this wholesale defection of allies and subjects is reflected in the revision of the tribute which was made in 446-5 B.C. Many states had their tribute reduced. The approaching termination of the Five Years Truce added to the anxieties of the Athenians. It was felt that at all costs terms must be made with Sparta. In the winter of 446 B.C., therefore, a Thirty Years' Peace was concluded between the two cities, on the following terms: the Athenians renounced all their Peloponnesian possessions—Pegae, Nisaea, Troezen, and Achaea; for the rest, each city retained what it had. Neither city was to receive into alliance an ally of the other; but any city that was independent of both might join whichever of the two it pleased. Differences between the two parties to the peace were to be settled by arbitration.

Its Reduction
by Pericles.
(446 B.C.).

Cleruchies in
Euboea.

Revision of
Tribute.

The Thirty
Years' Peace
(446 B.C.).

CHAPTER XXVI.

ATHENS UNDER PERICLES.

§ 197. Ephialtes and Pericles.—§ 198. Limitation of the Powers of the Areiopagus and of the Archons.—§ 199. Payment of the Dicasteries; its Effects.—§ 200. Opposition to the Policy of Pericles; its Collapse; Ideal of Pericles.—§ 201. The Buildings of Pericles: Athena Promachos; the Parthenon; the Middle Long Wall; the Peiraeus.—§ 202. Pericles the Ruler of Athens; his Political Position.—§ 203. Revolt of Samos; its Reduction by Pericles; Peloponnesian Intervention Discussed at Sparta.—§ 204. Extension of Athenian Influence in the Pontus and in Thrace; Foundation of Amphipolis.—§ 205. Athenian Competition with Corinth in the West; Foundation of Thurii.

§ 197. OUR knowledge of the internal history of Athens between the Persian wars and the end of the Hellenic war (450 B.C.) is fragmentary. In spirit the constitution became more democratic under the influence of Themistocles; and in form also the sovereignty of the people was more and more fully expressed. The mantle of the dead democratic leaders fell first upon the shoulders of the “incorruptible” Ephialtes, and when he was struck down, shortly after

^{Murder of} Cimon's ostracism, by the knife of a Boeotian ^{Ephialtes.} assassin, who was perhaps the tool of the enraged Areiopagites, it descended upon Pericles. Pericles was then about thirty years old. His father was Xanthippus, his mother Agariste, niece of Cleisthenes the Reformer, so that ^{Pericles.} he was connected with the Alcmaeonidae, that family which for weal or woe played so large a part in Athenian history. These two men, Ephialtes

and Pericles, carried to a conclusion the work of Solon, Cleisthenes, and the three statesmen of the Persian wars.

§ 198. The period is marked by two changes of vital moment: the limitation of the powers of the Areiopagus, and the extension of the principle of payment for public services.

Under the Solonian constitution the Areiopagus was "the overseer of all things, and the guardian of the laws." How it was affected by the reforms of Cleisthenes is unknown. Later, the institution of ostracism must have limited its most important political function, the protection of the state against tyranny. As it was composed of ex-Archons, and the Archons were drawn from the two richest classes, it must have been a conservative body. Its influence revived about the time of the invasion of Xerxes. We know less of the history and functions of the Areiopagus than of any other element of the Athenian constitution.

When Cimon was in Messenia (462 B.C.), Ephialtes destroyed the power of the Areiopagus; its functions passed to the Council of Five Hundred, the Ecclesia, and the law-courts; nothing remained to it except jurisdiction in cases of intentional homicide of citizens, and the care of the sacred olive-trees of Athena. It was restricted to those religious and ceremonial functions which had belonged to it from antiquity. It still continued to be composed of ex-Archons, whose seat on it was for life, and it was still irresponsible within the narrow limits of its jurisdiction.

The changes connected with the archonship reacted upon the Areiopagus. The archonship became a paid office to which men of the third class, the Zeugitae, were eligible; in time even Thetes were not

excluded. Further, the Archons were chosen by lot directly from all eligible citizens, the preliminary election of candidates being abolished (see p. 192).

§ 199. The direct employment of the lot, without the precaution of preliminary election of candidates, is characteristic of this period; even more characteristic is the wholesale introduction of payment for public service. It was, in fact, useless to throw open office to the poorer citizens if the necessity of working for a living compelled them to decline the chance of the lot. Pay was therefore introduced not only for the Archons, but for the members of the Council of Five Hundred.

Of far-reaching consequences was the introduction by Pericles of payment for service in the law-courts. Popular jurisdiction was a creation of Solon, but it was the downfall of the Areiopagus that made the popular Importance of courts (Dicasteries) and the Council the most the Dicasteries important factors in the constitution; the judicial competence of the magistrates became ever more restricted. The power of the courts lay in the fact that from their verdict there was no appeal; their weakness lay in the absence of any trained judicial element, the jurors being both judge and jury, possessing only an amateur knowledge of law, and so being really at the mercy of the most persuasive speaker. As every citizen could sit as juror, payment was necessary to enable all to exercise the right; but the evils attendant upon the development of popular judicature were inherent in the system, and were

Effect of the Payment of the Dicasteries. not due to the introduction of pay. The pay was, in fact, a most miserable pittance—either one or two obols a day! The fee was no compensation for service rendered, but a grant in aid to enable

the service to be performed at all. Too frequently the whole system of payment is criticised as though Athens was filled with an idle rabble living in fatness upon state money. The fee offered could not compete with the average wages of labour. Even when it was raised in 425 B.C. to three obols a day, that was only the rate for service in the fleet, and only half the rate for hoplite service in the field.

The most false of all the criticisms of the action of Pericles is that which regards the system as mere bribery—a political manoeuvre to counteract the influence of the wealthy Cimon by “giving the masses their own property.” This charge is part of the wider charge brought against democracy in its entirety by the rich, upon whom fell various burdens, or Liturgies, which in Athens took the place of taxes upon income; such were the Trier-^{Liturgies.} archy or equipment of warships, the Choregia or charges for the training and outfit of tragic or comic choruses.


§ 200. Not only did the oligarchs hate the democracy, but they had also no love for the empire with which it was so closely connected. They were ^{Oligarchic} _{Opposition to} _{Pericles.} bitter foes of the imperialism of Pericles.

Although the cause of the allies became a party cry, there was one statesman whose advocacy of it was thoroughly honest Cimon's son-in-law, Thucydides, the son of Melesias, fiercely attacked the expenditure of tribute upon public buildings in Athens as a malversation of funds; but this was the last open effort of the opposition. In a resort to ostracism in 442 B.C., the community sided with Pericles, who was henceforth given a free hand in carrying out his great programme. His ideal was to make Athens the Queen of Hellas, a centre of light and leading, the “school of ^{Ideal of Pericles.} Greece.” It was a sign of this ambition that in 448 B.C.,

before the loss of Boeotia, he invited the Greek states to send representatives to a Panhellenic Congress to be held in Athens to discuss measures for the restoration of the temples destroyed by the Persians. The scheme did not come to anything, though Athens under Proposed Pan-hellenic Congress. the direction of Pericles carried out alone her share in the work in a way which has made all the world her debtor.

§ 201. One of the earliest monuments of this period was the "great bronze Athena," called in later times "Athena Promachos." Athena Promachos (the "Champion"), in the open air at the western end of the Acropolis. It commemorated the victory over the Persians. The sunlight flashing from the helmet and spear-point towering thirty feet was visible for miles to sailors coming up the coast from Sunium. The great glory of the Acropolis was the new temple called the Parthenon, in which stood the colossal image of Athena, of wood, gold, and ivory—gold for the raiment, ivory for the exposed parts of the body, in the style called chryselephantine; in her right hand was poised a golden figure of Pheidias. Victory. This statue was the work of the sculptor Pheidias, who wrought also a wondrous statue of Zeus in the temple at Olympia.

The buildings of the Periclean age form a most important chapter in the history of art. Provision was made for mercantile and military needs also. About The "Long Walls" (458 B.C.) 458 B.C. the upper city had been united with the harbour town by the building of two "long walls," the The Middle Long Wall (444 B.C.) northern one going down to the Peiraeus, the other to the eastern side of the bay of Phalerum. The space enclosed was very great, and the base of the triangle was open to the sea. About 444 B.C.



ATHENS AND HER PORTS.

a third or "middle wall" was built, about two hundred yards south of the northern line and parallel to it; thereafter the wall to Phalerum was allowed to fall into decay. At the Peiraeus itself store-houses and various conveniences for traders were built, and ship-sheds for the war-vessels which protected the commercial sea routes. Athens was heiress of the commerce of Ionia, which had almost died out; the centre of commercial and political gravity was now in eastern Greece.

§ 202. Pericles was undisputed leader, and indeed master, of Athens during the twelve years following the ostracism of Thucydides (442 B.C.). Though he was as absolute as any tyrant, his position was constitutional; his power depended upon his annual re-election to the Board of the Ten Strategi, and upon his personal influence with his colleagues and the people. Nominally all the Strategi possessed equal powers, and they were now the chief executive magistrates in Athens, with the right to summon the Assembly, supreme over the conduct of foreign affairs and over all the forces of the state, both military and naval.

§ 203. The chief event of the period of the Thirty Years' Peace was the revolt of Samos (440 B.C.), which arose out of a dispute between Samos and Miletus concerning Priene. Miletus appealed to Athens, for both states belonged to the Athenian League or Empire; but the oligarchs of Samos sought help of the Persian Satrap at Sardis. Pericles quickly sailed with sixty ships; one of his colleagues was Sophocles, the tragedian. When a reinforcement of forty ships arrived from Athens, and of twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, Samos was blockaded by land and sea. It was reported that the Persian fleet was approaching, and Pericles withdrew most of his ships

to the Carian coast, so that for a short time the blockade was raised. Squadron after squadron came from Athens until at last no fewer than two hundred ships were blockading Samos. In the ninth month the town surrendered (439 B.C.).^{Its Surrender (439 B.C.)} The Samians agreed to pull down their walls, surrender their ships, pay a war indemnity of fifteen hundred talents, and to give hostages; they were not made tributary, but were required to furnish troops on demand. Byzantium also had seized the opportunity to revolt, but the fall of Samos convinced her that resistance was hopeless; her tribute was raised.

Thus a moment of grave peril had passed. If Chios or Lesbos, or an enemy nearer home, had seized this opportunity to declare war, it might have gone hard with Athens. And in fact the latter contingency had been all but realised; for Sparta and her allies had discussed the question of war, and the Corinthians afterwards claimed to have saved Athens by setting their faces against intervention.^{Threatened Peloponnesian Intervention.} If Corinth really did prevent hostile action on the part of the Peloponnesians, she must later on bitterly have regretted her short-sighted policy; for the war which she afterwards stirred up in order to ruin the commercial supremacy of Athens ruined only herself.

§ 204. The victory over Samos was followed by an extension of Athenian influence in the north. The region of the Pontus was in fact of vital importance to Athens, as she looked thither for the corn, fish, and timber, which meant life for her crowded town. Here, as in so much that he did, Pericles only followed the lines laid down by the Peisistratidae who, in Sigeium and the Chersonese, had secured for Athens the control of the outer doorway of the Pontus. Pericles appeared in the Pontus at the head of a great squadron as a

demonstration of Athenian might. Sinope was visited, and probably also the headquarters of the grain trade — Panticapaeum on the Cimmerian Bosphorus; at any rate, the rulers of that town were afterwards loyal friends of the Athenians.

Of importance scarcely inferior to that of the Pontus ^{Pericles Extends Athenian Influence there.} was the northern coast of the Aegean. Just at this time the Thracian tribes had been united


^{Athenian Policy in Thrace.} in a powerful kingdom by Teres and his son Sitalces. Pericles was thus constrained to renew the attempt to get possession of the lower Strymon. Athens already possessed the fortified place of Eion at the mouth of the river, but she desired also to control the trade route which crossed the river about three miles higher up, at Ennea Hodoi ("Nine Ways"), as well as the passage into the interior along the stream. Ten thousand colonists under Leagros sent out in the time of Cimon had all been massacred at

^{Foundation of Drabescus by the Thracians (465 B.C.) Now Amphipolis.} Pericles sent out Hagnon (436 B.C.), and a city was founded just at the point where the river issuing from the hills makes a great bend open to the east. The town was called Amphipolis, a curious coinage to express the fact that on three sides it was surrounded by the stream. In after time Amphipolis was destined to be a cause of

^{Its Future History} much sorrow to the Athenians, for, probably from their admixture with alien elements, the colonists and their descendants lost all sense of their connection with Athens and became bitterly hostile to her.

§ 205. The second commercial city in Greece Proper at this time, next to Athens, was Corinth; and ^{Competition of Athens with Corinth for Trade in the West.} Corinth, now practically ousted from the Aegean, was beginning also to feel the effects of Athenian competition in the west. Under the inspiration

of Pericles Athens established the colony of Thurii, near the site of the ancient Sybaris destroyed by the Crotoniats, as a centre of Athenian influence in Magna ^{Foundation of} Graecia. Hippodamus, the architect of the ^{Thurii.} Peiraeus, had a free hand in designing the new city. The most famous of the colonists was the "Father of History," Herodotus, who, born on the eastern confines of the Greek world, at Halicarnassus in Caria (perhaps about 485 B.C.), and settled for long in the central city of Greece, the home of letters and art, went to spend the evening of his life in this western outpost of Ionic civilisation (443 B.C.).



CHAPTER XXVII.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (FIRST PERIOD).

206. Origin of the War; Position of Corcyra; the Quarrel of Epidamnus and Corcyra; Alliance between Corcyra and Athens; War of Corinth with Corcyra; Battle of Sybota.—§ 207. Revolt of Potidaea and Decree against Megara.—§ 208. Congress of the Allies at Sparta; they Decide on War.—§ 209. The Theban Attack on Plataea.—§ 210. The Allies on both sides; Strategy of Pericles.—§ 211. First and Second Invasions of Attica.—§ 212. Blockade and Capture of Plataea.—§ 213. The War in Western Greece; Phormion's Victories.—§ 214. Revolt, Blockade, and Fall of Mytilene; Debate upon the Fate of the Mytilenaeans; Resolutions of Cleon and Diodotus; Fate of Mytilene.—§ 215. The Revolution in Corcyra; Victory of the Democrats aided by Athens.—§ 216. Failure of Demosthenes in Aetolia; he Saves Naupactus; Battle of Olpae.—217. Demosthenes Fortifies Pylus; Spartans Isolated in Sphacteria.—§ 218. Negotiations for Peace; Cleon Sent to Pylus; Capture of Sphacteria; Nicias Takes Cythera; End of the Aeginetans.—§ 219. Athenians Capture Nisaea.—§ 220. Failure of Athenian Attack on Boeotia; Battle of Delium.—§ 221. Brasidas in Thrace; he Captures Amphipolis; Exile of Thucydides.—§ 222. Successes of Brasidas in Chalcidice; Truce for One Year.—§ 223. Operations in Thrace; Cleon Sent to Chalcidice; Battle of Amphipolis; Death of Cleon and Brasidas. § 224. Peace of Nicias.—§ 225. Corinth, Boeotia, and Megara Refuse to Recognise it; Alliance between Athens and Sparta.

206. It was a question of commercial expansion that kindled the great war for which the fuel had been accumulating in the shape of hate and envy during the fifty years that followed the war with Persia. Corinthian commerce was hampered by the hostility of her colony, Corcyra, which had emancipated itself from the sentimental

ties which united colony and mother-city. The Corinthian tyrants had reduced the island to dependence,
^{Position of}
^{Corcyra.} but after Periander's death it was again lost.

By establishing colonies on the Acarnanian coast (Anactorium, Leucas, Ambracia), the Corinthians tried to break the Corcyrean monopoly in the western seas. By 480 B.C. Corcyra had a fleet of 120 ships; Athens alone had more. The island stood aloof from Greek politics, and nothing is known of it from the time of the flight of Themistocles until 435 B.C., when it was obliged to abandon its policy of isolation, for in that year the "Corinthian war" broke

^{Quarrel of}
^{Epidamus}
^{and Corcyra.} out between Corcyra and Corinth. Epidamus, an offshoot from Corcyra, had appealed to her for aid against her oligarchs, who had been expelled

by the democrats. Corcyra refused to interfere, and Epidamus then appealed to Corinth. Corcyra objected to Corinthian intervention, and in a fight off Actium

^{Corinth Aids}
^{Epidamus}
^{and is Defeated}
^{by Corcyra.} eighty Coreyraean ships defeated seventy-five Corinthian. The Coreyraeans also seized Epidamus. The remainder of that year, and the whole of the next (434 B.C.), was employed by the Corinthians in making preparations for a decisive campaign. Corinth was supported by the Peloponnesian states, but Corcyra stood alone; she felt that she must abandon her

^{Application by}
^{Corcyra to Join}
^{the Athenian} policy of non-alliance, and sought to join the Athenian confederacy. The rights of the case

^{League.} as between Corcyra and Corinth did not concern Athens; the only question for her was as to what an alliance with Corcyra implied, and whether it was politic to accept her proposals. The terms of the Thirty Years' Peace allowed both Athens and Sparta to receive into alliance states which were allies of neither party, but this did not cover the case in which the state seeking alliance

at war with the other party or with one of her allies. Corcyraean alliance was indubitably bound to lead to ^{aggressive} action against Corinth in defiance of the treaty 446 B.C. Athens sought to safeguard herself by making ^{Defensive} ^{Alliance} ^{between Athens and Corcyra—} a defensive alliance with Corcyra, but it was merely a formal concession to the ^{atenian} peace-party. The cogent argument Pericles and the war-party was that acceptance of alliance did not really alter the situation, for war ^{of no Benefit} ^{to Athens.} h the Peloponnesian League was inevitable and the struggle imminent, so that it would be folly to lose the chance of securing the Corcyraean fleet. Yet, judging from her past history, Corcyra was not likely benefit greatly any state that entered into alliance with her, and as a matter of fact Athens derived benefit whatever from her. The defensive alliance was included, and the Athenian ships saved the Corcyraean fleet from annihilation by the great ^{Battle of Sybota (433 B.C.)} attainment of the Corinthians, which, in the autumn of 433 B.C., defeated the Corcyraeans in a battle at the islet of Sybota.

§ 207. Athens also widened the breach with Corinth her action in the Chalcidic peninsula, where Potidaea, on the isthmus of Pallene, was at once a Corinthian colony and a tributary ally ^{Athenian Action in Chalcidice.} Athens. Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, was hostile to Athens; and as Potidaea was strongly fortified and was under Corinthian influence, the Athenians apprehended danger. Upon the demand that she should raze her northern wall, give hostages, and break off her relations with Corinth, Potidaea revolted, and after a defeat was blockaded by sea and land (autumn, 32 B.C.) ^{Revolt of Potidaea.}

Athens had special cause for bitterness against Megara. Closing of the Ports of the Empire against Megara for her treachery in 447 B.C. Megara had also assisted Corinth at the battle of Sybota. A decree was therefore passed excluding the Megarians from the ports and markets of the Athenian empire (432 B.C.): at one stroke Megara was ruined.

§ 208. The cup was now full, and the members of the Spartan confederacy assembled at Sparta and formally charged the Athenians with a breach of the Thirty Years' Peace. It was necessary to bring the Spartans to this view in order that war might be declared. Archidamus, one of the kings, advised delay; but the Ephors belonged to the war-party, and chiefly among them Sthenelaidas. Mainly, however, the Spartans were influenced by the attitude of Corinth, for she was the most powerful of their allies; so the Spartans decided that the Athenians had broken the peace. After passing this vote the Spartans consulted the Delphic oracle, and received a favourable reply. Then (autumn, 432 B.C.) the representatives of the states of the confederacy were summoned to a second Assembly, and a majority declared for war; but They Decide nearly a whole year passed in preparation on War. before Attica was invaded. In the meantime embassies were sent to Athens, in order to gain time and put Athens more clearly in the wrong.

§ 209. In the early spring of 431 B.C., before war actually began, three hundred Thebans entered Plataea on Plataea (March, 431 B.C.) by night, and for a moment held possession of the town. The Theban army did not arrive in time to support them, and the Plataeans, becoming aware of the smallness of their numbers, overpowered them. The Thebans afterwards said that the Plataeans promised to set their prisoners free when their territory was evacuated; but

as soon as the army had gone, and the Plataeans had got in their movables from the country, the men, 180 in number, were slain ; the Athenian message bidding the Plataeans do no violence to their prisoners arrived just too late. Athenian troops were sent to put Plataea in a state of defence ; the women, children, and other non-combatants were removed to Athens.

§ 210. The Plataean affair was a glaring violation of the Thirty Years' Peace, and removed all hope ^{Feelings of the Greeks.} of averting the war by mutual concessions. All Hellas was excited by the coming struggle between her two chief cities ; sympathy was in general with Sparta, who posed as the champion of Hellenic freedom. "Their respective allies were as follows : The Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the Peloponnesians, with the exception of the Argives and the Achaeans—they were both neutral ; only the Achaeans of Pellene took part with ^{The Allies of Sparta—} the Lacedaemonians at first ; afterwards all the Achaeans joined them. Beyond the borders of the Peloponnes, the Megarians, Phocians, Locrians, Boeotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians were their allies. Of these the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians provided a navy ; the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry ; the other states only infantry. The allies of the Athenians were Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania, ^{—and of Athens} Corcyra, Zacynthus, and cities in many other countries which were their tributaries. There was the maritime region of Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian coast, the islands that lie to the east within the line of the Peloponnes and Crete, including all the Cyclades, with the exception of

Melos and Thera. Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra furnished a navy; the rest, land-forces and money."* The strategy of Pericles in the war was expressed in his advice to the people—"let us give up lands and houses, but keep a watch over the city and the sea"; "defend the walls, but do not go out to battle; equip the fleet, in which lies

War Policy of your strength; keep the allies well in hand."

Pericles.

Thus the war during its earlier stage became a series of raids into Attica, with counter-raids upon the Peloponnesians; Pericles hoped in a few years to exhaust his enemies by the futility of their own efforts to overcome a city which, being mistress of the seas, was invulnerable to the attacks of a continental confederacy.

§ 211. In May, 431 B.C., Archidamus invaded Attica for

First Invasion of Attica (May, 431 B.C.) the first time, with a levy of two-thirds of the forces of the Peloponnesians. From the Isthmus

he sent Melesippus to Athens, if haply submission would be made at the eleventh hour; but his envoy was refused admission to the city. He was escorted to the frontier, and as he turned to depart he uttered these impressive words: "This day will be to the Hellenes the beginning of great sorrows." The Aeginetans experienced

Aegina becomes Athenian. their truth, for they were now entirely cleared out of the island, which was henceforth occupied by Athenian cleruchs; the exiles were settled by

Sparta in the Thyreatis. Next year the Second Invasion of Attica (430 B.C.) Peloponnesian invasion was repeated, and the

crowding of the people of Attica into Athens aggravated the terrible visitation of the plague which

The Plague at Athens. broke out that summer. The plague was said to have travelled gradually from Ethiopia; it baffled all the resources of medical science. The visitation

* *Thuc.*, ii. 9, Jowett's translation.

had a terrible effect upon the *morale* of the people ; Athens, in fact, never recovered her old tone, and her population was permanently reduced. Plague ^{Its Effect on Athena.} also raged at about this time (436—432 B.C.) in Rome, and the conjecture has been made that it was brought both to Rome and Athens from Carthage through the commercial intercourse between the cities. Athens suffered from it four years, but never so much as during the first year. It was some compensation that this winter saw the fall of Potidaea, which had held out desperately for two years ; the siege cost the Athenians two thousand talents, and did much to ruin their finances, upon which Pericles had counted to carry them through the war. For a moment Pericles lost his hold over the people ; their accumulated sufferings were too much for them, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to come to terms with Sparta. Pericles was suspended in his office as General, tried for misappropriation of funds, and fined (July, 430 B.C.) ; presently, however, he was re-elected Strategos when the gust of passion had passed. He ruled Athens ^{Attacks on Pericles.} for one more year, and died in the autumn of 429 B.C. His last years were years of sorrow ; his enemies attacked his friends—Pheidias, who had glorified the Acropolis, was accused of embezzlement of treasure, and condemned ; Anaxagoras was fined and driven from the city for his philosophy, which was branded as impiety ; the cruellest blow of all was the attack upon the brilliant and gifted Aspasia of Miletus, whom Pericles had married despite a law he had himself introduced declaring the offspring of mixed marriages illegitimate. Pericles also lost by the plague his two legitimate sons, but his son by Aspasia was legitimised by public decree ; he bore

his father's name, and was fated to die some twenty-three years later by decree of the same democratic Assembly.

§ 212. The third year of the war (429 B.C.) was marked by the attack of the confederates upon Plataea. As long as Plataea remained loyal to Athens, communication between Boeotia and the Peloponnese by land was difficult. Relying upon promised Athenian support, the little garrison, consisting of four hundred Plataeans and eighty Athenians, refused the overtures of Archidamus, and the siege began. Every art was exhausted; at the end of the year the siege became a blockade; a double wall was built, with quarters for the investing force, half of which was Boeotian, between the two lines; the town was absolutely cut off from the outside world, and the Athenians sent no help. For a year the garrison held out, and then (winter, 428 B.C.) 212 men took their lives in their hands and made a wonderful escape over the enemies' double wall and trenches, and reached Athens safely. A few months latter (summer of 427 B.C.)

<sup>Its Surrender
and Destruction</sup> the remnant of the defenders was obliged to surrender at discretion—two hundred Plataeans (427 B.C.)

and twenty-five Athenians. The Thebans took their revenge by persuading the Spartans to put them all to death after a mockery of trial; the city was destroyed off the face of the earth, with the exception of the temple of Hera.

§ 213. Athens was carrying out the policy of Pericles in refusing to help Plataea, in spite of all her promises. She had determined to avoid continental warfare, and in the western seas this policy was crowned by brilliant successes. Phormion was stationed at Naupactus, guarding the entrance of the Corinthian gulf with twenty ships (429 B.C.). The Spartan Cnemus,

<sup>The War in
Western Greece</sup>

with one thousand Peloponnesians, had succeeded in crossing into Acarnania, wishing to wrest that region from the Athenians. A fleet from Corinth and the other Peloponnesian states sailed to support him, forty-seven strong. Phormion waited until the enemy's fleet was outside the gulf, and then by skilful handling of his small squadron crowded their ships into a narrow space; when the breeze from the gulf threw them into confusion, the Athenians fell upon them and captured twelve ships and disabled many of the rest. This sea-fight was the first attempt of the Lacedaemonians, who were amazed at the result, and could not believe that they were really so much inferior to the Athenians. Preparations were made for another fight. Phormion sent for reinforcements, but they did not come in time, and he was compelled against his will to fight with his twenty ships inside the gulf; for the twenty-seven Peloponnesian ships commanded by Cnemus, Brasidas, and other Spartans swooped down upon Naupactus. Nine of the Athenian ships were cut off, but the remaining eleven routed their pursuers and retook the captured vessels. The Peloponnesian fleet was now unable to keep the sea.

§ 214. In the fourth year of the war (428 B.C.) the island empire of the Athenians received its first blow; the great island of Lesbos, which for years had been preparing for revolt, suddenly renounced her allegiance; only the town of Methymna stood firm. The revolt was the more serious as the Lesbian oligarchs confessed that, apart from the limitation of autonomy which membership of the Athenian empire implied, they had no ill-treatment of which to complain. Once again the Peloponnesians failed to grasp the opportunity, just as they had failed in the case of Samos (440 B.C.)

Operations in
Acarnania.

Phormion's
First Victory.

Phormion's
Second Victory.

Revolt of
Lesbos.

Blockade of
Mytilene.

Mytilene was soon blockaded by sea and land by Paches, who had with him one thousand Athenian hoplites. The wasteful expenditure of the last few years had now begun to tell upon the Athenian treasury, and for the first time

<sup>Property-Tax
(Eisphora)
at Athens.</sup> recourse was had to a property-tax (*Eisphora*), which yielded two hundred talents (= £48,000);

money-collecting ships were also sent to collect tribute from the allies. During the winter the Spartans sent out Salaethus, who made his way into Mytilene with assurance of relief; in the summer of 427 B.C. Alcidas with forty-two ships was actually sent out to relieve the

<sup>Mytilene
Capitulates
(427 B.C.).</sup> city, but he sailed slowly and reached the coast of Asia only to learn that Mytilene had

been driven to capitulate a week before his arrival; his one idea then was to get back as fast as he could into Peloponnesian waters. The leaders in the revolt were sent to Athens, along with Salaethus, who was at once put to death. The Athenians felt very bitter about the revolt, for Lesbos was not a subject, but a free

<sup>The Population
Sentenced
to Death.</sup> ally; it was resolved to put to death not only the ringleaders then in Athens, but all the grown-up citizens of Mytilene, and to enslave the women and children. A trireme was sent out with this decree to Paches; but next day remorse seized the

<sup>The Sentence
Rescinded.</sup> people, and the decree was rescinded, but not without a struggle of orators in the Assembly, and by a very narrow majority. The mover of the decree of massacre was Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, who then was the most influential leader of the people; he supported

<sup>Arguments of
Cleon and
Diodotus.</sup> the decree on grounds both of legal right and policy. His opponent was Diodotus, who waived the discussion of the legal aspect of the case to attack its wisdom on grounds of expediency.

The ship which bore the fatal mandate had a start of about twenty-four hours, but it had sailed slowly. The Mytilenaean envoys provided wine and barley for the crew of the trireme that was to race across the Aegean with the reprieve, and large rewards were promised if they arrived in time. The men rowed while they ate their barley, kneaded with wine and oil, and slept and rowed by turns. The city was saved, but only just in time, for Paches had already read the decree when the second trireme arrived, and was about to put it into execution. The prisoners in Athens, thirty or more, were put to death; Mytilene lost her fleet and her walls, and the whole island, with the exception of the ^{Fate of} ^{Mytilene.} Methymnaean territory, was parcelled out among 2700 Attic cleruchs, who let their lots to the Lesbians for an annual rent of two *minae* (about £8).

§ 215. This year was a bloody year in the history of the war. To it belongs the beginning of the revolution in Corcyra, which ran its ghastly course from 427 to 425 B.C. The oligarchs began it in the interests of Corinth with the assassination of Peithias and sixty other democrats. When Nicostratus, and later on Eurymedon, arrived with Athenian fleets, the democrats massacred their opponents during seven days; every form of death was to be seen—suppliants were dragged from the shrines; some were walled up to perish in the temple of Dionysus; fathers slew their own sons. Six hundred of the oligarchs escaped and established themselves on Mount Istone and ravaged the open country. After two years an Athenian fleet commanded by Eurymedon and Sophocles arrived at the island, on its way to Sicily, and supported the democrats in an assault on the hill. Again

^{Victory of the Democratic Party.}

there was a slaughter of the prisoners, and this time the democrats made an end. The oligarchical faction at

^{Impression made in Greece by the Revolution.} Corcyra was rooted out, and peace reigned in the island (425 B.C.). The revolution in Corcyra made a deep impression in Greece; men's eyes were opened to the lengths to which the spirit of partisan strife was prepared to go.

§ 216. With the year 426 B.C. there came a change in the policy of Athens, under the influence of the daring energy

^{Schemes of Demosthenes in Aetolia (426 B.C.)} and original mind of her general, Demosthenes. Defence was exchanged for vigorous offensive.


Demosthenes conceived the idea of subduing the mountaineers of Aetolia, and then marching through the territory of the Ozolian Locrians and the northern Dorians, combining with the friendly Phocians, and thus falling upon Boeotia from the west. He had sailed round the Peloponnese and was attacking Leucas in conjunction with the Acarnanians. In pursuance of his scheme he abandoned his operations at Leucas, and penetrated Aetolia without waiting for the Locrian light troops. Near Aegitium the Aetolian javelin-men surrounded him, and his hoplites

^{Their Failure.} were severely handled; 120 fell—"the very finest men lost by Athens during the war."

After this reverse Demosthenes dared not return to Athens. Consequently, when the Spartans as a counter-

^{He Saves Naupactus.} stroke sent Eurylochus to march from Delphi with three thousand hoplites to capture Naupactus, he was able to save the town by inducing the Acarnanians to throw a garrison into it; subsequently he won a great victory over Eurylochus at Olpae, in the ^{Battle of Olpae.} territory of the Amphilochians on the Ambracian gulf. This success compensated for his failure in Aetolia, and Demosthenes was able to return home.

§ 217. In the following year Demosthenes, though holding no official position, sailed with the fleet of forty ships which Eurymedon and Sophocles were taking to Sicily. On the coast of Messenia stress of weather drove the fleet into the harbour of Pylus or Coryphasium, a headland at the



A. Pylus.
B. Peloponnesian Camp.
C. The spot where Epitadas surrendered.

northern end of what is now the bay of *Navarino*. The desert island of Sphagia or Sphacteria, nearly three miles long, really a continuation of the cliffs of Pylus, lies in front of the bay, which thus has two entrances—a narrow channel between Pylus and Sphacteria, and a wider passage of nearly a mile between the southern end of Sphacteria and the mainland.

Description of
Pylus and
Sphacteria

Demosthenes wished to fortify Pylus as a base of operations, but the two commanders would not consent, until the troops themselves, for the mere sake of something to do, fortified the promontory. Demosthenes was left with five ships to hold it while the rest of the fleet passed on to Corcyra. Soon the Spartans appeared with ships and men; troops were thrown into the island, and a determined attack, in which Brasidas, the son of Tellis, distinguished himself, was made upon Pylus. The Spartan assault, renewed on the following day, was repelled. Then suddenly the Athenian fleet, now fifty strong, recalled from Zacynthus, dashed into the bay, defeated the Spartan fleet and cut off in the island Epitadas with 420 Lacedaemonian hoplites and their attendant Helots. It was impossible to relieve them, and the Spartans sent ambassadors to Athens to ask for peace, in the meantime surrendering their entire fleet until negotiations were concluded.

§ 218. The Athenian Assembly was under the influence of Cleon, and the restoration of Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea, all of which Athens had lost by the Thirty Years' Peace, was demanded as the price of the surrender of the doomed men in Sphacteria. These terms were refused; but the Athenians, alleging some breach of the truce, declined to give up the Lacedaemonian ships. Blockade of the island Sphacteria was difficult and winter approached. The Athenians grew impatient, and there was a reaction against Cleon, who retorted with an attack upon the Generals, and especially upon Nicias, the leader of the peace-party, for cowardice. When Nicias offered to forego his command in favour of Cleon, the latter was compelled to accept the offer, and being formally invested with the command,

declared that without taking a single additional Athenian hoplite with him, he would either bring the Spartans prisoners to Athens or leave them dead in the island, within twenty days. His vaunt was fulfilled. Acting with Demosthenes, Cleon sent to Pylus. ^{Cleon Sent to Pylus.} Acting with Demosthenes, Cleon threw an overwhelming force into the island, and after a desperate resistance the survivors of the beleaguered force, 292 Capitulation in number, including about 120 Spartiates, ^{of the Spartans in Sphacteria.} capitulated and were brought captive to Athens within the stipulated time. Pylus was garrisoned by Messenians of Naupactus. At the end of the same year Nicias seized and fortified the peninsula of Methana (or Methone), between Troezen and Epidaurus, and in the following year he reduced the island of Cythera, ^{Nicias Takes Cythera.} which gave the Athenians a base of operations against Laconia and the eastern Peloponnese. The Athenians thus took the offensive, and at the same time they were secure from the annual invasion of Attica as long as they held the Spartan prisoners. They seized this opportunity to make a descent upon Thyrea, on the shore of the bay of Argos, and to utterly ^{Destruction of the Aeginetans.} destroy the remnant of the Aeginetans. This was the end of a brave people of whose island Pindar sang that "some ordinance of immortals hath given to this sea-girt land to be to strangers out of every clime a pillar built of God," who gave their name to the oldest and most widely spread of the Greek systems of weights and coinage, whose commerce had extended from Egypt to Etruria. This butchery in cold blood of the Aeginetans (for the survivors were put to death by vote of the Assembly) was a set-off to that of the hapless Plataeans by the Spartans and Boeotians.

§ 219. The same year (424 b.c.) gave the Athenians another important success. Ever since 427 b.c. the islet

of Minoa, over against Nisaea, the port of Megara, had been in Athenian hands, having been seized by Nicias, who thus blockaded the port. A revolution occurred in Megara,

^{The Athenians} and Nisaea, together with the "long walls" ^{Capture Nisaea,} (built by the Athenians themselves in 460 B.C.)
^{the Port of}

^{Megara} joining Megara to her port, was betrayed to Demosthenes and Hippocrates. Megara itself was saved by the energy of Brasidas, who happened to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth collecting volunteers for an expedition destined to have results disastrous for the Athenians.

§ 220. The success of Athens inspired the democrats elsewhere to move, and to the Athenians themselves it seemed that both the hour and the man had come for

^{Athenian} ^{Invasion of} an attempt to win back the continental possessions lost at Coroneia. A triple simultaneous attack upon Boeotia was planned in

concert with the democrats of Boeotia. Demosthenes, sailing from Naupactus, was to seize Siphae, the port of Thespiae, beneath Mount Helicon. On the same day the Athenian army under Hippocrates was to enter eastern Boeotia, and fortify the temple of Apollo at Delium on the coast; at the same time Chaeroneia, near the western frontier of Boeotia, was to be seized by the democrats. The scheme completely miscarried, for a Phocian betrayed it to the eleven Boeotarchs who governed the Boeotian confederacy. Siphae and Chaeroneia were strongly garrisoned, so that the democrats could make no sign, and

^{Their Defeat} ^{at Delium} ^(424 B.C.) Demosthenes retired baffled. Hippocrates indeed fulfilled his part of the programme, only to be slain and have his army completely defeated

near Delium by the general levy of the Boeotians led by Pagondas, one of the Boeotarchs. This was the last great battle fought by Athens alone on land, and the

verdict pronounced when her hoplites were confronted by the stalwart Thebans in their deep phalanx would soon be given again when they were ranged against the trained warriors of Sparta (battle of Mantinea, 418 Decline of the A.c.). It was indeed a verdict inevitable; the Athenian Army. Decline of the army and the decay of strategic skill was the necessary outcome of the policy of Themistocles and Pericles, the price at which the Athenians bought their decisive superiority in the handling of ships of war.

§ 221. In conflict with a continental power, the Thracian quarter was the one vulnerable spot in the The War in Thrace. Athenian empire, and it was here that Athens was struck a blow from which she never recovered, which entailed also far-reaching consequences. It was struck by Brasidas, one of the few triumphs of individuality over the levelling influences of Spartan training. His daring and energy had baffled an Athenian attempt upon Methone in Messenia in the first year of the war, and saved Megara from Demosthenes, the Athenian whom he most Brasidas in Chalcidice. resembled. Now, in response to Perdiccas and the Chalcidians of Olynthus, he was sent, with only seven hundred Helots armed as hoplites, and such Peloponnesians, 1000 in number, as he could recruit, to the Chalcidice. He marched first against Acanthus, on the base of the peninsula of Acte. The Acanthians had no grievance against Athens, and no desire to revolt; but Brasidas had an oratorical ability strange in a Lacedaemonian, and a frank and winning manner that contrasted strongly with the pride and insolence of the Spartan abroad. The Acanthian Assembly was won by his specious statement of the Lacedaemonian programme with its magic formula—the liberation of Hellas Revolt of Acanthus— Voting secretly, the majority determined to revolt, and their example was followed by Stageirus and

Argilus, both, like Acanthus, Andrian colonies originally. The crowning success was the surprise of the bridge over the —and of Amphi-[—] Strymon and the surrender of Amphipolis with-^{polis (424 B.C.)} out a blow. The Athenians were not indeed unrepresented in Thrace at this moment, for their general Eucles lay in Amphipolis, apparently without a garrison, while Thucydides, the son of Olorus, the future historian of the Peloponnesian war, was at the island of Thasos with a squadron. Thucydides hastened to the Strymon with seven ships, just in time to save Eion, at the mouth of the river. He was subsequently accused of neglect of duty, Cleon being probably active against him, and until the conclusion

^{Exile of the Historian Thucydides} of the war he remained in exile, “associating with both sides and watching quietly the course of events,” he tells us, and thus accumulating the materials for his immortal book. We hardly know enough of the facts to decide who was most to blame for this loss of the jewel of the empire. The truth seems to be that the Athenian people had no real estimate of Brasidas as a soldier and diplomatist, and that Thucydides and Eucles were mediocre men in both respects, but unfairly called upon to perform a difficult task with totally inadequate forces.

§ 222. Brasidas continued his successful career unchecked (winter, 424-3 B.C.). The remaining small towns on the eastern promontory of Chalcidice (Acte) were subdued.

^{Revolt of Scione—} Torone, the strongest city in Sithonia, the central peninsula, was surprised. Scione, on the western peninsula (Pallene), revolted of her own accord and summoned Brasidas; so great was the exasperation in Athens at the defection of a city which was practically an island, that Cleon carried a decree that it should be destroyed, all its male inhabitants be

executed and the women and children sold into slavery; ultimately, after a long blockade, this decree was carried into effect (421 B.C.). The revolt of Scione was followed by that of the neighbouring town of Mende, —and of Mende. It was probably fortunate for Athens that at this moment Brasidas was called away to aid Perdiccas in an expedition against Arrhabaeus, king of the Lyncestians, in which the Spartan showed that he knew as well how to conduct a dangerous retreat as to lead a victorious advance.

The Athenians had made no attempt to check Brasidas, partly because the defeat at Delium had disheartened them, partly because, contrary to all precedent, he continued his operations far into the winter, when it was useless to ask citizen-soldiers to undertake a campaign. Both the Athenians and the Spartans and Lacedaemonians were anxious to put a limit to the victories of Brasidas—the former wishing to avoid further losses, the latter because he had embarked on a career which carried them too far, for either Sparta must redeem his pledges by sending troops far from the Peloponnese to protect the revolted cities, or abandon the task to him and so allow full scope to his dangerous ambition. Above all, the Spartans wished to recover the prisoners taken at Sphacteria. So by the efforts of King Pleistoanax, who had been recalled from exile (see p. 255), and Nicias, leader of the peace-party at Athens, a truce for a year was proclaimed (spring, 423 B.C.), that the terms of a durable peace might be arranged. One of the chief articles of the truce was that each side should retain what it had at the moment. Now it so happened that the truce had been concluded two days before Scione revolted; so that

Attitude of
Spartans and
Athenians
towards
Brasidas.

True for One
Year between
Athens and
Sparta (March
423 B.C.)

the Athenians refused to admit the Scionaeans to the benefit of the armistice. Brasidas, however, refused to surrender either Scione or Mende.

§ 223. When Brasidas returned to Torone he found that an Athenian force led by Nicias and Nicostratus had

^{Continuation of Hostilities in Thrace.} recovered Mende and was besieging Scione. Throughout the rest of Greece the year's

truce was observed, while hostilities continued in Thrace. Formal right was on the side of Athens, and there was one man, the much-abused Cleon, who saw that the recovery of the Thracian cities was of vital moment. In the spring of 422 b.c. he was himself elected as one of the Generals to lead a force to the Chalcidice. To say that his military ambition had been kindled, and that he flattered himself that he had only

to appear in Thrace and all would be recovered, is probably a baseless calumny. He sailed with thirty ships having twelve hundred Athenian hoplites on board. He displayed a vigour akin to that of his adversary in his well-planned attack upon Torone,

^{He Captures Torone.} which he captured along with its Lacedaemonian governor. Then he went on to Eion. The discontent of his army forced Cleon's hand. Before his preparations were completed he ventured upon a

^{Cleon at Amphipolis.} reconnaissance in force, leading his troops up the ridge which extends from Mount Pangaeus towards Amphipolis. The city was placed in a loop of the Strymon; west of the river rises the hill of Cerdylion, upon which, secure from attack, Brasidas was posted for observation. He saw at once that in retiring the Athenians must necessarily present their vulnerable flank, the unshielded right side, to the city. He proposed therefore to make a sally at the head of 150 chosen hoplites and

attack their centre in person, while Clearidas issued from a more northerly gate and attacked the Athenian rear. All befel as he had planned. His own daring charge upon the centre cut the Athenian column, as it retired left in front, into two parts; the leading ranks fled; only those in the rear stood against the onset of Clearidas. Brasidas fell mortally wounded; Cleon was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian targeteer (peltast); after a vain stand against a cloud of light troops and cavalry, the remnant of the right wing broke and fled. Brasidas lived long enough to be assured of his victory; after his death the people of Amphipolis set the seal to their defection from Athens by honouring him as a Hero and as the founder of their colony (Oekist) in place of the Athenian Hagnon; sacrifices were offered to him and yearly games.

§ 224. The death of Brasidas freed the hand of the Spartans; that of Cleon left Nicias a clear field, and after long negotiations the Peace of Nicias brought the Archidamian war (so this first part of the Peloponnesian war is named) to an end (spring, 421 B.C.). Peace of Nicias (421 B.C.) Athens was to receive the fortress of Panactum on the Boeotian frontier, and the Thracian cities of Amphipolis, Argilus, Stageirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus, which cities were to retain their autonomy but to pay tribute to Athens according to the assessment of Aristeides. Athens was left free to deal as she pleased with Scione and Torone. On her side she was to restore the posts occupied during the war—Pylus, Cythera, Methana, the island of Atalanta between Euboea and the Locrian coast, and Pteleum in Thessaly. The Athenians insisted, however, upon retaining Solium and

Anactorium in Acarnania, and the port of Nisaea. All prisoners on both sides were to be released. The treaty was to be confirmed by oath every year ; and its text was to be inscribed on pillars erected at Olympia, Delphi, the Isthmus, on the Acropolis of Athens, and in the temple of Apollo at Amyclae near Sparta.

§ 225. From the outset the peace was a failure, for the three most important states of the Peloponnesian

^{Refusal of} confederacy refused to accept it. Corinth lost ^{Corinth, Boeotia,} great part of the advantage for which she had ^{and Megara} to Accept it. fought if Athens retained the Acarnanian towns ; Megara was dissatisfied at the loss of Nisaea ; Boeotia was unwilling to give up Panactum. Sparta alone profited by the peace in which she sacrificed the interests of her allies, for she regained her prisoners. Athens sacrificed all her advantages to recover the Thracian cities, which, after all, Sparta was unable to restore to her ; and as

^{Amphipolis never Restored to Athens} a matter of fact the most valuable of them, Amphipolis, was never again an Athenian possession.

Above all, the peace still left Athens girt with a ring of hostile states. Owing to the inability of Sparta to restore Amphipolis, the peace was endangered at the outset ; and as the Corinthians, Megarians, and Boeotians, together with the Eleans, refused to accede to it, Sparta was driven to offer Athens a defensive alliance

^{Defensive Alliance between Athens and Sparta} on condition of recovering the Sphacterian prisoners. This was accepted, and the prisoners were restored ; but Athens kept Pylus and Cythera as a set-off to the lost Amphipolis.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (SECOND PERIOD).

§ 226. Sparta and Argos ; Disruption of the Peloponnesian League ; Hyperbolus and Alcibiades.—§ 227. Alcibiades brings Athens into Alliance with Argos. Battle of Mantinea.—§ 228. Ostracism of Hyperbolus ; Coercion of Melos.—§ 229. Relations of the Athenians with Sicily ; Alliances and Expeditions down to 416 B.C. ; Congress of Gela.—§ 230. Embassy from Segesta ; Sicilian Expedition Voted ; Mutilation of the Hermae ; Alcibiades Suspected.—§ 231. Sailing of the Expedition ; Divided Opinions of the Generals ; Recall and Flight of Alcibiades.—§ 232. Operations of Nicias ; Alcibiades at Sparta ; Athenian Policy in Sicily.—§ 233. Siege of Syracuse ; the Athenian Wall ; First and Second Syracusan Counter-Walls ; Gylippus Arrives.—§ 234. Third Syracusan Counter-Wall ; Demosthenes Sent to Support Nicias ; Syracusan Victory by Sea.—§ 235. Demosthenes Fails to Recover Epipolae ; the Athenians are twice Defeated in Sea-fights ; Retreat of the Athenians by Land and Surrender of the Army ; Fate of the Generals and Prisoners.

§ 226. A REASON which weighed greatly with the Spartans in desiring peace was the fact that in 421 B.C. a Thirty Years' Peace which had been concluded between Argos and Sparta in 451 B.C. would come to an end.

A generation of peace had given Argos almost the exclusive control of the Peloponnesian trade ; but she had not forgotten or relinquished her ambition of holding the hegemony of Greece, as in the heroic days of the Trojan legend. In her thousand picked hoplites, trained at public expense, she had created an instrument for enforcing her claims when the

proper moment came. She refused to renew the peace with Sparta except at the price of the retrocession of the district of Cynuria, from old time a bone of contention between the two states.

The action of Sparta in concluding a defensive alliance with Athens led to the actual dissolution of the Peloponnesian League. Corinth and the Chalcidians of Thrace made alliance with

Argos, and so also did the Mantineans, who had been extending their power in Arcadia, and feared its curtailment by the Spartans; Elis also joined. Neither Sparta nor Athens was satisfied with the existing arrangement, and when Sparta concluded an alliance with Boeotia the

<sup>War-Party
at Athens:
Hyperbolus.</sup> war-party in Athens once more rose to power. The democratic or war-party in Athens was at this time led by Hyperbolus, a lamp-maker; but the party was now strengthened by the accession of a man who did more harm to his city than any other Athenian, except his political opponent Nicias, who in all other respects was his exact antithesis. This man was

^{Alcibiades.} Alcibiades, son of Cleinias. Related through his mother to Pericles, Alcibiades, brilliantly gifted in person and intellect, seemed marked out for a great career, on the lines followed by his famous relative. Hitherto he had appeared only as a leader of fashion, outstripping all by his reckless extravagance and the incredible insolence with which he outraged every convention of social life. Of morality in any sphere he had no conception; but his bravery was undeniable, and his seductive manners irresistible. Political convictions he had none, save the resolve to be foremost. It is, however, impossible to extract from his career any definite programme, or to interpret it by the light of any great idea

such as gives unity and meaning to the life of Themistocles, the man who, in many respects, most resembles Alcibiades. In a word, Alcibiades was destitute of conviction, of balance, and with all his talents he is the greatest failure in Greek history ; in spite of the glamour which surrounds him, he is essentially mediocre, an embodiment of Greek brilliancy divorced from the crowning virtue of the Greeks, sobriety (*σωφροσύνη*).

§ 227. In 420 B.C., Alcibiades was one of the Generals, the highest officials in the state, and, urged by him, Athens concluded an alliance with Argos and her allies, Elis and Mantinea, for one hundred years. Alcibiades went into the Peloponnese and tried to extend the anti-Spartan combination there. His policy was defeated partly through the disunion of the allies, for Elis withdrew her three thousand hoplites at a critical moment ; partly also through lack of effective support on the part of the Athenians, who for 418 B.C. elected Nicias as a General ; most of all through the decisive superiority of the Spartan hoplites in the field. The Lacedaemonians, under King Agis, won a brilliant victory over the allies in the neighbourhood of Mantinea, and restored the prestige which the incident of Sphacteria had tarnished (summer, 418 B.C.).

Battle of
Mantinea
(418 B.C.)

§ 228. It was in consequence of this defeat that Hyperbolus proposed that a vote of ostracism should be taken. The object, probably, was to get rid of Nicias, the chief opponent of the anti-Spartan policy. If Nicias escaped, the adverse vote would probably fall to the lot of Alcibiades, the most prominent man on the other side. Alcibiades saw the danger, and a coalition was arranged between him and Nicias, with the result that the votes of their combined supporters were given against Hyperbolus,

who was thus ostracised (spring, 417 B.C.). Hyperbolus ^{Hyperbolus} was sacrificed by the democratic party, which ^{Ostracised.} in after years was destined bitterly to rue the choice it made this year. This was the last occasion on which ostracism was applied at Athens. Hyperbolus retired to Samos, and was murdered there on the occasion of the outbreak of the oligarchical reaction (411 B.C.).

It was probably a desire to revenge upon the Dorians of the islands her failure against the Dorians of the mainland that prompted the Athenians, under the influence of Alcibiades, to coerce the island of Melos, the only one of the Cyclades which was not a member of the Athenian League. The Melians hitherto had taken no part in the war. Thirty-eight ships with 2,700 hoplites on board made resistance hopeless; nevertheless, the Melians made a stout defence for the freedom which they had enjoyed for seven centuries. The siege lasted through the summer, but at length there was no other course but to surrender at discretion. The men of military age were put to death; the women and children were sold as slaves; the land was distributed among five hundred Athenian cleruchs. By the irony of history this callous exemplification of the doctrine that "Might makes Right" occurred directly before the fatal expedition to Sicily.

§ 229. From early times the West, and especially Sicily, had a fascination for the imagination of the Athenians. Under Pericles, with the foundation of Thurii (443 B.C.) ^{Alliance with a western policy had definitely begun. Even Segesta—} ten years before this an alliance had been concluded with the Elymian town of Segesta (Egesta) in the west of Sicily, and again ten years later Athens entered into alliance with Rhegium in Italy and Leontini in Sicily.

The object of Athens, or at least one of her objects, was to support the Chalcidian (Ionian) cities against —and with the Dorian states, which were predominant ^{Rhegium and Leontini} in number and power. This was the more ^(433 B.C.) necessary as the Peloponnesians at the outbreak of the war had hoped to secure the assistance of the ships of the Dorians of Sicily. The Dorians there also formed a strong support of the commercial interests of Corinth, the mother-city of Syracuse, the greatest of the Dorian cities of the West. In 427 B.C. envoys arrived in Athens from Leontini, then struggling to preserve her independence against Syracuse. Among the envoys was Gorgias of Leontini, the sophist, or professor of eloquence, whose fame was Panhellenic. The people of Rhegium joined in the appeal to Athens, on the strength of the treaties of 433 B.C., to assist her Ionian kin. Intervention in Sicily was advocated by the democrats, especially by Hyperbolus. An expedition was sent out under Laches, but no result was achieved. In the spring of 425 B.C., forty ships were sent to Sicily under Eurymedon and Sophocles. This was the fleet which was detained by the occupation of Pylus, and afterwards by events in Corcyra. By the time it reached Sicily a change had come over the face of Sicilian politics. Envoys from all the cities had met at Gela to discuss the question of a general peace in order to exclude foreign intervention. Hermocrates of Syracuse was the most prominent man at this congress, which effectually closed the door to Athenian hopes for a time. The year 423 B.C., however, shed a new light upon the aims of Syracuse, for in that year the aristocrats of Leontini overpowered the democrats, destroyed the city, and migrated to Syracuse.

Policy of Athens in Sicily.

Expedition under Laches.

Under Eurymedon and Sophocles (425 B.C.)

Pacification of Gela.

It seemed that if the Sicilian cities had escaped the Athenian designs of conquest, they were likely to fall a prey to the ambition of Syracuse.

§ 230. In 416 B.C. Segesta, then at war with her southern neighbour, the Dorian Selinus, appealed for aid to Athens, in conjunction with the remnant of the Leontine democracy.

The Segestacans offered to pay the expenses
ask Help from of the expedition, and in fact the Athenian
Athens.

commissioners sent to report on their resources brought back with them sixty talents, as well as glowing accounts of the gold and plate displayed at the banquets to which they had been invited, and the reserves in the temples. When the promises of Segesta proved delusive, it was said that the commissioners had been deceived—that one magnificent service of plate, and that mostly borrowed, had been passed from house to house to greet the Athenian guests at every table! Alcibiades supported the Sicilian Expe- dition Voted appeal; Nicias was strongly opposed to it. In the end it was voted that one hundred triremes should be sent, with Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus in command.

When the expedition was on the point of sailing, a mysterious event took place (May, 415 B.C.). At the entrances of the temples and private houses throughout Athens stood square stone pedestals surmounted with a Mutilation of carved representation of the human head; these the Hermæ. were called Hermae. In a single night these, with one exception, were all mutilated. The perpetrators of this outrage against religion were never known, nor the motive of their action. The strange inference was drawn that the constitution was threatened. The enemies of Alcibiades tried to fasten the deed upon him, and it was true enough that he had been guilty of a somewhat similar religious offence—a mock celebration of the

Eleusinian rites in a private house. Alcibiades demanded to be put on trial at once, but this did not suit his enemies' plans. It was decreed instead that the expedition should sail, and Alcibiades be recalled to stand his trial within a fixed time.

§ 231. The expedition was the largest and most magnificently equipped that had ever sailed from the Peiraeus; there were sixty triremes and forty transports from Athens, thirty-four triremes from Chios and the other allies; the number of heavy-armed troops was 5,100; the total number of combatants (sailors and soldiers) was over 30,000. These great preparations were discounted by the fact that no one, not even the generals in command, had any precise idea of the real object in view! The nominal goal was Segesta and Leontini, but Syracuse was the real enemy. At Rhegium, therefore, a council of war was held. Lamachus, who was only a soldier, without birth or wealth to support him, proposed to strike at Syracuse at once. Nicias was in favour of attempting something for Leontini, in what way he was not quite clear, and returning home after a demonstration along the Sicilian coast. Alcibiades, who felt that he was a born diplomatist, was for delaying the attack upon Syracuse until he should have combined the Greek and Sicel cities against her. Both Nicias and Alcibiades were quite incompetent as leaders of such an expedition; it is strange that the Athenians should have failed to see that they had in Demosthenes the only man capable of leading it to success. The plan of Alcibiades was adopted, but its chances of success were destroyed when the state trireme, the *Salaminia*, arrived, recalling Alcibiades for trial. He sailed in his own ship as far as Thurii, where he made his escape. The

Council of War
at Rhegium:
Plans of the
Generals.

Recall and
Flight of
Alcibiades.

Athenians condemned him to death in his absence, and confiscated his property.

§ 232. At the end of the summer Nicias enticed the Syracusans forth to the Athenian camp at Catane, and in the meantime sailed with his entire fleet into the great harbour and fortified a camp near the temple of the Olympian Zeus, on its south-west shore. Here, Operations of Nicias in Sicily. on the Syracusans' return, the first battle of the war was fought, which resulted in a victory for the Athenians. In spite of this, Nicias surrendered the advantage he had gained, and withdrew for the winter to Catane. During the winter the Syracusans appealed


^{Alcibiades at Sparta} to Corinth and Sparta for assistance. Their appeal was supported by Alcibiades, who had gone across to Sparta. He urged Sparta to save Syracuse if she wished to save Sicily and all the West; above all, to send a Spartan to conduct the defence; and to strike Attica by occupying Deceleia, a fort commanding her northern frontier and the land route from Euboea. On their side the

^{Athenian Negotiations with Carthage and Etruria.} Athenians in Sicily tried to obtain help from Carthage, and negotiated with the cities of Etruria. In estimating the Athenian policy in Sicily it must never be forgotten that from the first she came forward in the interests of the non-Hellenic Segesta, and that she tried to unite against her kindred in Sicily the two great foes of Hellenic civilisation in the West, the Etruscans and the Carthaginians.

§ 233. In the spring (414 b.c.) the siege of Syracuse began. The Athenians cleverly surprised the heights of Epipolae, the triangular plateau extending westwards from Achradina and Tycha, the two mainland suburbs which occupied the seaward extremity of the ridge. At the western end of the ridge rose

^{Beginning of the Siege: Epipolae Seized.}

the high point of Euryalus; the plateau falls in steep cliffs, especially along its northern side. On the edge of the northern cliffs the fort Labdalum was built by the Athenians to secure the ascent from the sea on this side (the bay of Thapsus). They then erected a circular fort (*kíklos*) in the centre of the plateau, and from it, north and south, began to



a—*a*. Ancient Wall of Syracuse.

b—*b*. New wall of defence erected 415 B.C.

c. Athenian naval camp at Dascon.

d—*d*. Athenian siege lines.

e. The circular fort (*kíklos*).

f,g,h. First, second, and third Syracusan counterwalls.

i. Euryalus.

k. Olympicum.

l,l,t. Athenian line of retreat.

m. Labdalum.

drive a line of wall to cut off the Syracusans from the open country. The Syracusans built a ^{First Syracusan Counter-Wall} counter-wall, starting from the Temenites just outside Achradina, and running westwards to cross the southern Athenian line; this wall the Athenians destroyed. Then the Syracusans ran a trench, with

palisade, through the low marshy ground on the north-west of the great harbour to prevent the Athenians bringing their line down from the southern cliffs of Epipolae to the harbour.

This work also was destroyed by the Athenians, but Lamachus was slain in the operation. The whole of the southern line, between the circular fort and the great harbour, was in course of time completed ; where it crossed the marshy ground it was double. If the northern line had

^{Northern Line}
of Wall not
Completed. been built, Syracuse would have surrendered in a few weeks, for the Athenian fleet had now taken up its station in the great harbour.

The building of the northern section was not pushed with vigour. Nicias failed to realise the importance of rendering his investment effective as soon as possible, nor did he realise the supreme importance of the plateau of Epipolae, and especially its apex Euryalus, as the key of the whole position. When Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, the general sent by the Spartans, marched overland from Himera, on the northern coast of the island, and ascending by Euryalus, entered the city along the northern edge of Epipolae, the operations entered upon a new phase.

^{Arrival of}
^{Gylippus.} § 234. Gylippus seized Labdalum and carried a counter-wall westwards across the unfinished northern section of the Athenians, as far as Euryalus.

^{Third Syracusan Counter-Wall.} Nicias was then practically driven from the plateau, for at best he commanded only the southern half of it. The Athenians, indeed, seized Plemmyrium, the promontory lying opposite the island of Ortygia (the acropolis of Syracuse), and with it commanding the entrance to the great harbour ; but the investment of the town was now hopeless without strong

<sup>The Athenians
Seize Plemmyrium.</sup>

reinforcements. Nicias gave the Athenian Assembly a clear account of the position of affairs, and begged to be recalled, for he was stricken with mortal disease. He was not recalled, but Eurymedon and Demos ^{Demosthenes Sent to Support Nicias} thenes were sent to his support with a new expedition, which, by the time it reached Syracuse, numbered seventy-three ships, bearing five thousand hoplites, besides light troops.

Before the reinforcements arrived things in Sicily had gone from bad to worse. Gylippus captured the three Athenian forts on Plemmyrium with all ^{Gylippus Captures Plemmyrium} their stores of grain and war material (spring, 413 B.C.). The Syracusans had even ventured to meet the Athenians at sea, and with their specially strengthened prows had gained at least one ^{Syracusan Victory at Sea} undoubted victory over their enemies, who were unable to manoeuvre on the confined waters of the harbour.

§ 235. Demosthenes saw that Epipolae must be regained, but his desperate night-attack upon the Syracusan cross-wall, after all but succeeding, ended as a ghastly failure with a loss of two thousand men. Syracuse was supported by all the Sicilian cities, except Acragas (Agrigentum), Naxos and Catane, and retreat was imperative. It was decided to withdraw the fleet and army to Catane, but on the eve of departure the moon was eclipsed (August 27th, 413 B.C.), and Nicias followed the soothsayers in forbidding all movement until thrice nine days had elapsed. The doom of the Athenians was sealed. In a naval engagement the Athenians were completely defeated, and Eurymedon was slain. The mouth of the harbour was now closed, and in a final desperate effort to burst the

^{Failure of Demosthenes' Attack on the Syracusan Cross-Wall.}

^{Eclipse of the Moon (August 27th, 413 B.C.) and Postponement of Retreat.}

^{The Athenians twice Defeated in the Great Harbour.}

barrier the Athenians again lost the day. The pride of the sailors was broken and they refused to fight again.

^{Retreat of the Athenians by Land.} Retreat by land was attempted—first by the western road, across the river Anapus into the

Sicel territory and so to Catane; next, when that way was blocked by the enemy, southwards in the direction of Camarina or Gela. The division of Demosthenes was

^{Surrender of the Army.} surrounded, and surrendered; that of Nicias fought its way through the Syracusans to the stream of the Assinarus, where the fugitives were slaughtered as they drank, until Gylippus stayed the massacre at the request of Nicias, who surrendered himself to him.

Nicias and Demosthenes were put to death in spite of the opposition of Gylippus. The prisoners, at least seven

^{Fate of the Generals and Prisoners.} thousand men, were thrown into the stone-quarries of Achradina, exposed to the burning

sun in the daytime and the bitter cold at night, on a scanty allowance of food and water. Those who survived the winter were put to work in the public prison or sold, so that Sicily became “full of slaves.” Such was the

^{Thucydides on the Expedition.} end of the great enterprise. “Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this war, or, indeed, of any Hellenic actions which are on record, this was the greatest; the most glorious to the victors, the most ruinous to the vanquished, for they were utterly and at all points defeated, and their sufferings were prodigious. Fleet and army perished from the earth—nothing was saved; and of the many who went forth, few returned home.”*

* *Thucydides*, vii. 87, Jowett's edition.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (THIRD PERIOD).

§ 236. Position of Athens; Spartan Garrison in Deceleia; Consequences of the Sicilian Expedition; Renewed Activity of Persia.—§ 237. Revolt of Athenian Allies; First and Second Treaties between the Spartans and Tissaphernes.—§ 238. Alcibiades at Sardis; he Negotiates with the Athenian Oligarchs and Tissaphernes; Peisander Sent to Athens; Third Agreement between Tissaphernes and Sparta; Negotiations between Persia and Alcibiades broken off.—§ 239. Oligarchic Revolution at Athens; Government of the Four Hundred.—§ 240. The Democracy at Samos; Fall of the Four Hundred; Moderate Democracy at Athens.—§ 241. Athenian Successes in the Hellespont; Battle of Cyzicus; Spartan Overtures for Peace Rejected; Full Democracy Restored at Athens.—§ 242. The Athenians Regain Command of the Bosporus; Cyrus and Lysander; Recall of Alcibiades; his Disgrace consequent on the Battle of Notium.—§ 243. Battle of Arginusae; Impeachment, Trial, and Execution of the Generals.—§ 244. Lysander Aided by Cyrus; Battle of Aegospotami and Capture of the Athenian Fleet.—§ 245. Siege and Surrender of Athens; Conditions of Peace Imposed; End of the War.—§ 246. The Thirty at Athens.—§ 247. Thrasybulus at Phyle; the Thirty Defeated at Munychia; Intervention of Pausanias and Restoration of the Democracy; the Oligarchs at Eleusis.—§ 248. Position and Method of Socrates; his Unpopularity; his Trial and Execution; the *Apology*; Socrates as Champion of Free Thought.

§ 236. THE wonder is that after the Sicilian disaster the Athenians did not immediately succumb; for, in addition to their losses in ships, money, and men there, the standing Lacedaemonian garrison in Deceleia inflicted immense injury upon them, by preventing even the

partial cultivation of Attica, which had been possible in spite of the annual invasion, by affording a refuge to the slaves, who deserted in such numbers from Laurium that the silver-mines there had to be shut down, and by preventing the overland importation of the Euxine grain. Deceleia had been fortified by King Agis upon the definite renewal of hostilities in the spring of 413 B.C. Reorganisation was necessary to

^{Spartan Garrison in Deceleia.} tide over the crisis; consequently the chief direction of affairs was entrusted to a board of Ten Probuli, who worked with or partially superseded the Council of Five Hundred for the time being. The tribute was abolished in favour of a tax of

^{Board of Ten Probuli at Athens.} 5 per cent. upon all goods passing between ports of the empire, including Athens herself, so that the Athenians, in this respect at least,

were placed upon the same footing as their subjects. Two consequences of the defeat, however, could by no means be averted, and these combined worked the ruin of the Athenians. On the one hand, the allies everywhere were moved to revolt; on the other, the Persian Satraps in Asia Minor saw in the downfall of the Athenian naval supremacy an opportunity of bringing the coast towns once more within their sway. This might be effected by playing off one power against the other—by sending financial

^{Harbour-Duty Substituted for Tribute.} assistance to that belligerent who would sur-

render the Asiatic cities to Persia. Thus there began a game of intrigue between the two re-

presentatives of Persia in Asia Minor. Tissaphernes, Satrap of Sardis, was commanded by the king to collect the arrears of tribute from the Greek cities of Ionia—arrears which went back to 479 B.C. He therefore supported the application made directly to Sparta by the Chians and

^{Renewed Activity of Persia.}

Erythraeans for help in throwing off the Athenian yoke. Pharnabazus, Satrap of Phrygia, being also pressed for arrears of tribute, was eager for the Lacedaemonians to operate in the Hellespont. Tissaphernes and the Chians were supported by Alcibiades, and the Spartans determined to assist Chios in her revolt.

§ 237. In 412 B.C. the appearance of five Laconian vessels with Alcibiades on board was the signal for the revolt of Chios, Erythrae, and Clazomenae. Revolt of Athenian Allies.

Next Teos, Miletus, and Lebedus revolted.

Chios was the only autonomous ally of the Athenians remaining, except Methymna in Lesbos, and was the largest and richest of the states of the empire. Under the circumstances the Athenians considered that the moment had come for touching the thousand talents set aside at the beginning of the war as a last reserve, and the money was spent in fitting out a fleet

Fleet fitted out for Asia under Strombichides and Thrasycles. from Reserve Fund.

The Athenian headquarters in Ionia was the island of Samos, which remained consistently loyal. The demos of Samos, in fact, rose against the oligarchical party, and in return the Athenians conceded the privileges of independence to the island. On the other hand, the Chians encouraged even Methymna to revolt, as well as Mytilene, and for a moment it seemed

Revolt and Recovery of Lesbos.

that Lesbos was wholly lost; but upon the arrival of another Athenian fleet under Diomedon and Leon it fell back again into subjection and the war was carried into Chios itself.

Upon the revolt of Miletus a treaty had been struck between Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, the Spartan commander. It was agreed that all the territory and cities which were then in the king's possession, or had ever been

in the possession of his forefathers, should be recognised as his, that the Lacedaemonians and their allies should aid him in preventing the Athenians deriving tribute therefrom, that both parties (412 B.C.) should carry on the war with Athens jointly, and that cities revolting from the king should be treated as rebels from both parties. Actually no stipulation was made as regards payment of the Lacedaemonian fleet, though the treaty, if its words were pressed, surrendered to Persia not only the Asiatic cities which for nearly seventy years she had been powerless to reduce, but also the mainland of Greece as far south as Boeotia, which had once been occupied by Persian troops with the consent of its inhabitants (in 480 B.C.).

At the end of summer (412 B.C.) forty-eight ships sailed from Athens to Samos with 1,000 Athenian hoplites on board, together with 1,500 Argives and 1,000 allies, under the command of Phrynicus. Outside Miletus the Peloponnesian forces and the auxiliaries sent by Tissaphernes were defeated, and the city itself was only saved by the timely arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet reinforced by twenty-two Sicilian ships under Hermocrates. Chiefly owing to

the remonstrances of Hermocrates, Tissaphernes (412 B.C.) was obliged to make some increase in the subsidy to the Peloponnesian fleet, and in the end a second treaty was arranged in which the king was definitely pledged to the maintenance of the allies while

they were operating in his country. The anti-Athenian movement was extended into Caria, where Cnidus and the rich and powerful state of Rhodes seceded to the Peloponnesians (beginning of 411 B.C.).

§ 238. In the meantime the influence of Alcibiades at

Sparta had waned. King Agis was his personal enemy. At last he fled from the Peloponnesian camp and ingratiated himself with Tissaphernes, with the object of transferring that Satrap's favour to the Athenians. He also entered into negotiations with the partisans of oligarchy in the Athenian fleet at Samos, promising to secure the support of the Satrap and the king if only the "villainous democracy" were abolished. In this he was moved by the desire to procure his own recall to Athens, a thing impossible so long as the ultra-democrats were in power. What further designs were at the bottom of his tortuous policy it is impossible to say—perhaps he hardly knew himself, for although he had a gift as well as a passion for intrigue, Alcibiades was not a great statesman. Peisander was sent to Athens to pave the way for the return of Alcibiades and the modification of the constitution; the people recognised that they must sacrifice certain of the extreme features of democracy if Athens was to be saved by the only power that could save her; the way for the change had also been prepared by the powerful secret societies (*Hetaeriae*) of the oligarchs (411 B.C.). However, the hollowness of the pretensions of Alcibiades was exposed as soon as the attempt was made to arrange a treaty with Tissaphernes, for the Satrap would not desert the Peloponnesians, but even concluded a third agreement with them. In this the king's territory was expressly confined to Asia; the Persians were to support the Peloponnesian fleet until the king's fleet arrived from Phoenicia, when the two navies were to act together. In order to conceal his own impotence, Alcibiades, ostensibly on behalf of Tissaphernes, made impossible demands upon

Alcibiades' Impossible Demands.

Third Agreement between Sparta and Tissaphernes.

Alcibiades Escapes to Tissaphernes.

He Negotiates with the Athenian Oligarchs.

the Athenians as the price of Persian aid. All Ionia and the adjacent islands were to be ceded to Persia, and

^{Negotiations between the Athenians and Tissaphernes broken off.} Persian fleets were to be allowed free access to the Aegean. Negotiations were consequently broken off, and the proposed revolution at

Athens lost its *raison d'être*. The oligarchs in Athens, however, had gone too far to give up their plans.

§ 239. The first months of 411 B.C. had been a reign of terror in Athens, and the dagger, the favourite instrument of the oligarchical conspirator everywhere, had been at work. Androcles, a prominent democrat, who had taken a leading part against Alcibiades, was struck down, and others shared his fate. A commission of thirty, including the ten Probuli, was established to draft a scheme

^{Oligarchical Constitution Established (May, 411 B.C.)} for the reform of the constitution. Their report was delivered before an Assembly which sat in the precinct of Poseidon at Colonus, about a mile from the city. It was resolved first to suspend the law against illegal proposals (the Graphe Paranomōn), to abolish payment of public offices, and to restrict the franchise to five thousand—those most able to assist the city in person and purse. A provisional government of

^{Government of Four Hundred.} Four Hundred (forty from each of the ten Tribes) was constituted, with irresponsible control over finance and all magistrates; the old Council of Five Hundred was forcibly dissolved. The new Assembly of five thousand was a dead letter, as it could meet only at the summons of the Four Hundred. The leading spirits of the oligarchy were Peisander, the orator Antiphon, Phrynicus, and Theramenes. The first political act of the new government was to make overtures for peace, first to Agis, and then to Sparta (about June, 411 B.C.).

§ 240. The success of the revolutionary movement was due to the fact that the “seafaring rabble,” the core of the democracy, was to a great extent absent on the fleet at Samos, where also were many of the middle class serving as hoplites. Among the Samians themselves, oligarchic conspirators were stirring, and had murdered Hyperbolus; but the Samian democrats combined with the Athenian army. The leaders of the democratic reaction in Samos were Thrasybulus, a trierarch, and ^{Democratic Reaction at Samos.} Thrasyllus, a hoplite of the state-trireme *Paralus*. Athenians and Samians joined in an oath to resist Sparta and the oligarchs of Athens; they declared themselves to be the genuine Athenian ^{Thrasylus.} public, and chose new Generals, among them ^{and Thrasyllus.} Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, and recalled Alcibiades and appointed him also a General.

The attitude of the Athenians at Samos emboldened the moderate party among the Four Hundred led by Theramenes to act against the extreme oligarchs, who were led by Phrynicus, Antiphon, and Peisander. The latter began to fortify Eetioneia, the spit which forms the northern side of the entrance of the Peiraeus, not so much to keep out the fleet from Samos, as to admit that of the Peloponnesians. Phrynicus, who had recently returned from Sparta, was struck down by assassins in the ^{Phrynicus Assassinated.} market-place. The appearance of forty-two Peloponnesian ships in the Saronic gulf increased the prevailing suspicion, and the works at Eetioneia were destroyed at the instigation of Theramenes. The hostile fleet under Agesandridas sailed to Oropus to raise Euboea in revolt. The Athenians sent thirty-six ships under Thymochares to Eretria, where they fought and were utterly

^{Revolt of Euboea.}

defeated; all Euboea, except Oreos, in the north, an Athenian cleruchy, rose. The rule of the oligarchs in consequence collapsed, after it had lasted about four months. Its place was taken by a moderate democracy on the lines advocated by Theramenes. Most of the oligarchical leaders escaped, except Antiphon, who was executed.

§ 241. It was the course of the war in Asia that gave a preponderant voice to the Athenian sailors and hoplites at Samos, and thus brought back the constitution to its old groove. The supine Spartan admiral Astyochus, who had

^{Fall of the Four Hundred: Qualified Democracy at Athens.} lain inactive for many weeks at Rhodes, was superseded by Mindarus, who transferred the war to the Hellespontine region and the satrapy of Pharnabazus—a region of vital importance to Athens.

^{War Transferred to the Hellespont.} Off the promontory of Cynossema the Athenians under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus gained a victory over a superior force and recovered Cyzicus, which had revolted (411 B.C.). The Athenians next gained a victory at Abydos, through the timely appearance of Alcibiades with additional ships during the action. Tissaphernes tried to damage the Athenian cause by arresting Alcibiades when the latter paid him a visit at Sardis, but Alcibiades succeeded in escaping, and next year won a brilliant victory. Mindarus, supported by the land forces of Pharnabazus, was besieging Cyzicus when he was surprised by an Athenian fleet of eighty-six ships. After a hard-fought battle by both land and sea Mindarus was slain and the Peloponnesian fleet practically annihilated (410 B.C.). The Athenians intercepted the laconic despatch in which Hippocrates, the second in command, informed his government of the disaster. "Our ships are gone," it ran; "Mindarus is

dead ; the men are starving ; we know not what to do." The Peloponnesians were paralysed by the blow, and Sparta made proposals for peace on the basis of the *status quo*, including the withdrawal of troops from the Spartan Over-garrisons and an exchange of prisoners. These ^{treaties for Peace} overtures were rejected on the motion of Cleophon, who from now until his death in 404 B.C. was one of the chief leaders of the democracy. Cleophon was by trade a lyre-maker.

It is clear that the success of the democratic fleet in the Hellespont encouraged the democratic party in Athens to raise its head and overthrow the "Polity" or modified democracy of Theramenes. The unlimited franchise and the Council of Five Hundred were gradually restored, with payment of offices—all characteristics of the developed democracy. In addition, Cleophon introduced a new payment, the Diobelia, or "two-obol payment," which was probably not the old jurors' fee at a lower rate (two obols instead of three), but a poor-relief measure.

§ 242. The Athenians continued to push their success in the Propontis and its neighbourhood, and gained ground. Chalcedon was made tributary (408 B.C.) ; tolls were levied on all cargoes coming out of the Euxine ; in the same year Byzantium was starved into surrender, and Athens Regains Command of the Bosphorus (405 B.C.). Athens once more completely commanded the Bosphorus. It was of little moment that nearer home the Megarians captured Nisaea and that Pylus was recovered by Sparta. It was, however, of fatal import that the Persian king at last intervened decisively and put an end to the intrigues of his Satraps, whose jealousy hindered an effective policy. In the spring of 408 B.C. Cyrus, the younger son of Darius,

^{Cyrus made Governor of Asia Minor.}

was sent down to the coast as *Caranus*, or governor-in-chief, over Cappadocia, Phrygia, and Lydia, with orders Lysander. to support the Lacedaemonians. Sparta also at last found the right man for her work in Lysander, a skilful diplomatist and able general, a man of the type of Brasidas.

Just at this moment Alcibiades, after an exile of eight years, returned to Athens at the call of the Recall of Alcibiades. democracy (407 B.C.). He was greeted with rapture; the curse which rested upon him as profaner of the Eleusinian rites was solemnly removed, his property restored, and he was elected General with full powers as the one man who could save Athens and restore her empire. He made amends to the Eleusinian deities and gained cheap credit as a general when, despite the hostile garrison in Deceleia, he conducted to Eleusis by land the annual procession from Athens along the Sacred Way; ever since the occupation of Deceleia it had been conveyed by sea. Towards the end of the year he sailed with one hundred ships to Samos; he was not destined to see his native land again. Alcibiades being absent at Phocaea, his second in command, Antiochus, in contravention of orders, brought on a general action with Lysander off Notium, to the north of Ephesus, and was defeated with a loss of fifteen ships (spring, 406 B.C.). This led to a revulsion of feeling, and Alcibiades was not re-elected. He retired to a fortified place in the Chersonese to watch events.

§ 243. Among the ten new Generals was Conon, who was defeated off Mytilene by the new Spartan Conon Blockaded by Calli- admiral, Callicratidas, with a loss of thirty cratidas. out of his seventy ships. The remainder of the Athenian fleet was blockaded in the harbour of

Mytilene. A single vessel managed to run the blockade and bring the news of Conon's peril to Athens. An extraordinary effort was made. In thirty days 110 ships were equipped—slaves, resident aliens, and knights were pressed into service. At Samos they were reinforced by ten ships and more than thirty came from the other allies, so that the Athenians arrived off Mytilene with more than 150 ships. Callicratidas, leaving fifty vessels to blockade the port, met them with 120 near the Arginusae islands, in the channel south-east of Lesbos. Callicratidas fell in the battle, and the Spartans were defeated with a loss of seventy ships. After the battle a storm arose, which hindered Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who were ordered with forty-seven ships to rescue the crews of the twenty-five wrecked Athenian vessels and to collect the dead, from carrying out their orders. The Generals were suspended for neglect of duty and were summoned to Athens for trial. The matter was investigated in the full Assembly, not by an ordinary court. In the end the eight Generals who had been at Arginusae were condemned to death and their property was confiscated. Six of them, including Thrasyllus and Pericles, son of the great statesman, were in fact executed; two of the Generals had refused the summons to return. Athens had no mercy upon the shortcomings or failures of those who served her; in the present instance the Assembly violated the law by pronouncing sentence upon the accused in a body instead of judging each case separately. In some obscure way the fate of the Generals was due to the intrigues of Theramenes acting in self-defence.

§ 244. Once more the Spartans offered peace, but once more the offer was rejected at the instance of Cleophon.

The last act of the long drama of war now began. Lysander was sent out as junior admiral ^{Lysander in Command.} (*Epistoleus*), as the Spartan law did not allow a man to be a second time admiral (*Navarchus*). He reorganised the fleet, assisted by Cyrus, who indeed ^{Aided by Cyrus.} entrusted to him the administration of his satrapy and its finances during his own absence at Susa (405 B.C.). When he sailed to the Hellespont and took Lampsacus he was followed by the Athenian fleet of 180 ships. The Athenians lay at Aegospotami ("Goat's Rivers"), an open beach two miles from Sestos, over against Lampsacus. Lysander refused to be tempted to fight in the strait. The Athenian Generals rejected the advice of Alcibiades to withdraw to Sestos. On the fifth day, when the Athenians had retired from offering battle

^{Defeat of the Athenians at Aegospotami and Capture of their Fleet.} before Lampsacus and had dispersed on shore for their meal, all the Peloponnesian ships rowed rapidly across and captured the entire Athenian

fleet, with the exception of a squadron of nine vessels commanded by Conon (end of summer, 405 B.C.). Conon took refuge with Evagoras, king of the Cyprian Salamis. The *Paralus* conveyed the news to Athens. The city was lost, for she had no more ships nor means of building new ones.

§ 245. The plan of Lysander was to starve Athens into surrender. With this view, all the Athenians found in the cities of the empire were sent to Athens to swell the multitude that would soon be suffering the pangs of famine. The remnant of the Athenian allies revolted, with the

^{Blockade of Athens and the Peiraeus.} exception of Samos, which held staunchly out even after Athens herself had fallen. At last

Lysander sailed into the Saronic gulf with 150 ships, occupied Aegina and blockaded the Peiraeus,

while King Pausanias encamped with a Peloponnesian army in the Academeia, just outside the walls of Athens (November, 405 B.C.). All through the winter the doomed city held out, until hunger silenced all opposition. A conference of the Peloponnesian confederates was summoned to decide the fate of Athens. Surrender of Athens.

The Thebans and Corinthians wished to vent their long-hoarded hate upon her by utterly destroying the city and selling the whole population into slavery, but the Spartans would not consent to blot from the map of Hellas a city that had done so much for Greek freedom. The terms actually offered and accepted were, that the Athenians should demolish the Long Walls and the fortifications of Peiraeus, resign all foreign possessions and confine themselves to Attica, readmit all their exiles and become allies of Sparta, recognising the same friends and foes and following her leadership by land and sea. By the grace of Lysander they were permitted to retain twelve triremes. When the terms were ratified, Lysander sailed into the Peiraeus, and to the sound of flutes the work of demolition was begun ; that day was thought to be the dawn of freedom for Greece (16th Munychion = April, 404 B.C.). So ended the Peloponnesian war almost exactly twenty-seven years after its first outbreak in April, 431 B.C.

End of the Peloponnesian War (April, 404 B.C.)

§ 246. The exiles who returned to Athens were oligarchs ; the most prominent among them was Critias of the noble house of the Medontidae (to which Solon also belonged). Under Lysander's influence the Assembly constituted a Board of Thirty, ostensibly to frame a code of laws for the future government of the city. The Thirty filled the Council of Five Hundred with their partisans and invested it with the judicial

The Board of Thirty.

powers which had formerly been exercised by the whole people. At the outset the new rulers were moderate, and according to their programme purged the city of evildoers, putting to death a number of professional informers (sycophants). Finally, however, protected by a Spartan garrison under the Harmost Callibius, the Thirty displayed

Misrule of the Thirty. themselves as simply tyrants of the most vulgar type. They executed with or without form of trial not only political opponents, but many others, both citizens and resident aliens, on account of their wealth. To this reign of terror Theramenes was opposed; he still desired the establishment of a moderate constitution, such as for a moment he had seen in operation in 411 B.C. Theramenes would no doubt have become the centre of a *Execution of Theramenes.* reactionary party had he not been suddenly arrested in full Council by the emissaries of Critias and executed.

§ 247. Though resistance was overawed in Athens, hostile elements were combining beyond the Attic frontier. Democrats who fled for their lives found refuge at Corinth, Megara, or Thebes, where a revulsion of feeling against Sparta and Spartan methods had already taken place.

Thrasybulus Seizes Phyle— Thrasybulus and Anytus with seventy companions, starting from Thebes, seized the fortress of Phyle in Mount Parnes (December, 404 B.C.). After defeating two attempts to dislodge them, the democrats, now a thousand strong, descended from Phyle and occupied Peiraeus. A battle was fought *—and Defeats the Thirty at Munychia.* on the hill of Munychia, in which Critias was slain and the partisans of the Thirty defeated.

The Thirty were deposed and retreated to Eleusis, which they had treacherously seized and fortified as a place of ultimate refuge. The civil war between the oligarchs of

the city and the democrats of Peiraeus continued until Lysander intervened with an army in favour of the former. Thrasybulus and his party were lost had not Lysander been superseded by King Pausanias, his declared opponent. Both parties submitted to the king's arbitration. A commission of fifteen was sent out from Sparta to aid him, and a general reconciliation was effected. An amnesty was proclaimed, from which only the Thirty, the Eleven who had carried out their judicial murders, and a few others were excepted; Eleusis was to be an independent state, to which any irreconcilable might retire within a specified time. Lawgivers (*Nomothetae*) were appointed to revise the constitution, and they restored the old democracy with its unlimited franchise (archonship of Eucleides, 403-2 B.C.). Some time later, payment for official duties was also reintroduced. For two years Eleusis remained independent, and then, as the oligarchs were hiring mercenaries, the people marched out, slew the oligarchical generals, and persuaded the rest to return to Athens—and “having sworn that they would bear them no grudge, they live together up to this day in the same city, and the demos keeps the oath” (Xenophon). Eleusis of course became once more part of the Athenian state. Thrasybulus was the saviour of his city, and with such wisdom and tact was the restoration managed that never again did oligarchical conspiracy endanger the state. Parties were formed on new lines.

§ 248. One great crime the restored democracy committed—the execution of Socrates (399 B.C.). Socrates, whom the Delphic oracle declared to be the wisest of the Greeks, was probably the most

Arbitration
of Pausanias.

End of the
Civil War.

The Old Demo-
cracy Restored.

The Oligarchs
at Eleusis.

remarkable man whom Greece produced (born about 469 B.C.). By profession a sculptor, he neglected all other interests to roam the streets of Athens, his status being almost that of a beggar, eternally questioning every one

His Method. and criticising everything. He was in essence

a sophist, though, unlike the sophists, he did not deliver lectures or take a fee, for he professed to have no knowledge; his business was to discuss and test all popular notions and popular terms; his demand was for rigid definition. So far as he had any definite doctrine to deliver, it was embraced in the formulae "the good is the useful," "virtue is happiness," "no man willingly does

His Doctrine. wrong"—in other words, he was the founder

of the doctrine of utilitarianism. He was the determined foe of all shams, and therefore the foe of the sophists, to whom, by his scepticism, his logical power, and his teaching capacity, he really belonged. It is easy to understand that the dull but honest democrat regarded him as a dangerous freethinker. It was unfortunate that

Causes of his Unpopularity. men whose names were anathema had stood in close relation to his influence—notably Alcibiades and Critias. He represented a spirit fatal to the order of things in which he lived. When Meletus, Lycon, and Anytus accused him of "introducing new gods and corrupting the Athenian youth," the general truth of the charge was undeniable, and no other verdict but that of guilty was possible. Tried before a court of 501 judges, a

His Trial. majority of sixty found the aged philosopher guilty. The penalty proposed was death, but by the practice of the Athenian courts it was open to him to propose a mitigation of the punishment. He seemed only to insult the court when he claimed maintenance in the Prytaneum as a benefactor of Athens;

and although in the end he proposed a small fine of thirty *minaē*, he was condemned to the hemlock by a much larger majority. A month later he drank the fatal draught, discoursing to the last with his friends on the high topics which had occupied his life. In his *Apology of Socrates* Plato has reproduced in artistic form the general outline of the defence before the court. Although the words there put into the mouth of Socrates are not to be regarded as his genuine utterances on that memorable occasion, there is no doubt they correctly represent the great philosopher's general attitude, and sum up in phrases that may often have been actually on his lips his conception of his mission to his countrymen. There is indeed no such thing as "Socratic philosophy," if by that we mean a definite body of doctrine or systematised result of speculation in ethics or metaphysics; nevertheless, Socrates is rightly regarded as the father of all later philosophies, for these are but the logical and systematised developments of various elements implicit in the teaching. And in a wider sense Socrates stands as the representative of all true philosophy, and especially of Greek philosophy, in that he voices its demand for what has been called "the most precious thing in the world, fearless freedom of thought." *

* Bury, *History of Greece*, p. 836

His Condemnation and Death.

The *Apology*.

The Champion of Free Thought.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE TEN THOUSAND.

§ 249. The Expedition of Cyrus against Artaxerxes.—§ 250. Battle of Cunaxa ; Death of Cyrus.—§ 251. Treachery of Tissaphernes and Massacre of the Greek Generals ; Retreat of the Greeks under Xenophon to Trapezus.—§ 252. Their Arrival at Byzantium ; they are Employed by Sparta against Persia ; Subsequent Career of Xenophon.—§ 253. Significance of the Expedition of the Ten Thousand.

§ 249. THREE years after the fall of Athens there occurred a remarkable episode in Greek history—the Upgoing *The Anabasis* (*Anabasis*) and Return of the Ten Thousand of Xenophon. Greeks. The whole history of the event has been narrated by one who played a large part in it—Xenophon, an Athenian, who had been one of the companions of Socrates.

On the death of Darius II. (reigned 425—405 B.C.), his eldest son ascended the throne, and reigned as Artaxerxes ^{Position of Cyrus.} (*Mnemon*), notwithstanding the intrigues of his mother, Parysatis, who tried to secure the crown for her younger and favourite son, Cyrus. Cyrus determined to overthrow his brother with the help of Greek mercenaries.

^{He takes the Field with Greek Mercenaries.} There was no difficulty in collecting 13,000 Greeks, 10,600 of whom were hoplites commanded by Clearchus, an exiled Spartiate who had served as admiral and Harmost. The Spartan government, which owed so much to Cyrus, was also induced to send him 700 hoplites, nominally to co-operate with him for other

purposes. Neither men nor officers (except Clearchus) knew the real goal of the expedition; the reduction of the brigand tribes of Pisidia furnished a convenient pretext. The Great King, however, received ample warning of the invasion through Tissaphernes.

Starting from Sardis (spring, 401 b.c.), Cyrus marched south-east to Colossae and thence to Celaenae; here he turned north through Peltae to Ceramon Agora ("Potters' Mart"), whence the march continued in a south-easterly direction through Cayster-Plain, Thymbrion, and Tyriaeon, to Iconium, and then in a wide ^{The March through Asia Minor.} semi-circle skirting the southern edge of the Lycaonian plain to Tyana in Cappadocia; then due south through the pass in Mount Taurus called the "Cilician Gates" to Tarsus in Cilicia. Here the Greeks struck for higher pay—a daric and a half, instead of a daric, a month per man. The march was now directed eastwards, across the rivers Sarus and Pyramus to Issus, and then through the pass called the "Syrian Gates" to Myrian-^{Arrival at the drus;} next over Mount Amanus, and across the desert to Thapsacus, on the Euphrates. Here at last Cyrus owned that Babylon itself was the goal of the expedition.

§ 250. Marching along the left bank of the Euphrates, the army reached a great trench, extending forty miles across the plain between the Wall of Media (a brick wall one hundred feet high and twenty feet broad) and the Euphrates, where a narrow space was left between the trench and the river. This passage was undefended. Two days after passing the trench, the Persian host, about 400,000 strong, commanded by Tissaphernes and the king in person, confronted Cyrus. The Oriental troops under Ariaeus formed the left wing of the army of Cyrus, who himself commanded

a squadron of cavalry in the centre; on the right, near the Euphrates, was Clearchus with the Greeks. The Persian left soon broke and fled, pursued by the Greeks, Battle of Cunaxa.
(401 B.C.) Cyrus charged the centre, and was already victorious, when he caught sight of his brother, and in a passion of hate pressed forward to kill him, and so lost his seat and was slain. The Greeks returned to find the battle lost, their camp pillaged, and the soul of the expedition dead. The battle was fought near the village of Cunaxa (September, 401 B.C.)

§ 251. The concern of the Greeks now was to return Position of the Greeks. home, for they refused to surrender. It was impossible to recross the desert; they had to march northwards across the mountains of Armenia to the Black Sea, an utterly unknown route. Following the army of Tissaphernes, they passed the Median Wall and crossed the Tigris near Sittace, and then marched up the left bank of the Tigris, across the lesser Zab, to the bank of the greater Zab. Here Tissaphernes Tissaphernes Seizes the Greek Generals. treacherously seized Clearchus and his four colleagues. The Greek generals were sent in chains to the Persian court, and there put to death. In this crisis the courage and energy of Xenophon saved the army. Though he had no rank, being merely a volunteer, he was chosen one of the new generals, and was in fact the real leader of the Return. It lasted eight months. From the Zab to the Xenophon Assumes Command. Carduchian mountains (*Kurdistan*) they were harassed by the army of Tissaphernes. When they entered Carduchia the Greeks passed out of the Retreat of the Ten Thousand. Persian Empire, but the wild hillmen were a more terrible foe than the Persians. It was already December before the army crossed the Centrites Carduchia.

into Armenia. They made their way amid severe privations and hardships through the icy mountains west of Lake *Van*, and through the country ^{Armenia.} of the hostile Chalybes, crossing the two branches of the Upper Euphrates, to the friendly city of ^{The Chalybes.} Gymnias. Then on the fifth day, as they gained the crest of Mount Theches, the Euxine far below them burst into view, and they knew ^{Arrival at} that they were saved at last. A few more days brought the army to Trapezus (^{Arrival at} Trapezus. February, 400 B.C.).

§ 252. The last stages of the Return, from Trapezus to Chalcedon, accomplished partly by sea and partly by land, were marked by delays. On the arrival of the Greeks at Chalcedon, Anaxibius, the Lacedaemonian admiral on the Bosphorus, induced them to cross over to Byzantium; then they took service under Seuthes, a Thracian prince, who cheated them of their pay. Finally the remnant, six thousand in number, was employed by Sparta in her war with Persia; and crossing again into Asia, the survivors of ^{The Remnant taken into the Pay of Sparta against Persia.} the Ten Thousand paid off old scores against Tissaphernes (399 B.C.). As for Xenophon himself, he also fought in Asia, and returned to Europe with Agesilaus. In the meantime he had been formally banished from Athens, but the Spartans presented him with an estate at Scillus, near Olympia. Here he lived the life of a country gentleman for seventeen years (387—370 B.C.), years devoted to sport and literature, and the service of the gods. Afterwards his sentence of exile was revoked, and his son Gryllos as an Athenian knight fought and died for Sparta in her last struggle with Thebes. Xenophon himself died full of years at Corinth (about 354 B.C.).

§ 253. The significance of the expedition of the Ten Thousand was great, for it revealed to the Greek world the hollowness of the great eastern empire. If ten thousand Greek hoplites could thus shake the throne of the Great King, and defy the myriads of his vast empire, what might not be expected from Persia.

The Expedition Showed what Greece could Effect against vast empire, what might not be expected from Persia. the Greeks as a whole when well led, upon a national enterprise, and not in the interests of an individual's ambition? The dreams of the Spartan Agesilaus, the Thessalian Jason, the Macedonian Philip, were not mere chimeras, but practicable schemes—this the episode of the Ten Thousand proved. Their exploit was the prologue to the greater achievement of Alexander.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA (FIRST PERIOD).

§ 254. Establishment of the Supremacy of Sparta; her Method of Rule.—§ 255. Sparta Unfitted for her New Position.—§ 256. Effect of Sparta's Empire on her Domestic Condition; Conspiracy of Cinadon.—§ 257. The Greeks of Asia Appeal to Sparta against Persia; Campaigns of Thibron and Dercylias.—§ 258. The Succession to the Kingship at Sparta; Accession of Agesilaus.—§ 259. Conon and the Persians; Cyprus a Rallying-point against Sparta.—§ 260. Agesilaus at Aulis; his Relations with Lysander; Spartan Fleet Reorganised.—§ 261. Mission of Timocrates; Thebes Induces Athens to Join her against Sparta; Coalition against Sparta; Agesilaus Recalled.—§ 262. The War by Land; Battle of Corinth; Agesilaus Enters Boeotia.—§ 263. Battle of Coroneia; its Result.—§ 264. The War by Sea; Battle of Cnidus; Destruction of Sparta's Sea Power; Rebuilding of the Long Walls of Athens; Regeneration of Athens.—§ 265. Federal Leagues of Greek Cities; Negotiations between Sparta and Persia; Death of Conon.—§ 266. Military Reforms of Iphicrates.—§ 267. Capture of Lechaeum and Piraeum by Agesilaus; Iphicrates Annihilates a Spartan *mora*.—§ 268. The Athenians Support Evagoras.—§ 269. Peace of Antalcidas.

§ 254. THE thirty-four years following the victory at Aegospotami are the years of Sparta's supremacy. The period falls into two parts, as it was only during the first nine years that she was undisputed mistress of Greece. With Sparta's victory Greece might be thought to have reached a better condition than ever before; for the first time in Greek history she was for the moment united. In order to gain this unity, however, nearly one-third of the Greek

Period of
Spartan
Supremacy.

name had been sacrificed, for almost all the Greek cities in Asia had been abandoned to the Persians; and in Sicily Carthage had advanced to the gates of Syracuse. Further, how did Sparta stand with regard to her professions at the opening of the Peloponnesian war? She had claimed to be the champion of autonomy. Two courses were open to her now—either to yield to the Greek instinct and to fulfil her pledges by proclaiming universal independence, or to regard herself as the heiress of Athens and become an imperial power. The latter was the course adopted, under the influence of Lysander.

The great war as it went on had become largely a conflict of political principles, a struggle between Sparta's Victory
a Triumph
of Oligarchy oligarchy and democracy, so that Sparta's victory meant that enslavement of the many to the few which Brasidas had described to the Chalcidic towns as "more intolerable than foreign domination." In Decarchies
and Harmosts.
the "liberated" cities Lysander established oligarchical boards of ten men, the hated Decarchies; and most of the towns had to receive a Lacedaemonian Harmost and garrison. In addition to this change in constitution, and the burden of a foreign governor and garrison to enforce their own enslavement,

^{Tribute.} the cities of the Spartan empire had to pay tribute. Such was the bitter fruit of a generation of warfare. The Decarchies, it is true, fell with the fall of Lysander, and were modified or dissolved, as we have seen was the case at Athens, but until the total collapse of the Spartan supremacy the Harmost and his garrison were the established instruments of Spartan rule.

§ 255. Lysander was not wholly to blame for the ill-success of the system he inaugurated. On the one hand, the oligarchs who returned to govern retaliated with

interest upon the democrats for their banishment, and Lysander must not bear the blame for the ruthlessness of Greek political strife, nor for the fact that the oligarchs gratified purely personal feelings under the cloak of political necessities. On the other hand, the Spartan Harmost was "ignorant," as Lysander himself put it, "of the art of governing free men." This was but the nemesis of the brutalising one-sided training that from time immemorial had been in vogue at Sparta. The Greek saying that "rule proves a man" was eminently true of the Spartan state. Her Harmost abroad dealt with her allies and subjects as he dealt at home with his Helots. Sparta had, in fact, totally failed to keep pace with the development of the rest of the Greeks, and could govern an empire only as if it were a camp. Indeed the very possession of an empire involved wide departures from those institutions with which, according to Spartan official theory, the well-being and very existence of the state were indissolubly connected. Among the most obvious of such departures was the introduction into the state of large quantities of the precious metals.

§ 256. The possession of an empire thus reacted powerfully upon the domestic condition of Sparta. The acquisition of money abroad, combined with the pressure of the long war, led to the concentration of wealth in a few hands. The class of fully privileged Spartiates (*σπουδοι*) who paid their contribution to the public messes (*Syssitia*) grew gradually smaller, with proportionate increase of the class of Inferiors. Sparta was menaced by the same class distinctions as formed the standing difficulty in the other Greek states; in addition, her Perioeci and Helots were a

Sparta Unf:
to Govern
Greece.

Domestic
Condition of
Sparta.

Class of
Inferiors.

constant danger. Shortly after the accession of Agesilaus, a Spartiate named Cinadon, a young man of the class of Inferiors, actually organised out of the disaffected elements a widespread conspiracy which had for its object the overthrow of the oligarchy of Peers and the Ephors. The scheme was betrayed, and the Ephors struck with their accustomed secrecy and decision. Cinadon was got out of the city on a bogus mission, on which he was arrested. The names of his accomplices were wrung from him by torture. He was scourged through the streets of Sparta and put to death with his accomplices (397 B.C.).

§ 257. Though by her treaties with Persia Sparta had abandoned the Greeks of Asia to the king, the cities there seem to have been governed by Spartan Harmosts ever since Lysander had been put in charge of his satrapy by Cyrus in 405 B.C., and were practically independent of Persia after Cyrus had left the coast on his fatal expedition. For his services against Cyrus Tissaphernes was made governor-general (*κάραβος*) of all Asia Minor west of the Halys. His first object

They Appeal to Sparta against Persia. was to recover the Greek cities, and he attacked Cyme. The Asiatic Greeks appealed to Sparta for protection, and thus for the first time she was called upon to perform the duty which Athens had performed for over seventy years. An answer to the appeal was the easier to give as Sparta had already *de facto* broken her treaties with the king by supporting the revolt of Cyrus.

An army was sent across to Asia under Thibron, who was also reinforced by the five or six thousand warriors of the Ten Thousand; but the result did not answer the expectations of the government, and Thibron was superseded by Dercylidas (399 B.C.)

who was called Sisyphus on account of his wiliness. Dercylidas engaged in desultory operations during two years until he was superseded by one of the Spartan kings—Agesilaus.

§ 258. On the death of King Agis in 397 B.C., a dispute arose at Sparta as to the succession to his kingship. Doubts were felt about the legitimacy of Leotychidas, who in the natural course of events would have succeeded

Disputed
Succession at
Sparta.

him as his son. As Agis left no other children, Leotychidas' rival for the throne was his uncle

Agesilaus, son of Archidamus by his second wife Eupolia, and consequently half-brother of Agis. Agesilaus was supported by Lysander, who for a time had been under a cloud, but hoped to recover his influence in foreign affairs if he secured the throne for his nominee; Lysander's exegetical ingenuity proved of great value in the game of intrigue played by the rival parties. An old oracle was produced, warning Sparta against a "lame reign" ($\chiωλὴ βασιλεία$)—the interpretation of which was obvious, seeing that Agesilaus was lame in one foot. Lysander, however, contended that the god meant not a mere bodily defect, which might not even be congenital, but the reign of one who was not of the true blood. So Agesilaus was chosen to succeed, probably because he was of mature age and of proved ability. His character has been overrated, as historians have accepted Xenophon's portrait of him. The fact that he never came into collision with the Ephors, for example, only proves that in the politics of Sparta he was a nonentity, not that he was a great king, which, curiously enough, is the inference drawn by Xenophon.

§ 259. Like the Romans, the Lacedaemonians never really convinced themselves of the importance of sea power;

consequently when, by the advice of Pharnabazus, the Persians made preparations to prosecute the war by sea, they were taken by surprise, and instead of creating an ^{The Persians} overwhelmingly strong fleet they put all their and Conon. energies into the war on land. The Persians had the right man to their hand in the Athenian Conon, who had fled defeated but not disgraced from Aegospotami.

Conon had taken refuge with Evagoras, king of Salamis, in the east of Cyprus. The house of Evagoras was always Hellenic in its sympathies, but ever since Cimon's death ^{Evagoras of Cyprus.} and the abandonment of Cyprus by Athens, a Phoenician dynasty had held sway in Salamis. In 410 B.C. Evagoras regained the sceptre of his ancestors, and Cyprus was once more open to Hellenic, especially Athenian, influences, and at Salamis not only Conon but many Athenian refugees fleeing from the oppression of Spartan Harmosts found an asylum after the battle of Aegospotami.

§ 260. Before he crossed the Aegean as the champion of Greece to do battle with the "barbarians," the Spartan king desired to sacrifice, as Agamemnon had done before him, according to the legend, at Aulis in Boeotia. The victims

^{Agesilaus Rebuffed at Aulis.} were already on the altar when down came a squadron of Boeotian horse and ruthlessly spoilt the king's whimsical parallel. It was a bitter humiliation and a poor beginning for the great expedition. As a matter of fact, Agesilaus achieved nothing at all in Asia for a long time. He was hurt also by the fact that among the Asiatic Greeks Lysander's reputation quite overshadowed his own. In order to assert ^{His Treatment of Lysander.} his own dignity he systematically humiliated Lysander by refusing all petitions presented through him, and at last drove that officer to ask to be

sent on detached service. Agesilaus is one of Xenophon's heroes, and is portrayed as a miracle of uprightness and sagacity, but in his dealings with Lysander, to whom Sparta owed her empire, and he himself his throne, he stands revealed a man of mean impulses and shallow ambitions, gifted, if at all, with more than average Spartan duplicity.

In 395 B.C. Agesilaus gained a victory over Tissaphernes under the walls of Sardis. This sealed the doom of that wily satrap. Parysatis had never forgiven him for the part he had played against Cyrus. Tissaphernes experienced the same ingratitude as Lysander, for Artaxerxes also owed his throne to the servant whom now he consigned to death at the hands of Tithraustes. Perhaps his downfall was also in some way connected with the vigorous naval operations which after long delay Conon and Pharnabazus succeeded in developing. To counteract this move Agesilaus was made generalissimo of the Greek land and sea forces. He reorganised the Spartan fleet and put it under the command of Peisander, his brother-in-law. As regards the operations on land, the Spartan king was simply the sport of the Persian diplomatists, who amused him with armistices in the intervals of his plundering raids. At last these same diplomatists sprung a mine in his rear which caused his retirement from Asia with all speed (394 B.C.).

§ 261. The Persians had resolved to stir up war for the Spartans at home. Tithraustes sent Timocrates, a Rhodian, to Greece with fifty talents to be distributed in the states that were hostile to Sparta. All had the same general grievances—Spartan tyranny where they had looked for freedom, Spartan monopoly of the fruits of victory. The chastisement of Elis in 399-7 B.C., the last act of Agis, was significant

of the way in which Sparta meant to use her authority. The leading spirit of the opposition was Thebes, who had set an example of insubordination by refusing to assist Pausanias against Thrasybulus or Agis against Elis. When both powers were eager for war, an excuse was easily found; a border war broke out between the Locrians of

^{Outbreak of War between Sparta and Thebes.} Opus and the Phocians. Sparta supported the Phocians, and Thebes the Locrians. The plan

of the Spartans was to strike at Boeotia from two sides. Lysander, who had returned from Asia, was sent to Heracleia, the centre of Lacedaemonian influence in northern Greece, to assemble the contingents of Phocis and the dependent tribes in that region. At Haliartus, between Thebes and Orchomenos, King Pausanias would join hands with him on a given day for a combined operation.

Thebes applied to Athens for aid, and being supported by

^{Athens Joins Thebes against Sparta.} Thrasybulus, who remembered what Thebes had done for him in the dark days of 404 b.c., the appeal was not made in vain.

As once before in Boeotian history (424 b.c.), the carefully planned combination failed. Pausanias arrived at Haliartus only to find that Lysander had fallen before its walls. The opportune arrival of the Athenians to reinforce the Boeotians compelled Pausanias to evacuate Boeotia as the price of the recovery of the dead. He was condemned to death at Sparta, but took sanctuary in the temple of Athena at Tegea, where he ended his days; he was succeeded by

^{Death of Lysander at Haliartus.} his son Agesipolis, a minor. The league of Thebes and Athens was joined by the other malcontents, Corinth and Argos, as well as by Megara, Euboea, the Chalcidians of Thrace, and other

minor states. Corinth became the headquarters of the confederates, and the strife which had begun as a Boeotian developed into the Corinthian war. Under the circumstances there was nothing to be done but to relinquish the war in Asia; so in response to the orders of the Ephors the army of Agesilaus, following the route once taken by the Persian invaders, set out on its long march to the Isthmus (394 B.C.)

§ 262. The confederates acted vigorously: they went "to smoke the wasps in their nest," as Timolaus of Corinth put it. They had already begun their forward movement when they learnt that the Lacedaemonians under the regent Aristodemus had marched out by way of Tegea and Mantinea to Sicyon, where they threatened the communications of the allies with Corinth. Rapidly they fell back and took post behind a ravine covering the city. They outnumbered the enemy, and on the right the Thebans, Argives, and Corinthians were victorious, but their left, composed of six thousand Athenians, was rolled up by the Lacedaemonian hoplites, and the whole army was thrown back defeated upon Corinth with a loss of nearly three thousand men (July, 394 B.C.). Strategically the Spartan victory was worthless, for it was fought too near Corinth to be decisive, and it was fought a month too soon. The Isthmus still remained in the hands of the confederates.

The march of Agesilaus was harassed by the Thessalians, and it was August before he reached Boeotia. Advancing along the great north road, he gathered in the contingents of Phocis and Orchomenos as well as a Lacedaemonian battalion (*mora*) conveyed across the gulf, and so came to Chaeroneia. Here a partial eclipse of the sun (August 14th, 394 B.C.) presaged ill, and soon

there came a messenger with the news that Peisander had lost his fleet and his life at Cnidus. The situation was critical. In a few hours the column must inevitably meet the enemy thrown across its front, and the struggle with the heavy infantry of Boeotia would try its temper to the utmost. Under these circumstances the king dared not let the truth be known, and proclaimed to his troops the death of Peisander in the arms of victory.

§ 263. At Coroneia, six miles to the south, the allies barred the passage. In numbers the two armies were nearly equal. Agesilaus led the Lacedaemonians on the right, opposite the Argives; on the left were the Orchomenians facing the Thebans; in the centre the veterans of Cyrus with the Asiatic allies stood opposite the contingents of Athens and Corinth. The Lacedaemonian centre and right drove their opponents off the field, and the Thebans were equally successful against the Orchomenians, but thereby found themselves cut off from their allies. Nothing daunted, the Thebans formed in close order to force their way through the victorious centre and right, which wheeled to withstand them. The struggle that ensued made an indelible impression upon the veteran Xenophon, who took part in it—"crashing shield on shield they pushed and fought and slew and died: there was no shouting nor yet was there silence, but the noise of men locked in the fury of battle." Agesilaus himself fell wounded, and was saved only by the devotion of his guards. In the end the deep Theban column bored its way through by sheer weight and obstinacy, and rejoined the main body at the foot of Mount Helicon.

The confederates still remained in position across the Lacedaemonian line of march. The battle of Coroneia was

Battle of
Coroneia
(394 B.C.)

thus as barren of result as that of Corinth, for Agesilaus was as powerless to cross the Isthmus as the regent Aristodemus had been. The honours of the day remained with the Thebans, who had given a foretaste of what they were destined to achieve on the fields of Leuctra and Mantinea. Agesilaus had to withdraw to Delphi and to cross the gulf from Cirrha.

§ 264. The campaign by land remained thus strategically and politically without result for Sparta, in spite of two victories. The issue of the contest had in fact been already decided at sea. After long delays Conon, late in the summer of 394 B.C., was at last in a position to force his way into the Aegean. Peisander lay waiting at Cnidus. He was outnumbered by the Hellenic section of the hostile fleet, to say nothing of the Phoenician ships under Pharnabazus. Nevertheless, battle could not be refused. Desereted at the beginning of the action by the Asiatic squadron, defeat was inevitable, and Peisander fought and died like a true Spartan. Fifty ships fell into the hands of the victors. Thus did Conon, as a Persian admiral, avenge the disgrace of Aegospotami. The Spartans lost at a blow their supremacy in the Aegean, and Conon's victory was the salvation of the allies at the Isthmus, for they could not have maintained their lines had a fleet been able to co-operate with the Spartan land forces.

Pharnabazus and Conon everywhere expelled the Spartan Harmosts and garrisons. Dercylidas, however, gallantly maintained both Abydos and Sestos. The victory at Cnidus was in reality a victory for Athens, for the liberated states in many cases renewed their relations with that city. The question was left open how far the expulsion of the Spartans

Its Result.

Battle of
Cnidus.
(394 B.C.)Fall of the
Spartan Mar-
itime Power.Position of the
Liberated
States.

meant submission to the Persians; after all, the claims of Persia were quite incompatible with the ambitions of Athens, and Conon must have been a man of delicate tact to have played successfully the double rôle of Athenian liberator and Persian admiral.

Next year the victorious fleet crossed the Aegean—the first time for nearly ninety years that a Persian fleet was seen in these waters. The Cyclades were freed, <sup>Movements of
the Persian
Fleet.</sup> the Messenian coast ravaged, Cythera occupied,

and finally the ships came to the Isthmus and replenished the war-chest of the allies. The time was now ripe for the execution of Conon's great design—the restoration of Athens as she was before her surrender in 404 B.C.

He was left with eighty ships in the Peiraeus, <sup>Long Walls
of Athens
Rebuilt
(393 B.C.).</sup> with ample funds, and the rebuilding of the Long Walls and the fortifications of Peiraeus

was completed. It was a striking proof of the kaleidoscopic nature of Greek politics to see Boeotian volunteers helping in the work of restoration: only eleven years had passed since the voice of Thebes had been loudest raised for wiping Athens from the face of the earth. The

<sup>Regeneration
of Athens.</sup> results of the Peloponnesian war were completely undone; once more Athens became a self-determining state, and entered upon a new half-century's lease of dignity and commercial importance. Just as Themistocles had created the Athens of Pericles, so did Conon create the Athens of Demosthenes.

§ 265. On land the war was practically at a standstill, and the Spartans were cooped up within the Peloponnese;

<sup>Federation of
Corinth and
Argos.</sup> their headquarters were Sicyon. In order to strengthen their hold over the Isthmus, Corinth and Argos united themselves by a federal bond; the boundary pillars between the two states were removed,

and their citizens enjoyed common rights (392 B.C.). Another federal movement which belongs to the period after 394 B.C. is known to us only from coins. A number of states, Rhodes, Cnidus, Iasus, Samos, and Ephesus, formed themselves into a league and issued coins having on the one side the infant Heracles strangling the snakes, on the other the tokens of the various cities; Heracles and the snake is an old Theban type, so that these alliance coins indicate a political or perhaps rather only a sympathetic connection with Boeotia. Later the same type appears on the coins of Cyzicus and Lampsacus, which were threatened by Persia, and on those of Croton and Zacynthus, which viewed with apprehension the expansion of Syracuse; it indicates in the case of all these cities a consciousness that, widely sundered as they were in space, their cause was the same.

It was clear that Sparta required not a soldier, but a statesman of the type of Lysander in order to detach Persia from the cause of the confederates. The attempt was actually made in 392 B.C. through Antalcidas. Sparta offered to surrender all the Asiatic cities on condition that the islands and cities of Greece should be autonomous—in other words, that Hellas should be completely disintegrated. These proposals meant for Thebes the loss of supremacy over Boeotia, for Argos isolation from Corinth, for Athens the surrender of her newly recovered allies in the Aegean area. Envoy's from the confederates were sent to counteract the representations of Antalcidas. The result was to deprive Athens of Conon, who was arrested by Tiribazus, the successor of Tithraustes as Satrap of Ionia, on the ground that he had injured the king; it was true that his work in the Aegean was of dubious

Attempt of
Sparta to Detach
Persia from
the Allies.

Imprisonment
and Death
of Conon.

value from a Persian point of view. Conon was carried up to Susa and there executed, or according to another account he escaped to Cyprus and died there of disease. The negotiations of Sparta proved fruitless.

§ 266. The war by sea was a series of raids and counter-raids on the part of the Spartans, Gorgopas and Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, stationed on Aegina, and the Athenian Chabrias, who appears now for the first time. On land it was also a warfare of raids between the mercenaries on either side. On the side of the allies the man of mark was

^{Military Re-}
^{forms of}
^{Iphicrates.} Iphicrates of Athens, who took in hand the improvement of the light troops (*ψιλοί*), which hitherto had been of little use in regular Greek warfare. Demosthenes had learnt by bitter experience on the Aetolian hills that the hoplite might be sometimes at their mercy (426 B.C.), and he had used at Sphaeteria the variety of light-armed troops called Peltasts.

^{Peltasts.} The accoutrement of the peltast was originally simply that of a Thracian highlander—a javelin or two (*ἀκόντια*) like the Zulu assegai, a target (*πέλτη*) of leather, and a dirk (*εγχειρίδιον*) for close combat. The problem before Iphicrates was to combine the mobility and manoeuvring power of light troops with the hoplite's steadiness and effectiveness in close combat. He lengthened both javelin and dirk, and strengthened the target, and so put the peltast more on a level with the heavy-armed hoplite; he also invented some kind of footgear which was called by

^{New Light}
^{Infantry.} his own name. The result of these changes was a light infantry of a value much nearer that of the hoplite than was the case with the old light-armed troops.

§ 267. In 391 B.C. Agesilaus reopened the gate of the Peloponnese by breaching the Long Walls, twelve stades in

length, which joined Corinth to Lechaeum, her port on the western gulf. Teleutias with the fleet co-operated and captured Lechaeum itself. Next year the king penetrated to the territory of Peiraeum, the headland projecting into the Corinthian gulf formed by the westernmost spurs of Mount Geraneia. Here he commanded the communications between Corinth and Creusis, the Boeotian port. Theban delegates, as a consequence, actually appeared in his camp to discuss terms of peace when news was brought which changed the situation.

It was an ancient privilege of the hoplites of Amyclae when on active service to return home for the festival Hyacinthia (held in July). On this occasion they had been escorted past the walls of Corinth by a battalion (*mora*) of hoplites, six hundred strong, and its regiment (one hundred) of cavalry. The infantry returning unsupported by the cavalry were attacked by the peltasts of Iphicrates. Again and again the Lacedaemonians charged in sections, but could not get within range of their nimble adversaries. The pick of the hoplites had already fallen when their cavalry rejoined them ; but the Lacedaemonian cavalry, never very good, were unwilling to charge home. When Athenian hoplites under Callias came to support Iphicrates, the Lacedaemonians broke and fled. A mere handful survived. Confession of defeat had already been made by the request for the dead under the usual truce before Agesilaus could reach the scene of the disaster. The moral effect of this affair resembled that produced by the capture of the Spartans in Sphacteria thirty-five years previously.

§ 268. The action of Athens herself turned Persian favour in the direction of the Spartans. Against their own apparent

interest, the Athenians voted to assist Evagoras, who, as the friend of Conon, had actually been presented with Athenian citizenship, against Persia. Their first squadron of ten ships fell into the hands of Teleutias, who was cruising near Rhodes, but a second was sent under Chabrias in 388 B.C. "It was a curious instance of cross-purposes on the part of the two belligerents. Here were the Athenians, supposed to be on friendly terms with the Persians, sending assistance to Evagoras, who was at open war with them; and here again was Teleutias, the admiral of a people at war with Persia, crippling a fleet which had been sent on a mission hostile to their own adversary."* The revolt of Evagoras was serious, for he had made himself master of nearly the whole of Cyprus, and had captured Tyre, and stirred up rebellion in Cilicia, and allied himself with the rebel king of Egypt. He was brilliantly supported by Chabrias. In spite of the heavy pressure of the war upon her finances, Athens had also recovered her hold upon the Hellespont through the skill and bravery of Iphicrates, who had been sent thither from Corinth.

§ 269. Under these circumstances the diplomacy of Antalcidas, who had again gone to Susa, was at last successful. And just at the last moment the Spartans, aided by twenty ships sent by Dionysius of Syracuse, and by Persian reinforcements, were able to blockade the entire Athenian fleet in the Hellespont—the situation as it was after the Blockade of the Athenian Fleet. victory of Aegospotami was reproduced (387 B.C.). Consequently, now that the only power which could effectively combat Sparta was rendered harmless, the belligerent Greek states consented to send their repre-

* Xenophon, *Hellen.*, iv. 8. 24 (Dakyns).

sentative to Sardis to hear the king's rescript. It ran as follows: "King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, with the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, should belong to him; that he should leave independent the rest of the Hellenic cities, both small and great, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyrus—these shall belong to the Athenians, as of old. Should either of the belligerents not accept this Peace, I will war against them, with those who are in agreement with me, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money."

The representatives reported these terms to their several cities, and then met at Sparta to swear to ^{Thebes and the Peace.} them. Thebes, it is true, wished to take the oath on behalf of all the cities of Boeotia, whereas all the other cities swore each for itself. One of the main objects of Sparta would thus have been defeated, but the threat of war compelled the Thebans to recognise the Peace unconditionally and to swear to respect the independence of the Boeotian towns (386 B.C.). This Peace, called the King's Peace, or the Peace of Antalcidas, remained the basis of the political organisation of Greece until the supremacy of Macedon.

The Peace of
Antalcidas
(387 B.C.)

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA (SECOND PERIOD).

§ 270. Effects of the Peace of Antalcidas; Position of Sparta.—

§ 271. Policy of Sparta; Dismantling of Mantinea.—§ 272. The League of the Chalcidians; its Growth and Extent; Opposition of Acanthus and Apollonia; Sparta Decides to Suppress the League.—§ 273. Parties at Thebes; Policy of Sparta towards Thebes.—§ 274. The Theban Citadel (the Cadmeia) seized by Phoebidas; Execution of Ismenias.—§ 275. Restoration of Plataea.—§ 276. Dissolution of the Chalcidian League; Reduction of Phlius.—§ 277. Conspiracy of Pelopidas; the Liberation of Thebes.—§ 278. Attitude of Athens.—§ 279. Attempt of Sphodrias to Seize the Peiraeus; Discussion of its Motive.—§ 280. Alliance between Athens and Thebes; the Spartans Beaten by Pelopidas at Tegyra.

§ 270. THEBES suffered most by the Peace, for by the
Effects of the forcible dissolution of her nascent supremacy in
Peace on Boeotia she sank at once to the position of a
Thebes third-rate state, over-topped even by her hated
rival Orchomenos, as the latter had the support of Sparta.
Argos and Corinth lost the advantages of their short-lived
federation, and for Corinth in particular the withdrawal
of the Argive garrison meant the return of her exiled
oligarchs, and a relapse into the position of a
—on Athens— member of the Spartan confederacy. Athens
was obliged to give up what she had already regained of her
old empire, although she retained her walls, her fleet, and
the islands of the Thracian sea—the basis at any rate of
that empire; she had entered upon the war as a mere

subject of Sparta, but stood at its conclusion an independent state of the first rank. Sparta derived the chief benefit, from an external point of view, as she was the "champion" (*προστάτης*) of the Peace, the vague final clauses of which left a large opening for tyrannical interference with the other states. Morally, the Peace marked the complete downfall of Sparta, as by it she not only surrendered the Asiatic cities, once the cradle of Greek culture, but betrayed even continental Greece to practical dependence upon the king's will—which was at least half of what Darius and Xerxes had required a century previously. The only safeguard lay in the fact that the power assumed by Persia had as little foundation in reality as had the pretensions of Sparta to care for Greek autonomy.

§ 271. How little Sparta had taken to heart the lesson of the war was soon proved. Agesilaus and the Spartan Ephors were too dull politicians to do anything but tread once more the path which had led to disaffection and revolt. Just as Elis had been invaded in 399 B.C., at once to wipe off old scores and to point the moral for others, so now in 385 B.C. the Arcadian Mantinea was dismantled, and its inhabitants dispersed in five villages—to enjoy, forsooth, the autonomy guaranteed by the King's Peace.

§ 272. In the far north of Greece Sparta carried out the same policy, for once more her attention was called to that region in which it was her destiny to intervene always with fatal effect—to the region of the Chalcidice. Although it was a city of this region, Potidaea, which had had so large a share in firing the train which brought about the explosion of 431 B.C., the Chalcidice, apart from the episode connected with the name of Brasidas,

had been but little touched by the turmoil of the last fifty years. Favourably placed with regard to Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, the Chalcidic cities of Olynthus. had greatly prospered. The pre-eminence of Olynthus, at the head of the gulf of Torone, was due to a concentration (*συνοικισμός*) of the coast towns, effected by the Macedonian king, Perdiccas, when Potidaea revolted (432 B.C.). Soon after the end of the Peloponnesian war the Olynthians and the neighbouring towns formed a federation called

^{The League of} *the Chalcidians*. “the League of the Chalcidians” (*τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Χαλκιδέων*), all the members living under the same laws, with common rights of intermarriage and property, and forming a single state. The exact relation of Olynthus to the federal members is not clear. The prosperity of the League is indicated by its beautiful coins. The turmoil in Macedonia after the death of King Archelaus favoured the expansion of the Chalcidians, for when King Amyntas, who was in alliance with them, was driven from his throne by the Illyrians, he

^{Accession of} *Macedonian Towns to the League—* handed over to the League the cities of Lower Macedonia and those round the head of the Thermaic gulf (385 B.C.). These towns became members of the League—a position which was doubtless a great improvement upon their old status as towns of the Macedonian kingdom, and when Amyntas returned

^{—and of} *Potidaea.* to the throne the League refused to abandon them. The accession of Potidaea to the League gave it the command of the peninsula of Pallene and easy communication with the Thermaic gulf and the Macedonian

^{Opposition of} *Acanthus and Apollonia.* members. In the north-east, however, Acanthus and Apollonia resolutely clung to their autonomy, and being threatened with force by the Chalcidian League, they sent Cleigenes of Acanthus to

ask for Spartan intervention (383 b.c.). The Peloponnesian confederacy decided to send an army; ^{Spartan Intervention.} an advance corps was sent out under Eudamidas, who was to be speedily followed by his brother Phoebidas with additional forces.

§ 273. The direct line from the Peloponnese to Olynthus lay through Boeotia. Parties were evenly balanced at this moment in Thebes, and of the Polemarchs, the chief officials, one, Leontiades, was a strong partisan of Sparta; another, Ismenias, as vigorous an opponent. As Spartan domination was based upon oligarchy, the national party, which aimed at seeing Thebes at the head of a united Boeotia, was driven into the arms of democracy, and it was from this alliance with democracy that the greatness of Thebes was born—a greatness short-lived, indeed, because centred in a single man, and also because democracy never thrrove in Boeotia. When the two parties were so evenly balanced, a little weight would turn the scale. Failure in the Chalcidice might be followed by the severance of Sparta's communications with the north, and a renewed combination of the disaffected elements in open hostility. For apparently even before this the Olynthians had entered into negotiations with both Thebes and Athens, if they had not actually concluded a treaty with the former. Consequently, although the evidence available does not allow us to say that the seizure of the Theban acropolis was planned in Sparta, it needed no preternatural shrewdness on the part of Phoebidas to feel assured that the home authorities would support him—in the event of success.

§ 274. The affair was almost ridiculous. The Lacedae-monians, who had encamped just outside the city, got in

motion as if to resume their march to the north, but were led straight to the citadel by Leontiades. The Seizure of the Theban Citadel streets were almost deserted, as it was noon (the Cadmeia) by the Spartans of a hot summer's day; the citadel itself was (382 B.C.) also just then tenanted only by the Theban women, who were celebrating the Thesmophoria. Leontiades himself bore the news of the occupation of the citadel to the Theban senate, and arrested Ismenias; the rest of the anti-Spartan leaders made haste to cross the frontier to Athens (383 or 382 B.C.). Thus without a blow Thebes was completely in the power of Sparta, and that by the action of her own oligarchical faction. With solemn hypocrisy Phoebidas was court-martialled. Agesilaus showed himself here also a true Spartan; if the deed brought advantage to Sparta, he explained, it was a time-honoured custom to allow full scope for acts of that sort! In deference to the outraged sentiment of Greece, Phoebidas was condemned to pay a fine, but its very amount proves that this was not meant seriously, and in 378 B.C. he reappears as Harmost in Thespiae. The Cadmeia it was resolved to hold at all costs. The last touch was given to

this picture of Spartan hypocrisy by the trial
Trial and Execution of Ismenias on a charge of
Execution of Ismenias.

“playing into the hands of the barbarian, of seeking friendship with the Persians to the detriment of Greece.” Thus the Spartans took their revenge for the wounds inflicted upon them by Ismenias when he was general in the Corinthian War in 395 B.C.

§ 275. Probably it was after the seizure of the Cadmeia that Plataea was restored. It was the Spartans Restoration of Plataea. themselves who forty-five years previously had delivered over that town to the Thebans for destruction; it was now restored, professedly in accordance with the King's

Peace, which obviously did not apply, but in reality to complete the humiliation of Thebes and to secure the Spartan hold upon Boeotia ; the restoration would also tend to sow enmity between Athens and Thebes, for Athens had always extended her sympathy to Plataea. The remnant of the Plataeans was at this moment actually domiciled in Athens since their expulsion from Scione at the end of the Peloponnesian war.

§ 276. The war with Olynthus proved more serious than was anticipated. Teleutias conducted it with the help of Amyntas, but he fell in action with heavy loss (381 B.C.). King Agesipolis himself took the field, but died of fever (380 B.C.). Next year Polybiadas forced the Olynthians to capitulate. Their League was dissolved, its component towns entering per-
force the Lacedaemonian confederacy. Amyntas regained the cities he claimed, and thus was destroyed a bulwark of Greece against the steadily growing power of Macedon. The downfall of the Olynthian League in the north, and the reduction of the recalcitrant city of Phlius in the Peloponnese to impotence in the same year, left Sparta once more uncontestedly mistress of Greece.

Dissolution by
Sparta of the
Chalcidian
League
(379 B.C.)

Reduction of
Phlius.

§ 277. The Theban democrats found shelter in Athens, who thus repaid the debt incurred twenty-five years before, when Thebes gave asylum to Thrasybulus and his comrades. One of the exiles, named Pelopidas, and another, Melon, organised a conspiracy for the recovery of Thebes. Perhaps even the daring of Pelopidas would have been of no avail had the exiles not had friends in Thebes—Charon, a citizen of repute, and Phyllidas, the secretary of the Polemarchs. The story of the liberation reads like a chapter of romance. On a December day (379 B.C.) the chief conspirators,

Conspiracy of
the Theban
Exiles.

seven in number, cautiously crossed Moun in the guise of hunters. Under cover of day approached the city, and lay in hiding all night. Towards nightfall, as though they were belated from the fields, they made their way, скривившись от снегопада, into the town by different routes. During that night and the following day sheltered in Charon's house. On the following day Phyllidas, according to arrangement, gave a banqueting entertainment to the two Polemarchs, whose year of office then came to an end. The entertainment was to wind up with the introduction of some of the beauties of Thebes to the revellers. In the last moment, it was said, the plot came very near being discovered. A messenger arrived in hot haste from Athens with full details of the conspiracy, but Archias, the Polemarch, thrust it under his cushion unopened, and exclaimed, "Business to-morrow."Flushed with excitement, Archias and his friends called upon Phyllidas to keep his promise, and with affected modesty there entered the house of Charon and their comrades, dressed as women. The masqueraders had little trouble in despatching the two Polemarchs and the few friends with whom they were associated.

*Assassination
of the Pole-
marchs.*

The meantime Pelopidas and others had gone to the house of Leontiades—a more secret errand, for Leontiades was a brave man and stood by Cephisodorus before he fell beneath the hand of Epameinondas. When this was done Epameinondas refused to take part in a deed of blood, though he was a man of honour for his country, appeared with a select body of Thebans, horse and foot, were summoned to the frontier, seeing that the tyrants were dead. Messengers were sent to hurry up the main body of the exiles who had taken arms upon the frontier, and in the morning they

monian garrison found itself beset in the Cadmeia. The Lacedaemonian generals had sent at once for aid from Plataea and Thespiae, but these reinforcements were beaten off without difficulty. As it was mid-winter, rescue from Sparta would be long in coming, if it came at all. So the Harmosts agreed to evacuate the citadel in return for safe-conduct of their troops and arms to the border. Two of them paid at Sparta with their lives for their pusillanimity, and the third was fined; but the fact still remained that Thebes was lost, and all Boeotia with her.

Surrender of
the Spartan
Garrison in
the Cadmeia
(379 B.C.).

§ 278. If the Theban patriots reckoned upon open support, they had miscalculated. Two of the Athenian Generals and some Athenian troops ^{Athens does not Support the Thebans—} had indeed aided the outbreak, but the Assembly gave no official support. Athenian neutrality was justified, and perhaps partly caused, by the prompt and vigorous display of force made by the Spartans. King Cleombrotus, brother and successor of Agesipolis, at once marched into Boeotia with an army, but the Thebans would not fight, and he withdrew, leaving Sphodrias in Thespiae. ^{—and Punishes the Strategi who helped them.} Anxious above all things to avoid a breach with Sparta, the Athenians tried the Generals who without authorisation had taken part in the recent events; one was executed, the other went into exile.

§ 279. It was the Spartans themselves, or rather the Harmost Sphodrias, who threw Athens into the arms of Thebes. Sphodrias tried to emulate the exploit of Phoebidas. Starting at dusk from Thespiae, he proposed to seize at dawn the Peiraeus, which was still ^{Attempt of Sphodrias to Seize the Peiraeus (379 B.C.).} incompletely fortified. He overrated the powers of his men, and daylight surprised him as he descended into the Thriasian plain, in which Eleusis lay.

He was therefore obliged to retire, ravaging the country as he went. Athens demanded satisfaction. Even Sphodrias felt that death awaited him at Sparta, and preferred voluntary exile, but once more Agesilaus came to the rescue of the situation with the argument that Sparta could ill afford to lose a man who had given such excellent proof of truly Spartan genius! So Sphodrias was acquitted;

^{Sphodrias} _{Acquitted.} he had given proof, at all events, of colossal folly in imagining that fourteen or fifteen hours was sufficient allowance for a march in the dark over the forty miles that lay between Thespiae and Peiraeus.

The truth about this *coup* that failed will never be known. Some at the time thought that its originator was Cleombrotus himself; others that Sphodrias was bought by the Thebans, who wished to force the hand of Athens, and compel her to declare against Sparta. What, however, if the Peiraeus had been taken? Athens would in that case have been forced into war; but with her port and arsenal already occupied by the enemy she could have given little

^{Was the Attempt Planned in Sparta?} help to Thebes. Or was the attempt not deliberately planned in Sparta? The peace-party was at that moment supreme in Athens, but there was no guarantee that such a condition of things would last. If the surprise succeeded, Thebes would be left without any effective assistance, and at the worst Sparta would only be faced by a combination which she had reason to fear would sooner or later be set on foot against her. Her misfortune was that her instrument, no doubt the best to hand, was not an officer with the skill and dash of a Brasidas or Teleutias; the latter in 388 B.C. had actually raided the Peiraeus.

§ 280. The acquittal of Sphodrias was practically an official sanction of his breach of the peace, and Athens

had no choice but to side with Thebes (378 B.C.). The Peiraeus was put in a state of defence, new Alliance of ships were laid down, and aid sent to the Thebes against Thebans. Agesilaus during two years invaded Sparta. and ravaged Boeotia, but the Thebans upon the whole were successful in their defensive war against him; he refused to try conclusions with the combined Theban and Athenian forces, the latter under Chabrias. Phoebidas was slain by the Thebans. King Cleombrotus, who led the invasion of 376 B.C., actually failed to cross Mount Cithaeron. In 375 B.C. Pelopidas, at the head The Sacred Band. of three hundred chosen hoplites of the noblest families, called the Sacred Band, defeated in open fight two Lacedaemonian *mora*e at Tegyra, between Orchomenos and the country of the Opuntian Locrians; the moral effect of the victory was great. In her eight years' war with Boeotia on land Sparta had to confess herself beaten, and at sea against Athens she fared no better. Battle of
Tegyra
(375 B.C.).

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE SECOND ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY.

§ 281. Revival of Athenian Naval Power brought about by Conon and Thrasybulus.—§ 282. Effect on Athens of the Peace of Antalcidas; the Second Athenian Confederacy; its Origin, Object, and Constitution.—§ 283. Its Administration and Membership; its Weak Point.—§ 284. The Battle of Naxos: its Results; Expedition of Timotheus.—§ 285. Operations at Corcyra; Timotheus Superseded and Tried; Policy of Callistratus.—§ 286. Plataea and Thespiae Destroyed.—§ 287. The Peace of Callias: its Terms; Claim of Thebes to Represent Boeotia; the Thebans Excluded from the Peace.—§ 288. The Question at Issue between the Spartans and the Thebans.

§ 281. It was the ambition to recover their empire that had caused the Athenians to join the Thebans against Sparta in the Corinthian War. The restoration of Athens to her old position as mistress of the Aegean was the work of Conon, who, however, could have done nothing without Persian aid; thus the city which once had baffled the Persian expansion westwards owed her own restoration to the circle of first-class states to that very power eighty-seven years later. After the battle of Cnidus Conon formed alliances in the Athenian interest with various Asiatic towns and islands of the Aegean, and by his work in Athens itself he encouraged the hope of winning back the empire. A fleet was the first necessity, and heavy burdens were laid upon the rich to create one. Athens seems to have recovered without difficulty her old cleruchies, Lemnos, Imbros, and

Scyrus. This policy led to Conon's arrest by Tiribazus in 392 B.C., as already related, but not before his chief work for his city was done.

The work of Conon was developed by Thrasybulus in 390 B.C., when he was sent with forty ships (the ^{—and of} largest fleet mustered by the Athenians since ^{Thrasybulus.} the Peloponnesian War) to help the democrats of Rhodes. Instead of sailing straight to Rhodes, he turned to Thrace and the Hellespont, for if ever the resurrection of Athenian power was to take place the northern highway of trade and food-supply must be recovered. Thrasybulus brought over Thasos, Samothrace, the Thracian ^{Thrasybulus Restores} Chersonese, Byzantium, and Chalcedon; like ^{Athenian} supremacy in ^{Thrace—} Alcibiades after the battle of Cyzicus, he imposed a toll of 10 per cent. on all vessels passing through the straits. Continuing his victorious career, Thrasybulus defeated and slew the Spartan Harmost in ^{—and at Lesbos.} Lesbos, and established Athenian supremacy over most of the island. He also won over Clazomenae. He appears to have imposed tribute, in its later form of a duty of 5 per cent. upon imports and exports. As he made his way southwards, he made descents ^{His Death} upon the Asiatic coast to raise money. At ^{(389 B.C.).} Aspendus in Pamphylia he was attacked by night in his tent by the inhabitants, and slain (389 B.C.).

§ 282. Thus Athens seemed to have embarked once more upon a career of maritime supremacy. The Peace of Antalcidas therefore struck a blow ^{Effect on Athens} of the Peace of ^{Antalcidas.} not so much at the Thebans as at the Athenians, for the king's claim to the Asiatic cities meant that they must give up all that Thrasybulus had won, and compelled them to withdraw from the Thracian and insular possessions regained during the past few years, with the

exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyrus—a bribe to secure Athenian assent to the Peace. However, ^{She forms Alliances.} she silently assumed the right to conclude alliances with various states, as with Chios, Mytilene, and Byzantium, on the general basis of the King's Peace. In this way Athens would again gradually have re-created a League, but events in Greece gave impetus to the movement. History so far repeated itself that, just as the First Confederacy of Delos became an Athenian instrument through the misconduct of the Spartan Pausanias, so the Second Athenian Confederacy was based professedly upon resistance to Spartan oppression, especially against such treacherous actions as the seizure of the Cadmeia and the ^{Origin of the Second Athenian Confederacy.} attempted capture of the Peiraeus. The raid of Sphodrias was thus the direct occasion of the formation of the Second Athenian Confederacy, but everything had been prepared for it, and it was only the last step that was taken in 377 B.C.

In that year Athens invited all states, both Greek and foreign, except those that were under the sway of the Great King, to combine in an anti-Spartan defensive league. In the archonship of Nausinicus, Aristoteles, of the deme of Marathon, proposed in the Assembly a decree which ^{Object of the Confederacy.} embodied the principles of the League; the original stone upon which the decree and the names of the members of the League were inscribed is still in existence. The object of the League was "to force the Lacedaemonians to allow the Greeks to enjoy peace in freedom and independence with their lands unviolated." The Persian king was recognised as lord of the Asiatic cities. Athens guaranteed in no way to interfere with the constitution of the cities of the League, and expressly renounced all pretensions to colonial posses-

sions—*i.e.*, to cleruchies; the having and holding by the Athenian state or individual Athenians of house or lands “by purchase or mortgage or any other means whatsoever” in the territories of the allied cities was forbidden under penalty of confiscation.

The League was divided into two parts—on the one side Athens, on the other the allies. The allies formed a congress (*συνέδριον*) sitting in Athens permanently, upon which every state, irrespective of its size or importance, was represented; Athens herself had no voice in it. Whatever the congress of allies approved was laid before the Athenian Assembly, which either accepted or rejected the motion; and the congress was free to deal in the same way with proposals coming before it from the Athenian Assembly. In certain cases—*e.g.*, of treachery to the League—the congress was paramount, having the same power of dealing with an Athenian as it had of judging any of the allies.

§ 283. The allies paid “contributions” (*συντάξεις*) to the war-chest of the League; the old term “tribute” (*φόρος*) with its odious associations was not employed; so much virtue was there in a name! The administration of the funds of the confederation, and the leadership in war, remained in the hands of the Athenians.

The first states to join the League were Chios, Mytilene, Methymna, Rhodes, Byzantium; then Tenedos, Thebes, Chalcis, and Eretria and other Euboean towns joined. The accession of Corcyra, Jason of Pherae in Thessaly, the Molossian prince Alcetas, and other states in the Aegean and the west, brought up the number of members to about seventy. The weak point of the League lay in its

professed aim, of preserving the independence of Greece against Sparta—an aim much more readily attainable than the safeguarding of Greece against Persia, the aim of the old Delian Confederacy; consequently the disruption of the union was a contingency that was bound to be faced very soon, and as a matter of fact the League soon fell to pieces, and never attained high political importance.

§ 284. Two years after its foundation the Athenians won back their control of the seas by a great victory between Naxos and Paros over the Spartan admiral Pollis. Pollis had been blockading the Attic coast, and with his fleet of sixty triremes cutting off the corn-ships coming from the Euxine. The Athenians under Chabrias, with eighty ships, were completely victorious, only eleven Peloponnesian vessels escaping. Chabrias might have captured these also, but he was afraid to follow up the pursuit, remembering the fate of the Generals who commanded at Arginusae. This was the first victory at sea won with their own ships by the Athenians since the Peloponnesian war; Conon's victory at Cnidus was won with Persian vessels. The result was that Naxos and most

of the Cyclades joined the Athenian League

(376 B.C.); next year Chabrias sailed to Thrace and won over many states. Another result of the victory was that the Athenians were emboldened to display their energy in the West, and Conon's son, Timotheus, carried

sixty ships round the Peloponnese, and cruised in the Ionian sea. The powerful island of Corcyra, Alcetas of Epirus, the Cephallenians, the Acarnanians, of old loyal allies of Athens, were his contribution to the League (375 B.C.). In these operations Thebes refused to co-operate either with ships, money or

men, and the discontent of the Athenians, who also saw with alarm and jealousy the continued success of the Boeotians, disposed them to peace between Athens and Sparta. In 374 b.c. peace between Sparta and Athens was actually made.

§ 285. The peace was almost immediately broken, because Timotheus on his way home assisted certain exiled democrats of Zacynthus in establishing themselves in their island. The Spartans retaliated by sending Mnasippus with sixty ships to recover Corcyra. This fleet was largely composed of Corinthian ships, so that the war in this quarter was really the old question of 431 b.c. over again—the question of the command of the Ionian sea. The Corcyraeans suffered severely from famine, as Timotheus, who had been charged with their relief, had to waste months in collecting men and money in the Aegean. Timotheus was even deposed from the command, his place being taken by Iphicrates and Callistratus, in conjunction with Chabrias. The Corcyraeans in the meantime had relieved the pressure upon them by a successful sally, in which Mnasippus was slain. The siege was raised upon the news of the approach of Iphicrates; ten ships sent by Dionysius of Syracuse to reinforce the Lacedaemonians also fell into his hands. At the end of the year (373 b.c.) Timotheus was put upon his trial for neglect of duty. His accusers were Iphicrates and Callistratus. As so often in Athens, the trial before a jury took the place of the modern appeal to the country. The policy of Callistratus, the ablest orator and financier of the day, was based upon harmony with Sparta (the policy of Cimon before him); and the question really at issue was as to the future policy of Athens. Timotheus was acquitted,

Renewed War.
Operations at Corcyra.
Trial of Timotheus.
Policy of Callistratus.

but his credit was damaged and he retired for a time to Egypt.

§ 286. The decisive check administered to Sparta in the West gave Callistratus the power to force his policy upon both states. The ruthless energy with which Thebes was carrying through her policy of making herself supreme in Boeotia also alienated Athenian sympathies. Nothing contributed to this end so much as the treacherous seizure and destruction of Plataea by the Thebans (372 b.c.). It was unfortunate that owing to the strategic importance of Plataea and its stiff-necked refusal to acknowledge Theban claims this measure was inevitable for the Thebans. Once more the Plataeans found a home across the border. Thespiae shared the same fate a short time afterwards. The Thebans also attacked the Phocians, old friends of the Athenians. Under these circumstances the Athenians invited the Thebans, who were still nominally members of their League, to take part in a conference of the states at Sparta in the spring of 371 b.c. Among the Athenian envoys was Callias, hereditary Torchbearer in the Eleusinian Mysteries, and from him the Peace now concluded takes its name.

§ 287. All parties agreed to a general Peace on the basis of the principle affirmed by the King's Peace—that of the autonomy of all Greek cities. Sparta undertook to recall her Harmosts and her land and sea forces. The important difference between this Peace and that of Antalcidas was that the enforcement of the new treaty was left to any

state that might care to undertake it, while Effects of the Peace on Sparta none could be constrained to do so. In effect, and Athens, this dissolved the Spartan confederacy as well as any imperial relationship that Athens might arrogate

to herself in her dealings with her League. In addition, this clause freed Athens from the danger of being involved if trouble arose between Sparta and Thebes, while Sparta was well satisfied thereby to be assured of Athenian neutrality. To the Peace the Spartans swore on behalf of themselves and their allies; for Sparta always professed to recognise the autonomy of the members of her confederacy, and in fact did so: her rights were traditional and their limitations were well understood, and were in practice recognised by Sparta herself. Athens and her allies swore separately, state by state, which was simply in accordance with the relations existing by treaty between her and them. Thebes took the oath, possibly as a member of the Athenian League, but on the following day Epameinondas demanded that the signature "Thebans" should be altered to "Boeotians"—

Claim of
Thebes
to Represent
Boeotia.

a demand which amounted to a claim for the formal recognition of the supremacy which Thebes had actually acquired over the Boeotian towns. To this Agesilaus would not consent; the name of the ^{Thebes Excluded} from the Peace. Thebans was therefore erased, and they were declared to be deprived of all benefits of the Peace.

§ 288. The whole scene was a case of "diamond cut diamond." Epameinondas knew that when he wrote "Thebans" he meant one thing, while the Spartans meant another. To him the word was the expression of the political dream of Thebes—to reduce the other cities of Boeotia to complete dependence upon ^{Political Aims of Thebes in} Boeotia. herself, leaving them merely municipal freedom; to make them, not what the Demes were in Attica, for every Attican was *ipso facto* a citizen of Athens, but what the Perioeci were in Laconia. The futility of this lay simply in the impossibility of creating in Boeotia at one

stroke a state of things which in Laconia was the outcome of long years of immemorial warfare. The verdict of history had been given in the case of Laconia; in that of Boeotia it had been different—Orchomenos, Plataea,

Theespiae, and the other cities, had a past which ^{Their Futility.} justified them in refusing to surrender their political existence to further the schemes even of an Epameinondas. The only feasible policy for Thebes was to aim at a confederacy of the Peloponnesian type, and to have claimed to swear in the name of her allies as Sparta had just done; but it was just this qualified freedom that she was unwilling to grant to the Boeotians. If, however, the Boeotian cities refused to submit to obliteration, they had technical right on their side and the sentiment of Greece at their back, however desirable the unity of Boeotia might appear from a panhellenic standpoint.

The Spartans on their side quibbled diplomatically upon the fatal word “autonomy,” and persisted in applying it to Boeotian politics in a sense which they deprecated in the case of their own confederacy. The Boeotian towns were

^{Position of the Peloponnesian Allies.} to be sovereign units, absolutely independent of Thebes in all points; the independence of

the Peloponnesian allies, on the other hand, was limited by use and wont or by positive articles of treaty in a way that was outside discussion. The Peloponnesian states had long ago acquiesced in their position, just as the Laconian towns had acquiesced in theirs—and there was an end of the matter. Agesilaus was right in claiming that the historical genesis of Sparta’s position could not be held to

^{Agesilaus and the Theban Claims.} justify a present violation of right on the part of Thebes. In refusing, however, to concede to

Thebes any ground of right in her claims to be paramount he was wrong, for the Boeotian confederacy

in one form or another was among the oldest facts of Greek history. The difference between the two powers was fundamental. The unreasoning jealousy of the one and the self-respect of the other made other arbitrament than that of the sword impossible; and the astute Athenian diplomatist Callistratus, fully alive to this, warily looked on while the issue was contested. The appeal to arms was forthwith made, and twenty days after the exclusion of Thebes from the Peace Epameinondas stood triumphant upon the battlefield of Leuctra.

Policy of
Callistratus.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE SUPREMACY OF THEBES.

§ 289. Cleombrotus Marches against Thebes ; his Tactics.—
§ 290. Battle of Leuctra.—§ 291. Jason of Pherae.—§ 292. Effects of Leuctra ; Action taken by Athens.—§ 293. Democratic Reaction in the Peloponnese ; Argos ; Rebuilding of Mantinea : Panarcadian Federation.—§ 294. First Theban Invasion of the Peloponnese ; Epameinondas invades Laconia.—§ 295. Restoration of the Messenians by Epameinondas ; Foundation of Messene.—§ 296. Second Theban Invasion of the Peloponnese.—§ 297. Policy of Thebes in Northern Greece ; Expeditions against Alexander of Pherae and Ptolemy of Macedonia.—§ 298. Lycomedes Extends the Power of the Arcadian League ; the Tearless Battle ; Persian Rescript in favour of Thebes.—§ 299. Third Invasion of the Peloponnese by Epameinondas ; Death of Lycomedes ; Neutrality of Athens.—§ 300. Athenian Activity in the Aegean ; Timotheus Captures Samos, Potidaea, and Torone.—§ 301. Attempt of Thebes to become a Sea Power—§ 302. Pelopidas in Thessaly ; Battle of Cynoscephalae and Death of Pelopidas.—§ 303. Rift in the Arcadian League ; War with Elis ; Quintuple Alliance against Thebes.—§ 304. Fourth Expedition of Epameinondas into the Peloponnese ; his Attempt to Surprise Sparta ; his Cavalry Defeated by the Athenians.—§ 305. Tactics of Epameinondas.—§ 306. Battle of Mantinea ; Death of Epameinondas ; Terms of Peace.—§ 307. Last Expedition of Agesilaus.


§ 289. WHEN the Peace of Callias was signed, King Cleombrotus was in Phocis with a large army. The question now arose whether he should be recalled or be ordered at once to act against Thebes. A Spartan, Prothoos, alone remonstrated, urging that the army should be disbanded and voluntary contributions be then collected at

Delphi, together with troops, from those states that were willing to maintain the principle of autonomy against Thebes. Agesilaus and the war-party rejected this advice, and were justified in so doing, for negotiations with a view to peace having failed, ^{Policy of the Spartan War-Party.} the state of war with Thebes still continued. The Thebans should have refused to discuss terms until the Spartans withdrew from their borders. Clearly the engagement of the Spartans to disband their forces only held good towards those states with which they had actually concluded peace.

Cleombrotus was therefore instructed to issue an ultimatum to the Thebans, and in case of its rejection to march upon the Boeotian capital. The reply of Epameinondas was to occupy the defile at Coroneia through which the Lacedaemonians must pass if they invaded Boeotia from the west. The Spartan king proved himself no mean strategist. Marching southwards, and then along the coast by way of Thisbe, with Mount Helicon on his left, he suddenly descended upon Creusis, captured twelve Theban triremes and the town itself, thus securing his communications with the Peloponnese; then turning north-eastwards he advanced upon Thebes. Epameinondas and the Boeotians had fallen back in response to the Spartan movement and blocked the way at Leuctra; the king's clever attempt to surprise the capital and take the Boeotian forces in the rear had failed. In numbers the Boeotians were decidedly the inferior—perhaps six thousand to eleven thousand; there was only a bare majority among the seven Boeotarchs in favour of risking a battle as against the fatal alternative of standing a siege in Thebes.

^{Strategy of Cleombrotus.}
^{Epameinondas Bars the Way at Leuctra.}

§ 290. Epameinondas put in practice the tactics in which he had long been training his troops. Hitherto a battle between Greeks had been largely a question of weight



BATTLE OF LEUCTRA.

JULY 6, 371 B.C.

- | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| A. Army of Cleombrotus: | B. Theban Army before the action. |
| a. Right wing, Spartans. | C. "Phalanx" of Epameinondas. |
| b. Centre and left, Allies. | e. Centre. |
| c. Horse. | f. Horse. |
| | g. Sacred Band under Pelopidas. |
| | h. Right. |

applied without skill; the opposing forces joined issue simultaneously along the whole line, and the lines were of approximately equal depth (eight to twelve ranks). Epameinondas saw that the traditional deep formation of

the Thebans must break through a thin line, as at Delium in 424 B.C., and at Coroneia in 394 B.C.; but as it was impossible to deepen his line Epameinondas strengthened only one wing, “refusing” the other—*i.e.*, keeping it out of action and relying for victory upon the moral effect of breaking the enemy’s best troops. To oppose the picked Spartiates and Lacedaemonians on the enemy’s right, he massed his hoplites on the left to the unheard-of depth of fifty shields, while on the flank of this tremendous phalanx lay Pelopidas with the Sacred Band of three hundred men. The Boeotian horse was superior to the Lacedaemonian, so that the latter was driven in upon the centre of the troops standing in line. The great strength of the Lacedaemonians lay in that cohesion and steadiness and perfection of drill which enabled them to perform movements in the field that would have been fatal to other troops

Battle of
Leuctra
(371 B.C.)

Cleombrotus tried to use this power and to deploy to the right in order to outflank the Boeotians, but before the movement was completed Pelopidas with the Sacred Band was upon him, while Epameinondas bore down in front. Cleombrotus fell mortally wounded, and it was only by desperate fighting that the Spartans succeeded in bearing him from the field still living. Gradually weight began to tell, and the Spartans were pressed back up the hill to their camp. Their allies in the centre and left were never seriously engaged by the Boeotians, but were kept in check by the victorious cavalry. More than one thousand Lacedaemonians lay on the field, and of the seven hundred Spartiates that left the camp only three hundred returned to it. There was nothing for it but to confess defeat by asking for the burial truce (July, 371 B.C.).

The number of Spartiates slain proved that Spartan

Defeat of the
Spartans

soldiers still knew how to die; and the manner in which the Spartans at home received the news of the defeat showed that the old discipline was still operative. "It was the last day of the Gymnopaedia, and the chorus of men had just entered the theatre. The Ephors when they heard the news were grieved, as well they might be, but they did not dismiss the chorus, but allowed the contest to run its course. They gave the names of the fallen to the relatives of each, cautioning the women not to make wailing, but to bear their sorrow in silence. And next day you might see those whose relations were among the dead going about in public with bright and smiling faces, whilst of those whose friends survived there were few visible, and those with downcast gloomy countenances."*

Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, was sent with an army of relief, but at Aegosthena, in the Megarid, he met the defeated troops already returning, for, in the meantime, Jason of Pherae had arrived from Thessaly to the help of the Thebans, and had persuaded them to grant an armistice to the survivors, and allow them to retire unharmed. In the face of the combined armies the Lacedaemonians were compelled to acquiesce in this arrangement.

§ 291. Of the rise of the energetic and daring Jason, despot of Pherae, we know nothing. He comes before us just at the moment when, by force of arms and diplomacy, he had attained the position of Tagus, or commander-in-chief of all Thessaly. Pharsalus had in vain (about 372 B.C.) appealed to Sparta for help against him, but Sparta was no longer able to act as she had acted in 380 B.C. against Olynthus. For the first time Thessaly was united, under an able and ambitious prince whose

* Xenophon, *Hellen.*, vi. 4. 16.

Reception of
the News at
Sparta.

power extended on the one side into Epirus, where Alcetas was his vassal, and on the other to Macedonia. He allied himself with Thebes against Sparta, and it was doubtless because he could rely upon His Alliance with Thebes against Sparta. Thessaly that Epameinondas threw down the gauntlet to Agesilaus in 371 B.C. Jason also set to work to build a navy. He designed to make himself supreme in Greece, and to become the leader of Hellas in a crusade against the Great King. On his return from Boeotia, after the battle of Leuctra, he seized the opportunity of dismantling Heracleia on Mount Oeta, an outpost of Lacedaemonian power, thus securing the pass of Thermopylae. He intended a second appearance in Greece in the following year in a more striking character. As ruler of Thessaly he commanded a majority in the synod of the Delphian Amphictiony, and at Delphi at the ensuing Pythia he determined His Designs. to preside in person over sacrifices such as had His Assassination. never before been seen. There were sinister rumours that the sacred treasures were none too safe. In the midst of his large designs, which none knew, but all feared, Jason was assassinated at a review by seven young men (370 B.C.). Thebes, at any rate, breathed more freely when the tyrant was dead. With him disappeared the union of Thessaly, and all chance of greatness for that country. In this respect Jason resembles Epameinondas.

§ 292. The news of the Spartan defeat at Leuctra electrified the Greek world: the supremacy which had been the slow growth of centuries, Overthrow of Spartan Supremacy. the one great fact in Greek politics, linked on the one hand with the power of Persia, on the other with that of the despots of Syracuse, was overthrown for ever. A new power had sprung with a bound into the front rank.

Her soldiers were the first who had overcome the Spartans, those artists and craftsmen in war, in fair fight ; her general was such as had never yet been seen in Greece.

^{Reaction against Sparta.} Throughout the Peloponnese there followed a democratic reaction against Sparta ; a new political world was to be built out of the ruins of the old.

Athens contributed not a little to the dissolution of the Spartan confederacy by reminding its members of the independence guaranteed to them by so many treaties, but never realised. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Peace of 371 b.c., the states had obeyed the summons of Sparta to send their contingents to the army of Archidamus ; it was hard to break the custom of so many centuries. The

^{Athens takes place of Sparta as Champion of the Peace of Antalcidas.} Athenians therefore summoned a congress of the states at Athens to ratify the Peace of Antalcidas, and to pledge them to mutual defence of their liberties. No dissentient voice was raised except that of Elis. Thus Athens usurped the position held by Sparta in 387 b.c., of champion (*προστάτης*) of the Peace, but the only real result of the step was the weakening of the sense of dependence upon Sparta.

§ 293. In Argos the democratic reaction displayed itself in its most brutal form. The masses rose against the wealthy and beat out the brains of some twelve or fifteen hundred with cudgels. The demagogues who had roused the mob also fell victims to its fury. This massacre was known as the " scytalism " or " clubbing. "

The anti-Spartan spirit displayed itself in Arcadia with far-reaching results. The Mantineans at ^{Rebuilding of Mantinea.} once rebuilt and refortified their city, which Agesilaus had destroyed (in 385 b.c.). More than that, the hour had now come for the Arcadians to stand forth

as one people with something more in common than their name—as members of a federal state. The mutual jealousy of Tegea and Mantinea unfitted either for Panarcadian Federation. being the capital of the federation. A new city was created by the concentration (*συνοικισμός*) of some forty Arcadian villages. The site chosen was on both banks of the Helisson in south-west Arcadia, close to the Laconian frontier, and therefore admirably designed as a bulwark against Sparta to match Tegea in the eastern Arcadian plain. The city was laid out on a great scale, with a circumference of fifty stades, hence it was called Megale Polis, or Megalopolis, the "Great City." Its theatre was the largest in Greece. In a vast hall, attached to it, called the Thersilion, met the Federal Assembly, the official title of which was the Ten Thousand, for every Arcadian was a member. This assembly made war or peace, concluded alliances, and judged offences against the Panarcadian League. In the Thersilion there also sat the Federal Senate of fifty Damiorgi, representing the federal cities, exercising the usual executive and deliberative functions of a Greek Council (*Βουλή*). A permanent federal force called the Epariti, five thousand strong, was also maintained. The new city was a vast failure, and became a great desert, as a comic poet described it, but the federation itself existed until Alexander the Great dissolved it in 324 b.c. The date of the building of Megalopolis is uncertain; perhaps 369 b.c.

§ 294. The scheme of a united Arcadia was largely due to a certain Lycomedes, of Mantinea. In Tegea its supporters had to fight for the idea, but Agesilaus in vain appeared with an army in the Mantinean territory to hinder the movement. The Arcadians appealed for aid to Athens, and,

upon her refusal, to Thebes. This led to the first Theban invasion of the Peloponnese (winter, 370 B.C.).
First Theban Invasion of the Peloponnese (370 B.C.) The Thebans had just overcome the last vestiges of resistance to their supremacy in Boeotia; and the death of Jason had freed them from fear of Thessaly.

The Lacedaemonians had retired before Epameinondas and Pelopidas reached Arcadia, so that the primary object of the expedition had disappeared, but the opportunity of striking at Sparta in her own domain was too good to be lost. The invaders crossed the Laconian frontier by four separate

Epameinondas Marches on Sparta. routes, uniting at Sellasia. Finding themselves opposite Sparta, but on the left bank of the

Eurotas, they did not venture to assault the bridge, which was strongly guarded, but passed on to Amyclae, three miles to the south, and there crossed the river and advanced cautiously towards the capital again. Sparta had no walls, and her women had never seen an enemy's fires. Intestine dissension and the fear of a Helot rising added to the confusion and alarm. In this crisis Agesilaus Saves Sparta. it was the vigilance and energy of Agesilaus that saved the city. Soon also across Mount Parnon reinforcements came from the states still loyal, from Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius and the towns of the Argolic peninsula, and Epameinondas dared not risk an assault. He ravaged all Laconia between the Eurotas and Mount Taygetus, and returned to Arcadia.

§ 295. Epameinondas now carried out a great design—
Restoration of the Messenians. the restoration of the Messenians to the land of their forefathers. Though for ninety years the Messenians had been wanderers over the face of Greece, they had lived always with the hope of return to Messenia. Since their expulsion from Naupactus and Cephallenia, on

the fall of Athens, they had sojourned in Rhegium, Messana, and near Cyrene in North Africa; now they thronged back to Greece at the call of Epameinondas, and the land southwards from the Arcadian border, between the sea and the range of Taygetus, one of the most fertile regions in the Peloponnese, was once more their home. That remnant of the old population which had lived as the serfs of Spartan lords upon what had once been their own land, was restored to freedom, and combined with the returning exiles. It was a wonderful realisation of hopes long deferred, and a striking proof of the downfall ^{Helpless Condition of Sparta.} of Sparta that she was compelled to look on helplessly while one-third of her territory was torn from her, and large numbers of her own citizens were thus ^{New City of Messene.} brought to beggary and disfranchisement. A new city, Messene, was built on the western foot of Mount Ithome, the stronghold hallowed by the long defence of the ancestors of the new people. Messenia was "synoecised," like Attica in prehistoric days; ^{Synoecism of Messene.} for Messene was the real state, and the other towns of the land stood to it as the towns and Demes of Attica to Athens.

§ 296. Thebes was now becoming too strong in the Peloponnese, and it was not to the interest of Athens that Sparta should be too far depressed. ^{Defensive Alliance between Athens and Sparta.} Iphicrates was therefore sent to the Isthmus to threaten the Theban retreat. Soon Sparta and Athens joined in a defensive alliance, and the lines of Mount Oneium were occupied by their joint forces, the Athenians under Chabrias. Epameinondas broke through the lines, and won Sicyon to the Theban side, but ^{Second Theban Expedition into the Peloponnese.} other result of this second Theban expedition into the Peloponnese there was none (369 B.C.), so that

Epameinondas fell into disfavour, and was not re-elected Boeotarch for the following year. Possibly, however, the real purpose of the expedition was to effect a diversion in order to allow the Messenians to fortify their town without interruption.

§ 297. It was the course of affairs in Thessaly that brought back Epameinondas to power. Thessaly and the farther north began more and more to engage the attention of the Thebans, as it was in that quarter that Athenian designs were formidable. Jason had been succeeded by his

Alexander of Pherae. brothers, Polydorus and Polyphron. The former

was murdered by the latter, and he in turn by Alexander his nephew, who became Tagus of Thessaly, and showed himself a cruel tyrant. The Thessalians appealed first to Alexander of Macedon, who seized Larissa, Crannon, and other cities in his own interest. Then they appealed to Thebes, who could not allow the growth of a strong power in the north. The first expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly was contemporaneous with the second of Epamei-

*First Expe-
dition of
Pelopidas to
Thessaly
(369 B.C.)* nondas into the Peloponnese (369 B.C.). Under Theban protection the Thessalians revived their old federal union. The country was divided

into four political districts, corresponding to its geographical divisions. At the head of each was a Polemarch, with an Archon over all. Pelopidas also arranged a dispute between Alexander of Macedon (son of Amyntas) and Ptolemy of Alorus, rival claimants for the crown of Macedon. Scarcely was his back turned when his work there was undone, for Ptolemy murdered Alexander. The Athenian Iphicrates (who had been adopted as his son by Amyntas) also intervened with a fleet in support of Perdiccas and Philip, the sons of Amyntas. In order to combat this Athenian intervention, Pelopidas

reappeared in Macedonia (368 b.c.), and forced the regent Ptolemy to enter the Theban alliance and give hostages. One of these hostages was Philip, who thus lived for a few years in Thebes, gaining ^{Theban Intervention in Macedonia.} an insight into Greek politics and studying the methods of the greatest captain of the age.

On his return Pelopidas put himself in the power of his enemy Alexander of Pherae, who, relying on Athens, detained him. Athens, in fact, sent ^{Pelopidas a Captive of Alexander of Pherae.} Alexander thirty ships and one thousand troops. The leaders of the Theban punitive expedition were so incompetent that the soldiers called upon Epameinondas, serving then as a hoplite in the ranks, ^{Rescued by Epameinondas.} to save them. He performed his task brilliantly, and was elected Boeotarch, in which capacity he returned next year (367 b.c.) and forced Alexander to restore his captive.

§ 298. In the Peloponnese a new element of discord was at work, in the attitude and pretensions of the Arcadians. The guiding spirit was Lycomedes, whose programme was the emancipation of Arcadia from Boeotian and all other foreign influence. Arcadian power rapidly extended; Heraea and the Arcadian Orchomenos, which had hitherto stood aloof, were compelled to join the federation, which thus became truly pan-arcadian. Alliance was formed with Argos ^{Growth of the Arcadian League.} on the one side and Messene on the other.

Aided by a force of Celts sent by the tyrant of Syracuse, the Spartans under Archidamus invaded south-west Arcadia. As they were retiring the Arcadians and Argives cut them off and compelled them to fight to recover the road to Sparta. The Lacedaemonians charged with the courage of despair so fiercely that they swept all before

them. The Arcadians fled, pursued by the ruthless Celts. Of the Lacedaemonians, not a single man, it is said, fell.

^{The Fearless Victory (368 B.C.).} This, the so-called Tearless Victory (368 B.C.), was the first success gained by the Spartans since Leuctra, and the extravagant delight felt at Sparta showed how low she had fallen.

During the summer, Ariobarzanes, Satrap of Phrygia, had sent to Greece an agent, who, at a congress at Delphi, tried to arrange a general peace; but the attempt failed, as Sparta made the recovery of Messenia a *sine qua non* of her assent. Thebes then sent Pelopidas to Susa, whither

^{Persian Rescript in Favour of Thebes.} also envoys from the other states repaired. The king issued a rescript in the interests of

Thebes. Thebes, who hoped now to play the part played before by Sparta in connection with the King's Peace, but she was disappointed, for the congress of allies summoned to Thebes refused to accept the rescript.

§ 299. The reply of Thebes to this refusal to acknowledge her claims was the third invasion of the ^{Third Invasion of the Peloponnes by Epameinondas (366 B.C.).} Peloponnes by Epameinondas (366 B.C.). The object of this expedition was quite different ^(366 B.C.) from that of 369 B.C. On that occasion the object was to humble Sparta and support Arcadia; now, it was Arcadia that most stubbornly defied the will of Thebes; Sparta was no longer formidable. The expedition effected no permanent result, beyond making the breach between Thebes and her recalcitrant *protégé* irreparable. When in the same year Thebes seized Oropus, the Athenians and

^{Death of Lycomedes.} Arcadians made alliance. This was the last act of Lycomedes, who was murdered by some exiles into whose hands he fell; Arcadia thus lost the best man she had. Athens was now pledged to assist both Arcadia and Sparta, which were actually at war; this

meant, practically, that she remained neutral, an attitude that presented no difficulty, as the Peloponnese now ceased to be the scene of active warfare, more especially as Corinth also, with Phlius and the Argolic cities, made peace with Thebes, but without alliance with her or withdrawal from their alliance with Sparta. The price of this neutrality was their recognition of the independence of Messene.

§ 300. The real conflict lay now between Thebes and Athens, for Athens supported Arcadia and Sparta, unwilling to sacrifice either to Theban ambition; and at the same time she was pushing her supremacy in the Aegean and the north in a way that seemed likely to fetter Boeotia. The active and successful instrument of Athenian policy in the Aegean was Timotheus, who reduced Samos after a siege of ten months (365 B.C.). As the price of aid rendered to Ariobarzanes, who was now in revolt against the Persian king, the Athenians recovered Sestos and Crithote—a stepping-stone to the recovery of the entire Thracian Chersonese. Timotheus was now called to replace Iphicrates upon the Thracian station. Just at this moment there came a change of policy in Macedonia, where Perdiccas slew Ptolemy, the regent, and turned to Athens for support against Thebes (365 B.C.). Timotheus was therefore able to reduce the towns round the Thermaic gulf. He captured Potidaea and Torone, and compelled Pydna and Methone to join the Athenian alliance. Potidaea, like Samos, was occupied by Athenian cleruchs. Amphipolis, however, successfully resisted two attempts at capture; she was assisted by the resources of Olynthus at the head of the Chalcidian states, who herself was also menaced by the growth of Athenian power here

Athenian Activity in the Aegean.

Timotheus Reduces Samos—
and Potidaea and Torone.

§ 301. Epameinondas determined to contest with Athens the supremacy of the sea—a strange departure from the policy that would seem to have been imposed upon Boeotia by nature. At this time Boeotia had a coast both on the Euripus and the Corinthian gulf, and the important island of Euboea also belonged to her. In 364 B.C. the Boeotarch Epameinondas went to the Propontis with one hundred ships; the Thebans were determined to strike at the most vital point. The disaffected among the maritime allies of Athens were thus encouraged to revolt. It was clear from her sending a cleruchy to Samos—a breach of the spirit though not of the letter of the articles of association promulgated in 377 B.C.—that Athens was determined to regain her old imperial position. Byzantium rebelled; Rhodes and Chios negotiated with Epameinondas; even Ceos, close by the Attic coast, renounced her allegiance—only to be immediately reduced by Chabrias. Nevertheless, in spite of this initial success, the first attempt of Thebes to make herself a sea-power was also the last. In fact, the essential basis of sea power, mercantile relations, was, in her case, entirely lacking. Even Corinth, in spite of her advantageous position, was in this period a nonentity in politics, just because she had no trade. The revival of Athens was due simply to the fact that the loss of her empire had not meant the loss of her trade.

§ 302. Even if Thebes could have sustained the financial burden of maintaining a fleet continuously, events on land were bound to divert her energies. The last act of the short drama of Theban supremacy was soon now to be played. Whilst Epameinondas was at sea, Pelopidas fell upon Thessaly to assist the Federation against the designs of the tyrant of Pherae.

An eclipse of the sun (July 13th, 364 B.C.), which occurred before he left Thebes, was interpreted as a presage of ill. A battle took place for the possession of the hills of Cynoscephala ("Dog's Heads") between Scotussa and Pherae—the battlefield on which ^{Battle of} ^{Cynoscephala} ^{(364 B.C.).} nearly two centuries later the Roman legions under Flamininus were destined to vanquish utterly the phalanx of Macedon. The cavalry of Pelopidas drove off that of Alexander, but the infantry of the latter seized the heights, and it cost Pelopidas a hard fight to recover them. In the very moment of victory the Theban general caught sight of the Pheraean tyrant, and in a frenzy of passion dashed forward to smite him in the midst of his guards; so Pelopidas died, like Cyrus at ^{Death of} ^{Pelopidas.} Cunaxa. In the following year the Thebans sent another army, which compelled Alexander to withdraw from all his Thessalian conquests and bound him to subservience to Thebes.

It was probably also during the absence of Epameinondas that the Thebans seized the opportunity of getting rid finally of their ancient enemies, the Orchomenians. The town was destroyed, the men ^{Thebes Destroys} ^{Orchomenos.} slain, the women and children sold as slaves. The fate of the honourable and ancient city raised a cry of pity and horror throughout Greece. Not thirty years were to pass before the same doom would fall upon Thebes herself, now so desperately set upon maintaining her supremacy at home and abroad.

§ 303. In the Peloponnesian Arcadia seemed to be slipping entirely from Theban control. Ever since the death of Lycomedes there had been an ever-widening rift in the Arcadian League; the breach was widened through war with Elis. In the course

Rift in the
Arcadian
League.

of that war the Epariti actually occupied Olympia, and the Olympic Games of 364 B.C. were held under the presidency of the Pisatans, protected by the federal army. The

<sup>Battle of
Olympia
(364 B.C.)</sup> Spartans under Archidamus in vain tried to effect a diversion. The Eleans and Achaeans came against the Arcadians, and the sacred Altis became a battle-field. The treasures of the temple were also seized to pay the Arcadian army. This gave Mantinea the opportunity she sought of formally withdrawing from the League. In a curious way there thus came about a complete reversal of parts. Hitherto Tegea had always been the Arcadian outpost of Lacedaemonian power, and Mantinea bitterly hostile to Sparta; now Mantinea headed the separatist and philo-Spartan party in the League, while Tegea held by the unity of Arcadia

<sup>Quintuple
Alliance against
Thebes.</sup> in reliance upon Thebes. A quintuple alliance was formed between the Arcadians of Mantinea,

the Eleans, Achaeans, Phliasians, and Athenians, with their allies, for mutual protection; the Spartans would assist the Mantineans. The schism brought Epameinondas into the Peloponnese on his fourth and last expedition (362 B.C.).

<sup>Last Invasion
by Epamei-
nondas of the
Peloponnese
(362 B.C.)</sup> § 304. Epameinondas advanced rapidly southwards on his last campaign, at the head of a full muster of the Theban confederacy. The Phocians were not represented, as their alliance bound them only to lend aid in case Thebes was attacked. Pausing at Nemea, Epameinondas prepared to intercept the Athenians, but when he learnt that they would go by sea to Laconia, he marched to Tegea, his Arcadian base, where he was joined by the forces of the Theban party in the League along with the Argives and Messenians. The enemy concentrated upon Mantinea, where Epameinondas hastened

to offer battle before the Athenians arrived, but he found their position too strong and retired again to Tegea. He then determined upon a brilliant *coup*, which, if successful, would have ended the war at a stroke, and enabled Thebes to dictate terms to the Peloponnes. Marching rapidly from Tegea, he tried to surprise Sparta. He Attempts to Surprise Sparta. He would have found the city as unprotected as "a nest of young birds," had not a Cretan deserter run all through the night with the news of the advance to Agesilaus. In hot haste the Spartans fell back; it was a race for very existence, but the Spartans won, and fighting literally with their backs to the wall beat off the Theban assault.

Baffled here, Epameinondas dashed back to Tegea. His idea was that the Arcadians would be marching to succour the Spartans, and that he would find Mantinea undefended. His hoplites were worn out with their forced His Return to Tegea. night-march of thirty miles and could not get beyond Tegea; but, calling upon his weary cavalry for a desperate effort, Epameinondas advanced the remaining twelve miles to Mantinea. Here a second disappointment, unforeseen and unavoidable, awaited him. At the very moment of the Theban approach from the south the Athenian cavalry entered the city, having come after all by land through Cleonae. The conflict between the two troops of tired horsemen was short and sharp; the Thebans and Thessalians, more weary than their opponents, were repulsed. It was in this encounter that Gryllos, one of the sons of Xenophon, fell. He Fails to Capture Mantinea.

§ 305. The allies then drew together once more to Mantinea, twenty thousand strong, and Epameinondas must attack them on ground of their own choosing. They occupied the narrow part of the plain Position of the Allies.

three or four miles south of the city, blocking the road from Tegea. Epameinondas did not march directly to the gap, but north-westwards across the plain to the opposite hills. Seeing him move thus across their front at a distance

Tactics of Epameinondas. of several miles, the enemy concluded that he would not fight that day. When Epameinondas reached the foot of the hills, his column inclined to the right and crept slowly nearer to the foe; then halted as if to encamp. Suddenly the centre and rear companies turned from column into line. Thus the Thebans and Boeotians, who had been marching at the head of the column of march, now formed the strong column of attack which, as at Leuctra, was to bear all before it. The cavalry, which had probably been covering the right flank of the column, split into two bodies—one going to the left wing to act with the phalanx, the other advancing to *Dispositions for Battle.* seize a knoll out on the plain to the right front. Epameinondas had gained the position he sought—a line oblique to that of the enemy, which enabled him to throw his huge Theban phalanx upon the Mantineans and Lacedaemonians on the right and right centre of their line, while he refused his own right. The cavalry and men-at-arms posted on the knoll threatened the Athenian rear, if they, being on the enemy's left wing, should wheel inwards to attack the right flank of the charging Thebans.

§ 306. Before the enemy had realised these plans, the Theban column, "like the prow of a charging galley," was bearing down upon them in the wake of the *Battle of Mantinea* (362 B.C.) victorious cavalry, which had swept aside the Peloponnesian horsemen. The Lacedaemonian hoplites could not maintain cohesion at the point of impact; soon the fragments of the allied army were in flight, when

suddenly the arms of the victors were paralysed by the news that their great commander had fallen, pierced as he charged at the head of his troops. The story of the death scene has often been told. Epamei-^{Death of} Epameinondas. nondas lived long enough to know that victory was his, long enough also to know that it was useless. Iolaidas and Daimantus, the two generals he would have chosen to succeed him, had also fallen, he was told. "You must make peace," he said, as the fatal point was withdrawn.

A general peace was proclaimed on the basis of the *status quo* and the autonomy of all the states; the independence of Megalopolis and Messene was thereby recognised, though the Arcadian League remained severed as before the battle. Only Sparta refused acquiescence, but her protests fell upon unheeding ears, and she was too weak to enforce them. Lack of men and lack of funds were rapidly reducing her to complete exhaustion.

§ 307. It was to gain money that Agesilaus in his old age became a soldier of fortune. He led a Lacedaemonian force to the aid of Tachos, the rebel king of Egypt. Agesilaus in Egypt. Agesilaus was not accepted in Egypt at his own valuation, and so when in Egypt itself the standard of revolt was raised by Nectanebus, he gave him his support. Soon a second pretender arose who brought Nectanebus himself to the brink of destruction, but the latter was rescued by the skill of Agesilaus and the valour of his Greek troops. The outcome of this intestine strife was that the great coalition of Egypt and the rebellious Satraps of western Asia came to nought, and Artaxerxes reasserted his authority over Asia Minor. Sparta got what she most required—230 talents from Nectanebus in return for the services of Agesilaus. He did not live to see Sparta again, but on his homeward

His Death
(361 B.C.).

journey died near Cyrene at the age of eighty-four (360 B.C.). There is something pathetic in the old king's end. He had seen the great triumph of Sparta, and her great downfall—himself one of the guiding spirits of her policy during her thirty years of supremacy ; and, grey-haired and disappointed, he went forth on a degrading service to win as a mercenary the money which she needed in her sullen struggle with fate.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE GREEKS IN SICILY.

§ 308. Syracuse after her Victory over Athens; Democratic Advance.—

§ 309. Carthaginian Invasion of Sicily; Destruction of Selinus and Himera.—§ 310. Return and Death of Hermocrates.—§ 311. Conquest of Acragas by Carthage.—§ 312. Rise of Dionysius; he makes Terms with the Carthaginians in Order to Secure his Tyranny.—§ 313. Dionysius Strengthens Syracuse; his First War with Carthage.—§ 314. Dionysius's Second War with Carthage.—§ 315. Conquest of Greek Italy by Dionysius; his Power in the Adriatic.—§ 316. Dionysius at the Height of his Power.—§ 317. Dionysius's Third and Fourth Punic Wars; Death of Dionysius.—§ 318. Character of Dionysius; Result of his Reign; Secret of his Failure.—§ 319. Dionysius II.; Dion; Dionysius Trained by Plato; Banishment of Dion and Return of Plato to Greece.—§ 320. Dion Returns to Syracuse and Defeats Dionysius; he is Banished and Recalled; he Frees Syracuse from Dionysius.—§ 321. Dion's Political Method; he becomes a Tyrant; Murder of Dion.—§ 322. Second Tyranny of Dionysius; Carthaginian Invasion; Syracusan Appeal to Corinth.—§ 323. Timoleon Sent to Sicily.—§ 324. Dionysius Overthrown by Timoleon.—§ 325. Hicetas Overthrown and Syracuse Delivered by Timoleon; Syracuse Repeopled.—§ 326. Carthaginian Invasion of Sicily; Battle of the Crimisus; Peace with Carthage; Last Years of Timoleon.—§ 327. The Greeks of Italy in Conflict with Brettians and Lucanians; Aid Given to Taras by Sparta and by Epirus against the Lucanians.

§ 308. THE inhabitants of the great Dorian city of the West had passed through an experience very similar to that which sixty-five years previously had visited the forefathers of the Athenians who had tried to conquer them. Just as the Persians had been foiled in 480 B.C. on the straits of Salamis by the Greek fleet, so in 414 B.C.

had the bay of Syracuse seen the issue of the desperate struggle between the two most powerful of the Greek cities, the one fighting for freedom, the other staking her prestige and almost her very existence upon the attempt to enslave her fellow-Greeks. The victory over the Persians had launched Athens upon a career of empire and democratic development. What were to be the consequences of the victory so nobly earned by the Syracusans? In the first place,

^{Syracusan} ^{Struggle} ^{between Athens and Syracuse.} the premier rank among the Sicilian cities was assured to Syracuse; henceforth the future of Sicily.

the island lay with the Dorians. At the same time, the privilege of leadership entailed the responsibility of protection, and the championship of Hellenic civilisation in the island devolved upon Syracuse. This meant war with the Carthaginians at no distant period. As regards internal development, the experience of Athens after the Persian wars was repeated at Syracuse; there ensued a

^{Democratic} ^{Developments} ^{at Syracuse.} great advance in a democratic direction. This development was rendered easier by the fact

that Hermocrates, the real hero of the defence, but no democrat, was appointed to the command of the Syracusan squadron co-operating with the Spartan fleet in the Aegean (from 411 B.C.).* Consequently the democratic

^{Diocles.} party under Diocles had free scope for their innovations, which included, among other things, the adoption of the thoroughly democratic device of the lot in the appointment of magistrates.

§ 309. In 410 B.C. the renewal of the quarrel between Segesta and Selinus led to war with Carthage. Segesta Appeals to Carthage. Segesta, now that Athens could intervene no more, appealed to Carthage, where Hannibal, the grandson

* See p. 304.

of that Hamilcar who had fallen at Himera * seventy years before, thirsted for vengeance upon the Greek race. A great expedition was fitted out; Selinus was stormed and its population slaughtered to the merest remnant. Then Hannibal turned upon Himera. The Syracusan fleet succeeded in carrying half the population into safety at Messana, but the rest were massacred, three thousand of them being sacrificed after torture to the spirit of Hamilcar, and the city was utterly destroyed. Western Sicily was now entirely in Carthaginian hands.

§ 310. At this moment Hermocrates returned to Sicily. After the defeat of Mindarus at Cyzicus † (410 b.c.), Hermocrates had been deposed from his command by his government, and banished. By reoccupying Selinus and warring upon the Carthaginians, and by bringing home from Himera the bones of the Syracusans lying unburied before her ruined walls, he strove to secure recall. When all this failed, he broke into Syracuse by force, but was slain by the inhabitants along with most of his desperate band (407 b.c.). His Death.

§ 311. The Carthaginians next year renewed their attack. Their object was to make all Sicily a Carthaginian province. Acragas, the greatest city of the island next to Syracuse, was invested by Hannibal and his cousin Himilco (406 b.c.). Hannibal died of a pestilence which ravaged the Carthaginian camp, but the siege continued. As food ran short, the mercenaries, the main strength of the defence, deserted. When at last Dexippus, a Spartan who directed operations for the Acragantines, also deserted the town with the remnant

* See p. 230.

† See p. 308.

Siege of Acragas
by the Carthaginians.

of the hired troops, the whole population in despair determined to evacuate the place. All, with the exception of those too old or too sick to travel, fled by night, unmolested by the Carthaginians, to Gela ; some few, however, preferred to remain and die in the town. The Acragantines have been branded as cowards for this, but wherein does their conduct differ from that of the defenders of Plataea, or of the Athenians in the Persian wars, or of those modern Greeks who cut their way out of *Mesolonghi* through the Turkish lines in the War of Liberation in 1826 ?

§ 312. The fall of Acragas paved the way to the establishment of tyranny at Syracuse. One Dionysius, a man

^{Dionysius—} of obscure birth, who had been a partisan of

Hermocrates, gave voice to the popular dissatisfaction and alarm by accusing the Syracusan generals of treachery. The generals were deposed, and Dionysius and a new board were appointed. His intrigue took the usual course. Soon his colleagues were in turn accused by

^{—Elected General with full Powers (406 B.C.)} him of disloyal designs, and he was elected sole general with full powers. The last step was to procure a bodyguard. This was granted by the Syracusan army when Dionysius pretended that his enemies had tried to assassinate him. [The steps by which Dionysius gained his power, and the position that he held, are exactly paralleled by the history of the Athenian Peisistratus.]

The first exploit of Dionysius hardly justified his pretensions. The Carthaginians were by this time encamped before Gela. The plan of a combined attack upon their camp completely failed

^{Failure of his Attack on Carthaginians at Gela.} (405 B.C.). All that could be done was to evacuate the town and remove the population in a body ; the entire population of Camarina was also bidden to quit that

city and take refuge in Syracuse. So great was the revulsion of feeling produced by this sorry exploit, in which the good faith of Dionysius was with reason impugned, that an attempt was made by the Syracusan knights to subvert their tyrant. The knights, of course, belonged to the aristocratic families. The attempt failed, and Dionysius came to terms with the Carthaginians (405 B.C.). The Carthaginians were to retain their own territory in western Sicily, together with Acragas, Selinus, and Himera (on the site of which the Carthaginians had erected a new town called Thermae); Gela and Camarina were to be unwalled towns, paying tribute to Carthage; Leontini and Messana, as well as the Sicel communities in central Sicily, were to be independent. Lastly, the Syracusans were to be subject to Dionysius. Thus at the price of sacrificing Hellenic cities Dionysius gained from the national foe the guarantee of his own unconstitutional position, and the opportunity of consolidating his power.

§ 313. During the next few years Dionysius carried out those works of fortification which rendered Syracuse the strongest city in the Greek world. First he fortified the island of Ortygia, which served as the acropolis of Syracuse, to be his own impregnable castle. In 403 B.C. the citizens mutinied and besieged him, and he was only saved by the Campanian (*i.e.*, Samnite) mercenaries whom the Carthaginians employed in Sicily. Then he attacked the independent Sicel communities, and also made himself master of Catane, Naxos, and Leontini. Messana alone of all the Sicilian Greek cities now retained her independence. The Syracusan fleet was raised to three hundred ships; siege

engines hitherto unheard of were constructed, and immense stores of arms were accumulated. In 397 B.C. ^{Preparations against Carthage.} the Syracusan tyrant threw down the gauntlet to Carthage by demanding that the Carthaginians should give the Greek cities their freedom.

The tributary Greek cities hailed him as a deliverer.

^{Dionysius's First War with Carthage.} He captured Eryx, and after desperate efforts took the island-town of Motya by means of a mole and siege-towers. Next year, however, Himilco retook Motya and Eryx, and captured and razed Messana; the Syracusan fleet was defeated near Catane, and Dionysius was shut up and besieged in Syracuse. Thirty-two ships under a Lacedaemonian admiral arrived to his aid, but his chief ally was the malaria which decimated the forces of the besiegers. A night attack broke up the demoralised host. Himilco and the citizens of Carthage

^{Its Failure.} were allowed, under a secret agreement, to escape, but their allies and mercenaries were destroyed or enslaved. The result of this First Punic War of Dionysius was to confine the Carthaginians once more to the western corner of Sicily, and to leave ^{Carthaginians Confined to West of Sicily.} Dionysius directly or indirectly lord of the rest of the island. Probably the Carthaginians might have been entirely expelled, but in the menace of their continual presence lay the only guarantee of the Syracusan tyrant's position.

^{Second Punic War of Dionysius.} § 314. Five years later (392 B.C.) the Second Punic War broke out, but both the cause and the course of it are obscure. The Carthaginian general was Mago. Dionysius allied himself with the Sicels, especially Agyris, tyrant of Agyrium, and the Carthaginians sued for peace, explicitly acknow-

ledging the sway of Dionysius over eastern and central Sicily.

§ 315. With this date (391 B.C.) begins the third period into which the career of Dionysius falls—that of the conquest of Greek Italy. The prelude to this expansion was the refoundation of Messana in 396 B.C. In Italy itself Dionysius had an ally in Locri; his object was to capture Rhegium, which town, besides commanding the strait on its Italian side, had deeply offended Dionysius when he wished to marry a Rhenine maiden; the only wife he should have, he was told, was the hangman's daughter. The first attack was repulsed. Dionysius allied himself with the Lucanians, a people of Samnite origin then threatening the Greek cities from the north. The army of the combined Greek cities was defeated on the river Elleporus (389 B.C.), and their league shattered. Rhegium staved off the day of doom for a time by the surrender of her fleet. The end came in 387 B.C., when on feeble pretexts Dionysius invested the town. Under the leadership of Phyton, the Rhenines held out for more than ten months; on the fall of the town those who could not find means of ransom were sold into slavery; Phyton was executed with torture; the town was utterly destroyed. Eight years later Dionysius took Croton, and so became master of southern Italy (379 B.C.). His power extended into the Adriatic, where his colonies of Lissus in Illyria, Pharos and Issa (islands near the Illyrian coast), and his alliance with Alcetas, prince of the Molossians, secured at least some part of the commerce in this region for Syracuse.

§ 316. Dionysius was now at the zenith of his power. Even in Greece proper his influence was felt. It was the

Conquest of
Italian Greeks
by Dionysius.

Capture of
Rhegium—

—of Croton.

Settlements of
Dionysius in
the Adriatic.

weight of his alliance thrown on the side of Persia and Sparta that, in 387 B.C., had forced the Peace of Antalcidas upon Greece.* In 373 B.C. he assisted Sparta against Athens, and in 369 and 368 B.C. against Thebes.† The general feeling in Greece about the great tyrant of the West found expression in an incident which occurred at the Olympic Games of 384 B.C., when the Athenian orator Lysias raised a voice of warning against the dangers threatening Greece from Dionysius and Artaxerxes, the Persian king. A magnificent deputation from the Syracusan tyrant was present at the festival; such deputations were invested with a sacred character, but on this occasion this did not avail before the storm of angry feeling roused by the orator; the tents of the Syracusan envoys were torn to shreds, and the envoys themselves narrowly escaped violence at the hands of the infuriated mob.

§ 317. Apparently in 383 B.C. the Carthaginians renewed their warfare with Dionysius. Little is known of this Third Punic War. In one battle the Syracusans were victorious, and Mago, the Carthaginian commander, was slain. This occurred at Cabala, the site of which is not

<sup>Third Punic
War of
Dionysius.</sup> known. Soon another battle was fought, at Cronion, near Panormus, in which Dionysius was defeated (378 B.C.). He had to surrender all his territory west of the river Halycus, including the city Selinus.

For the next ten years we know nothing of the Syracusan empire. In 368 B.C. Dionysius began his Fourth Punic War. Fourth Punic War to win back the lost Greek territory. He captured Eryx and its harbour, Drepanon, and recovered Selinus. He next laid siege to Lilybaeum,

* See p. 338.

† See pp. 355 and 371.

the city founded by the Carthaginians on the bay of Motya to take the place of that town. Lilybaeum defied all his efforts, and when the Carthaginians captured nearly the whole of his fleet in the harbour of Drepanon, he was compelled to retire. Next year the great tyrant died. He was a writer of tragedies, and at last had won first prize at the Lenaean festival in Athens with a tragedy entitled *The Ransoming of Hector*; out of joy, it was said, at this tardy recognition, he drank so freely as to bring on a fever which killed him.

§ 318. Dionysius was not a truly great man; his aims were too personal. If he was ever conscious of his own significance in history as a champion of Hellenic—*i.e.*, European—civilisation against the Asiatic, he was, at the same time, always ready in the interests of his own ambitions to shut his eyes to his true mission. All that he did was done primarily for his own aggrandisement, and it is somewhat foolish to lay stress upon his championship of Hellenism. The net result of his thirty-eight years' reign was that the Sicilian domain of Carthage was lessened by the strip of territory which lay between the rivers Halucus and Himerus; some of the fairest Greek cities in the island had been abandoned to the enemy; others Dionysius himself had enslaved and destroyed; in Italy he was leagued with the Lucanians against the Greeks; everywhere his own unconstitutional rule replaced the free play of Hellenic autonomous activity. In his unconstitutional position we find the secret of his life's failure. Dionysius had some qualities of a great man, but just because he was in the Greek sense a tyrant, all his aims and actions were marred by the necessity he was under of looking primarily to his personal security.

Dionysius
Baffled at
Lilybaeum

Death of
Dionysius
(367 B.C.)

The Result of
his Reign.

Secret of his
Failure.

§ 319. Dionysius had two wives — Doris of Locri, who bore him three sons, and Aristomache, daughter of ^{Dionysius II.} Hipparinus of Syracuse, who bore him two sons, Hipparinus and Nysaeus, and two daughters. The eldest of the whole family was Dionysius, a son of Doris, to whom the empire now descended. He was a feeble but not unamiable prince of about twenty-eight years of age. His chief minister was Dion, who had also been the most trusted of the ministers of Dionysius I.

^{Dion.} Dion was in fact allied by marriage with the house of Dionysius. He was brother-in-law to the elder Dionysius, who had married his sister Aristomache, and had himself married Arete, the daughter of Aristomache and Dionysius. The tyrant's second daughter, Sophrosyne by name, was the wife of her half-brother, Dionysius the younger. Thus the new king and his minister were closely connected by marriage. But as Dion was uncle by blood to Hipparinus and Nysaeus (his sister's sons), it might have seemed likely that he should support their claim to the empire. His adhesion to Dionysius II. was the outcome of a hope which he cherished of carrying into effect one of the most curious experiments that history can show—that of turning a tyrant into a philosopher, and so realising upon earth the Platonic Utopia in which kings are philosophers and philosophers ^{Plato's Influ-} ^{kings.} For Dion had come under the influence on Dion. of Plato's magic personality,* and he hoped that Dionysius would respond to the same influence. To that end Plato, now sixty years of age, was invited to visit Syracuse to train the young Dionysius, already a convert to philosophy through Dion, and to bring into being an ideal state. When Plato had visited Syracuse

* Plato, born 428 B.C., died 347 B.C.

twenty years previously he had incurred the suspicions of Dionysius I., who, it was said, had him sold as a slave in Aegina by the Spartan Pollis. However, in 367 b.c. Plato returned to Syracuse in the interests of the great experiment. The course of instruction was very different from what one ignorant of Plato's mind might have expected. Plato began at the very beginning, and set the young prince to the study of geometry. At that rate it would have been some years before the framing of the ideal state could have been taken in hand; but if the prime condition, that of philosopher-king, was to be realised, it is hard to see how Plato could have proceeded otherwise than he did. For Plato was very far from making the mistake of thinking that a few general lectures could be a substitute for thorough and systematic study. The result was natural, and indeed inevitable; Dionysius grew tired of his geometry, and the statesman and historian Philistus, a strong adherent of despotic rule, and a foe of Dion, replaced Dion in the prince's favour. Dion fell under suspicion of aiming at supreme power and was sent into exile. After some time Plato was granted leave to return to Athens, but very soon he returned again to Syracuse, probably with the object of securing the recall of Dion from exile. This time Plato was enabled to escape only through the good offices of Archytas of Tarentum, who was both a statesman and a philosopher of the Pythagorean school (360 b.c.).

§ 320. Dion meanwhile had betaken himself to Greece. In 357 b.c. he sailed from Zacynthus with a small force to overthrow Dionysius. He escaped the fleet of Philistus, which was on the watch for him off the Italian coast, by

Plato's
Training of
Dionysius II.

Opposition of
Philistus.

Banishment
of Dion.

Archytas of
Tarentum
Saves Plato.

sailing directly across the open sea. He landed at Minoa, a Carthaginian port in south-western Sicily; thence he ^{Dion Enters Syracuse.} marched straight upon Syracuse, for Dionysius was at that moment absent in Italy. Syracuse was entered without a blow, but the citadel (the island of Ortygia) was still held by the mercenaries of Dionysius.

^{Defeat of Dionysius and Death of Philistus.} A week later Dionysius himself sailed into the great harbour with his fleet. In a naval battle which ensued, the fleet of Dionysius was totally defeated, with the loss of its commander, Philistus, who was captured and cruelly put to death.

^{Heracleides.} This victory was gained by a returned Syracusan exile, Heracleides, who was made admiral by the Syracusan assembly in opposition to the wishes of Dion. Upon his defeat, Dionysius escaped from Ortygia, leaving his son Apolloocrates in command of his mercenaries. The enmity between Heracleides and Dion culminated when the Syracusans, suspecting the loyalty of the latter, deposed him and dismissed his Peloponnesian troops ^{Dion Deposed.} unpaid; Dion retired to Leontini (356 B.C.). When the garrison of Ortygia, being reinforced by a Campanian leader of mercenaries called Nypsius, who arrived with a large convoy, made a sally into ^{Dion Recalled and Syracuse Freed.} the city ravaging and burning, Dion was recalled. Soon afterwards Apolloocrates surrendered Ortygia and departed, and Syracuse was free at last.

§ 321. Freedom as understood by the Syracusans, and freedom as understood by Dion, were two different things.

^{Dion's Ideal of Government.} The disciple of Plato regarded democracy as little better than tyranny. It was in Sparta, if at all on earth, that an approach to an ideal government was discerned by the Platonic philosophers, and it

was upon the lines of Spartan polity—*i.e.*, in the direction of aristocracy or modified oligarchy, under the kingship of Dion himself—that the Syracusan government was to be remodelled. His refusal to dismantle the fortifications of Ortygia, the visible sign of despotism, and his retention of the mercenary standing army, gave the lie to Dion's professions of his desire to restore liberty. When at last he caused his rival Heracleides, who was indeed a worthless intriguer, to be murdered, he virtually declared himself the successor of Dionysius. It was from the bosom of the Platonic school itself that vengeance soon came upon the disciple who had proved faithless to his philosophy. Callippus, an Athenian, a trusted friend of Dion, had him assassinated, and himself seized supreme power (354 b.c.).

§ 322. Callippus ruled despotically for about a year, and then, being absent at Catane, he was expelled by a rising headed by Hipparinus and Nysaeus, the sons of Dionysius I. and Aristomache (353 b.c.). He was finally murdered at Rhegium. Hipparinus reigned in Ortygia until he was murdered in his drunkenness. Nysaeus succeeded him until 346 b.c., when Dionysius II. once more obtained possession of what was left of his father's kingdom. Most of the Sicilian cities were now under the sway of tyrants; Carthage was encroaching in the west and preparing to reduce the whole island; bands of Campanian mercenaries roamed at will desolating the open country; the different quarters of Syracuse were turned into camps of the various factions, and its streets were their battlefields. Dionysius II., who, since his flight from Syracuse, had been living at Locri, his mother's city, suddenly returned and

He becomes
Tyrant of
Syracuse.

Murder of
Dion (354 b.c.).

Tyranny of
Callippus—

—of Hip-

parinus—

—of Nysaeus.

Chaos in Sicily
and Syracuse.

Second Tyranny
of Dionysius.

expelled Nysaeus. The Locrians wreaked vengeance for his tyrannies upon his wife and daughters, who were murdered with cruel outrages. The Syracusans turned for assistance against Dionysius to Hicetas, tyrant of Leontini, formerly a friend of Dion. Just at this moment the Carthaginian Invasion. Carthaginians invaded Greek Sicily, and were joined by Hicetas, who hoped by their aid to make himself lord of Syracuse. The Syracusans, thus betrayed, appealed for help to Corinth, their parent city.

§ 323. Once before Syracuse had appealed to the sister cities of her race, and Sparta had sent her one man, Gylippus, who had accomplished all that was asked; now again, this time by Corinth, one man was sent, and he accomplished

more than any one could have hoped. That Timoleon. man was Timoleon, one of the most tragic and interesting figures of Greek history. The son of Timodemus, of noble family and eminent personal qualities, Timoleon would have seemed marked out for a distinguished career in his own city; but for the past twenty years he had been living the life of a recluse on his paternal estate, his life darkened by the memory of his brother's murder and his mother's curse. His brother Timophanes had established himself as despot of Corinth in 366 B.C., when the threatening attitude of Athens had made it necessary to set on foot a permanent garrison of mercenary troops, of

Murder of his Brother, Timophanes. which Timophanes was in command. In vain did Timoleon reason with his brother, whose life he had once saved at the peril of his own. When entreaty failed, he put patriotism before fraternal affection, and stood by a silent accomplice in his murder. When now the appeal came from Syracuse, Timoleon was selected to

lead the forlorn hope; his success or failure in the desperate enterprise was to decide whether he was to be lauded as a tyrant-slayer or loathed as a fratricide. It was not the best of omens that the poor force which he took with him was mainly composed of discharged mercenaries ^{He Sails} lately serving on the Phocian side in the Sacred ^{to Sicily.} War—men already branded with the charge of sacrilege for their share in the plundering of the temple at Delphi.*

§ 324. By this time Hicetas, in conjunction with the Carthaginians, had shut up Dionysius closely ^{Hicetas at} in Ortygia, and was practically master of Syracuse. ^{Syracuse.} His envoys, supported by a Punic fleet, attempted to intercept Timoleon at Rhegium, but by a stratagem he escaped and arrived safely at Tauro-^{Timoleon at} menium, a city established by the Carthaginian ^{Tauromenium.} Himilco in 397 B.C. above the site of Naxos, which Dionysius I. had destroyed.† Hicetas was defeated at Hadranum, and allies flocked to Timoleon. The Corinthian liberator marched on Syracuse, ^{Surrender of} Dionysius ^(344 B.C.) and Dionysius surrendered to him (344 B.C.). The ex-tyrant was sent away to Corinth on a pension, and there he lived the remainder of his days, a sort of living curiosity as a “king in exile,” whose smart sayings made him a worthy counterpart ^{His Exile} of the cynic Diogenes, who also lived at Corinth.

§ 325. It remained for Timoleon to get rid of Hicetas, to whose support Mago came with a great fleet. ^{Hicetas Supported} Now at last the object so long striven for by ^{by the} the Carthaginians was all but attained; they ^{Carthaginians.} had secured admission within the walls of Syracuse, though Timoleon’s lieutenant, Neon, held out with a Corinthian garrison in Ortygia. Before long, however, Timoleon and

* See p. 426.

† See p. 385.

Neon gained certain successes which gave them a portion of the city, and Mago, suspecting Hicetas of treachery, withdrew his forces. This withdrawal was fatal to Carthaginian hopes, and Mago committed suicide rather than face the certainty of horrible death at the hands of his enraged countrymen.

Timoleon recovered the remainder of Syracuse from Hicetas, who withdrew to Leontini. The seal was set to the deliverance of Syracuse by the demolition of the hated fortress on the island of Ortygia; on its site halls of justice were built.

Timoleon's next care was to repeople Syracuse, for the turmoil of the past years had sadly reduced the number of citizens. Word flew through all Greece, recalling exiles and inviting new settlers. It was the second foundation of the city. Two citizens of Corinth revised the constitution in a democratic sense, upon the basis of the laws of Diocles (see p. 382). From this date Syracuse issued silver coins of a new type—with a Pegasus or winged steed, the symbol of Corinth, Timoleon's native city, on one side; and on the other the head of Zeus, the God of Freedom, fit emblem of the work he had achieved.

§ 326. The work of reorganisation was interrupted by a great Carthaginian invasion led by Hamilcar and Hasdrubal from Lilybaeum in co-operation with Hicetas. The Carthaginians marched straight upon Syracuse with seventy thousand men. Timoleon determined to meet them with some twelve thousand men, all he could raise, in Punic territory—*i.e.*, west of the river Halycus. The two armies met on the river Crimisus, in the territory of Selinus. When the mist rolled away in the early morning, the Greeks on the high ground

watched the war-chariots and the picked troops of the enemy, including the “Sacred Band” of two thousand five hundred Carthaginians of noble and wealthy family, crossing the river. Then Timoleon swooped upon them with horse and foot. For long the Greeks strove in vain to break down the solid wall of shields of the “Sacred Band”; their spears were flung aside at last as useless for this work, and the attack was renewed with the sword. The “Sacred Band” of Carthage died as did that of the Thebans at Chaeroneia, and the rest of the host, discomfited by a storm of wind and hail driving full in their faces, could make no stand; behind the Carthaginians, the Crimisus, swollen by the sudden storm, swept the fugitives to destruction. Fifteen thousand prisoners, ten thousand dead, and the rich spoil of the camp was the result of this hard-fought action (339 b.c.). The Carthaginians made some attempt to renew the struggle in the following year, but the Sicilian tyrants were doomed. Mamerucus of Catane and Hicetas of Leontini were both captured and slain; Hippon, who had recently seized Messana, was tortured to death in the theatre by the Messanians. The remaining despots were easily expelled, and all Sicily east of the Halycus was once more free. Carthage sued for peace, and the Halycus was acknowledged as the boundary between Carthaginian and Hellenic Sicily. The ancient but long depopulated sites of Gela, Acragas, and Camarina received new inhabitants, and peace and prosperity reigned in Sicily for the next twenty years.

As soon as his work was done, Timoleon laid down his power. The Syracusans gave him a property near the city, on which he lived for the remainder of his days the honoured arbitrator of the Greek

Battle of the
Crimisus
(339 b.c.)

Overthrow of
Sicilian
Despots.

Terms of Peace
with Carthage.

Last Years of
Timoleon.

cities. In the last months of his life he was blind. He died some two years after his great victory (337 B.C.). "Among the statesmen of that age, next to Epameinondas, the noblest representative of the old Greek republics, and Alexander, the most brilliant soldier, Timoleon may be considered the greatest; he was the hero of western Greece."*

§ 327. We must turn for a moment to the history of the Italian portion of the empire of Dionysius I. The collapse of that empire under the assault of Dion necessarily threw the Greek cities in southern Italy upon their own resources, and exposed them to attack by the native tribes pressing from the mountains of the interior—the Lucanians, Messapians, and Brettians, or Bruttians. The Brettians first appear in history in 356 B.C.; they were apparently simply the native element in south-western Italy, which, having for long been subject to the influence of Greek civilisation, rose to prominence and asserted its independence when the strong arm of the Greek tyrant was no longer felt. The greatest Greek city in southern Italy at this date

was Tarentum, originally a colony of Sparta.† The Tarentines grew effeminate as wealth increased, and about 346 B.C. they were fain to appeal for help to their parent city, even as Syracuse had appealed to Corinth. The Spartan king, Archidamus, responded to the appeal, and fought with the Messapians until he was slain at Manduria, or Mandonion—on the same day, it was said, that Philip won his victory at Chaeroneia (338 B.C.). The Tarentines then obtained assistance from another quarter

* Holm's *History of Greece*, iii. 404.

† See p. 51.

The Greeks
of Italy—

—Attacked by
Native Tribes.

The Brettians.

Appeal of
Tarentum
to Sparta.

Battle of
Manduria
(338 B.C.)

Alexander, brother of Olympias (and therefore uncle of Alexander the Great), king of the Molossians, seized the opportunity thus presented of founding a kingdom in the West, as his nephew was doing ^{Alexander of Epirus Aids Tarentum.} on a much grander scale in the East. In 334 B.C. he arrived in Italy. He subdued the Messapians and conquered the Brettian League. The infant republic of Rome made a treaty with him. ^{He Subdues the Messapians and Brettians.} Alexander was treacherously slain during an engagement at Pandosia by a Lucanian exile serving in the Tarentine army (330 B.C.). The murderer was an emissary of the Tarentines, who had at last come to fear their too successful ally. It is possible that Alexander had dreamed of an empire that should embrace Sicily as well as southern Italy—a dream which fifty years later brought across the Adriatic his descendant, Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, ^{Pyrrhus of Epirus.} in answer to an appeal of Tarentum for aid against the Romans.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE RISE OF MACEDONIA.

§ 328. Collapse of Sparta and Decay of Thebes ; Maritime Power of Athens ; she Recovers the Thracian Chersonese and Euboea.—§ 329. Macedonia ; its Geography ; its History to the Accession of Philip.—§ 330. Philip of Macedonia ; the Question between him and Athens about Amphipolis ; he Seizes Amphipolis ; War with Athens.—§ 331. Progress of Philip : he Captures Pydna and Potidaea, and Founds Philippi.—§ 332. Philip makes a United Nation by Organising a National Standing Army.—§ 333. Development of the Phalanx ; the Sarissa ; Importance of the Cavalry.—§ 334. Mausolus of Caria ; he Incites Chios, Cos, and Rhodes to Revolt.—§ 335. The “ Social War ” ; Attack on Chios ; Trial, Condemnation, and Death of Timotheus.—§ 336. Operations of Chares ; End of the War, and of the Athenian Naval Empire.—§ 337. Death of Mausolus ; Artemisia ; the Tomb of Mausolus.

§ 328. Of the three principal states of Greece, Athens alone continued to be of supreme importance after the battle of Mantinea. The greatness of Thebes depended upon the life of a single man, and when he was gone the motive power of Boeotia was lost. The collapse of Thebes. collapse was instantaneous and irretrievable. The decay of Sparta was due to a different cause. She perished from the steady decrease in the number of her fully qualified citizens ; they had dwindled from eight thousand at the time of the Persian wars to fifteen hundred at the time of the battle of Leuctra ; but fatal as was that battle, in which four hundred Spartiates perished in a day, it was the wresting of Messenia that

Basis of Athenian Power. more fatally reduced the number of the landed class. The constant warfare had also drained the Spartan treasury, and there were no means of tapping the wealth of individuals, as by the Liturgies, or gratuitous state services, at Athens. The result was that Athens alone retained her old place, for she alone had a sure basis of prosperity in her trade by sea, quite apart from the success or failure of her foreign policy. Neither Sparta nor Thebes could hope ever to become centres of commerce; for Sparta the very attempt was impossible, owing to her peculiar institutions. Hence Sparta never exerted herself, except spasmodically, to gain and keep maritime power, and the Theban attempt had no time for development. The rivals of Athens were now not Thebes or Sparta, but Macedonia, and the Carian king Mausolus.

We have already seen how Iphicrates and Timotheus extended the power of Athens in the northern Aegean. For a moment after Mantinea her position was threatened. Cotys, king of the Odrysae, seized Sestos and nearly all the Chersonese. In 360 or 359 B.C. he was murdered, and the territory on the Propontis fell to the lot of the eldest of his three sons, Cersobleptes, who was supported by the Euboean mercenary captain Charidemus. Cersobleptes engaged to hand over the Chersonese, with the exception of

Athens Recovers the Thracian Chersonese. Cardia, to Athens, but it required the strong arm of Chares, who captured and made an example of Sestos, to make him fulfil his promise (357 B.C.). Cleruchs were sent to the Chersonese.

In the same year Euboea was recovered from —and Euboea. Thebes. This career of aggrandisement in the north brought Athens at this moment into contact with Macedonia.

§ 329. Into the gulf of Therma two great rivers fall—
 Macedonia in the Strict Sense. the Axios (*Vardar*) and Haliacmon (*Kara-su*), and between these a smaller stream, the Lydias (*Vistrizta*). In their lower course these rivers flow through the Emathian plain surrounding the head of the gulf. This was Macedonia in the strict sense, the land where settled those immigrants of Greek stock afterwards called Macedonians. Perhaps it was they who pushed the Phrygians out of that region into Asia Minor; they themselves were subjected to pressure by the Illyrians in the mountains behind them. The Macedonians were destined to be conquerors, and they pushed their arms into In the Wider Sense. the hills and reduced to partial subjection the neighbouring hill tribes, the Orestians, Lyncestians, Pelagonians, and others, so that Macedonia in its widest sense stretched to the Illyrians on the west and the Paeonians on the north.

The key of early Macedonian history lies in the absence Struggle with Hill Tribes. of community of tradition and race between the lowland Macedonians and the highlanders of Illyrian blood. The king was always struggling with the hill-men, who under compulsion acknowledged his overlordship, but continued to be ruled by their own princes. The process of consolidation advanced under Alexander I.,

Effect of Athenian Empire on Macedonian Policy. who, after the turmoil of the Persian invasion, extended his dominions to the Strymon. The rapid rise of the Athenian empire, of which the jewel was the natural sea-board of Macedonia, was an obstacle to a forward national policy. Hellenisation was fostered by Archelaus (413—399 B.C.), who removed his court from Aegae (Edessa) to Pella in the plain below. Artists like Zeuxis and poets like Euripides gathered to him; he

built cities and made roads, and ruled with skill and energy until his assassination was the signal for a relapse into the old state of chaos. Owing to internal troubles the opportunity of reaching the sea which was offered when Sparta broke the power of Olynthus was lost, and fourteen years later Athens had once more a firm grasp on all this region.

§ 330. Perdiccas III. slew Ptolemy of Alorus, his guardian and step-father (365 b.c.), and for six years was sole king ; then he fell in a battle against the Illyrians. Philip, his brother, became regent for Amyntas, the infant son of Perdiccas (359 b.c.). Philip's few years at Thebes had educated him both as a politician and as a soldier through contact with Pelopidas and Epameinondas. He was now twenty-four years old. The Paeonians on one side, the Illyrians on the other, menaced the country ; the Thracians supported one pretender to the throne, the Athenians another. The hostility of Athens hinged upon the question of Amphipolis, which had never been regained since its capture by Brasidas, in spite of all diplomatic or military efforts. In 362 b.c. King Perdiccas had occupied it with a Macedonian garrison at the request of its inhabitants, and so the Athenians supported the claims of Argaeus against Philip.

His Breach
with Athens
about
Amphipolis.

Philip conciliated the Athenians by withdrawing his troops and renouncing all claim to Amphipolis. The Thracians were also bought off ; the winter was thus gained for remodelling the army on Greek lines, and the nucleus of that force was created which was to give Philip Greece and his son the Persian empire. The Paeonians were next defeated, and the Illyrians quelled in a short campaign, and the same year Philip summoned Amphipolis to surrender (358 b.c.). The possession of this city, which commanded the passage into Thrace as well as the

Policy of
Philip.

gold-bearing district of Mount Pangaeus, was essential to the realisation of Philip's schemes. For Philip thus early had taken in hand the standing problems of his house—the unification of Macedonia, and her extension to the sea. Now at last the Amphipolitans turned to Athens, but their

^{Athenian Agreement with Philip about Amphipolis and Pydna.} appeal was rejected; for there was a general impression in Athens that in the agreement with Philip there was a secret clause, by virtue of which Philip undertook to conquer

Amphipolis for Athens, while Athens engaged to surrender Pydna to him in exchange. Not only were the overtures of Amphipolis rejected, but those of Olynthus also, when, alarmed at Philip's operations on the Strymon, she pro-

^{Philip Captures Amphipolis (357 B.C.)} posed common action against him. Amphipolis fell through treachery, after a brave resistance,

but was not given to the Athenians. Thus began a chronic state of war between Athens and Philip, called the Amphipolitan War, which lasted for eleven years, until it was ended in 346 B.C. by the Peace of Philocrates.

§ 331. Philip's next act was to seize Pydna, which indeed was Macedonian by origin and right. Then after ^{Philip Captures Potidaea (356 B.C.)} a long siege Potidaea also fell, apparently without any serious attempt on the part of Athens to relieve it. Potidaea and Anthemus were given to Olynthus. Soon after the capture of Potidaea (356 B.C.) three messages came to Philip at the same time, one announcing a victory of his general Parmenio over the Illyrians; another, the victory of his horse at the Olympic

^{Birth of Alexander.} Games; the third, the birth of his son Alexander, whose mother was the fierce and beautiful Olympias, daughter of Neoptolemus, prince of the Molossi. The night of Alexander's birth was also the night of the burning of the great temple of the Asian Goddess at Ephesus

In this year Philip converted the Thasian settlement of Crenides on Mount Pangaeus into a fortress, which he named Philippi. Soon Philip was in receipt of one thousand talents yearly from the mines. His realm now extended to the river Nestus, and of all her possessions on this coast Athens retained only Methone, on the west of the Thermaic gulf. In 353 B.C. Philip seized this also. Of the two problems which faced him at his accession one was solved; Macedonia had been extended to her natural limits; the other was in process of solution through the unifying influence of Philip's great creation—a national standing army.

§ 332. Philip's "new model" army combined the merits of the two species of military force known at the time—the civic militia and the mercenary army. The levy of citizens was, it is true, a national force, but it was in general small, unskilful, and difficult to retain in the field. On the other hand, the mercenary standing armies maintained, for example, by Jason of Pherae or Dionysius of Syracuse, were insubordinate, untrustworthy, and expensive—but they were professional. "A professional army with a national spirit—that was the new idea; and Philip, equally great in practice and theory, intended to add later a new organisation, a new weapon, and new tactics."* During the six years 357—352 B.C. he was engaged in the creation of this new instrument, the perfection of which was to be the work of his son.

The chief problem was how to incorporate the levies of the feudatory hill-tribes so as to form a national force, and through it a united nation. Both horse and foot were

* Hogarth, *Philip and Alexander*, p. 51.

Philip Founds
Philippi
(356 B.C.)—

—and Seizes
Methone
(353 B.C.).

*Creation of
a National
Standing Army
by Philip.*

organised by Philip in territorial regiments. The heavy cavalry ranked above the foot, and were called "Companions" (Hetaeri) and "Royals"; one squadron being called "the Royal" *par excellence*. The heavy infantry were called Pezetaeri or Foot Companions, and ^{Organisation of the Cavalry} constituted the Phalanx. A lighter infantry (*Hetaeri*)—^{—and of the Light Infantry} formed a corps of Guards (Hypaspistae); one-third of these was the "Agema" or "Royal" corps, later known as the "Silver Shields" (Argyraspides). ^(Hypaspistae) Besides the Macedonian troops, there were the allies and the mercenaries. Apparently each of the great foot regiments was composed of two battalions, the first the Macedonian Pezetaeri, the second (of less honour) the mercenaries and allies, each battalion being perhaps fifteen hundred strong.

§ 333. As regards the mode of fighting, the cavalry were taught to charge in masses, not in line, and were kept carefully apart from the infantry, to which they bore a large proportion. For the infantry Philip developed ^{Development of the Phalanx} the phalanx. He was not, indeed, the inventor of the phalanx, a formation as old as the historic Greeks themselves. Greek hoplites were always ranged in a compact mass, and the battle went largely by weight, as at Marathon or at Delium. The weight might be made irresistible, as at Leuctra and Mantinea, but at a sacrifice of mobility. Philip tried to secure both qualities. It is apparently a mistake to imagine the phalanx of Philip and Alexander as like the immobile monstrous mass which fell ^{Its Formation under Philip.} to pieces before the Roman legions. Philip did not, in fact, keep the deep files of Epameinondas, but reverted to the comparatively shallow formation of eight or sixteen deep; the men were trained to stand freer than before, but to lock up their intervals if

necessary. The phalanx was enabled to draw first blood, as it was armed with the long *sarissa*. In later times the Macedonian *sarissa* was a monstrous pike some twenty-four feet long, but probably in Philip's time it was not more than fourteen feet. In action the rear ranks would carry the *sarissa* at the slope, and level them to the charge when they stepped forward into the place of fallen comrades. The real attack both of Philip and Alexander was not made with the phalanx, but with the cavalry. Both father and son were cavalry leaders. The phalanx was used to hold the enemy engaged in front, as it bored into and broke up their array; until at the "psychological moment" the cavalry was hurled forward on the flank to dash the foe into fragments.

§ 334. While Philip in the north was tearing one town after another from the grasp of Athens, she was also threatened in the south by a foe apparently still more formidable. Caria was inhabited originally by a race older than the Greek, but the Greek towns on the coast had leavened the people and made them to all intents Greek. The ruler of the whole country at this time was the prince of Mylasa, who had been recognised as Satrap by the Great King. Hecatomnus, the founder of the dynasty, was succeeded by his son Mausolus (properly Maussollos) in 377 B.C. The Greek towns of the coast—Halicarnassus, Iasus, Cnidus, and perhaps even Miletus—had been already subdued, and Lycia annexed. Mausolus saw that Caria must become a sea-power; it was significant of his policy that he transferred his residence from Mylasa, an inland town, to Halicarnassus, where two harbours were constructed, one for merchant

The Sarissa.

Importance of
the Cavalry

Caria.

Mausolus,
Prince of
Mylasa.

Caria to be
a Sea-Power.

ships, the other for the Carian navy; on the islet of Zephyrium, in front of the city, the castle of the dynast was built.

Rhodes and Cos and Chios at this time belonged to the Athenian League; Samos was occupied by Athenian cleruchs.

Dissatisfaction of Athenian Allies. The planting of cleruchs here had raised great dissatisfaction and fear through all the islands.

The exactions of the mercenary captains of the Athenians were also a cause of complaint. The design of Mausolus, to seize the islands off his own coasts, was furthered by the existence in Rhodes, Cos, and Chios of an aristocratic party ready to overthrow the democracy; but defection from Athens was a necessary preliminary to political revolution. The battle of Mantinea and

Mausolus Induces Chios, Cos, and Rhodes to Revolt. death of Epameinondas allowed the Carian dynast to step into the place of Thebes, and fan the flame of discontent. In 357 B.C. the three islands revolted, and were supported by Byzantium. Thus began the war of Athens with her allies (the Social War).

§ 335. Chares and Chabrias attacked Chios by land and sea, but Chabrias fell gallantly leading an assault on the harbour. The attack on Chios was abandoned, and the Chians in their turn took the offensive, with one hundred ships blockading Samos. Sixty ships under Iphicrates and Timotheus were sent to reinforce the sixty already with Chares, and Samos was relieved; but the three admirals failed in an attempt to surprise Byzantium. Then Chares was repulsed at Chios,

Failure of Attack on Chios. owing to the refusal of his colleagues to support him in an attack on the enemy's fleet on a stormy day (356 B.C.). The greatest armament sent forth by Athens since the Peloponnesian War had thus

done practically nothing, though commanded by the best captains of the day. Chares accused his colleagues of treachery. Iphicrates was acquitted, but Timotheus was fined one hundred talents. Though he was rich, Timotheus could not pay this enormous sum, and so he retired to Chalcis, where he soon afterwards died. Such was the end of Conon's son, the man who, with Callistratus and Chabrias, had done most to build up the second Athenian empire. Iphicrates also is heard of no more as holding office, and seems to have died a few years later.

§ 336. Chares was now sole commander, but he had no money to pay his men. He, therefore, used his forces to assist Artabazus, the Satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, in a revolt against Artaxerxes (Ochus); he thus secured pay for the troops, but the reply of Persia was to threaten a great invasion of Greece, and as Athens found it impossible to enlist the worn-out enthusiasm of the states in a crusade against the Great King, she was fain to recall Chares. This meant giving up all attempt to reduce the rebellious allies. The great Athenian pamphleteer Isocrates openly condemned a policy of imperialism, and called upon Athens to surrender her naval empire (355 B.C.). Athens was, in fact, compelled to recognise the independence of the seceding states. Lesbos soon renounced her allegiance; Corcyra also fell away; and the power of Athens was thus confined to Euboea and the smaller islands, for in the meantime Macedonia had robbed her of her Thracian possessions (353 B.C.).

§ 337. The defeat of Athens meant the success of Mausolus. The democrats in the islands were over-

Trial, Condemnation, and Death of Timotheus.

Operations of Chares.

Isocrates.

End of Social War.

Fall of Athenian Empire.

thrown by the oligarchs, who were supported by Carian garrisons. Mausolus died in 353 B.C., and was succeeded by his widow Artemisia. The Rhodians tried to regain their freedom, and appealed to Athens for aid,* but their suit was rejected, and Artemisia recovered the island. The Carian dynasty lasted until it fell before Alexander the Great.

Death of
Mausolus
(353 B.C.).

Artemisia
Recovers
Rhodes.

Its abiding memorial was the great tomb built by Mausolus and his queen for themselves at Halicarnassus, which has given the name "mausoleum" to all similar structures. The statues of Mausolus and Artemisia which adorned it are now in the British Museum.

The Tomb of
Mausolus
(Mausoleum).

* Cp. p. 420.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE SACRED WAR.

§ 338. Quarrel between the Phocians and Thebans; the Presidency of the Delphic Temple.—§ 339. Outbreak of the Sacred War; Philomelus Seizes Delphi and Uses Delphic Treasures; Death of Philomelus.—§ 340. Successes of Onomarchus; Philip's Aid Invoked against Phocis by the Thessalian League.—§ 341. Onomarchus Defeated and Thessaly Won by Philip; the Athenians Save Phocis; Phayllus and Phalaecus.—§ 342. Philip's Position a Menace to Athens; her Financial Position under Eubulus; the Theoric Fund; its Nature and Effect.—§ 343. Policy and Administration of Eubulus; Contrast between Phocion and Demosthenes.—§ 344. Birth, Career, and Early Speeches of Demosthenes.—§ 345 Philip's Activity in Thrace; the First Philippic.—§ 346. Quarrel between Olynthus and Philip: Olynthus Allied with Athens; Fall of Olynthus.—§ 347. Revolt and Loss of Euboea; Demosthenes Assaulted by Meidias.—§ 348. Career of Aeschines; his Relations to Demosthenes; Characters of the Two Men Contrasted.—§ 349. The Peace of Philocrates; Athens Betrays Phocis but Refuses to Co-operate with Philip.—§ 350. Submission of Phalaecus; Philip Passes Thermopylae; Panic at Athens.—§ 351. Punishment of the Phocians and of Sparta.—§ 352. Philip Holds the Pythian Games; Attitude of Athens; Demosthenes on the Peace; his Political Ascendancy.

§ 338. PHILIP in 353 B.C. saw the extension of Macedonian supremacy over Greece already coming within the range of practical politics. The Thebans and the Phocians were never good friends; the Phocians had also inveterate foes in the Locrians and the Thessalians.

The Thebans had therefore no difficulty in setting in motion against them the obsolete machinery of the Amphictionic Council. The particular ground of complaint ^{Phocians Fined by Amphictionic Council.} is not clear. Certain prominent Phocians were condemned by the Council to a ruinous fine. This was not the first occasion on which the Thebans had used the Amphictionic Assembly as a political engine. Not long after the battle of Leuctra they had accused the Spartans before it for their seizure of the Cadmeia in defiance of international law. The Spartans had been fined five hundred talents, which had remained unpaid, so that the Spartans were excluded from the Council, the Delphian temple, and the Pythian Games. The effects of this new vote of the Assembly were unforeseen and fatal to the liberties of Greece (356 B.C.).

When the Phocians refused to pay the fine, the Council voted to treat them as it had treated the sacrilegious Cirrhaeans in Solon's days (590 B.C.), by confiscating their land and dedicating it to Apollo. The condemned appealed to their countrymen, and it was determined to resist. Philomelus of Ledon and Onomarchus of Elateia were invested with supreme command. An old question concerning the right of presidency over the temple, often

^{Presidency of the Temple at Delphi.} raised but never settled, was now reopened.

The Delphian community was originally simply a part of the Phocian state; as the temple of Apollo grew in wealth and prestige the Delphians had severed themselves from the rest of the Phocians and claimed the administration of the shrine as their peculiar privilege. In this chronic dispute Sparta had always sided with the Delphians, as, for example, in 448 B.C., when she had rescued the temple for them from the Phocians, though her work had been undone

immediately by Athens, who supported the Phocians. On the decline of Athenian power the Phocians lost control of the temple, and by the Peace of Nicias (421 B.C.) the Delphians were recognised as its managers.

§ 339. Philomelus revived the old claim of Phocis, and advised the Phocians to forestall the Amphictions by seizing the shrine. First of all he visited Sparta, which stood under the Council's ban. Archidamus promised secret support and gave him fifteen talents to hire troops. Philomelus then occupied the town and temple of Delphi, with little resistance. The Locrians of Amphissa who hurried to the rescue were repulsed. A manifesto was issued setting forth the Phocian claims and offering an inventory of the sacred treasures and guarantees for their preservation. Sparta at once openly supported Phocis, and so did Athens and Achaea. Thebes, with all the northern Amphictionic states, was ranged on the opposite side. When the Locrians were at length defeated with great loss at the cliffs called the Phaedriades ("Shining") overhanging Delphi, many of them hurling themselves over the cliffs rather than die by Phocian hands, it was time for Thebes to interfere actively. A Sacred War was now decreed against the Phocians.

In order to meet the Amphictionic coalition headed by Thebes, Philomelus, who had hitherto sustained the war by forced contributions from the Delphians, was compelled to touch the temple treasures in order to raise mercenaries, for Sparta sent him but a poor thousand men, whilst Athens, exhausted by her war with her allies, could give him nothing but moral support. He had no difficulty in raising ten thousand men, with

*Delphi Seized
by Philomelus
(355 B.C.).*

*Defeat of the
Locrians by
the Phocians.*

*The Delphic
Treasures
Seized by
Philomelus.*

whom he defeated first the combined Locrian and Boeotian army and then the Thessalians. At length the allies with thirteen thousand men invaded Phocis and won a victory at Neon on the north side of Parnassus.
 Battle of Neon; Death of Philomelus. Philomelus, fighting desperately, was driven to the edge of a precipice, down which he cast himself to avoid falling alive into the hands of his ruthless foes (354 B.C.).

§ 340. Onomarchus, as able and vigorous as his dead colleague, now took command. Westwards, Successes of Onomarchus in Locris— he reduced the Locrian capital, Amphissa ; northwards, the territory of Doris, as well as Thronium of the Epicnemidian Locrians, thus securing the pass of Thermopylae and cutting the communications between Boeotia and her Thessalian allies ; —in Boeotia— eastwards, he invaded Boeotia itself, and restored the remnant of the Orchomenians to their old home, thus gaining a garrison in the land. Not less important —in Thessaly. was his success in Thessaly, where with Delphian gold he bought the alliance of the despots of Pherae, Lycophron, and Peitholaus ; the Thessalian League was thus unable to co-operate with Thebes.

This success of the Phocians in Thessaly led to their own undoing and that of Greece, for the Thessalians, led by the Aleuadae of Larissa, called in the assistance of Philip against Lycophron. Philip had just (353 B.C.) removed

Invasion of Thessaly by Philip. the last barrier to his southward progress by the reduction of Methone. He marched into Thessaly and defeated the brother of Onomarchus, Phayllus, who with seven thousand men had come to the aid of Lycophron ; he also captured Repulsed by Onomarchus. and garrisoned the port of Pagasae. Then Onomarchus with the entire Phocian army of twenty

thousand men defeated him in two battles, and forced him to evacuate Thessaly. Just at this moment the Phocians also won Coroneia in Boeotia, so that 353 b.c. marks the high-water level of Phocian power. Their supremacy extended over a large part of the region comprised between Mount Olympus and the Corinthian gulf; it seemed as if upon the ruins of Theban supremacy the Phocians were destined to attain to the headship of Greece. Onomarchus had shown himself a man of first-rate diplomatic and military capacity. Unfortunately the power of Phocis was rotten at the foundation; her mercenary army would dwindle as the Delphian treasures melted, and she was confronted by a greater diplomatist and soldier than the Phocian leader, and by a power that was based upon a national army and the fountain of gold in Mount Pangaeus.

§ 341. Next year Philip again took the field against Onomarchus. The decisive battle was fought somewhere on the western shore of the Pagasaean gulf. Philip's cavalry was far superior to that of the enemy; he also posed as the champion of Apollo against sacrilegious usurpers, and had wreathed his soldiers' helmets with laurel, so that they fought with a courage born of their new enthusiasm. Six thousand mercenaries fell; some of the fugitives swam out to the ships of Chares, which were co-operating with the Phocians, but three thousand of them were caught and drowned for their sacrilege. Onomarchus himself was slain and his body nailed to a cross by the victor. Phayllus led back the remnant of the defeated force within Thermopylae. Thessaly fell at once into Philip's hands (352 b.c.).

Philip attempted to pursue his success, but he was not to

The Phocians
at the Height
of their Power.

Cause of their
Downfall.

Second Invasion
of Thessaly by
Philip.

Defeat and
Death of
Onomarchus
(352 b.c.).

Philip Master
of Thessaly.

enter Thermopylae yet. Athens acted with unusual energy
 The Athenians and despatched an armament by sea under
 Prevent Philip's Nausicles to the pass. The king did not attempt
 Passing Thermopylae. to force a passage; it was no part of his plans
 to appear in Greece owing his position merely to his sword.

Phayllus maintained the Phocian position against both
 Phayllus and Boeotia and Locris. After two years he died
 Phalaecus. of disease, and his nephew Phalaecus, son of
 Onomarchus, took command (350 b.c.). The war continued
 year after year without decisive result. Boeotia was certain
 to win in the end, when the treasures were exhausted; but
 before that moment came the question was settled by Philip.

§ 342. The fact that Philip held the three chief outlets
 upon the northern Aegean—the bay of Pagasae, the
 Philip's Strength a Thermaic gulf, and the mouth of the Strymon—
 Menace to constituted a grave menace to Athens. His
 Athens. fleet, now growing, damaged her commerce
 and made descents upon her dependencies, Lemnos, Imbros,
 Euboea, and even upon the sacred strand of Marathon.
 Nevertheless, Athens was powerless to retaliate, if only
 on account of her financial exhaustion.

The leadership of the Athenians during these years was
 in the hands of Eubulus, who had a genius for
 Eubulus. finance. His official position was that of
 Chancellor of the Festival (Theoric) Fund, an office which,
 though specially concerned with the surplus of the revenue,
 necessarily involved general control of the finances of the
 state. The Theoric Fund grew up in connection with the
 drama, for dramatic entertainments were really religious
 The Theoric Fund. ceremonies of the state. At first the seats in
 the theatre were free, but later on a small
 charge of two obols was made for each performance. When

the practice of giving to each citizen who applied for it the price of his ticket began, is uncertain, but in the fourth century B.C. it was already an established system which had been extended to other religious celebrations besides the Dionysiac Festival. The annual surplus of the revenue was paid into the fund from which these grants were made, instead of being in part set aside as a reserve for military purposes. Under the Graphe Paronomon, or indictment for unconstitutional proposals, it was always possible to attack any one who proposed to trench upon the Theoric Fund, and it was not until the very eve of the battle of Chaeroneia that Demosthenes prevailed upon the people to appropriate the money to war purposes. It would, however, be a great mistake to regard the Theoric Fund as a vast state charity, or to imagine that the people of Athens at this time were ^{Its Real Nature and Effect.} an idle city rabble living on state pay which was merely a thinly disguised robbery of the rich. The Athenians had the perfectly correct idea that it is the duty of a state to provide for its citizens, first, means of livelihood; secondly, safety; and, thirdly, means of enjoyment. What proportion the Theoric moneys bore to other items of state expenditure we do not know; we do know, however, that the claims of other departments were fully satisfied, in spite of the ^{Military Departments not Neglected.} reluctance of Eubulus to enter upon a reckless war policy. Athens at this time maintained more war-vessels, larger docks, and better-stored arsenals than any other state in Greece, not excepting Macedonia herself.

§ 343. Eubulus cherished no illusions as to the power and capacity of Athens. He recognised that ^{Policy of Eubulus.} she must abandon her vain dream of supremacy, and develop her remaining material resources in a defensive

spirit. Hence he frankly accepted the peace which ended the war with the allies at the earliest possible moment. His watchwords were non-intervention and peace with honour. It was easy for short-sighted opponents to pronounce this policy unworthy of Athens and her great traditions,

^{The Opposition of Demosthenes.} and this is the verdict given to-day by those to whom Demosthenes is the ideal patriot and statesman. Yet Eubulus could strike, and strike with effect; his administration had to its credit the single successful blow ever struck by the Athenians against Philip—the occupation of Thermopylae in 352 b.c., which brought him to halt at the gates of Greece and postponed his victory for six years. It was to Eubulus, again, that

^{Demosthenes' Debt to Eubulus.} Demosthenes owed the very possibility of his last stand against Macedonia, for Eubulus it was who had replenished the store of munitions of war, reorganised the cavalry, and increased the efficiency of the navy.

The singular fact about the prominent men of this party was their honesty. The integrity of Eubulus was universally recognised. Phocion, who supported him, carried his honesty to a point that to the Greeks in general seemed eccentricity. On the other hand, his best friends must admit that Demosthenes could not keep his hands clean, though we may grant that he took money only to serve his country—that is to say, his party; albeit the best men in Greece thought, as the best men do to-day, that the cry of party was no palliation of the offence. Apart from his honesty, Phocion had no claim to be regarded as

^{Phocion and Demosthenes Contrasted.} above the average either as a soldier or a statesman, though he was forty-five times elected Strategus—significant indication of the paucity of talent in the Athens of that day. That his

character was strongly tinged with misanthropy and cynicism conduced to give him a pseudo-originality that passed for something akin to genius. He took no pains to disguise his contempt for the multitude. He was thus the very antithesis of Demosthenes, who stood in much awe of this ruthless "pruner of his periods." Phocion's opposition to the war policy of Demosthenes was based upon his conviction that resistance was hopeless—which was indeed true if Athens could not command better generals than himself.

§ 344. Utterly opposed to this party was Demosthenes. Like several other great Athenians—for example, Themistocles—he had foreign (Scythian) blood in his veins, through his mother. He was born, Birth and Parentage of Demosthenes. probably, in 384 B.C. He was only eight years old when his father, a well-to-do manufacturer of arms, died. His guardians fraudulently dissipated and embezzled his estate, which drove him, a delicate and sickly youth, with no taste for the palaestra and gymnasium, all the more indefatigably to the study of oratory and law under Isaeus, one of the best advocates of the day and a specialist in cases of inheritance. Only a small portion of his patrimony was recovered after long litigation. Demosthenes adopted the profession of logographer, or writer His Early Career. of speeches for the law-courts, a career of very various degrees of respectability and repute. He had physical defects which seemed to be a fatal bar to his success as an orator. His maiden speech ended in discomfiture and ridicule. Of the dogged determination with which he set himself to overcome these obstacles there are many familiar stories—how he practised speaking with pebbles in his mouth to cure his stammer or lisp, repeated poetry as he ran uphill, and declaimed on the sea-shore,

how he practised his gestures before a mirror, and how in order to acquire style he copied out over and over again the *History of Thucydides*.

His first extant political harangue in the Assembly belongs to 354 B.C., when, in a speech on the ^{His Speech on the Symmories (354 B.C.)} Navy Boards, or Symmories, he advocated a reform in the method of collecting the contributions towards fitting out the fleets; it was delivered

^{His Speech for the Rhodians (353 B.C.)} to allay a foolish panic that Greece was threatened with a Persian invasion. In 353 B.C. he spoke for the Rhodians, urging the Athenians to support the Rhodian democrats, who had repented of their connection with the Carian dynasts. At

^{—for the Megalopolitans (353 B.C.)} the end of the same year he dealt with Peloponnesian politics in a speech for the Megalopolitans. The Spartans had taken advantage of the embroilment of Thebes with Phocis to threaten the Megalopolitans, who applied for help to Athens. Demosthenes urged intervention on the principle of preserving the balance of power, allowing neither Thebes nor Sparta to grow too strong. His policy was quite obsolete, for the day of both these cities was gone for ever, nor could Athens

^{His Want of Perspective.} herself again play the part she had played in the past. The political centre of gravity now lay north of Thermopylae, not in Attica. Perhaps overmuch study of Thucydides may have conduced to this partial blindness to the true situation; to the last, indeed, Demosthenes failed to see things in proper perspective.

§ 345. The two years following his victory in Thessaly Philip spent in extending his power in Thrace, ^{Philip in Thrace.} thus threatening the Chersonese, which was of vital importance to Athens. There was panic in the city and forces were voted, but in the end nothing was done, as

Philip's activity was checked by illness, and he contented himself with making Cersobleptes subject. It was in connection with this incident that Demosthenes delivered the first of that series of orations called *Philippics* (351 b.c.). It is a call to the people to act vigorously with a definite plan, no longer "to battle with resolutions and despatches"; to set on foot a permanent force, consisting in part of citizens, and to station it along the highway of their trade, at Lemnos or Imbros, that no opportunity for action might be let slip.

§ 346. The Chalcidice was most endangered. Olynthus had before allied herself with Philip to drive Athens from that coast; but now she was fain to look to Athens for help. After Philip's Thessalian victory Athens and Olynthus made peace, Athens surrendering her claim to Potidaea, and Olynthus recognising the right of Athens to Amphipolis—barren concessions, seeing that Athens could never more hope to make good her claims to either city, while Olynthus would soon be fighting for very existence. In 349 b.c. Philip summoned the Olynthians to deliver to him his half-brother, a pretender to the throne who had taken refuge with them; their refusal served as a pretext for war. One after another the towns of their confederacy fell away to Philip or were captured. Olynthus sought a formal alliance with Athens; during the debates on the subject Demosthenes delivered his three Olynthiac orations, which are in fact Philippics—they were, of course, not the only speeches, nor perhaps even the most decisive speeches, made in the Assembly on the matter. Athens accepted the alliance, and in answer to repeated appeals for help mercenary forces were sent, first under Chares, then

The First
Philippic
(351 b.c.)

Peace between
Olynthus
and Athens.

The Olynthiac
Orations
(349 b.c.).

Alliance be-
tween Olynthus
and Athens.

under Charidemus. When at last two thousand citizen hoplites was sent, it was too late; treachery within their walls nullified the brave resistance of the Olynthians, and the town fell before the army of relief arrived. Euthyocrates

Olynthus and Lasthenes, two of the Olynthian generals, ^{Olynthus} _{Destroyed by Philip (348 B.C.)} opened the gates to Philip (348 B.C.). The doom of the faithless city was severe; it was razed, and its people dispersed as slaves in Macedonia. The other cities of the confederacy were incorporated with Macedonia. Demosthenes would have us believe that Philip utterly destroyed the thirty-two towns of the Chalcidice; he exaggerated the effect of the conquest as unscrupulously as he minimised the power of Philip in his speeches, but neither in Athens nor in Greece generally were any but crocodile's tears shed over the woes of Olynthus.

§ 347. Athens would probably have intervened with more vigour had her hands not been tied by a revolt of

Euboea. ^{Revolt of Euboea} The loss of that island would seriously damage the finances of Athens, and possibly imperil her corn supply. Eubulus and his party determined to recover Euboea, and Phocion was sent to support Plutarchus, tyrant of Eretria, who professed to represent Athenian interests. The Athenians were betrayed, and ^{Athens Loses Euboea} although Phocion by a victory at Tamynae saved the army, all Euboea was lost, with the exception of Carystus, which remained loyal (348 B.C.).

The Euboean war was the cause of an unpleasant incident in the life of Demosthenes. He had strenuously opposed the division of the forces of the city. Among the adherents of Eubulus was a rich and somewhat vulgar man named Meidias, who had an old feud with Demosthenes arising out of the prosecution of his fraudulent guardians. This year Demosthenes as Choregus provided the outfit

of the chorus of his Tribe (Pandionis) in the dithyrambic contest at the City Dionysia. On the day of the performance, in full view of the citizens and strangers assembled in the theatre, Meidias assaulted Demosthenes by striking him in the face—an act which involved contempt of religion. The political exigencies of the moment obliged Demosthenes to compromise the case for thirty minae, but the speech which he had intended to deliver is still extant.

The complete failure of Athenian foreign policy in Thrace and Euboea, and the financial exhaustion caused by the recent efforts made it clear even to Demosthenes that he must acquiesce in the peace policy of Eubulus. Moreover, a mission in the Peloponnese to organise a national league against Philip met with no response, though the trumpet-tongued Aeschines was one of its chief agents. It was on this occasion that Aeschines first came prominently forward (347 b.c.).

§ 348. Aeschines was a self-made man. He was about six years older than Demosthenes, and was born in a humbler station (389 b.c.). He began life as assistant to his father Atrometus, who was a schoolmaster, then he was a tragic actor, and next, clerk to the Assembly. He saw service as a soldier; in Euboea he attracted the notice of Phocion, who chose him to carry the despatches announcing his victory at Tamynae. Aeschines thus entered public life identified with the party in power. As an orator he was second only to Demosthenes. It is chiefly to his collision with Demosthenes in 346 b.c., and afterwards, that he owes his celebrity, and by an error in perspective the impression is apt to arise that Demosthenes all his life was engaged in a Titanic duel on the one hand

Meidias Assaults Demosthenes at the Dionysia.
Aeschines in the Peloponnese.
Career of Aeschines.
His Relations to Demosthenes.

with Philip, on the other with Aeschines. Aeschines, however, was in no sense the leader, and perhaps not even the official exponent, of the peace-party. Thanks to Demosthenes, Aeschines stands branded as a traitor. In morals there was little to choose between them. The superiority of Demosthenes lay in the intensity of his

^{Character of} enthusiasm for a revived Athens. ^{Demosthenes} ^{and Aeschines} had no enthusiasm in his nature. Demosthenes ^{Contrasted.} was an idealist, the life-long victim of a noble delusion, while Aeschines was practical in every fibre, discerning the signs of the times, with no desire for martyrdom for a dream. Neither the one nor the other was gifted with deep insight. Aeschines did not see the true place of Macedonia in history. On the other hand, Demosthenes with his “pурblind patriotism” was unable to appreciate the plans and character of Philip; but his obstinate life-long struggle against the destruction of the political system with which Athenian greatness was identified is one of the fine things in history. Demosthenes thundering against Philip, the Sacred Band dying in its ranks at Chaeroneia, Cicero defying the sword of Antonius—these are the great pictures of all time.

§ 349. The course of the Sacred War strengthened the ^{Philip asked} ^{by the Thebans} ^{to Intervene} ^{in Sacred War.} desire for peace. Thebes openly prayed Philip to intervene as champion of the Amphictionic League. In Phocis there had been domestic strife, and Phalaecus had been deposed; but he still held Thermopylae, though it was suspected that he had an understanding with Philip, and he refused to admit either Spartans or Athenians into the pass.

Late in 347 B.C. ten Athenian envoys, including Philocrates, who proposed the embassy, Aeschines, and Demosthenes, went to Pella, together with a representative of

the Synedrion of the allies of Athens, to negotiate terms of peace. They were courteously received, and soon Philip's envoys, three in number, appeared in Athens. Of Philip's delegates, one was Parmenio, another was Antipater, for whom fate had in store a return to Attica at the head of a victorious army to ask for the heads of the anti-Macedonian orators, the chief of whom, Demosthenes, was on the present occasion his host. In accordance with the instructions of the Macedonian envoys, Philocrates proposed a decree of peace and alliance with Philip on the part of Athens and her allies, excepting only the Phocians and the Thessalian town of Halus; for the rest, each side was to keep what it had got. Thus Athens would surrender her claims to Amphipolis, which were indeed by this time quite obsolete, and Philip would guarantee to her the Chersonese. The Athenians in vain tried to secure the inclusion of the Phocians, but their exclusion was a cardinal point in Philip's calculations, for if peace was made with the Phocians, his design of armed intervention south of Thermopylae was defeated. So the people ultimately swore to the Peace on these terms, only the Phocians were not expressly mentioned at all (March, 346 b.c.).

In the meantime Philip had been pushing his conquests in Thrace after Athens had tied her hands by the Peace. Weeks passed before the Athenian delegates succeeded in securing his ratification. By the time the oath was administered to his allies the Thessalians, he was only three days' march from Thermopylae. The advantages that might accrue to Athens from co-operation with Philip were discussed in Athens by Aeschines and the politicians of the party of Eubulus, and the Assembly

decreed that the treaty of peace and alliance should be extended to the posterity of Philip, and that the Phocians should surrender the temple of Delphi to the Amphictions, under threat of armed force. When, however, Philip invited the Athenians to send an army to co-operate in the settlement of the Sacred War, they listened to Demosthenes and his party, and refused. For from the first Demosthenes had never intended that the peace should pass into the closer bond of active co-operation; whereas the desire of Aeschines, Philocrates, and Eubulus was to meet Philip in his desire to have Athens with him in his arbitrament in central Greece. Thus between the rival statesmen the Athenians had betrayed the Phocians and lost their voice in the final settlement, and had thrown Philip perforce into the arms of the Thebans.

^{Athens Betrays Phocis, but Declines to Co-operate with Philip.} § 350. Phalaecus had no resource but to sell the pass to Philip for liberty to retire unmolested with his ten thousand mercenaries and such Phocians as chose to accompany him. They dispersed to various theatres of war in Sicily, in Italy, and in Crete. The Sacred War was thus finished without a blow, and Philip was within the gates of Greece, the accepted champion of Apollo and the Amphictionic League. He joined forces with the Thebans; and the Phocian towns, which had as little choice as the king, surrendered without resistance. When the Athenians awoke to the consequences of their foolish policy, there was

^{Groundless Panic at Athens.} panic. Imagination conjured up the picture of Philip advancing upon the city at the head of a combined Theban and Macedonian army. It was resolved to put the Peiraeus and the Attic fortresses

into a state of defence and bring the women and children and movable property within the walls. There was, as a matter of fact, not the smallest ground for all these terrors and precautions, as was soon made clear by a despatch from Philip himself.

§ 351. The king next convened the Amphictionic Assembly to pronounce the doom of the Phocians. They were solemnly dispossessed of their place as one of the twelve races in that Assembly, and their two votes were transferred to Macedonia ; their claim to govern the temple was formally cancelled ; the twenty towns of Phocis, with the sole exception of Abae, were dismantled and broken up into villages of not more than fifty houses ; they were required to pay back by instalments of sixty talents a year the value of the Delphian treasures (put at ten thousand talents). Actual participants in the spoils were outlawed. The Spartans were disqualified from returning either of the two members who gave the Dorian vote ; Athens, by her timely decree against the Phocians, escaped a similar punishment. Certain of the smaller states, in excess of zeal and bitterness, proposed the utter extermination of all Phocians, but these counsels were overruled. The sentence actually passed was striking from its mildness, seeing that the struggle had been so embittered. Religion was, in fact, only a pretext, and the contest was not in any true sense a religious war. The severest sufferers were the recalcitrant Boeotian towns, Orchomenos and Coroneia, for they were razed and their people sold into slavery.

*Orchomenos
and Coroneia
Destroyed.*

§ 352. The crowning triumph of Philip came in September of this year, when the Pythian Festival fell to be celebrated. Philip was empowered by the Amphictionic Council to

hold the festival with the Boeotians and the Thessalians. Athens sent no deputy to the Council nor representatives to the festival—a protest before all Greece against the inclusion of Macedonia within the circle of Amphictionic states. Philip contented himself with sending an embassy notifying to the Athenians the fact of his election and inviting concurrence. For a moment it seemed as if the people would crown the folly of the anti-Macedonian orators by defying Philip. Demosthenes was forced to stultify his own anti-Macedonian agitation by his oration on the Peace, in which he begs the Athenians to acquiesce in the results of the futile policy he had persuaded them to adopt. After sacrificing Oropus, Amphipolis, and the seceding islands, it would be sheer folly to go to war with all Greece for the “shadow at Delphi”; this bitter sneer with which the speech ends betrays the suppressed rage of the orator at the undignified position in which his own manoeuvring had placed him. The actual reply to the ultimatum of the Amphictions—for such it really was—is not known. A curious result was that from this time forward Demosthenes became more and more the leader of Athenian opinion and policy.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

THE SUPREMACY OF MACEDONIA.

§ 353. Philip's Ambitions; Megara and Chalcis allied with Athens; Demosthenes' Opposition to Philip.—§ 354. Impeachment of Philocrates and Aeschines.—§ 355. Philip's Designs in Western Greece; Alexander as Pupil of Aristotle.—§ 356. Philip's Conquest of Thrace; Collision between Athens and Philip in the Chersonese; Alliance of Athens with Byzantium; Euboeic League.—§ 357. Siege of Perinthus and Byzantium.—§ 358. Sacred War between the Amphictionic League and the Locrians; the Amphictions Invite Aid of Philip.—§ 359. Philip Advances South and Seizes Elateia; his Motives in doing so; Policy of Thebes.—§ 360. Alliance formed between Athens and Thebes.—§ 361. The Battle of Chaeroneia.—§ 362. Punishment of Thebes; Peace and Alliance made with Athens; Position of Athens.—§ 363. Congress of Corinth; Nature of the Unity Effected by Macedonia.—§ 364. Philip Elected General against Persia; Death of Philip; his Greatness.

§ 353. DURING the years 346 to 340 b.c., years of nominal peace between Athens and Macedonia, but full of diplomatic warfare, Philip was engaged in clearing away the last obstacles to his great ambition. ^{Aspiration of Philip.} He aspired to the leadership of the Hellenes in a war against Persia. To this work also he was called by the better spirits in Greece itself, notably by the aged philosopher Isocrates, who all his life ^{Isocrates' Ideal.} looked forward with prophetic eye to a time when the feuds of the states should be stilled in a panhellenic union, and the East should be thrown open to their superfluous population. Much had yet to be done before that

day dawned. Philip's power in Thessaly was to be consolidated, his navy developed, Euboea to be brought under his influence, supporters to be gained in the Peloponnese. The

^{Alliance of Megara with Athens—} record of these years is fragmentary. Philip gained the adhesion of Elis, Argos, Messene, and Megalopolis, in the Peloponnese. In Megara an attempt at revolution supported by Macedonian troops was forestalled, and Megara allied herself with Athens.

^{—and of Chalcis.} In Euboea oligarchy was established in the towns of Oreos and Eretria, backed by Macedonian garrisons; but Chalcis, so important strategically, resisted Philip's intrigues, and entered into an equal alliance with Athens (342 B.C.). One thing

^{Opposition of Demosthenes to Philip.} only the Macedonian king could not achieve—

the gaining the good-will of Athens. For the irreconcilable Demosthenes, now supreme in the Assembly, followed him step by step, obstructing and thwarting his policy so far as by his oratory he could do so. To counteract his influence in the Peloponnese, perhaps in 344 B.C., Demosthenes made a tour of the states to rouse the Messenians and Argives to hostility towards their new friend.

^{The Second Philippic (344 B.C.)} When Philip complained, Demosthenes defended his attitude in the Second Philippic. By this time he had convinced himself, and sought to convince others, that the sole object of Philip's policy was the enslavement of Athens!

§ 354. The hostility towards Philip was evinced by an attempt to crush Aeschines, engineered by Demosthenes, who was a personal as well as political foe of Aeschines.

^{Demosthenes Impeaches Aeschines (345 B.C.)} Immediately after Philip's installation as a member of the Amphictionic Council Demosthenes impeached Aeschines as having betrayed the interests of Athens for a bribe. Timarchus, a man

of notorious vice, was associated with Demosthenes in the case, and Aeschines parried the attack by an action against Timarchus, which secured his disfranchisement (345 B.C.). This momentary failure of the patriotic party was compensated when in 343 B.C. Hypereides charged Philocrates, whose name was associated with the Peace of 346 B.C., with serving Philip for Impeachment of Philocrates (343 B.C.). bribes to the detriment of the city. Such was the change in public opinion that Philocrates despaired of fair trial and fled from Athens; he was condemned to death in his absence, and passed the rest of his life in exile. This success cleared the way for the grand attack upon Aeschines, and the same year saw one of the most famous political trials in Athenian history, when Demosthenes impeached Aeschines for misconduct in his embassy. The speeches on both sides are preserved. The steady growth of anti-Macedonian feeling is shown by the fact that Aeschines secured acquittal only by the narrow majority of thirty votes (343 B.C.).

§ 355. It was probably this year that Philip extended his influence to the Ionian sea. He marched into Epirus to put on the throne Alexander, his wife's brother. He seized the opportunity to annex to Epirus the region of Cassopia, threatened Ambracia and Acarnania, and allied himself with the Aetolians, with the design of securing Naupactus and the western route through northern Greece to the Peloponnese. His plans were foiled, partly by the diplomatic efforts of Demosthenes and other envoys, partly by an Athenian force in Acarnania. Philip in Epirus. Athens Centre of Anti-Macedonian Movement. Ambracia, Corcyra, and Achaea sought the alliance of Athens. Athens was the recognised centre of all anti-Macedonian movement.

This year is memorable also for another event, which sets Philip in his true light as a lover and promoter of Hellenic culture, for all the hostility into which he was forced towards Athens, the queen of that culture, by the obstinate patriotism of her leader. Alexander, the crown prince, now fourteen years old, was put under the care of Aristotle of Stageirus. Aristotle's father, Nicomachus, had been court physician to Amyntas II. Aristotle himself, born 384 B.C., had studied in Athens, first under Isocrates, then under Plato, but he was living at Mytilene when Philip summoned him to Pella (342 B.C.). His selection as Alexander's tutor was due to his hereditary connection with the Macedonian court, and to his possession of the flower of Athenian culture without the anti-monarchical prejudices of a native-born Athenian, rather than to his reputation as a philosopher. We know nothing of the relations between Aristotle and his pupil. No doubt it would be satisfactory to trace in Alexander's life the influence of the great philosopher; but there is no point of contact between the practical politics of Alexander and the political theories of Aristotle.

§ 356. If Philip was to realise his ambition, he must be master of Thrace as far as the Bosphorus. Thrace was the door to Asia, but it was also the door to the Pontus; if he conquered the Greek cities on its two straits, Philip would have in his hands the food supply of Athens and southern Greece. We have no details of this great conquest to which he devoted nearly a whole year of constant campaigning. A monument of it remains to this day, in the city of Philippopolis on the Upper Hebrus, founded to maintain Macedonian influence in Thrace. In the end

Aristotle
Chosen as
Tutor of
Alexander.

Reasons for
the Selection.

Philip's Con-
quest of Thrace.
Founded.

Cersobleptes was overthrown, and Philip was master of the entire interior as far as the Haemus (*Balkan*) mountains, so that the Macedonian frontier was advanced to the neighbourhood of Byzantium on the one side and the Chersonese on the other (342—341 b.c.). In the meantime, Athens had tried to strengthen her position in the Chersonese by sending thither one Diopeithes of Sunium with fresh cleruchs and a mercenary force and a few ships. He attacked ^{Diopeithes} Cardia, on the isthmus of the Chersonese, a ^{Attacks Cardia.} town which had been expressly recognised as belonging to Macedonia, and was now garrisoned by Philip against Athenian incursions. Diopeithes was guilty of actual breach of the peace when he made an inroad into Philip's Thracian territories, but Demosthenes withheld the general desire to repudiate his action and recall him upon Philip's complaint, and in his speech on the Chersonese ^{Demosthenes'} urged the people not only to retain him in ^{Speech on the Chersonese} command, but to support him with money and men (341 b.c.). This speech was soon followed by the Third Philippic, which called upon the people ^{His Third Philippic} (341 b.c.) to declare war by sea and land, and to set on foot an active anti-Macedonian propaganda. Demosthenes himself went to the quarter in which danger threatened—to the Propontis. Byzantium, it was true, was no friend of Athens, for ever since 364 b.c. she had been leagued against her, first with Thebes, and then with the seceding allies. Now, however, Philip was a more dangerous foe than Athens, and so not only ^{Byzantium} Byzantium, but Perinthus and Abydos, joined ^{Allied with Athens.} the Athenian alliance. This was an act of war, as Byzantium had been in alliance with Philip from 352 b.c. In Euboea also the patriotic party stirred successfully. With the aid of Athenian troops the

governments of Oreos and Eretria were overthrown, ^{Euboeic League} and a Euboeic League was constituted with (341 B.C.) its headquarters at Chalcis, independent of Athens, but allied with her (341 B.C.).

§ 357. Philip's reply was to begin the siege of Perinthus ^{Siege of Perin-} (spring, 340 B.C.). All the resources of the thus. recent development in the science of attack on fortified towns were brought into play; but the city, being built with its houses arranged in terraces "as in a theatre" on a lofty promontory rising at the end of a narrow neck of land directly from the sea, defied both siege-towers and engines. Nor was Philip's navy strong enough to make his blockade effective. Supplies and reinforcements were run into the town by the Byzantines and by Arsites, Satrap of Phrygia—the Persians were naturally deeply concerned to uphold the barriers between themselves and the Macedonians. In reply to the Athenian protests, the king sent a letter in which he enumerated the acts of hostility to himself which called for punishment; it

^{Siege of}
^{Byzantium}
^(340 B.C.) was an ultimatum, but the decisive breach only came when, baffled at Perinthus, Philip marched suddenly against Byzantium. The peril of the key of the Black Sea trade compelled both Athens and the eastern islands to act vigorously. The marble on which the Peace was inscribed was removed by formal decree (340 B.C.), and first Chares, then Phocion, was sent with a fleet to aid Byzantium. Rhodes and Chios also sent assistance. Baffled here also, Philip withdrew into Thrace; and having chastised the rebellious chief of the Scythians at the mouth of the Danube, lost all his plunder, and

^{Philip Baffled.} narrowly escaped defeat on his homeward march at the hands of the Triballi (in the *Balkans*) (339 B.C.). This year was one of disaster for him, and the

chief disaster, the failure on the Propontis, was the work of Demosthenes, who received the thanks of the state and of the rescued cities. It was clear that Philip must engage in serious war with Athens herself.

§ 358. At this moment of all others, Philip received a call to intervene with his army south of Thermopylae. It was the "shadow at Delphi" (^{Assembly (Autumn, 340 B.C.)}) which gave him this opening. In the Amphictionic Assembly held at Delphi in the autumn of 340 B.C., the Locrians of Amphissa, instigated by the Thebans, were intending to propose that the Athenians should be fined fifty talents for having re-dedicated in the temple at Delphi, without the proper ceremonies, certain gilded shields bearing an inscription commemorating the victory at Plataea over the Thebans and Persians. Fortunately the interests of Athens lay in the proper hands. The Athenian representative, Aeschines, turned the tables upon the accusers, who themselves were guilty of sacrilege in having re-established the port of Cirrha, and taken into cultivation part of its plain, which had been doomed to lie untilled ever since the first Sacred War in the days of Solon (590 B.C.). In burning words Aeschines reminded the Amphictions of that old war, and, pointing to the plain at their feet, called upon them to expel its sacrilegious cultivators. Next morning the Amphictions and the Delphians trooped forth "to aid the god and the sacred land," and burned the town by the sea. On its way back the mob was attacked by the men of Amphissa, which lay ten miles up the plain; thereupon a special meeting was summoned for no distant date at Thermopylae to consider the punishment of the Locrians.

For a moment, it seemed as though Athens would range

The Locrians
Attack Athens.
Counter-
Charge of
Aeschines.

The Last
Sacred War.

herself upon the side of the outraged Amphictions, and lead the crusade against Amphissa; but the fatal influence of Demosthenes prevailed. He taunted Aeschines before the Assembly with bringing an Amphictionic war into Attica—blind himself to the fact that if there was to be a Sacred War at all, it was of vital moment to Athens to throw her weight into the scale to end it as soon as might be. His one object was to prevent any breach with the Thebans; consequently, under his advice, the Athenians took no part in the special Amphictionic Assembly, which imposed penalties upon the Locrians of Amphissa and endeavoured to enforce them. The Thebans also held aloof from undoing the Locrians, who were always their friends. The leadership was thus left to the Thessalians, and, after a year's desultory warfare, Philip was invited to come south once more as champion of the god and captain-general of the Amphictionic League (autumn, 339 B.C.). So opportune was this invitation, and so serious its consequences, that it has often been suspected that the whole episode which thus culminated was devised by the king himself, and engineered by his agents, but of this there is not the slightest evidence. So far as one man was responsible, it was Demosthenes and not Aeschines who brought Philip into Greece on this occasion.

§ 359. Philip marched without delay, and was speedily through Thermopylae. Nicaea, at the eastern end of the pass, hitherto occupied by the Thebans, was handed over to a Thessalian garrison. Thus secured as to his rear, he advanced into Phocis, and eastwards down the Cephisus valley to the important strategic point at which Elateia had stood before its destruction at the end of the Phocian war. Elateia commanded the easiest

Philip Seizes Elateia.

route from the Spercheius valley and Thermopylae into that of the Cephisus, and so into Boeotia. Here Philip halted, and refortified the ruined town. At the same time, he detached a force to occupy Cytinium, which lay at the northern end of the pass leading down to Amphissa.

The news of the occupation of Elateia created an astounding impression. Demosthenes has described the reception of the news at Athens one evening.

At earliest dawn the citizens streamed up to the Pnyx long before the Council of Five Reception of
the News at
Athens.

Hundred had concluded its preliminary meeting. Then the herald bade who would stand forward to advise in the crisis, but none replied, until at last Demosthenes arose. It suited him then, as afterwards, to represent Philip's presence at Elateia as a direct menace to Athens. Considering the doubtful temper of the Thebans it was simply the precaution of a prudent general, who had no mind to entangle himself in the mountains of Locris, leaving his communications with Thermopylae at the mercy of the Boeotians. If any city was threatened by the step, it was Thebes, lying but little more than forty miles away to the south-east. Demosthenes, indeed, assured the people that Philip's envoys had told the Thebans that his objective was Athens, and had called upon them to co-operate, or at least give him free passage through Boeotia, but this, if true, was designed to make the Thebans declare themselves. For Philip, as for Athens, everything depended upon the attitude of Thebes. Would she remain true to her Macedonian alliance, or would she unite with Athens, and compel him to fight the only formidable combination still possible in Greece?

§ 360. By the advice of Demosthenes, ten envoys, of whom he himself was one, were sent to Thebes. It was a crisis in

his life, for now or never was to be realised the aim of all his policy for the last eight years. Athens agreed to pay two-thirds of the expenses of the war, to abandon her claim

^{Offers made by Athens to Thebes.} to Oropus, to recognise the dominion of Thebes over Boeotia—this last concession a stultification

of the whole traditional attitude of Athens with regard to Boeotia. The Thebans exacted a high price for their alliance, though, as it turned out, they profited nothing by the bargain. It would be a delusion to set down this diplomatic triumph of the alliance

^{Alliance between Athens and Thebes.} with Thebes as one wrung from an unwilling people by the burning eloquence of Demosthenes.

It was clear that the interests of the two cities were now at last completely identical.

§ 361. The first aim of Philip was to finish the work he had come to do as leader in the Amphictionic War. The allies from the first were strategically beaten, since they divided their forces. They gained indeed two unimportant successes, but in the end ten thousand mercenaries sent by

^{Philip Captures Amphissa and Naupactus.} Athens to defend Amphissa were cut to pieces, and Amphissa itself captured, as well as Naupactus.

Then Philip drew towards the Boeotian border down the historic road which has seen so many armies pass along it. Across his path, at Chaeroneia, occupying the four miles' space between the hills and the Cephisus, the allies were posted for the decisive battle. “On the one side stood the miscellaneous array, half mercenary, half civic, of the last imperial Greek city-states; on the other was ranged the first great army of a national power.”*

No trustworthy and comprehensive account of the battle of Chaeroneia (August or September, 338 b.c.) has come down to us. Philip commanded thirty thousand infantry and

* Hogarth, *Philip and Alexander*, p. 127.

two thousand cavalry; the allies were of nearly equal strength. On the Macedonian side, the Thessalians and other allied cavalry were on the right; in the centre was the phalanx, flanked by the heavy Macedonian cavalry on the left; the Greek right was occupied by the Thebans; in the centre were the Phocians, Achaeans, Corinthians, and other allies; on the left the Athenians. The Macedonians were directed by a single mind, and that the mind of a master in war. Alexander, who led the heavy cavalry on the left wing, had all his father's skill, with brilliance of his own added; the Greeks had neither plan nor unity. Theagenes commanded the Thebans; the Athenians were under three Generals, Stratocles, Lysicles, and Chares. In the battle the Athenians pushed the allies and mercenaries on Philip's right off the field, but broke in doing so the continuity of the Greek line. The real struggle lay between the Macedonian and Theban phalanx, and was decided by a flank charge of Alexander's cavalry. The Theban leader fell; the Sacred Band died to a man where it stood; the Athenians and the rest, taken on the flank, fell back in rout to Lebadeia. Philip encamped on the battlefield, and after a wild orgy wandered out upon the bloody plain singing songs of triumph and derision; the barbarian in his nature burst for a moment in this hour of crowning triumph through the veneer of Hellenic culture.

§ 362. One thousand Athenians lay dead; two thousand fell into Philip's hands. The Theban loss was probably greater in actual slain. And it was upon Thebes that the victor's vengeance fell. While the bones of the slain Athenians were sent to Athens and her prisoners were unconditionally released, the Thebans on the other hand were forced to ransom both their dead

The Battle of
Chaeroneia
(338 B.C.)

Chastisement
of Thebes.

and their living. The Boeotian confederacy was broken up, and independence granted to the cities; the dismantled Orchomenos, Thespiae, and Plataea were again restored. A Macedonian garrison was placed in the Cadmeia and three hundred adherents of Macedonia, some of them restored exiles, were established as a supreme council, many of the opposite faction being banished or put to death. To Athens the orators Demades and Aeschines brought the offer of an unlooked-for peace and alliance. Oropus was to be hers, but she was to give up the Chersonese to Philip, and surrender the remnant of her maritime allies (with the exception apparently of Lemnos, Imbros, Samos, and Delos). Athens was also to acknowledge Philip's

^{The Peace of}
^{Demades.} leadership of Greece. The Peace of Demades was therefore a renunciation of all that Athens had fought for, and an acknowledgment that supremacy had slipped for ever from the grasp of Sparta, Thebes, and herself; but to say that by it Athens ceased to have an independent political existence is scarcely true. For a

^{Position of}
^{Athens.} moment after the defeat preparations had been made for a desperate defence. Hypereides had proposed to free all slaves who would fight, recall the exiles, and give citizenship to the resident aliens. The truth was that though hopelessly beaten on land, the existence of the fleet as a factor still intact made continued resistance not impossible; more especially as by a recent reform of

^{Improvement}
^{of her Navy.} Demosthenes, by which the cost of furnishing ships fell on each citizen in proportion to his wealth, the service of the navy had been much improved.

^{Motives of}
^{Philip's}
^{Leniency to}
^{Athena.} Philip's failure at Perinthus and Byzantium had showed how almost impossible it was to capture places like the Peiraeus without having complete command of the sea. Consequently Philip's treatment

of Athens was largely the outcome of calculation, but it would be an injustice to refuse to recognise also his genuine respect for Athens as the “theatre of glory” and his desire to enlist on his side the moral force she possessed in the Hellenic world.

§ 363. Philip marched into the Peloponnese to secure the recognition there also of the Macedonian supremacy. Sparta alone resisted, with a sullen passive resistance against which the phalanx was powerless. Philip in the Peloponnese. Philip deprived the Spartans of all territory beyond the old Laconian frontier. Then all the Greek states, with the exception of Sparta, obeyed the king's summons to attend a general congress at Corinth; Congress of Corinth. here Philip presided over the first assembly of an united Greece (338 B.C.). It was the long-delayed realisation of the dream of the most statesman-like of the writers and orators of Athens—Isocrates—who had lived just long enough to hear of Chaeroneia, and had died happy that the unity of Greece was thereby assured. He erred in thinking that the particularism which was the bane of Greece would die after a single Macedonian victory. Nor were the states themselves willing to recognise in Macedonia the champion of Hellenism. For Macedonia was still regarded as beyond the pale of genuine Greek states, however much her arms compelled acquiescence in her practical supremacy over them. Consequently, now that the time had come for Greece to retaliate upon Persia, there was no real enthusiasm for the work among the worn-out and over-politicised peoples of Greece proper. Rather, Persia seemed to many a welcome alternative to Macedonia. Macedonia and her kings were more really Greek in this respect than the Greeks themselves. Attitude of Greece to Macedonia and Persia.

§ 364. It was not until the second meeting of the national congress that Philip proclaimed his purpose, and was elected general-in-chief, and the votes of men Philip Elected General against Persia. and money passed (337 b.c.). In the following spring a portion of the army, under Parmenio, assisted by Attalus and Amyntas, crossed into Asia to hold the Hellespont. Philip intended to follow with the main body; but it was fated that he should never set foot on that Asiatic shore which had been in his dreams so long. His foes were of his own household. The wild woman Olympias had been divorced; Alexander himself had quarrelled bitterly with his father; the birth of a son by Cleopatra, Philip's second lawful wife, niece of Attalus, had roused suspicions that perhaps the succession of Alexander was endangered. A certain Pausanias, who had been wronged by Attalus and denied redress by Philip,

Murder of Philip (336 b.c.) was suborned by Olympias to drive a dagger to the king's heart just as he entered the theatre at Pella in solemn procession on the occasion of his daughter's marriage to Alexander, king of Epirus (summer, 336 b.c.). Whether Alexander was privy to the plot or no, is uncertain.

Thus Philip died, at the age of forty-six. His fame has been eclipsed by that of his son; his work and character are known to us through the mouth of his bitterest enemy Demosthenes only, for most unfortunately the history of Philip written by Theopompus of Chios has not survived. Yet we know enough to say that Philip was one of the three greatest statesmen in Greek history, and to endorse the verdict of Theopompus that Europe had borne no greater man than the son of Amyntas.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT,

§ 365. Alexander's Enemies; Reception of News of Philip's Death in Athens; Expeditions of Alexander in Thrace and Illyria.—
§ 366. Greek Cities Subsidised by Persia; Revolt, Capture, and Destruction of Thebes.—§ 367. The Persian Empire; its Resources and Inherent Weakness.—§ 368. Alexander Crosses the Hellespont; Persian Defence under Memnon of Rhodes; Alexander at Troy.—§ 369. Battle of the Granicus; Conquest of Asia Minor.—§ 370. Alexander at Tarsus; Death of Memnon.—
§ 371. Reduction of Cilicia; Battle of Issus.—§ 372. Siege of Tyre; Conquest of Syria.—§ 373. Conquest of Egypt; Foundation of Alexandria.—§ 374. Battle of Gaugamela.—§ 375. Surrender of Babylon and Susa.—§ 376. Conquest of Persia.—
§ 377. Flight and Death of Darius.

§ 365. ALEXANDER was twenty years of age when he ascended the throne. Like his father, he found enemies on all sides. The Illyrians, Thracians, and the ^{Alexander's} Greeks were all eager to seize the opportunity ^{Enemies} to shake off the Macedonian yoke; Persia was ready to support them; there was also division in the kingdom itself, as Attalus, the uncle of Cleopatra, supported the claim of Philip's infant son to the crown. These hostile elements were all weaker, however, than had been the case at Philip's accession; moreover, thanks to his father's unremitting toil, Alexander had at his back the best army in the world.

Alexander dealt first with Greece, where Athens was the real centre of disaffection. On the death of Philip Demosthenes had treated the people to a display of bad

taste unparalleled in Greek history ; having received prior information of the assassination, he appeared in the Assembly in festal robe with a wreath on his head,

^{Demosthenes and the Death of Philip.} although he was in mourning for his own daughter, who had died a week previously, and congratulated the people on the king's death.

At his instigation a thanksgiving festival was held and a wreath decreed to the murderer—although the people had only just passed a resolution that any one attempting Philip's life and fleeing to Athens should be surrendered to justice. Fortunately for Athens, the insensate opposition of Demosthenes was not allowed to go beyond these puerile displays of hate ; and Alexander was of too generous a nature to exact retribution for them. Long before he was expected, the new king had passed Thermopylae, received the recognition of the Amphictionic Assembly,

^{Alexander made General-in-Chief of Greece.} and summoned the states to Corinth to confer upon him the generalship-in-chief of Greece

(autumn, 336 B.C.). Next year he marched against the Triballi beyond Mount Haemus (*Balkan mountains*), which he crossed by the *Schipka* pass. He penetrated to the Danube and crossed it in face of the enemy without the loss of a man. This expedition made a great impression upon the

^{His Expeditions in Thrace and Illyria.}

Thracians and neighbouring peoples. From Thrace Alexander passed westwards against the Illyrians, whom he defeated. In the meantime the report of his death had emboldened the Greeks to stir once more.

§ 366. In order to occupy Alexander at home the Persian king put in motion the old policy which

^{Greek Cities Subsidised by Persia.} had proved successful against Agesilaus. The

anti-Macedonian party was supported by subsidies; three hundred talents left in the hands of Demosthenes

for this purpose were used to foment rebellion in the Peloponnese, and especially in Arcadia and in Thebes. When the standard of revolt was raised in Thebes by the murder of Macedonian officers, the investment of the Cadmeia, and the election of Boeotarchs, the Athenians supplied the Thebans with arms, but no troops. Alexander acted as speedily as before; in less than a fortnight he had transferred his army from the Illyrian mountains to the gates of Thebes. The city was carried by assault and more than six thousand of the defenders killed, and thirty thousand Thebans taken prisoners. Alexander allowed the Phocians, Orchomenians, Thespians, and Plataeans serving with him to decide the fate of the town. Their sentence was that Thebes should be utterly destroyed, the Cadmeia alone being left standing for a Macedonian fortress; and that the remnant of the population, including both women and children, should be sold into bondage—excepting only those who held sacred offices or had guest-friendship with Macedonians. The doom which Thebes had passed upon other Boeotian cities was now meted out to herself. Besides the Cadmeia, the house in which once Pindar had lived was the only building left standing; Thebes was blotted from the map of Greece until her restoration by Cassander in 315 B.C.

Thebes
Captured by
Alexander.
Its Destruction.
Pindar's House
Spared.

From Athens Alexander demanded the surrender of his chief adversaries, Demosthenes, Lycurgus, and Hypereides the orators, with Charidemus the general, as well as others, but by the efforts of Demades and Phocion he was induced to be satisfied with the banishment of Charidemus. With the fall of Thebes Alexander's work in European Greece was done. In the space of little more than a year which

had elapsed since his accession he had displayed all those qualities which distinguished him—power over his men, daring originality of conception, unexampled rapidity of execution. The remaining eleven years of his life were spent in Asia; during that time the history of Greece is almost a blank.

§ 367. The Persian empire extended from the Hellespont to the borders of India and from the steppes of central Asia to the cataracts of the Nile. It was a vast collection of provinces, with no internal bond save that of common subjection to the will of a single man. The ruling dynasty was that of the Achaemenidae; the character of their rule was upon the whole able and moderate, but the ideals of an Oriental ruler are quite other than those of men of western race. In two quarters the Persian empire was exposed to disintegration—in Asia Minor, owing especially to contact with Greek influences, and in Egypt, owing to the isolated character of that country. Egypt revolted as early as 408 B.C. and for sixty years maintained its independence, assisted by Greek generals like Chabrias and Agesilaus, while on the Persian side fought Iphicrates and Timotheus. The ten years' revolt of Evagoras (from 390 to 380 B.C.) partly diverted the Persian forces from Egypt. The Satraps in Asia Minor also were in revolt. Thus during the reign of Artaxerxes II. Mnemon the empire seemed to be on the point of dissolution. It was preserved for another quarter of a century by his successor, Artaxerxes III. Ochus (from 358 B.C.), who overcame revolt in Asia Minor, Cyprus, and Phoenicia, and conquered Nectanebus of Egypt (perhaps about 340 B.C.). Ochus ordered the sacred bull Apis to be drowned and

*Great Qualities
Displayed by
Alexander.*

*Weak Points
of the Persian
Empire :
Asia Minor—*

—Egypt.

*Reign of
Artaxerxes
Ochus.*

installed the ass as the sacred animal of Egypt. In 338 B.C. Ochus was murdered at the instigation of Bagoas, his minister, who first placed Arses, the son of Ochus, on the throne. Then Bagoas murdered him and his family and made a distant member of the Achaemenid house, Darius III. Codomannus, king (335 B.C.). Darius was a man of amiable character but of no ability or strength to cope with the crisis of the empire. Judged from the point of view of material resources, the odds were in favour of Persia, for she had inexhaustible supplies of men and an inexhaustible reserve of gold, the savings of two centuries; she had also the largest fleet in existence—four hundred Phoenician ships. Persian gold also attracted to the East the best of the Greek mercenary captains and soldiers, though this advantage was neutralised by the system of joint command by Persian Satraps. Chiefly, it was the almost complete lack of sea-power that made Alexander's invasion, from an external point of view, a foolhardy enterprise. Partly he relied upon the inherent weakness of the loosely knit empire; more largely upon his own military genius, of which he was sufficiently conscious.

§ 368. The strength of the army which Alexander led against Persia in the spring of 334 B.C. was thirty thousand foot of all ranks and about five thousand horse. Philip had previously sent a force across into Asia Minor under Attalus and Parmenio. Attalus had been assassinated by Alexander's orders. The Persian defence was conducted by an able mercenary leader, Memnon of Rhodes, who drove back Parmenio to the shores of the Hellespont. If the Persian fleet had been efficiently used, Alexander might have found

Persia's
Material
Resources.

Alexander's
Prospects
of Success

Alexander's
Army.

Memnon of
Rhodes.

himself met by grave difficulties at the outset; but as it was, he crossed the Hellespont from Sestos to Abydos without hindrance, and Memnon's defensive operations were quite without effect as regards the main invasion. Alexander regarded his enterprise as a real crusade or holy war, the prototype of which was the Trojan war. He erected altars to Zeus and Athena, who had given victory to the Greeks in that contest, and to Heracles, who once had sacked the city of Priam; he sacrificed to Priam to avert his wrath from himself as a descendant of Neoptolemus, Priam's slayer, and crowned the tomb of Achilles, his own great ancestor; and he did other things showing how much his spirit and imagination were steeped in Homer and Hellenic traditions.

The conquest of the Persian kingdom falls into three acts—the first is the conquest of Asia Minor, next that of Syria and Egypt, finally that of Babylonia and Persia and Media, closed by the death of Darius.

§ 369. An army of about forty thousand men, half of them Greek mercenaries, under Memnon and the Persian Satraps, was entrusted with the defence of Asia Minor.

Memnon's wise advice not to stake all on a battle was disregarded, and the right bank of the Granicus, a small river flowing northwards to the Propontis, was occupied to prevent Alexander's passage. The Persian cavalry lined the banks, while the hoplites were posted in reserve on the higher ground. Alexander's cavalry posted on the wings advanced through the stream, and after a stiff fight, in which the Persian commanders engaged hand to hand with Alexander himself and all but slew him, made good its footing. When the cavalry was routed, the mercenaries fell an easy prey to the attack of the phalanx in front and that of the

victorious cavalry on the flanks. The Macedonian loss was slight; after all, the affair was little more than a sharp skirmish of cavalry, but it left Asia Minor defenceless (May, 334 B.C.). Sardis and Ephesus threw open their gates without resistance. The first opposition was at Miletus. Alexander's fleet of 160 ships occupied the island and harbour of Lade and so prevented the relief of the town by the Persian ships. Miletus was taken by ^{Capture of} _{Miletus.} Alexander's next step was to disband his fleet, as it was unable to cope with that of the enemy; moreover, the Greek states, it was clear by this time, did not intend to help him actively. His next point of attack was Caria, where Memnon had garrisoned the towns, strengthened the fortifications of Halicarnassus, and made provision for pro-^{Claimants to} tracted defence. Halicarnassus was now in ^{the Dynasty} _{of Mausolus of} Halicarnassus. Persian hands. The dynast Mausolus had been succeeded by his brother, Idrieus. On his death another brother, Pixodarus, expelled his widow Ada, and the town eventually fell under the rule of a Persian, Orontobates, son-in-law to Pixodarus. Ada, however, still maintained her claim, and now sought the protection of Alexander, and gave up to him the towns over which she still held sway. After a fruitless attack on Myndus, Alexander concentrated his efforts upon Halicarnassus. After ^{Siege and Capture of} Halicarnassus. an obstinate defence, Memnon saw himself compelled to fire the town and withdraw his troops by sea, leaving strong garrisons in the two almost impregnable citadels. Ptolemy was left with three thousand mercenaries to blockade them while Alexander marched through Lycia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia receiving the submission ^{Alexander at Gordion.} of the towns, or capturing them, and so descending to Celaenae in Phrygia, and thence to Gordion

on the Sangarius, once the capital of the Phrygian kingdom (winter, 334 b.c.). Gordion contained the chariot of Gordios, the first king of the country ; its yoke was fastened to the shaft by a complicated knot, and there was an oracle
^{The Gordian Knot.} that he who should loose it should be master of Asia. Alexander, finding no other way, "loosed the Gordian knot" with his sword and so fulfilled the oracle.

§ 370. From Gordion, which had been assigned as the point of concentration for reinforcements from Macedonia,

^{Alexander at Tarsus.} Alexander marched in the spring through Ancyra into Cappadocia, and so by Tyana to the Cilician Gates and Tarsus before resistance could be organised. Here he caught a fever, which he aggravated by bathing in the icy Cydnus, and barely escaped death. Philip of Acarnania, his physician, recommended a certain purgative ; but just as Alexander was about to take it there came a letter from Parmenio warning him that Philip had been bribed by Darius to poison him. Alexander gave the letter to Philip and drank as the other read. His generous confidence was justified by the result.


Alexander had continued his operations careless of the fact that the Persian fleet, still intact, practically commanded the Aegean and his communications with Macedonia. Memnon had taken Chios and many of the towns of Lesbos.

^{Death of Memnon and Surrender of Mytilene.} He died during the siege of Mytilene, which afterwards surrendered. The design was to cause a movement in Greece, but when ten Persian ships came as far as Siphnos, they were for the most part captured by fifteen Macedonian vessels from Chalcis, and the danger was averted. The sequel of Alexander's operations was that the Persian fleet was rendered powerless through the capture of its base, the Phoenician cities,

§ 371. Darius meanwhile had collected in Babylon a great army—600,000 men, it was said, and advanced to the plain of Sochi on the east of Mount Amanus, ground highly favourable for the employment of his numerous ^{Subjugation} cavalry. Alexander consumed much time in ^{of Cilicia.} Cilicia subjugating the hill-tribes, and late in the year advanced along the southern road between Mount Amanus and the sea to Myriandrus—the route previously followed by Cyrus. Darius in the meantime crossed the mountains by a difficult pass, and descended to Issus in ^{Darius at Issus.} the rear of Alexander's army. Strategically this was a good move on the part of the Persians, as Alexander's communications were thus severed, and he must fight in a position where defeat was ruin. The mistake was made, however, of moving the entire Persian host, thus throwing away all the advantage ^{His Tactical Mistake.} of numerical superiority and all effective use of the cavalry. The battle was lost for the Persians through defective tactics even before it was begun.

The Persians occupied the whole breadth (three miles) of the plain of Issus ; their front was covered by the Pinarus, facing south. Their actual fighting line was composed of thirty thousand Greek hoplites and sixty thousand Oriental troops ; the remainder of their unwieldy force was massed in the rear and took no share in the action ; on the right were the cavalry. Alexander's tactics were ^{Alexander Tactics at Issus.} the same as at the Granicus—he crossed the stream with his Macedonian cavalry of the right wing, followed by the Hypaspists and the phalanx, and attacked the centre and left of the enemy. The Persian left did not stand long before Alexander and his cavalry ; but the Greek hoplites stoutly contested the advance of the phalanx until taken on the flank by the Hypaspists

and the cavalry; the cavalry on the Persian right crossed the river, charged the Thessalian horse under Battle of Issus
(333 B.C.) Parmenio, and carried all before them until the rout of the left and centre and the flight of Darius



THE BATTLE OF ISSUS.

A --- A. Persians

a. Cavalry.

b. Greek Hoplites.

c. Heavy-armed Persians.

d. Light-armed Troops.

e. Persian Infantry.

B --- B. Macedonian Army.

f. Greek Cavalry.

g. Greek Hoplites.

h. Phalanx.

i. Hypaspists.

k. Macedonian Cavalry.

l. Light-armed Troops.

checked their career. The Persians lost heavily in the retreat. Their camp, and with it Sisygambis, Flight of Darius and Capture of the mother of Darius, and Stateira, his wife, Persian Camp together with his children, fell into the hands of Alexander, who treated his royal captives with chivalrous respect (October, 333 B.C.).

The news of the victory was received with disappointment in Greece, where by the exertions of Hyperides and Demosthenes, and Agis, the king of Sparta, preparations had been made for a rising supported by the Persian fleet. Greeks envoys to the Persian king—a Spartan, an Athenian (Iphicrates, son of the famous general of that name), and two Thebans—fell into Alexander's hands at Damascus immediately after the battle.

How Greece Received the News of Issus.

§ 372. The immediate result of the battle of Issus was that the road into Syria was now open. Instead of pursuing the defeated monarch, Alexander turned to the second act of his work, the conquest of Syria and Egypt. Aradus, Byblus, and Sidon, and the towns of Cyprus, made their submission; but the mighty city of Tyre, on its island rock more than half a mile from the mainland, defied him. The Tyrians had still eighty ships of war at home, over and above their contingent acting in the Aegean. It was not until the squadrons of Aradus and Byblus, learning the submission of those cities, returned home, that Alexander was able to cope with the Tyrians at sea. Even so, the siege lasted seven months.

Resistance of Tyre.

Eight thousand of the inhabitants were slain; the rest, about thirty thousand, were sold into slavery (July, 332 b.c.). The fall of Tyre gave Alexander the supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean and put an end to all serious danger from the patriotic party in Greece. When the strong frontier city of Gaza had fallen after a two months' siege, and its men had been put to the sword and the women and children sold as slaves, all resistance in Syria was at an end, and the way to Egypt open (November, 332 b.c.).

Siege and Fall of Tyre (332 b.c.).

Siege and Fall of Gaza.

Conquest of Syria and Way to Egypt Open.

§ 373. The Egyptians looked upon the Macedonian king as a deliverer, and Mazaces, the Satrap, was fain to make his submission. In Memphis Alexander ^{Submission of Egypt.} sacrificed to Apis and the Egyptian deities and so conciliated the native hierarchy. His next action made it clear that it was in the interests of Greek civilisation purely that he conquered. He sailed down the Nile to the sea by its western branch to Canopus, and at its mouth, between Lake Mareotis and the Mediterranean, opposite the island of Pharos, he founded the ^{Foundation of Alexandria (331 B.C.).} city which still bears his own name—Alexandria, destined to become the mercantile centre of the Levant, and also of Hellenic culture and learning (331 B.C.). Alexandria was intended, in the first instance, to take the place of Tyre, and to transfer to the Greeks from the Phoenicians the mercantile supremacy of the East.

As king of Egypt Alexander was officially the son of the god Amen, or, as the Greeks called him, Ammon. In order to receive recognition as such from the priests, a visit was

^{Alexander's Visit to the Sanctuary of Zeus Ammon.} paid to the oracular sanctuary of Zeus Ammon in the oasis of Siwah; about this episode much mystery gathered, and tales were told of supernatural guidance across the desert; none ever knew what question was asked, or what reply was vouchsafed by the oracle, but it was rumoured that the consultation concerned the king's paternity—of which there had always been lurking doubts—and that the god claimed him as his son.

§ 374. In the spring of 331 B.C., Alexander set out to accomplish the third part of his task—the conquest of the ^{Crossing of the Euphrates—} eastern provinces of the Persian empire. At the head of forty thousand infantry and seven thousand horse he crossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus,

by two bridges previously built by his engineers, in spite of the opposition of the Persian Mazaeus. Then, marching northwards and eastwards round the head of the Mesopotamian desert, he crossed the Tigris with ^{—and of the} some difficulty, but without opposition. It was ^{Tigris.} clearly the plan of Darius to entice the invader into the heart of his empire in the hope of overwhelming him on the plains east of the Tigris, where a Persian ^{Plan of Darius.} victory would be decisive and a defeat least ruinous. Advancing cautiously down the left bank of the Tigris, Alexander came in contact with the last imperial army, which numbered, it is said, a million foot ^{Arrival at} and forty thousand horse, posted on the plain ^{Gaugamela.} of Gaugamēla, near the ruins of the ancient Nineveh. The battle which decided the fate of the Persian empire was fought on the first day of October, 331 B.C.; it takes its name from Arbēla, the capital of the province, ^{Arbela.} where the Persian baggage and stores were placed, thirty miles to the south, beyond the river Lycus, or Great Zab.

So great were the numbers of the enemy and so favourable their position on the plain, which had been carefully levelled beforehand to facilitate the movements of their cavalry and scythed chariots, that even the veteran Parmenio was dismayed, and recommended a night attack. “I do not steal victory,” was Alexander’s reply. The battle on the morrow tried to the utmost the discipline and temper of the Macedonian army, for the troops on the Persian side fought with the greatest bravery, and their battle was directed with more than usual skill. Alexander’s Dispositions for Battle. Alexander’s order of battle followed his usual plan— Thessalian and Greek cavalry on the left, the six battalions of the phalanx in the centre, on their right the Hypaspists,

and the heavy Macedonian cavalry as the right wing; Parmenio as usual commanded on the left, Alexander himself on the right. Behind each wing, to meet the danger of a flank attack, were other troops—Thracian foot and horse and Greek cavalry behind the left wing; Paeonian cavalry, Macedonian archers and lancers behind the right wing. Alexander sought and found a breach in the Persian left and broke up the left centre round

Battle of Gaugamela (331 B.C.) Darius, who soon turned and fled; on the right the Persians, under Mazaeus, pressed the

Thessalians hard and compelled Parmenio to send a message for reinforcements; the check on this side caused a breach in the line of battalions of the phalanx, through which the Indian and Persian cavalry of the centre poured and reached the Macedonian camp. It was a critical moment, but the steadiness of all ranks on the Macedonian left retrieved the situation, and the victory was already gained on this side also before Alexander could

Escape of Darius. come to the rescue. The pursuit was continued to Arbela, but Darius made good his escape to the mountains of Media, while Ariobarzanes fell back with the remnant of the army to Persia.

§ 375. Alexander held on his way to Babylon, which was surrendered by Mazaeus. Here also the victor Alexander at Babylon— posed as protector of the national cults, and rebuilt the shrines destroyed by Xerxes, and sacrificed to Bel, the Chaldaean god. Mazaeus was retained in his post as Satrap of Babylonia. Alexander then marched to Susa, the summer residence of the Persian monarchs.

Philoxenus, with some light troops, had been sent —at Susa. immediately after the battle of Arbela to secure Susa. With it the Great King's treasure, estimated at fifty thousand talents, fell into Alexander's

hands. Among other works of art were found also the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the tyrant-slayers, which Xerxes had carried off from Athens; these Alexander sent back to their old home.

§ 376. Though winter had set in (December, 331 B.C.), Alexander pushed on eastwards to the conquest of Persis, the high plateau of Iran, the original home of the Persians. The route lay through the country of the Uxii, who had defied the might of the empire in the midst of which they lay. These were now for the first time subjugated. The narrow defile called the Persian Gates, which formed the only entrance to Persis on this side, was strongly held by Ariobarzanes, but his lines were turned by a difficult path and his army dispersed. In Persae, or Persepolis, the capital of the province of Persis, which now fell into his hands, Alexander found an immense reserve treasure—120,000 talents, it is said—the savings of centuries. Farther north stood Pasargadae, the original capital of Cyrus, and here also great treasures were captured. For some months Alexander made Persepolis his headquarters. At a royal feast Thais, an Athenian courtesan, instigated the king and his guests to burn the great palace of Xerxes. Even this act of folly on the part of the drunken king has found apologists, who gravely assert that it was dictated by deliberate policy—of signifying to the world that the power of Persia was broken, or that Greece was avenged of her inveterate foe.

§ 377. During this time Darius lay at Ecbatana, the capital of Media, with an army drawn from the yet unconquered satrapies of the far East. Upon Alexander's advance in the spring of 330 B.C., however, he fled eastwards

through the Caspian Gates, in the *Elburz* range, making
^{Flight of} Darius. for Bactria. Thus the Great King's last capital
and last treasure fell into the victor's hands.
During the retreat a plot was formed among the Satraps,
led by Bessus, Satrap of Bactria, and kinsman of the king.
^{He is seized by} Bessus. Darius was seized and bound, his native levies
disbanded, and his Greek mercenaries withdrew.
Alexander pressed on in pitiless pursuit, sparing neither
men nor horses, for four nights. When Bessus and his
^{Death of} Darius
(330 B.C.). fellow-conspirators found that they were caught,
they gave the captive king a mortal wound
and made good their own escape. Darius died
before Alexander came up with him (July, 330 B.C.). His
body was sent to his ancestral tomb in Persepolis and
buried with royal honours.

CHAPTER XL.

THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST.

§ 378. Change in Designs and Attitude of Alexander.—§ 379. Conquest of Hyrcania and Areia; Submission of Drangiana.—§ 380. Conspiracy of Philotas; Execution of Parmenio.—§ 381. Alexander in Arachosia; Arrival at the Hindu-Kush.—§ 382. Alexander Crosses the Hindu-Kush to Bactria and Sogdiana.—§ 383. Surrender of Bessus; Conquest of Western Sogdiana.—§ 384. Murder of Cleitus.—§ 385. Reduction of Eastern Sogdiana; Marriage of Alexander with Roxane.—§ 386. Conspiracy of the Pages; Preparations for the Invasion of India.—§ 387. Battle of the Hydaspes; Porus made a Macedonian Suzerain.—§ 388. The Army Refuses to March beyond the Hyphasis; End of Alexander's Eastward Advance.—§ 389. March down the Hydaspes and the Indus to the Ocean.—§ 390. Return to Susa through the Desert of Gedrosia.—§ 391. Fusing of Greeks and Orientals by means of Inter-marriage and Common Military Service.—§ 392. Embassies from the West; Designs on Arabia; Babylon to be a Naval Station; Reform of the Phalanx.—§ 393. Death of Alexander; his Position in History.

§ 378. THE fall of Ecbatana marks a cardinal moment in Alexander's career, for now his work as avenger of Greece and destroyer of the Persian empire was virtually done, and the original scheme of conquest expanded into a wider scheme, which embraced the whole known world of the time. And with this expansion of his designs there went a change in Alexander's attitude towards his army; he would be no longer a Macedonian king, nor yet king of the Greeks only, but ruler of a

Expansion of
Alexander's
Scheme of
Conquest.

Change in his
Attitude and
Character.

world-wide empire, embracing both Greeks and Asiatics on an equal footing; at the same time the dizzy eminence attained by the all-victorious monarch reacted upon his character, accentuating those traits of vanity and imperious recklessness which were so conspicuous in him. The wild blood of Olympias coursed in his veins; his life was one of fierce conflicts, hard marches, and intense mental activity; no wonder that he came to drink more and more deeply, and acted often like a madman.

§ 379. His first task was the conquest of Hyrcania,

^{Conquest of} between the Caspian and the *Elburz* range.

^{Hyrcania.} Then he marched eastwards to Susia, a city in the north of Areia. Satibarzanes, the Satrap of Areia, submitted, and was confirmed in his satrapy, and given a Macedonian guard. Alexander's march to Bactria, where Bessus had proclaimed himself Great King, was scarcely resumed when Satibarzanes revolted. It was necessary, therefore, to return in order to secure Areia and prevent a combination of the unsubdued Satraps; for Areia corresponds

^{Conquest of} in part to the modern *Afghanistan*, which has

^{Areia.} always been important owing to its position between Persia, Turkestan, and India. Alexander surprised Artocoana, the capital, but Satibarzanes escaped to Bessus

^{Foundation of} in Bactria. Areia was secured by the establishment of a new capital city—Alexandria of the ^{Alexandria} ^{(Herat).} Areians (*Areiōn*), the modern *Herat*. The

March was continued southwards into Drangiana, the Satrap ^{Submission of} of which, Barsaentes, who had fled to the Drangiana. Indians, was given up by them and executed. Drangiana submitted without a blow.

§ 380. The change which had come over Alexander's designs found no favour among the older Macedonians, who saw that their privileged position as conquerors of

Persia was endangered by the new development of the king's policy in the East. Philotas, the son of Parmenio, seems to have been the prominent representative of this spirit of discontent. At Prophthasia, the capital of Drangiana, Alexander learned that Philotas had actually been cognisant of a conspiracy against his life, and had not reported it; it is uncertain whether Philotas was himself actively concerned in the plot. In accordance with Macedonian custom Philotas was tried by a general court-martial of the army, and executed. A messenger was also despatched with all speed to Ecbatana with the death warrant of the father, the old general Parmenio. Whatever the rights of the case against Philotas, the murder of Parmenio was a black act of sheer despotism.

§ 381. The southward march was continued into *Seistan* and the northern part of *Baluchistan* (*Gedrosia*). Here the winter of 330 b.c. was passed. As spring came on Alexander advanced north-eastwards through Arachosia up the valley of the *Helmund*. In Arachosia he founded an "Alexandria," which survives in *Candahar*. Then crossing the chain which bounds the valley of the Cophen (*Cabul* river) on the south, he reached the barrier of the *Hindu-Kush*. The whole complex of mountains in this region was called Caucasus by the Greeks, though the *Hindu-Kush* bore also the special name of Paropanisus (Paropamisus). At the foot of these mountains the winter of 329 b.c. was spent, and another "Alexandria" was founded—*Alexandria ad Caucum*, some distance north of Ortospa (*Cabul*).

§ 382. In the early spring of 328 b.c. the *Hindu-Kush* was crossed—a march comparable to that of Hannibal over

the Alps. Drapsaca, the frontier fortress of Bactria, was reached, and here the route turned westwards to Bactra (now *Balkh*), south of the Oxus river, the capital of the satrapy. Bessus, the usurper, fled across the Oxus as Alexander drew near. The country between the Oxus (*Amu Daria*) and the Jaxartes (*Sir Daria*) was called Sogdiana, from the river Sogd (*Saravshan*), which flows in the mid-space westwards through *Samarcand* and *Bokhara*, until it loses itself in the sands of the desert east of the Oxus. Alexander's army crossed the Oxus on sheepskins stuffed with rushes. Not far from the place of crossing was a solitary settlement of Greeks, the descendants of the Branchidae who had surrendered to Xerxes the temple of Apollo of Branchidae, near Miletus. Xerxes had transported them, to save them from the vengeance of the Milesians, to Sogdiana, where, though so far and long severed from Hellas, they had still retained Hellenic speech and custom. When these people came forth to welcome the army, Alexander called upon the Milesians with him to determine their fate; as they could not agree, he himself pronounced sentence, and, surrounding the town, he massacred all its inhabitants, and utterly destroyed the place. Yet historians ask us to believe that he who in cold blood perpetrated such a deed was consciously engaged in the mission of introducing Greek civilisation and policy into the benighted East!

§ 383. In order to stay the conqueror's progress, Spitamenes and Dataphernes, the leaders of the Sogdian allies of Bessus, offered to surrender him. Ptolemy, son of Lagus, afterwards the king of Egypt, and founder of its Ptolemaic dynasty, was sent with six thousand men to secure the usurper. Bessus was scourged and sent to Bactra for

final punishment. The surrender of Bessus did not have the effect anticipated, for Alexander had resolved to annex Sogdiana. Both Sogdiana and Bactria were then more fertile than they are now, and were inhabited by highly civilised peoples, who held the northern nomads in check. Sogdiana was also one of the chief seats of the Persian religion—Zoroastrianism. It was here, therefore, that Alexander experienced the first really stubborn resistance he had met since he left Phoenicia. First Maracanda (*Samarcand*) was seized, and then the march was continued north-eastwards to the point where the Jaxartes, issuing from the valley of *Fergana*, makes its northward bend through the steppes of *Turkestan*. Just here, on the banks of the river, was founded Alexandria Eschate (*Khodjend*). The modern *Khodjend*, marking the northern limit of Alexander's empire (328 b.c.).

The leader of the Sogdian resistance was Spitamenes, who invited to his aid the Massagetae and nomad tribes of the west, as well as the Turkmans dwelling to the north of the *Sir Daria*. Maracanda was invested, but for the moment it could not be relieved, as the northern nomads were threatening to cross the Jaxartes. Alexander drove them from the bank, and to inspire terror crossed the river and pursued them far into the desert in the direction of *Tashkend*. Having drunk incautiously of the foul water of the desert on this thirsty ride, Alexander contracted dysentery, which brought him to the brink of the grave. When at last the army was free to turn to the relief of Maracanda, Spitamenes fled westwards to the town of Sogdiana (modern *Bokhara*), and cut to pieces the detachment sent in pursuit. Alexander followed him

Surrender of Bessus.

Capture of Maracanda (Samarcand)

Foundation of Alexandria Eschate (Khodjend).

Spitamenes Invests Maracanda.

Relief of Maracanda and Conquest of West Sogdiana.

with an avenging army, ravaging the land as far as the Sogd river, and pursuing Spitamenes beyond it to the borders of the deserts to the north. Then, marching south-westwards to the Oxus, he crossed to Zariaspa, in Bactria (perhaps *Charjui*), into winter quarters (328 B.C.).

At Zariaspa Bessus was tried for the murder of his king, and was condemned to have his nose and ears cut off, and to be taken to Ecbatana for crucifixion

Trial and Execution of Bessus. —a sentence which showed how far Alexander

was prepared to go in meeting Orientals on their own ground and adopting Oriental methods. This policy of breaking down the barriers between Greeks and Orientals, and thus creating a new unity, was neither understood nor approved by the Macedonians, and

Discontent of the Macedonians with Alexander's Policy. discontent and friction displayed themselves very openly during this winter. Renewed rebellion in Sogdiana compelled Alexander to

recross the Oxus before the winter was over, and he spent some time at Maracanda. It was here that the great tragedy of his life occurred.

§ 384. The king gave a great banquet on the feast-day of the Dioscuri. Flatterers sang his praises, exalting him above Heracles and the Dioscuri, until Cleitus, his foster-brother, who had saved his life at the Granicus, sprang up and rebuked him, reminding him that his victories had been won by his Macedonians, and that he himself had been Alexander's preserver. Alexander started to his feet in frenzy, while the officers hustled Cleitus from the room. Bursting from them, Cleitus reappeared for a moment at

Alexander Murders Cleitus. the door to shout some insulting verses of Euripides. The king snatched a spear and hurled it, as it chanced, with aim that was but too sure, and Cleitus fell dead. In his first paroxysm of

grief the king tried to kill himself, and for three days he lay in his tent without food or drink in deepest remorse.

§ 385. Early in the following year there occurred an event significant of Alexander's views and policy—namely, his marriage with Roxane. She was the daughter of the Sogdian chieftain Oxyartes, who after the defeat of Spitamenes continued the national resistance. Spitamenes was slain by the Turanian nomads—or Scythians, as the Greeks called them, imagining that they were identical with the Scythian of the Russian steppes, with whom they were familiar at home. The centre of the resistance was thus transferred from western to eastern Sogdiana, the district called Paraetacene (modern *Hissar*), where Oxyartes held out in the fortress called the Sogdian Rock. When the fortress fell, Roxane was among the captives. Though she was only the daughter of a highland chieftain, and in manners and upbringing a great contrast to himself, the crown and flower of Hellenic civilisation, Alexander determined to marry her, in spite of the adverse criticisms of the Macedonians, who were naturally scandalised. A great deal is often made of the policy supposed to underlie this marriage, as symbolic of the union of Asia and Europe. Probably enough it was designed to secure the loyalty of the Sogdian chiefs, but most largely was it the result of personal fascination. Roxane had a son by Alexander, of the same name, born in 323 B.C.; after Alexander's death she put to death his other wife, the daughter of Darius, and, along with her son, was herself slain by Cassander in 311 B.C.

§ 386. Coming down to Bactra, Alexander made more
T. G.

determined and outspoken attempts to rule in Asiatic fashion. He had already adopted Asiatic costume ; now he demanded from the Greeks of his court the low obeisance which was usual in Persian ceremonial. The Olynthian

^{Callisthenes of Olynthus.} Callisthenes, nephew of Aristotle, who followed Alexander for the purpose of writing the history of his campaigns, regarding himself as Alexander's Homer, led the opposition to this innovation. When it was discovered that Hermolaus, one of the noble Macedonian

^{Conspiracy of the Pages and Execution of Callisthenes.} youths, had conspired to assassinate the king, Callisthenes was arrested as an accomplice, and executed. The unique success of his career had undoubtedly turned Alexander's head, and it is absurd to pretend to discover in all his infatuations a well-conceived, deliberate policy.

Later in the year Alexander retired from Bactria and Sogdiana to Afghanistan, in order to prepare for his

^{Alexander Prepares to Invade India.} further advance eastwards. Far as he had come from the Aegean, he had not yet, in fact, reached the limits of the Persian empire, for on this side Darius the Great had extended it even into the plains of the Indus. The permanent conquest of north-west India was likely to be attended with no great difficulties, as the mutual jealousies of its various rulers, and the racial difference of the peoples they ruled, made united resistance impossible. Omphis, the ruler of

^{Submission of Omphis of Taxila.} Taxila, visited Alexander at Nicaea (*Cabul* !), and recognised him as overlord, an example followed by others ; the defence of the *Punjab* chiefly devolved upon the powerful King Porus, whose kingdom lay between the Hydaspes (*Jhelum*) and the Acesines (*Chenab*).

§ 387. The great gate of north-west India is the famous

Khyber Pass, through which the Cophen (*Cabul* river) drains down to the Indus. The winter of 327 B.C. was spent in securing this line of communication by operations against the moun-
 taineers of the western Himalayas—in *Chitral* and the valleys of the *Panjkar* and the *Swat*. In the mean-time Hephaestion, with a detachment of the army, bridged the Indus in preparation for the main advance in the spring. The king of Taxila having already submitted, his kingdom, the region between the Indus and the Hydaspes, fell into Alexander's hands without a blow. The lands west of the Indus were organised as a satrapy, and Macedonian garrisons were placed in Taxila and some other places east of the great river. The real struggle lay on the Hydaspes, which was to be crossed in the face of the army of Porus, thirty or forty thousand strong, with two hundred elephants—the latter a new experience for the Macedonians. By a skilful manoeuvre, after many days Alexander threw himself across the swollen stream, but all his heavy infantry had to be left behind, and only the cavalry, five thousand in number, with six thousand Hypaspists and four thousand light foot, faced the formidable array of Porus. Alexander concentrated his attack upon the enemy's left, charging the flank with his heavy cavalry, until the time came for a general forward movement of the light infantry and Hypaspists against the wavering cavalry of Porus, which in the end also suffered from the wounded elephants. When the Indian cavalry were cut to pieces the twenty thousand infantry of Porus soon broke and fled. Porus, fighting bravely to the last, fell into Alexander's hands; his kingdom was restored to him, and largely increased.

Operations in
the Chitral and
Swat Valleys.

Alexander
Crosses the
Indus.

Battle of the
Hydaspes
(326 B.C.)

Porus Retains
his Kingdom.

Porus and Omphis were to be princes of protected states, acknowledging the suzerainty of Alexander and acting each as check upon the other. On the Hydaspes Foundation of Bucephala and two cities were founded—Bucephala on the Nicaea. right bank, named after Alexander's old charger, which had carried him thus far and died here; and Nicaea on the left bank, in commemoration of the last of Alexander's three great battles (326 B.C.).

§ 388. The advance was continued eastwards, across the Acesines and Hydraotis (*Ravee*) to the banks of Advance to the Hyphasis (*Beas*). Alexander's imagination (*Beas*). was fired by the report of the great river Ganges, which must assuredly, he thought, discharge into the Ocean stream, girdling the earth on the east, into which also the Indus flowed on the south—the Ocean, a northern inlet of which he imagined he had seen when he gazed upon the Caspian. Already the edge of the world on this side was almost within view when the tireless conqueror The Army Refuses to Advance Further. was brought to halt by a force before which even his imperious will was powerless. The toil-worn Macedonian veterans, still the core of his army, refused to cross the river and embark upon the Indian desert, which they learned separated them from the fertile plains of the Ganges. Twelve great altars on the banks of the Hyphasis marked the limit of Alexander's eastward advance and the place of one of the bitterest disappointments of his life.

§ 389. If the Ocean fringe on the east might not be reached, that to the south was not forbidden. March along the Hydaspes and Indus to the Ocean. It was proposed to follow the course of the Hydaspes, and then the main stream of the Indus to its mouth; a fleet of transports under Nearchus sailed down the river, while the bulk of the army in two

parts, under Hephaestion and Craterus, marched along either bank. The Malli, who dwelt at the junction of the Hydراotis with the Hydaspes, offered a formidable resistance, and in the storming of Multan Alexander's rashness nearly cost him his life. The advance through Sind was retarded by the resistance organised by the caste of the Brahmans, and it was nearly midsummer before Patala, at the head of the Indus delta, was reached. Patala (*Hyderabad*) (Hyderabad) was reorganised to be the emporium of the southern ocean; Alexander himself made an excursion down the river, and sailed at last upon the girdling sea, over which it was the task of Nearchus to find a way to the Persian gulf. Craterus had been despatched through the Bolan pass to quell a revolt in Arachosia. Alexander, with the rest of the army, was to march through Baluchistan to provide depôts of stores for the fleet, which was to sail westward with the monsoons in October (325 B.C.).

§ 390. The experiences of Alexander and his army in the desert of Gedrosia, now called the Mekran, were terrible. This region is almost uninhabited and almost uninhabitable, a burning, waterless

waste of sand, one of the hottest regions of the earth. Of the thirty thousand men who left India, more than half are said to have perished in this terrible march.

At Kirman Alexander was joined by Craterus, who in his circuit had done his work in Arachosia; presently Nearchus arrived from his pioneer voyage from the Indus. From Kirman Alexander marched by Pasargadae and Persepolis to Susa, while Nearchus continued his voyage up the Persian gulf and the river Pasitigris to the same place.

§ 391. Few had ever expected to see the king again, and

The Malli.

Patala
(Hyderabad)
reached.

March through
Desert of
Gedrosia
(Mekran).

Kirman.

Voyage of
Nearchus.

the oppression and misconduct of the Satraps and governors called urgently for punishment. Many were executed. The treasurer, Harpalus, fled with ill-gotten wealth, first to Tarsus, and thence to Greece. When authority had been re-established, the king took in hand the means he had thought out for fusing the Macedonians and the Persians, and breaking down the racial barrier between Oriental and western peoples. The many cities founded in the course of his conquests were intended to act as a leaven to produce a homogeneous people of predominantly Hellenic type; but now the problem was to be grappled with more directly. Susa became the scene of intermarriage on an unprecedented scale; nor has the world ever again seen this common political expedient repeated with such thorough-going and frank acknowledgment of its ulterior motive—the production of a mixed offspring in which divergent racial instincts should be fused. Alexander himself wedded Stateira, the daughter of Darius; Hephaestion married her sister; the officers of the army took to wife the daughters of the Persian nobles, the rank and file formed new connections with Asiatics. Far more sensible and effective was the introduction of common military service for both races. A beginning had long since been made, and now at Susa was held a review of the army of Hellenised "barbarians" trained on Hellenic methods in the military schools throughout the empire. Persians, Bactrians, and other Oriental peoples were enlisted even in the Macedonian cavalry regiments. The Macedonian nucleus saw that its paramount position was doomed, and once more raised its voice in fruitless protest—this time not by the mouth of one or two, but in a body. At

Misconduct
of Governors
Punished.

Fusing of
Macedonians
with Persians—

—by means of
Common Mil-
itary Service.

Opis, on the Tigris, on the route to Ecbatana, the formal discharge of some ten thousand Macedonian veterans whom old age and wounds had rendered unfit for further service brought about a general mutiny. Like Caesar on an equally famous occasion, Alexander <sup>Mutiny of
Macedonian
Veterans.</sup> discharged the whole army, and transferred the names of the old Macedonian regiments to a new army officered by Persians and Medes. The mutineers gave way, and implored pardon, and with feasting and sacrifice a reconciliation was sealed—but the position of the “barbarians” was not altered thereby.

§ 392. At Ecbatana Hephaestion, Alexander’s bosom friend, died, and was buried with profuse magnificence at Babylon. To Babylon at this time also came embassies from the barbarians of the west—<sup>Embassies from
the Western
Barbarians.</sup> Lucanians, Bruttians, Etruscans, Carthaginians, Celts, Scythians, and Libyans; for it was now clear enough that the great conqueror’s next ambition would be to round off his empire with the western limits of the world.

It seemed, indeed, that Alexander contemplated worldwide empire, but the steps to it were to be measured and orderly. Having accomplished the half of the sea-way westwards from the Indus, it was imposed upon Nearchus to round the projection of <sup>Projected
Conquest of
Arabia.</sup> Arabia and to come to the Red Sea. The king, by land, would co-operate in the work of including Arabia within the circle of his conquests. Apparently Babylon, an inland city, was designated for the capital of the empire, and by vast works and lavish expenditure of money and toil was to be made a naval station, and the centre of the world’s maritime commerce. Ships were constructed in Phoenicia and conveyed piece-<sup>Babylon to be
a Naval Station.</sup> meal overland to Thapsacus on the Euphrates, to swell

the fleet of exploration being built at Babylon itself. While these vast preparations were being made, the king found time to carry through a military reform—a transformation of the phalanx which his father had created.

^{Reform of the Phalanx.} The change was designed to increase the mobility, while retaining as far as possible the irresistible weight, of the phalanx. Retaining the old depth of sixteen men to the file, Alexander ordered that only the three first ranks and the last should be armed with the long pike ; the twelve intervening ranks were to be composed of Persians armed with their native javelin and bow. This step had also a political importance, ^{Its Political Importance.} as it taught Persians and Macedonians to fight together, and so ultimately to live together in unity as fellow-citizens of one empire.

§ 393. The great expedition to the south, inevitably the prelude to the subjugation of the western world—Sicily, Carthage, and the Italian states—was destined never to take place. The splendid funeral rites of Hephaestion (May, 323 B.C.) were followed closely by those of Alexander himself. Unsparring of himself at the festive board as in the day of battle, the king could not deny himself to the friends who craved his presence at the banquets and

^{Illness of Alexander.} carousals that were the prelude to the departure of Nearchus. He fell into a fever, and in a week his condition became serious. When it was rumoured that their beloved leader was dying, the Macedonians overbore all opposition and forced their way ^{His Death (323 B.C.)} into the palace to file past his bedside in a last review. Next evening the great conqueror lay dead (June 13th, 323 B.C.). He was not yet thirty-three years old.

There is no one in history like Alexander. The mere

fact that he died an unconquered general, with half the world at his feet, at the age at which most men are but beginning life, must inevitably arrest attention. It is strange also to find that of this man, whom friend and foe alike call great, the really authentic records are so scanty. Caesar has told his own story; Pompeius had many chroniclers and extollers of his deeds; Hannibal received the niggard testimony of his foes; but ^{Records of} Alexander and of what was in his heart we ^{Alexander.} know really very little—and that little, relating as it does to his marches and conquests and the lurid lights shed upon his career by outbursts of baser passions, is the least valuable of biographical material. We see and feel enough to know that in his brain big schemes surged, and wise projects and dreams and intentions that were truly good—the realisation of tendencies in Hellenic civilisation that would have vastly benefited the world. It is ^{Why Alexander} this breadth of view, this all-embracing range ^{is entitled to} be called “the ^{be called “the Great.”} of his schemes, that entitles Alexander to be ^{Great.”} called “the Great.” He was no vulgar conqueror eager only to add province to province that he might possess all, amassing untold millions for the mere sake of hoarding, greedy of power simply to feel that the lives of men hung upon his single wish and word; in fine, there is about Alexander nothing common or ignoble.

CHAPTER XLI.

GREECE UNDER MACEDONIAN RULE.

§ 394. Rising in the Peloponnese against Alexander.—§ 395. Athens in the Reign of Alexander.—§ 396. Speeches of Aeschines and Demosthenes on the Crown.—§ 397. Macedonian Decree concerning Greek Exiles.—§ 398. The Affair of Harpalus.—§ 399. Revolt of the Greeks against Macedonia; Battle of Crannon; Conditions Imposed on Athens.—§ 400. Flight and Death of Hypereides and Demosthenes.—§ 401. Demosthenes and Cicero: a Parallel.

§ 394. **ALEXANDER** had left Antipater as regent of Macedonia, charged with the supervision of affairs in Greece. He knew well that he did not carry with him into Asia the goodwill of the Greek cities. Many, we may be sure, hoped that the chance of war would cut off the king, and the sooner the better; or that the strength of Persia in men and money would ultimately tell, and that Alexander would be driven back defeated. The death of Darius must have been a great blow to this so-called

Rising in the Peloponnese. Only once in the interval was active hostility displayed. The Spartan king, Agis, induced the Arcadians, except the Megalopolitans, and the Achaeans, except Pellene, and the Eleans to join in a rising. The operations, such as they were, centred

round Megalopolis. Soon Antipater appeared to raise the siege, and Agis fell in the "battle of mice," as Alexander contemptuously called it, in contrast with his own battle at Arbela, which occurred about the same time.

Battle of
Megalopolis
(381 B.C.)

§ 395. If Athens had listened to the invitation of Agis, she would have been embroiled in the rising, but even Demosthenes saw the futility of the movement. The conduct of public affairs during the twelve years previous to the death of Alexander was in the hands of Phocion and Lycurgus. Both these men ^{Athens under Phocion and Lycurgus.} were honest, and Lycurgus had considerable talent as a financier. The orator Demades gave their line of policy his support; apparently both Aeschines and Demosthenes had fallen into subordinate rank in the politics of the time. Nevertheless, the spirit of Demosthenes was still alive in Athens, though for the moment it gave no sign. Phocion and Demades swayed the Assembly to prudence, but the finances were the charge of Lycurgus, whose uncompromising hostility to Macedonia had singled him out as one of those whose surrender Alexander had thought it worth while to demand, after the destruction of Thebes. Eubulus, the last great master of finance, had been president of the Theoric Fund. At this time the expenditure of the state was controlled by a Minister of the Public Revenue, elected by the people for the four years' space between one Panathenaic Festival and another. For ^{Lycurgus as Minister of the Public Revenue (338—326 B.C.).} twelve years in succession—for the first period in his own name, for the next two under the names of his son and another—Lycurgus held this office (338—326 B.C.). The vitality of Athens and her finances was shown, as in the days of Eubulus, by the surplus which the minister was able to devote ^{Public Works.} to public works—the Panathenaic Stadium on the southern bank of the Ilissus, the gymnasium of the Lyceum, in which Aristotle walked and taught, under Mount Lycabettus, the reconstruction of the Theatre of Dionysus. Lycurgus

was also responsible for a great naval expenditure, increasing the navy to nearly four hundred ships of war, with new sheds and ample stores of all kinds of gear. It was clear that when the opportunity came Athens would be fully ready to strike a blow for the recovery of her old sovereignty and the overthrow of the hated Macedonian.

§ 396. The secret spirit of the time was shown also in the last duel of its two great orators. Shortly before Philip's death, one Ctesiphon had proposed that the services of Demosthenes to the state should be recognised by the compliment of a golden crown publicly presented in the

Theatre. The Council so resolved, but proceedings were stayed by the fact that Aeschines

On the Crown.

lodged an accusation against Ctesiphon by a Graphe Paronomon, on the ground that his proposal was unconstitutional. For six years nothing happened, but the collapse of the insurrection of Agis emboldened Aeschines to try to crush his rival (330 b.c.). The two great speeches have been preserved—the last words of the two orators in a long and bitter quarrel, which has, in fact, never ceased to this day. In his reply, the Speech on the Crown, Demosthenes surpassed himself, and Aeschines, not having gained one-fifth of the votes of the jurors, left Athens and spent the rest of his life in exile.

§ 397. The outwardly tranquil current of Athenian life was ruffled when Alexander reappeared at Susa (324 b.c.). Twenty thousand exiles waited upon him praying him to procure their return to their native cities. At the Olympic

Macedonian Festival of that year the king's representative, Decree about Nicanor, stood forth and read to the assembled Greek Exiles.

Greeks their master's decree—that all states should receive back their banished citizens. It was a

thoroughly just, albeit a somewhat despotic and distasteful, method of doing away at a stroke with the great outstanding evil of Greek city politics. Athens would be compelled to recall her settlers from Samos and to restore the island; Aetolia had lately occupied the Resistance of Acarnanian town of Oeniadae. Athens and Aetolia to the Aetolia, geographically and in point of intellectual development the two extremes of European Greece, found themselves standing alone in resistance to the decree.

§ 398. Just at this moment the guilty treasurer Harpalus arrived off the coast of Attica with five thousand talents, thirty ships, and a body of mercenaries. As his object was to excite revolt, he was not received, and sailed to Cape Taenarum, where he left his men and ships, and himself returned alone to Athens with some seven hundred talents. When the demand for his surrender came, it was resolved to arrest him and hold the treasure until Alexander sent an officer expressly to receive it. Harpalus soon escaped and returned to Taenarum; he was shortly afterwards murdered. The stolen funds were deposited in the Acropolis under the care of a special commission, in which Demosthenes was included. Then the discovery was made that only 350 talents were actually in the Acropolis, and the city rang with charges and counter-charges of bribery and peculation.

Demosthenes, as one of the commissioners, could do no less than demand a special inquiry by the Areiopagus. The account books of Harpalus proved that seven hundred talents had been delivered for safe keeping in Athens. The evidence brought before the Areiopagus enabled that court to decide both who had received a share of the missing talents and the amount

received ; Demosthenes was reported as the recipient of twenty talents. The curious part of the story is that it is only the modern admirers of Demosthenes who refuse to credit the finding of the court. Demosthenes himself confessed that he had taken the twenty talents, but pretended that he thus recouped himself for an advance of

^{Demosthenes Reported as the Receiver of Twenty Talents.} ^{Prosecution of Demosthenes by Hypereides.} twenty talents to the Theoric Fund ! He

was prosecuted by Hypereides, an orator of his own party—from which fact the inference has been drawn that Demosthenes was made a scapegoat for the ^{Condemnation of Demosthenes.} party. The result was that he was condemned to pay a fine of fifty talents, and, being unable to pay it, was imprisoned, but presently escaped across the Saronic gulf to wait for a turn of fortune.

§ 399. The turn soon came, and with it the final act of his life. Immediately upon the receipt of Revolt against Macedonia. the news of Alexander's death the standard of revolt was raised by Athens, Aetolia, and other northern states. Eight thousand discharged mercenaries just come

^{Leosthenes.} back from Asia formed the nucleus of a strong army, and in one of their captains, the Athenian Leosthenes, the confederates found a general of more than average ability (323 b.c.).

^{Antipater Besieged in Lamia.} Leosthenes occupied Thermopylae, and beat off the first feeble attack of Antipater, who found all northern Greece disloyal except Boeotia. During that

^{Death of Leosthenes.} winter Antipater was besieged in Lamia. When a chance stone mortally wounded the brave Leosthenes all chance of ultimate victory for the allies was

^{Defeat of Leonnatus.} at an end. Nevertheless, Leonnatus, governor of Hellespontine Phrygia, hurrying in the spring to raise the siege of Lamia, was met by the confederates

in Thessaly, defeated, and mortally wounded ; but his object was gained, as the withdrawal of the allies from Lamia left Antipater free to march out and to retire to Macedonia to await Craterus, who was marching to his aid from Asia. In a battle near Crannon and Crannon, in Thessaly, the allied army was defeated with slight loss, and the coalition fell to pieces (August, 322 b.c.). This was the end of the Lamian war.

Battle of
Crannon and
End of Lamian
War (322 b.c.).

Antipater advanced into Boeotia in order to invade Attica. Athens was compelled to submit. Submission of Athens. During the progress of the war Demosthenes had actively exerted himself in the Peloponnese to support the allies, and by way of reward had been recalled to the city. Antipater was determined to deal with Athens effectually ; there should be no more of the ill-timed leniency of Philip and Alexander. Phocion and Demades were fain to accept his three conditions—the modification of the democratic constitution by a restriction of the franchise, all who possessed property amounting to less than two thousand drachmae losing their civic rights ; the establishment of a Macedonian garrison in Munychia ; the surrender of Demosthenes, Hypereides, and their friends.

Modification
of the Demo-
cratic Consti-
tution at
Athens.

§ 400. As soon as the city submitted, the orators implicated fled. Hypereides took refuge in the temple of Aeacus, in Aegina, with two companions, but was haled forth to Antipater and executed. Demosthenes fled to the temple of Poseidon, in the island of Calauria, and thither the ministers of doom followed him ; this time Macedonian vengeance was to make an end, and the lips of the great agitator were to be sealed for ever. The story of the orator's suicide Demosthenes at Calauria. Martyrdom, as we understand it, was

foreign to the thoughts and habits of the ancient Greeks, though Socrates is a conspicuous instance of one who comes very near the modern conception. Few if any of his contemporaries could have aught but praise and admiration for Demosthenes at the last; the end was inevitable, and it was no craven's act to choose the manner of death and to refuse to submit to the profane touch of the minions of a tyrant. So Demosthenes answered with light banter the messengers of Antipater when they shrank from invading the holy place with violence, and strove to entice

him forth with fair words; when he felt the
Demosthenes
(October
322 B.C.) working of the poison which he sucked from his
reed-pen, he staggered to the door that he might not defile the sacred building by dying within it, but he fell down by the altar and so breathed his last (October, 322 B.C.).

§ 401. It is curious that the two greatest nations of antiquity should each be represented by an orator closely matched one with the other in character, history, and genius.

For Demosthenes and Cicero stand side by side
Parallel between
Demosthenes
and Cicero. without peer among the great speakers of the world, wielding an instrument unrivalled among human tongues for grace and power; both were men of feeble frame and feeble achievement, as bodily strength is reckoned; both, helped by no prestige of lineage, wealth, or personal beauty, attained by strenuous exertion the highest place; both, in spite of ignoble traits and moral weaknesses that are all too apparent, exhibited the purest patriotism and the loftiest ideals; and both met with courage a violent death which must have been long foreseen; lastly, as men, both Demosthenes and Cicero seem known to us more intimately and vitally than almost any other of the great figures of classical antiquity.

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